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# Communist China's Military Policy and Its General Purpose and Air Defense Forces

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Submitted by

*Richard Helms*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

6 April 1967

Authenticated:

*James L. Payne, Jr.*  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA.

**Concurring:**

Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Director, National Security Agency  
Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission

**Abstaining:**

Mr. William C. Sullivan, the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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### ANNEXES

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## COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND ITS GENERAL PUR- POSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist China's general military policy and to estimate the strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces through 1969.

### CONCLUSIONS

A. Whatever the outcome of the current political crisis, any Chinese leadership will probably continue to work towards a dominant position in Asia and great power status on the world scene. It will probably continue to be concerned by the danger of conflict with the US, and possibly with the USSR. Thus China will almost certainly continue to give high priority to improving its military capabilities.

B. Although the threat of force and its actual use beyond China's borders are significant elements in Peking's outlook, Chinese military strategy places primary emphasis on defense. With the possible exception of their nuclear/missile activities, we do not see in train the general programs, the development or deployment of forces, or the doctrinal discussions which would suggest a more forward strategy. At least for the short term, the high priority nuclear program is probably viewed by the Chinese as primarily for deterrence, though Peking's successes in this field bring substantial prestige and political influence, particularly in Asia.

C. In our view, Chinese forces are capable of providing a strong defense of the mainland and launching significant offensive operations in neighboring areas. Thus far the political turmoil does not seem to have affected these Chinese capabilities or military production programs in any significant way.

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D. Under a broad policy of modernization, Peking is pursuing the following programs and objectives:

1. *The Army.* Improvement of firepower, mainly by supplying new tanks and heavier artillery. The army's organization and size has remained static: about 2.4 million men in 118 combat divisions of uneven quality and strength.

2. *Air Defense.* A growing inventory of fighters (Mig-19s), addition of better radars, and preparations for production of the SA-2, probably as part of a point defense system for key target areas. Production of the Mig-19 continues (20-25 a month) and production of the Mig-21 is expected.

3. *The Navy.* Five R-class submarines have been produced and about 10 more will probably be built by 1970. A construction program for guided missile patrol boats began in 1966 and is proceeding at an estimated rate of 10 per year. The South China Fleet is being strengthened by deployment of patrol and torpedo boats and by expansion of shipbuilding and shore installations in South China.

E. Nevertheless, the limitations and demands on China's economic and technological capacities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient in modern equipment at least into the early 1970's. There is little prospect for a significant increase in the mobility of Chinese ground forces; the air defense system will still be unable to cope with a major air attack; fighters will be at least a generation behind the US and USSR. Naval capabilities will still be mainly limited to offshore patrol and escort.

F. The current modernization programs for conventional forces plus even a modest effort to produce and deploy advanced weapons systems will, in our view, put pressures on an already strained economy. Thus China will face an increasingly difficult problem in allocating scarce economic resources between civilian and military needs and within the military sector. Resolution of these problems may be a cause of continued dispute, both within the military and at the top level of national decision-making.

## DISCUSSION

1. For well over a year China has been caught up in a great political crisis. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been involved, particularly in recent stages; its leadership has been shaken and present and future military policies may have been in dispute. The situation is still highly uncertain, and whatever its outcome, the PLA as a key institution is bound to be affected. For some time China may be in a period of transition.

### I. FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY POLICIES

2. From the outset, Maoist China has aspired to a dominant position in Asia, to great power status in the world, and to leadership of the world's revolutionary forces. These ambitions have brought China face to face with the US in Asia and caused Peking to view the US as its principal enemy intent on the encirclement and overthrow of the Chinese revolution. And these same ambitions led to the Sino-Soviet dispute and the eventual end of Soviet military, technical, and economic assistance.

3. In this situation, Chinese military policy has had to provide first of all for the defense of the mainland; beyond that, however, there has been a requirement to develop the military strength that would give weight to Peking's ambitions in the outside world. So far the solution seems to rest on a curious blend of the military doctrines derived from the receding revolutionary past plus some appreciation of the realities of the nuclear era.

4. Making a virtue out of the necessities imposed by limited material resources and near isolation, Chinese defense doctrine continues to emphasize the virtues of self-reliance, the supremacy of men over arms, and the tactics of people's war. Their basic strategy for defense of the mainland still relies on mass, distance, time, and superior ideology. But the Chinese recognize that material means are important, even if not paramount. Thus, support programs for the armed services have always been given a high priority and support for nuclear weapons development has had priority above all.

5. In the main, the Chinese are not building forces or developing great capabilities or theoretical doctrines for out-of-country operations. Much of the conventional equipment being produced (e.g., Mig-19s, radars, and motor torpedo boats) is best suited to air and naval defense. A system of strategic petroleum storage areas has been constructed in locations which would serve mainly to support wartime military and civilian operations within the country. Equipment programs that would improve China's ability to project its power over long distances outside its borders do not seem to have had a high priority. Not much has been done to enlarge air and sealift capacity, and there apparently has been no major effort to improve troop transport capabilities of the ground forces.

6. The positioning of the forces-in-being also reflects concern with defense. Large ground forces are stationed opposite Taiwan and adjacent to Korea, and

the bulk of the ground forces are deployed within a 150-mile deep strip along China's coast. The bulk of the naval forces are positioned to defend the northern and central coastal area, probably in recognition of this area's particular vulnerability to the powerful naval and amphibious capabilities of the US. The air defense forces are oriented toward defense of coastal areas.

7. Though we cannot be sure how the Chinese view their emerging nuclear capability, it could also fit into a generally defensive strategy. Given the tremendous imbalance in strategic strike capabilities which the Chinese cannot reasonably expect to alter in the foreseeable future, their development of such weapons would presumably be aimed at deterring a nuclear attack in the hopes of confining a war within limits most favorable to China. In any event, the Chinese are almost certainly motivated by prestige considerations, by their judgment that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a considerable impact on their overall political position, and by their desire to establish a more favorable military posture to support their foreign revolutionary programs.

