

Memorandum for Review
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3 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Possible Developments in the Trials of Oleg Penkovskiy and Greville Wynne

1. This memorandum defines the probable upper and lower limits to Soviet propaganda exploitation of the trial, now reported to begin 7 May in Moscow, and in the attached annex outlines tentative Clandestine Services planning for counter-action.

2. Minimum and maximum variants in Soviet propaganda exploitation:

a. Minimum exploitation: If the Soviet government so decides, it can try Wynne and Penkovskiy separately, the latter in a closed trial with no publicity except for an announcement of the verdict and sentence. The Soviets committed themselves, however, to an open trial for Wynne when they chose to cover his kidnaping from Hungary as an extradition action. (Recent press reports have specifically announced that the Wynne trial will be open.) In this minimum publicity variant, Penkovskiy would probably not appear as a witness in Wynne's trial and anti-U. S. and U. K. propaganda would be limited. The U. S. officials already named by the Soviet press but still in Moscow (Montgomery, Davison and German) might not be declared persona non grata.

b. Maximum propaganda exploitation: At the other extreme, a full show trial could be staged to provide maximum publicity to the exposure of American and British espionage activity against the USSR. Here, Penkovskiy would probably appear as a witness in open court and might even be tried before the same court or at a concomitant trial. In such a case, we expect that besides the U. S. officials already named in the pre-trial publicity, British involvement would be spelled out in appropriate detail; Penkovskiy's case officers would be identified (two of them, Joseph J. Balik and Rodney W. Carlson, have served in the USSR and Balik has since travelled there [redacted]

[redacted]; and other evidence in Soviet hands could be surfaced. (For example, the full text of the letter we wrote Penkovskiy in July 1962, of which a small part was printed in the Soviet press in November 1962, contains accommodation addresses and telephone numbers in the U. S. and in the U. K.) PNG action against all implicated American

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and British officials still in Moscow would almost certainly follow such a trial. It should be noted, however, that beyond providing extensive documentation to the charge that a high-ranking Soviet official committed espionage in behalf of U. S. and British intelligence, there is little that could be exposed in the trial. Without extensive fabrication, allegations of sabotage, assassination, covert political action, etc., would be extremely difficult to substantiate convincingly.

3. Review of Probabilities: Available evidence is insufficient to predict which course of action the Soviets will choose although recent Moscow reports tend to indicate that the stage is being set for an open, maximum publicity trial. (The hall reportedly reserved for the trial of Wynne has a seating capacity of 300 and it has been announced that the trial will be open.) There is some reason to think that there have been one or more changes of plan or at least of timing since the case was discovered by Soviet authorities. The initial burst of publicity in November and December 1962 was abruptly cut off; the long delay in bringing Wynne to trial cannot be explained by the need to complete the pre-trial investigation (from the counterespionage point of view, much of the investigation had to be done before the trap was sprung on Richard Jacob on 2 November 1962); pre-trial publicity and buildup (surfacing of the Popov and Olga Raue cases, etc.) has been sporadic and diffuse, something very uncharacteristic for the usually well-oiled Soviet propaganda machine. One possible explanation is that the Soviets have had second thoughts about the possible adverse effects that the publicity of the Penkovskiy case might have on the Soviet military establishment in connection with the recent important personnel changes in the military hierarchy (the dismissal and apparent arrest of General Serov, the replacement of Marshal Zakharov, etc.)

4. Evaluation of propaganda impact of Trials: Whatever course of action the Soviets choose, it appears that the Wynne and Penkovskiy trials will present more problems to the Soviets than to us. As far as U. S. involvement is concerned, the Soviets have already fired their biggest guns in the publicity following the detention of Richard Jacob; they can use the trial to document their charges, but they cannot add anything substantially new by way of exposure. The British situation is rather different in this respect. Besides Wynne himself, thus far there have only been vague allusions to the

role played by British officials in the case. Synne is in a position to implicate three or four MI-6 officers by true name and the revelation that the pregnant wife of a British Embassy officer was used for clandestine street meetings with an espionage agent may well have a strong effect on a British press still smarting from the treatment it received from the Radcliffe Tribunal.

5. Impact of the Trial in the Soviet Union: From the Soviet point of view, the problems presented by the Penkovskiy affair are much more serious and far-reaching. For one thing, in terms of damage to Soviet national security, the case is unprecedented in classical espionage history. It will be tremendously damaging to those who are held responsible and since Penkovskiy's circle of friends, patrons, and unwitting accomplices was large and highly placed, the struggle to escape or affix responsibility could assume considerable proportions. Although it is true that this struggle would take place in any event, a public airing of the Penkovskiy affair, no matter how carefully the facts are manipulated, is bound to feed oxygen to flames that are already reaching dangerously high.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment

PLANS FOR COUNTER-PROPAGANDA IN PENKOVSKIY CASE

The following plans have been reviewed within the Clandestine Services and by a representative of MI-6. Although it is recognized that policy considerations and developments during the trial may rule out the actual use of any or all of the materials now being prepared, preparation is underway to ensure that if it is desired to implement the plans, the material will be at hand to do so.

1. General strategy: The purpose of our counter-propaganda will be to emphasize the following points:

a. Penkovskiy was a career Soviet Army officer who served with great distinction in the Soviet armed forces during WWII and was decorated for valor, and who apparently sees himself in the role of a twentieth century "Decembrist"-- a Russian soldier and patriot working toward the establishment of a just and liberal government in his native land. He represents the exasperation and legitimate anger of the Soviet military establishment against the interference of the Communist Party and the Soviet security police, which has galled the military since 1918.

b. This trial should be viewed in the context of Soviet internal politics as they have developed since the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962. The failure of Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign, in recent months has greatly heightened the tensions among the Soviet leaders. Penkovskiy is a pawn in a deadly game of intrigue now being played among various factions in the Soviet leadership. Although only the trial can reveal the exact intent of the manipulators, it seems likely that the career officers of the armed forces and the military intelligence service are the most likely targets. It could be the curtain raiser in a campaign to destroy the present Soviet military leadership the way Stalin destroyed Tukhachevskiy and his cohorts in the late '30s.

c. Although it should be handled as a matter not directly relevant to the Penkovskiy case, the threat to the free world of Soviet intelligence operations and Soviet military intentions should also be emphasized.

2. Guidelines and Restrictions for Publicity: These plans have been drawn up with the following guidelines and restrictions:

a. No materials supplied to the press or used in the campaign will confirm the Soviet allegation that