8. Maoist revolutionary doctrine taught respect for the enemy and the need to avoid direct encounters with superior forces; this basic caution continues to guide Chinese military policies today. In our view this attitude also reflects Peking's continuing awareness of its own military and economic weaknesses, the risks of provoking a major attack, and, despite some brave oratory, a recognition that nuclear attack is not only possible but would be enormously destructive for China.

9. This is not to say that Peking's military and political strategies are passive. The threat of force and its actual use are still significant elements in Peking's outlook. There are several circumstances in which resort to military action is possible. They would almost certainly fight if attacked or if they believed the security of the mainland were threatened. If the collapse of Communist power in North Vietnam or North Korea seemed likely, from whatever cause, this would probably be regarded in Peking as posing such a threat and would thus lead to intervention with armed force. In the special circumstances of Vietnam, however, we cannot be confident at what point short of a large-scale invasion the Chinese might feel compelled to use their own combat forces. In other areas, such as India, Burma, Laos, and Thailand, the Chinese also might use force, if they deemed it necessary to protect China or to advance vital interests.

10. *Future Policy Problems and Prospects.* In its broad outline, China's strategic doctrines and policies realistically reflect the hard facts of the current strategic setting, the type of forces available, and the kind of war these forces could fight best. As for the future, it seems likely that the Chinese have not yet worked out a coherent strategic concept integrating their conventional and prospective nuclear capabilities. Some aspects of present military programs suggest a lack of coordination and phasing. It is possible that some programs, particularly in the advanced weapons field, are being pushed hard for political reasons and with less regard to practical military and economic considerations.

It is also possible that the Chinese underestimate the costs and complexities of building a modern military establishment.

11. Once Mao is gone, a broad range of economic and strategic questions will probably be reviewed. Chinese aspirations for great power status have created basic, long-term policy problems. Probably the most critical of these is how to divide resources between military and civilian programs. A subsidiary question is how to distribute resources between conventional and advanced weapons programs and between the various branches of the Armed Forces. And these issues cannot be separated from such potentially divisive and key foreign policy questions as Sino-Soviet relations, the proper posture toward the US, or support to "liberation struggles" on the periphery of China. That there are probably conflicting opinions on these issues within the leadership of the PLA is given added significance by the political convulsions now wracking China.

12. *The PLA's Political Position.* No one can say with much confidence when or how these political convulsions will end or what they will mean for the role of the military in national politics, for military policy, or for the capability of the Armed Forces. At present there seems to be an effort at stabilization and consolidation. It cannot be excluded, however, that disorders will again become severe. If so, the economy and central authority could be disrupted, and China's military programs, particularly those in the advanced weapons field, could conceivably suffer serious delays or even total disruption.

13. Barring such a collapse, however, the general circumstances in China would seem to favor a greater role for the military in the decision-making process. In January, the PLA was officially ordered to intervene in the political struggle, ostensibly to protect the revolutionaries in their attempt to seize power. As a result, the PLA now seems to be assuming an ever increasing role not only in administrative and control functions in the provinces, but in national politics as well. Indeed, events of the past year have so disrupted the party and other traditional control elements and created so much tension in Chinese society that it is difficult to see how any leadership—Maoist or otherwise—could reduce the heavy reliance on the Armed Forces for internal control.

14. Despite its enhanced political influence, we cannot be confident of the PLA's cohesion in advancing a common position. Factionalism has already appeared in the top command and there have been purges of important military figures. The old issue of professionalism versus political indoctrination may have contributed to the downfall of the Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching. But it is also possible that a broader range of issues was in dispute; for example, the Vietnam war may have provoked debate over the likelihood of war with the US, the proper strategy in the face of a confrontation with the US over Vietnam, and the advisability of "joint action" with the USSR.

15. In the provinces, the response of individual commanders to the cultural revolution has been ambiguous. Some military figures may have opposed the "cultural revolution" within the army, and others may have been reluctant to see the PLA used in the political struggle. In any case, many commanders were

forced to rely on their own judgments. In general, the army seems to have maintained its discipline and most of its actions in the "cultural revolution" suggest that its primary concern is with stability.

16. *Economic Problems.* Even with political stability and united councils, the Chinese will have to cope at some point with some distressing economic facts. The economic burden of China's military and military-related programs is heavy and will almost certainly become heavier. Although the data for making computations are most inadequate, we calculate that expenditures on these programs may be as high as 10 percent of China's gross national product (GNP). More significant than this highly generalized accounting is the fact that weapons programs use manpower and materials of the highest quality and absorb a very high proportion of China's modern investment. The cumulative effect over a period of time of concentrating scarce resources on weapons programs could be to threaten China's ability to solve its basic economic problems.

17. Production of major items of military equipment either slowed down or virtually ceased after mid-1960 following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance. Research and development (R and D) costs, on the other hand, probably increased after the Soviet withdrawal and continued to climb as R and D programs expanded and matured to include actual testing programs. Annual expenditures for hardware, which during 1961-1962 must have fallen well below their pre-1960 level, probably started to climb again in 1963 and rose more rapidly in the years thereafter. Thus total expenditures for the military are now probably at an all-time high.

18. China is now at the point where it faces further and possibly steeply rising expenditures if it continues its present programs and moves on to the deployment of weapons under development. Not only will outlays for new equipment increase, but, as this more sophisticated equipment becomes operational in military units, maintenance costs will be growing at increasingly higher rates. For example, in the case of radar production it is calculated that between 1956 and 1966 the portion of total output that went into replacement and maintenance increased from one-quarter to one-half. There will be more demanding standards for the technical qualifications and training of personnel required to operate more modern equipment and this, too, will cause costs to rise.

19. *Scientific and Technological Capabilities.* The Chinese are at least investigating the problems connected with most aspects of conventional military technology, as well as the more advanced weapons such as missiles and nuclear weapons. If the project were given sufficient priority and time, China's scientific and technological manpower is probably capable of providing the R and D necessary for the production of most any type of conventional or advanced weapon. China lacks the scientific, technical, and trained manpower base, however, for the simultaneous development of a full range of weapons and their production in quantity. This will remain true at least through the early 1970's.

20. Since 1960, when China was cut off from needed technical support by the USSR, the Chinese have been able to offset some of their technological weak-

nesses by importing critical items that have materially assisted their military programs. China has been purchasing in increasing quantities such items as special steels, refractory metals, special purpose lathes and other machine tools, scientific instruments, and other electronic equipment. China's purchases of complete plants have also expanded considerably since 1963. Some of these plants will provide important inputs to the buildup of China's military industrial base. Moreover, the purchase of advanced Western technology and equipment for priority civilian sectors will free additional scarce Chinese scientific and technical manpower for use in military programs.

21. *Prospects.* Though China's political situation is confused and uncertain, we see little chance in the short run of a change in the basic policy of stressing military development. Given the military programs we can now identify, military expenditures will almost certainly outpace overall economic growth. This does not mean that progress in present military programs is likely to stop, but it does mean that they cannot be greatly expanded without quickly running into more serious economic difficulties.

22. At this time we cannot predict with much confidence which programs the Chinese will favor in the future nor can we predict in what quantities Peking will decide to turn out various items of equipment. There is a good chance that the Chinese themselves do not yet see the way clearly. The process of adjusting military programs may be slow and painful and itself a cause of continued dispute, both within the military and at the top level of national decision-making.

23. For the next few years, we do not foresee any basic changes in Chinese strategy, which is likely to remain essentially defensive in nature. In this strategic context, it would appear to make sense for them to proceed with a program for modernizing conventional forces at moderate rates, plus a priority program for deploying a modest number of strategic missiles to serve as a deterrent and for political purposes. On balance, we believe this is the course the Chinese will follow, particularly if a more moderate leadership emerges in Peking.

24. We have noted, however, anomalies in the size and nature of certain production facilities which suggest that the Chinese may have considerably more ambitious goals. If the Chinese do try to pursue a more ambitious course over the next few years, we believe they would risk serious long-term economic consequences and the possible disruption of the military programs themselves.

## II. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AND AIR DEFENSE<sup>1</sup>

25. There have been no significant changes in the organization or structure of the PLA or its constituent elements, the Chinese Communist Army (CCA), Navy (CCN), and Air Force (CCAF). The Ministry of National Defense (MND),

<sup>1</sup> See Annex A for a summary of the order-of-battle for the Army, Air Defense, and Navy.

under the policy control of the Military Affairs Committee of the Party Central Committee, remains the senior military authority. The chief staff components of the MND are its three general departments: the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Rear Services Department. Most combat arms and services, such as the air force, navy, armored, artillery, and selected supporting organizations, are represented at the MND level by separate headquarters. However, there is no separate headquarters for the ground forces which are apparently controlled directly by the staff of the MND proper, or through the 13 military regions.

#### The Chinese Communist Army

26. While China is giving highest priority to the development of a nuclear deterrent, the main strength of the Chinese Communist military establishment will rest for many years on its large army and nearly inexhaustible reserves of manpower. The organization, deployment, and size of the army has remained relatively static. It numbers some 2.4 million. We can confirm the existence of some 118 combat divisions. We also believe there are some 21 independent combat regiments, and numerous combat support and service support divisions and regiments. It is likely that the strength and level of equipment of these units varies greatly. Nevertheless, if not faced with major opposition from a modern outside power, the Chinese could overrun their neighbors in Southeast Asia or Korea in a conventional attack. Moreover, China is in an excellent position to meddle in localized situations across its southern borders, where Chinese military presence and aid could be a decisive factor supporting a "war of liberation."

27. The CCA is a conscript army, but inasmuch as only a small percent of those eligible are taken into military service, the regime is able to be highly selective. Even so, the CCA has difficulty in finding or developing technical personnel. The extension of tours of service decreed in 1965 should help raise standards of technical training and experience. We believe that the extension in service tours was directed primarily to this end. There is no firm evidence that the extension resulted in an increase in the number of major units in the CCA, though there obviously has been some fleshing out of existing units.

28. If the Chinese Army undertook to engage in open warfare against modern opposition, these strengths in manpower would be offset by serious deficiencies. Much of the heavier military hardware in general use throughout the army is obsolescent by US and Soviet standards. The army also lacks the organic unit mobility necessary in modern warfare. Furthermore, Chinese infantry divisions are weak, by Western standards, in organic armor and artillery.

29. The Chinese have designated certain "on duty" or "alert" divisions. There are indications that the firepower and training activity of a number of divisions have increased. We are not sure how many divisions are involved nor what the basis is for their selection. However, this may be a program designed to bring selected units up to a higher level of military effectiveness.

30. *Conventional Equipment.* The Chinese are self-sufficient in the production of small arms and ammunition and are making progress toward their goal of self-sufficiency in the production of heavier ground force equipment. Production at the Pao-t'ou tank plant picked up again after 1963 and we estimate current output at about 500 medium tanks a year. Some artillery units within the CCA have shown a steady increase in weapons of a variety of calibers (including 85/100 mm field guns, 122 mm and possibly 152 mm howitzers, and 160 mm mortars) over the past several years, indicating a fairly substantial artillery production program. Truck production is low, however, and there is no evidence of programs to produce a wide variety of armored equipment. Despite some general progress, we believe the Chinese will not complete their current modernization programs until the mid-1970's. While this will result in a substantial improvement in mobility and firepower, the technical level of Chinese equipment at that point will still lag considerably behind that of the US and USSR.

31. *Tactical Missiles.* There was some activity in 1966 that could be interpreted to mean a Chinese interest in short-range ballistic missiles. There is currently, however, no evidence of troop firing, deployment, or series production of such missiles. The Chinese have tested at least one fairly lightweight nuclear device and probably have the capability to produce such weapons for tactical deployment. For the next few years the limited supply of fissionable material will probably be committed to the strategic weapons program. Lacking the nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, the Chinese could use chemical or high explosive warheads; however, since other more conventional and accurate means of delivery are available for these types of munitions, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese would employ missiles for such a purpose. If Chinese military doctrine does call for the deployment of tactical missiles and if they have been under development at the missile test range, the Chinese probably could begin deployment by late 1967 or early 1968. We think this unlikely, however, and we estimate that deployment of tactical ballistic missiles will be delayed for some years until there is a much greater supply of fissionable material. There is no evidence of a Chinese program to develop antitank missiles or large artillery-type free rockets.

32. *Air Support.* The Chinese have no separate tactical air command, and we have no information concerning PLA doctrine on the use of aircraft in a close support role. At present any tactical strike or ground support mission would fall principally on the 270 or so obsolescent IL-28s in the CCAF and CCNAF, although several fighter regiments appear to have a ground attack mission.

33. The Chinese have an extremely limited airborne assault capability. China has three airborne divisions, all subordinate to the CCAF, but little is known about their training, equipment, strength, or of Chinese doctrine concerning the use of such troops. The principal limitation on the employment of Chinese airborne forces is the small size of the Chinese air transport fleet and the

characteristics of the available aircraft. Available light and medium military transport aircraft could lift about 4,400 lightly-equipped troops or airdrop about 2,800 airborne infantry troops to a distance of about 500 n.m. Civil aircraft could augment this capability by about 50 percent. The only transport aircraft now in production in China is the single-engine AN-2 which can carry only 10 to 12 passengers. We have no evidence of preparations for producing a heavy transport aircraft. More up-to-date transport aircraft are being purchased by the Chinese on the foreign market at a rate of some 6 to 7 per year. In addition, acquisition of four AN-12/Cubs in late 1966 has increased the military airlift capability of the Chinese Communists. These aircraft are the first rear extraction aircraft in the Chinese inventory. Further purchases of this type aircraft from the Soviets would substantially increase the Chinese Communist airlift capability over the next few years.

#### The Air Defense Forces

34. The overall responsibility for air defense is vested in the Air Defense Command (ADC) of the CCAF. The ADC controls 9 air defense districts. It has at its command an extensive air surveillance and control network comprised of some 650 radar stations, a fighter force of about 2,300 aircraft (including some naval air), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and a limited number of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

35. There has been a substantial improvement in early warning and ground control intercept capabilities with the deployment of indigenously produced radars. The radar network is now capable of providing warning against approaching aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes [REDACTED] low altitude coverage is negligible. Radar coverage extends along the entire length of the eastern and southern approaches to China and is substantially complete on the western approaches. The northern border approach is still mostly open, although radars cover avenues of approach from that direction to all important target areas in the interior. Further expansion and improvement of the air surveillance network is anticipated. The electronics industry is one of the most sophisticated sectors of Chinese industry. It is almost completely self-sufficient in the production of existing radar types, and is actively engaged in the development of newer, more specialized equipment.

36. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Chinese have, on occasion and in response to specific situations, modified their air defense control structure in order to achieve more effective control of the air defense organization in a limited area. Such measures provided only marginal and short-term improvements. While the Chinese air defense system is capable of coping with minor incursions over its air space, we believe that the limitations [REDACTED] would result in an almost complete disintegration of the air defense system in the event of a large, concerted air attack on the mainland. There will be improvement [REDACTED] during the next few years. However, the costs

are too high, the technology too sophisticated, and the requirements too great for the Chinese to develop a system capable of coping with a major air attack over the next several years.

37. The Chinese fighter force consists of some 1,800 obsolete Mig-15s and Mig-17s, 500 or more Mig-19s, and 25-35 Mig-21s. A major improvement in the fighter capability has resulted from the resumption of Mig-19 production at Shen-yang at an estimated rate of 20-25 aircraft per month. Thus, the Mig-19 force has tripled since 1965. We think that production of the Mig-19 will continue at this rate, at least until a more modern fighter becomes available.

38. In this connection, we believe that the Ch'eng-tu plant should now be ready to produce Mig-21 aircraft. If we are correct in this judgment, Mig-21s could be entering operational service in small numbers in 1968 and in increasing numbers in 1969. The Chinese have claimed to be working on an improved version of the Mig-19. Even if this is so and they decide to produce such an aircraft in quantity, it could not be available for several years and we continue to believe that Mig-19s and Mig-21s will be the mainstay of the CCAF into the 1970's.

39. Probably less than 10 percent of the fighter force has airborne intercept equipment, but those aircraft that do are distributed among units along the southern and eastern periphery. Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) of the Soviet AA-2 type are believed to be available for use and the Chinese may be producing a limited number of them.

40. The air defense system includes, in addition to the fighter force, a point defense system involving 19 or 20 air force AAA and at least 6 army AAA divisions which are more lightly gunned. Since early 1965, China has shifted some of the weight of its AAA to the southern provinces adjoining North Vietnam and into North Vietnam.

41. In addition to the deployment of conventional, tube artillery, the Chinese have a limited SAM capability. Some 35 deployed sites have been built, but at least 13 were later abandoned. Of the remaining 22 sites, no more than 12 are believed to have been occupied at any one time. The administrative subordination of the SAM units is not known, but they are probably operationally subordinate to the various Air Defense Headquarters, and function in the same manner as conventional AAA units.

42. The Chinese are working on SAM development. The SAM R and D facilities at the Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Range have been modified several times since 1964. A new SAM unit training site was built in 1966, the technical training facility was expanded, and a solid propellant plant large enough to support series production of SAMs is nearing completion at T'ai-yuan. There is also some evidence that the Chinese are producing a few missiles to replenish the small stock of missiles supplied by the USSR before the 1960 crisis in Sino-Soviet relations.

43. We are not sure, however, that this activity presages a major deployment program. The Chinese must have learned from North Vietnam's experience that a large number of SAMs, supported by heavy concentration of AAA, are required to defend even a relatively limited area. They also have seen that the US has the capability to counter the Soviet SA-2 system with considerable effectiveness. Thus a decision regarding SAM deployment exemplifies a general dilemma facing Chinese military planners: whether to build and deploy at great cost a weapon system that at best can only partially fulfill a requirement and which would compete for resources with other high priority programs.

44. The Chinese will no doubt continue developmental work on SAMs, probably hoping to improve on the SA-2 system. In the meantime, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the Chinese will begin a program to deploy SA-2s for a point defense of a few key targets. We do not know which or how many targets the Chinese would select in the initial stages for such a defense, but facilities associated with advanced weapons program are likely candidates. This could involve at least some 20 areas and if the Chinese followed Soviet practice even this limited deployment would require 80 to 100 battalions and approximately 2,000 to 3,000 missiles. We estimate that it would take the Chinese 4 or 5 years to deploy an SA-2 force of this size.

#### The Navy

45. The CCN is growing rapidly but remains principally an offshore patrol and escort force. It consists of 11 principal surface ships, 34 submarines, about 525 smaller combatants and a variety of amphibious, auxiliary, and service craft. Headquarters is located in Peking and the operational forces are distributed among three major fleets.

46. Several programs now underway are contributing to the gradual development of Chinese naval capabilities. The CCN force of torpedo attack submarines continues to expand at the rate of 2 to 3 units a year. Construction of the W-class submarine has stopped and the Chinese are concentrating on production of the R-class. Five R-class have already been built and we believe that a total of about 10 more will be built by 1970. The Chinese have also [REDACTED] and commissioned at least one submarine tender, providing the CCN with some capability for supporting out-of-area submarine operations.

47. Another significant program is the construction of various types of coastal patrol craft. Since 1965, about 100 fast patrol boats of native design have been added to the fleet. A construction program for the OSA/KOMAR guided missile boats began in 1966 and is proceeding at an estimated rate of about 10 a year. [REDACTED] we believe the Chinese are producing missiles for these boats. These craft with a range of several hundred miles could extend their operations into the Tonkin Gulf and the Yellow Sea.

48. There is still no indication that the Chinese plan to develop or further deploy a land-based cruise missile for coastal defense. There are three confirmed sites: one for R and D and training, one for tactical use, and one inactive.


49. The South Sea Fleet, the weakest of China's three fleets, is being strengthened. Numerous fast patrol and torpedo boats, including a native designed hydrofoil type, have appeared in the South Sea Fleet. Shipbuilding and shore installations in South China have also been significantly expanded and modernized. In 1965, the Chinese began producing destroyer escorts of a native design (Kiangnan-class) in the Canton area, which now ranks second to Shanghai in shipbuilding capability.

50. The CCN's troop lift capability with amphibious ships and landing craft is about two infantry divisions (28,000 troops) or one infantry and one artillery division (20,200 troops), but we have not observed any troop training involving amphibious operations. In port-to-port operations, ships of the merchant marine fleet could deliver about four infantry divisions (up to 49,000 troops). In addition, in operations where the use of smaller ships and craft is feasible, the Chinese could employ literally thousands of junks for transporting troops and light equipment. The Chinese have not built any LST, LSM or large troop transports, but they are building substantial numbers of large landing craft and naval auxiliaries.

51. We believe that the CCN's program of expansion and modernization will continue and that its capabilities for operating close to China's shores will substantially increase. The Chinese lack training and experience in operations away from their own waters, however, and have as yet shown no interest in undertaking such operations. Once begun, it will take them several years before they can develop a significant operational proficiency.

#### The Outlook

52. The present outlook is for a gradual but general increase in the capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces as the process of modernization goes forward over the next few years. All arms and services are likely to share in this progress. Thus far we see no evidence that the political turmoil has affected the fighting capabilities or interfered with military production programs. But now the PLA is assuming more and more noncombat tasks and if this trend is long continued it would almost certainly affect the capabilities of the Chinese forces.

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ANNEX A

CHINESE COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE

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## ANNEX A

### CHINESE COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE

#### A. Army

1. The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) is estimated to include 118 combat divisions (107 infantry, 3 airborne,<sup>2</sup> 5 armored, 3 cavalry), 24 combat support divisions, 20 border/internal defense divisions, 11 railway engineer divisions, and some 112 combat and combat support regiments, 36 service support regiments, and 40 border/internal defense regiments. These units vary widely in equipment and military effectiveness.

2. The main field command organization in the CCA is the army, of which there are some 35. The typical CCA army includes 3 infantry divisions and 1 artillery regiment, and probably numbers about 50,000 at full strength. There is nothing in the CCA analogous to the Soviet combined arms or tank armies.

3. For administrative purposes, mainland China is divided into 13 military regions (see map), and these are divided into subordinate districts which in most cases conform to provincial boundaries. These are territorial rather than operational commands.

4. We estimate that at full strength the standard infantry division would number about 14,000 officers and men. Its principal combat elements would be 3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 tank/assault gun regiment. Its heavy equipment, all of Soviet type, would include T-59 and T-34 tanks, and SU-76 and SU-100 assault guns. The division would have a large number of mortars (82 mm, 120 mm, and 160 mm), as well as 57 mm, 76 mm, 85/100 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers. In addition to the standard infantry division the Chinese have light divisions for use in mountainous and other difficult terrain. These type units are similar to the standard division, but do not have the tank/assault gun regiment and are equipped with lighter artillery.

5. The Chinese armored division at full strength would number about 8,000 officers and men. Its principal combat elements would be 2 armored regiments, 1 artillery regiment, and 1 infantry regiment. Its heavy equipment would include T-59 and T-34 tanks, a few JS-1 or JS-2 heavy tanks, and some JSU-122

<sup>2</sup>One army, the 10th Air Army, consisting of the three airborne divisions, is subordinate to the CCAF, but is, for the purpose of this paper, included with the CCA.

and JSU-152 assault guns. In addition the division would have a small number of mortars, 76 mm, 85 mm, and possibly 100 mm guns, and 122 mm howitzers.

6. The CCA has two types of field artillery divisions. The gun division would have about 5,400 men at full strength; it usually has 3 regiments equipped with 122 mm guns and 152 mm gun-howitzers. The howitzer division would have about 6,300 troops; it is normally organized into 3 artillery regiments equipped with 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, and probably a rocket launcher regiment, equipped with 132 mm or 140 mm multiple rocket launchers.

7. [REDACTED]

It appears likely that the so-called "alert" divisions have had priority in the modernization program. They may be at or near the personnel strength and equipment levels of the formal TO&E described above; others probably fall short of what the TO&E calls for, and some may be well below this standard.

TABLE 1

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARMY UNITS 15 MARCH 1967<sup>a</sup>

	NUMBER OF UNITS
Army Headquarters .....	35 <sup>b</sup>
Combat Divisions .....	118
107 Infantry	
3 Airborne <sup>b</sup>	
5 Armored	
3 Cavalry	
Border/Internal Defense Divisions .....	20
Combat Support Divisions .....	24
15 Field Artillery	
3 Antitank	
6 AAA	
Service Support Divisions .....	11
11 Railway Engineer	
Combat Regiments (Independent) .....	21
5 Infantry	
6 Tank	
10 Cavalry	
Border/Internal Defense Regiments (Independent) .....	40
Combat Support Regiments (Independent) .....	61
11 Field Artillery	
6 Rocket Launcher	
35 Engineer	
9 Signal	
Service Support Regiment (Independent) .....	36
35 Motor Transport	
1 Railway Engineer	

<sup>a</sup> We estimate no substantial change in these figures through 1969.

<sup>b</sup> One army, the 10th Air Army, consisting of the three airborne divisions, is subordinate to the CCAF, but is, for the purpose of this paper, included with the CCA.

## B. Air Force

8. The Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force (CCAF and CCNAF), number slightly more than 214,000 men and are equipped with some 2,800 aircraft. The largest active operational unit in the CCAF is the Air Division, with each division consisting of 2 to 3 regiments. The CCAF has a total of some 89 regiments including 65 fighter regiments (Mig-15/Mig-17/Mig-19/Mig-21), 10 attack regiments (Mig-15/IL-10), 8 jet light bomber regiments (IL-28), 5 prop light bomber regiments (TU-2) and 1 medium bomber regiment (TU-4/TU-16). (See Table 2 for aircraft totals by type.)

9. Attrition is taking an increasing toll of the jet light bomber force and has already reduced the original force of some 450 to its present strength of approximately 270. The number of sorties flown per month by the average IL-28 pilot is probably barely sufficient to maintain minimum proficiency. However, the fact that many pilots have been flying these same aircraft for up to 10 years would probably provide the bomber force with sufficient experience to conduct daytime medium-altitude bombing missions. With less than 10 percent of training done at night, it seems likely that the night and radar bombing capabilities of most crews would be very marginal.

10. The strength of both bomber and fighter units has been gradually reduced during the past few years. IL-28 regiments, originally consisting of about 30 aircraft each, now are believed to possess only about 18 aircraft per unit. Fighter regiments, with a previous strength of 32 aircraft, have also been reduced due to attrition, and now have no more than 25 aircraft. With the advent of Mig-19 production, however, this trend will be reversed.

11. The Air Defense Command (ADC) is the only major command in the CCAF. For air defense purposes, both CCAF and CCNAF fighters are controlled by the ADC through its nine air defense districts. These districts are further subdivided into zones and sectors.

12. The air defense weapons system includes, in addition to the fighter force, 19 or 20 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions administratively subordinate to the CCAF. The AAA divisions are operationally subordinate to the CCAF Air Defense Headquarters in the area in which they are located, just as are other CCAF air divisions. The administrative subordination of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) units is not known. Undoubtedly, however, these units are operationally subordinate to the various Air Defense Headquarters, and function in the same manner as conventional AAA units. Some 35 deployed SAM sites have been built, but at least 13 were later abandoned. Of the remaining 22 sites, no more than 12 are believed to have been occupied at any one time.

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TABLE 2  
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT (1967-1969)

	15 MARCH 1967		1 JANUARY 1969	
	CCAF	CCNAF	TOTALS	
<b>Fighter</b>				
Mig-15/Fagot .....	330	0	330	50-100
Mig-17/Fresco .....	1,185	215	1,400 <sup>a</sup>	1,100-1,400
Mig-19/Farmer .....	425	105	530 <sup>b</sup>	725-850 <sup>c</sup>
Mig-21/Fishbed .....	35	0	35	75-125
<b>Bomber</b>				
TU-2/Bat .....	75	10	85	0-25
IL-28/Beagle .....	155	115	270	175-225
TU-4/Bull .....	13	0	13	0-10
TU-16/Badger .....	2	0	2	4-8
<b>Transport</b>				
Medium .....	13	0	13	25-35
Light .....	150	10	160	200-250
<b>Reconnaissance</b>				
BE-6/Madge .....	0	5	5	0-5
<b>Helicopter</b>				
MI-4/Hound .....	135	15	150	300-350

<sup>a</sup> Approximately 20 percent possess all-weather capability.

<sup>b</sup> Approximately 25 percent possess limited all-weather capability.

<sup>c</sup> We would expect this figure to be less if an intensified production of the Mig-21 occurs.

### C. Navy

13. *General.* Present ship strength of the CCN includes 34 submarines, 4 destroyers, 7 destroyer escorts, and about 525 smaller combatants, including at least 8 guided missile patrol boats. Personnel strength is estimated at about 142,000, including 17,000 in the naval air force.

14. Administrative and operational control over the naval forces is exercised through the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Orders from the Minister of National Defense are passed to the Commander-in-Chief of the CCN via the General Staff for information and coordination. CCN Headquarters is located in Peking. The CCN is comprised of three major fleets: North Sea Fleet with headquarters in Tsingtao, East Sea Fleet with headquarters in Shanghai, and South Sea Fleet with headquarters in Chan-chiang (Fort Bayard). The North Sea Fleet is the major Chinese fleet and includes over half of the submarines and destroyers. Submarines currently operate only in the North and East Sea Fleets.

15. The CCNAF fighter regiments, charged with the protection of Chinese territorial waters, are administratively controlled by CCNAF Headquarters at Peking through the fleet headquarters. In their air defense role fighter units are operationally controlled by the ADC of the CCAF. The bomber regiments are controlled by the fleet headquarters.

16. The CCNAF includes 12 fighter regiments of about 30 fighters each, and 6 jet light bomber regiments (20 IL-28s each). Naval IL-28 bombers have

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been detected in activity which suggests these aircraft may have a torpedo attack capability.

TABLE 3  
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NAVAL UNITS (1967-1969)

Type	15 MARCH 1967    MID-1969 *	
	TOTALS	
Principal Combatant:		
Old Destroyer (ODD) .....	4	4
Destroyer Escort (DE) .....	7	12-16
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSB) .....	1	1-2
Submarine (SS) .....	33 <sup>b</sup>	36-39
Patrol:		
Old Patrol Escort (OPF) .....	16	
Submarine Chaser (PC) .....	23	26-28
Fast Patrol Boat (PTF) .....	120	200-220
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT) .....	185	
Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat (PTH) .....	20	70-80
Motor Gunboat (PGM) .....	87	
Old Motor Gunboat (OPGM) .....	3	
Guided Missile Patrol Boat (PTG/PTFG) .....	8-10	30-40
Mineswarfare:		
Minesweeper, Fleet (MSF) .....	20	28-32
Minesweeper, Coastal (MSC) .....	35	
Minesweeper, Coastal (Old) (MSC(O)) .....	4	
Minesweeper, Auxiliary (MSA) .....	20	
Amphibious:		
Tank Landing Ship (LST) .....	20 (8) <sup>c</sup>	
Medium Landing Ship (LSM) .....	13 (11) <sup>c</sup>	
Landing Ship Infantry (LSIL) .....	16	
Utility Landing Craft (LCU) .....	10	
Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM/LCT) .....	220	250-260
Auxiliaries:		
Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG) .....	35	
Light Cargo Ship (AKL) .....	11	
Net Laying Ship (AN) .....	6	
Oiler (AO/AOL) .....	15	
Landing Craft Repair Ship (ARL) .....	1	
Small Submarine Tender (ASL) .....	1	
Ocean Tug (ATA) .....	10	
Service Craft (various types) .....	349	

\* Blank spaces indicate a lack of sufficient data to make useful projections.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 21 "W" class, 3 "M-V" class, 4 "S-1" class, 5 "R" class.

<sup>c</sup> Numbers in parentheses are additional units in merchant service.

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ANNEX B

MILITARY INDUSTRIES

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## ANNEX B

### MILITARY INDUSTRIES

#### A. Production of Ground Forces Equipment

1. At least 10 major plants are involved in the output of finished military equipment and about 30 plants are involved in explosives/ammunition production. Except principally for infantry weapons, little is known about current production rates for specific military equipment. [redacted]

2. The vast majority of Chinese Communist Army (CCA) weapons and vehicles are of Soviet design, and many of the older artillery pieces and all of the T-34 tanks are Soviet manufactured. Nevertheless, the Chinese now appear to produce all of the small arms, conventional ammunition, and T-59 tanks, some of the field and antiaircraft artillery and chemical munitions, and most of the transport vehicles found in the CCA.

3. Production of small arms is believed to be more than adequate to meet CCA unit requirements as well as to provide for a large reserve inventory. Samples of Chinese-produced weapons obtained in Vietnam have shown that small arms currently in the hands of CCA soldiers are well-made, rugged, and entirely adequate for their intended use. Future production rates are contingent on several factors, the most immediate of which is the conflict in Vietnam. However, the Chinese will probably not produce above the present rate and will probably reduce small arms production over the next few years.

4. [redacted] photography indicate that current production of field and antiaircraft artillery includes 57 mm antiaircraft guns, 85 mm and 100 mm field guns, 122 mm howitzers, and, possibly 152 mm howitzers. Even so, a substantial part of the CCA's total inventory of medium and self-propelled artillery was obtained from the USSR. Major Chinese artillery plants are located in Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh, Pao-t'ou, and T'ai-yuan.

5. There is no evidence that the Chinese are now building T34s, assault guns, or heavy tanks. The T-59, currently in production, appears to be a copy of a Soviet medium tank, T-54A. The Chinese are believed to have begun producing

the T-59 in late 1958. In 1961 the combined effect of the Soviet withdrawal and failure of the "Great Leap Forward" caused production either to slow considerably or perhaps to stop entirely for a time. If production did stop, it probably was resumed on a limited scale in 1962, but did not recover entirely until 1965. We now believe it is producing at a rate of 400-600 a year. Major operating tank facilities include an assembly plant at Pao-t'ou, a diesel engine plant at Ta-t'ung, a refitting and parts plant in Harbin. A research and development (R and D) center is located in Ch'ang-hsin-tien.

6. The current CCA inventory of wheeled transport vehicles is believed to be in the vicinity of 150,000 vehicles and is composed of a heterogeneous collection of Soviet, Chinese, and European-built vehicles. The majority of the Chinese trucks are produced in the Vehicle Plant Number 1 in Ch'ang-ch'un which was completed with Soviet technical and material assistance in late 1956.

#### B. Aircraft Industry

7. The Chinese Communists have given the development of military aircraft a high priority. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There are five centers of the aircraft industry in Communist China: Shen-yang, Sian, Ch'eng-tu, Nan-ch'ang, and Harbin. Three of these centers, Shen-yang, Nan-ch'ang, and Harbin are currently producing aircraft. The facility at Ch'eng-tu appeared completed by late 1964, and the facility at Sian in late 1966, although there is no indication of production as yet.

8. Chinese aircraft production began in 1956 with production of the Mig-17s at Shen-yang, where the Soviets had helped the Chinese build an airframe and jet engine plant. There is good evidence that this plant was retooled in the late 1950's, and that by 1959 or 1960, the Chinese began to assemble Mig-19s from Soviet supplied components. Assembly apparently ceased in 1960 with the Sino-Soviet rift. After a delay of several years, the Chinese resumed production of the Mig-19 at Shen-yang. This plant is currently believed to be producing at a rate of some 20-25 aircraft per month, with more than 500 Mig-19s produced since the resumption of production.

9. In the late 1950's, the Chinese began construction of a second fighter production complex at Ch'eng-tu. Construction continued at the plant in the early 1960's, and by late 1964 both the airframe and jet engine plants were apparently completed. As of 1 January 1967 the factory does not appear to be engaged in anything other than possible repair and maintenance. Older type aircraft (Mig-15/Mig-17s) have used the factory airfield, but apparently in an air defense capacity. Despite the delay in production, it is still estimated that a more advanced type of jet fighter, presumably the Mig-21, will be produced at Ch'eng-tu. The delay in the appearance of such aircraft may result from difficulties in producing this more complex aircraft.

10. A factory at Harbin is currently producing MI-4 helicopters, at a rate of about 10-12 per month. Production is believed to have resumed in 1965. The

aircraft plant at Nan-ch'ang which has been in production since the late 1950's, is currently producing AN-2 light transports and basic training aircraft of the Yak-18 type. While aircraft production at this plant never ceased entirely in the early 1960's, it was drastically reduced. As of 1 January 1967, the plant is estimated to be producing aircraft at a rate of some 10-12 AN-2s and 1-2 of the Yak-type trainers per month.

**C. Missile Production**

11. Chinese production of air defense type guided missiles (SAMs, AAMs) may be underway. [redacted]

[redacted] several factories in the T'ai-yuan area are considered good candidates for current production. Located at T'ai-yuan are solid propellant production and testing facilities, munitions plants, and an electronics plant. These facilities are believed capable of producing both SAMs and AAMs.

12. In addition to the T'ai-yuan complex, the Chinese have built a major solid propellant production and testing facility at Hu-ho-hao-t'e, in Inner Mongolia. This new facility, currently in the final stages of construction, is probably capable of producing various solid propellant grains in substantial quantities.

**D. Naval Construction**

13. Naval shipbuilding in Communist China has followed a pattern similar to that of other military industries. The Soviets assisted in establishing shipyards and while the Chinese were learning the technology, the Soviets supplied components which were assembled in China. Chinese Communist construction of modern units began under Soviet supervision during the 1955-1960 period. Following withdrawal of Soviet aid, their construction was severely curtailed and remained so for several years. In late 1962 an active program of ship production resumed. The Chinese have been constructing some Soviet class ships as well as increasing numbers of indigenously designed or modified ships of various classes. The naval shipbuilding industry has progressed to a level higher than that achieved prior to 1960, and several shipyards are currently being modernized and enlarged.

14. Chinese Communist submarine construction, initiated under the Soviets, virtually ceased in 1960 due to the Sino-Soviet rift. However, the outfitting of four "W" class units previously launched continued. By 1962, 21 "W" class submarines had been constructed in China, 15 at Shanghai and 6 at Wu-ch'ang, from Soviet supplied components.

15. In 1962, construction of "R" class submarines began at Shanghai and Wu-ch'ang. Currently, five "R" class units appear to be operational. While the "R" class construction program is continuing at Wu-ch'ang, it appears to have been interrupted at Shanghai. How many of this class submarine the Chinese intend to construct is not known, but we believe that a total of about 10 more will be built by 1970.


16. A single "G" class ballistic missile submarine was constructed at the Luta Shipyard, Dairen, between 1962 and 1964. The Soviets almost certainly provided the hull design, and may have supplied components for the vessel, as well. We have no evidence that the Chinese are now constructing any more of this class submarine.

17. Two years after the withdrawal of Soviet assistance, the Chinese began production of a number of native-designed craft. Twelve Shanghai class PTFs appeared in production at Shanghai from 1959 to 1961; production of an enlarged version of the Shanghai class began at Dairen in 1963 and has reached the rate of about 50 units per year. Other native-designed units include the Hainan class subchaser and Huchwan class hydrofoil torpedo boat (PTH). Three and possibly four of the Hainan class subchasers were constructed at the Huangpu Shipyard, Canton, from 1964 through 1966. The Huchwan class PTHs are constructed in Shanghai. The extent of the latter (PTH) program is not known, although some 17 units had been produced by 1967. The most significant product of the Chinese naval design program is the Kiangnan class destroyer escort, the first of which completed fitting out at Shanghai in 1966. Construction of additional Kiangnans began at Canton in 1965 and is continuing. Three units are currently operational, and two more are under construction at Canton.

18. Numerous other small combatants and support units, primarily of Soviet design are under construction at the various shipyards. It became evident in 1966 that the Chinese were producing guided missile patrol boats of both the OSA and KOMAR classes. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Additional T-43 class minesweepers are being constructed as are P-6 class PTs. About 12 of the latter are believed to have been produced at the Huangpu Shipyard since late 1965, and the program may be continuing.

# COMMUNIST CHINA Radar Coverage, 15 March 1967




# COMMUNIST CHINA

## Disposition of Ground Forces, 15 March 1967




# COMMUNIST CHINA

## Air Order of Battle (CCAF/CCNAF), 15 March 1967




# COMMUNIST CHINA

## Naval Strength and Disposition, 15 March 1967



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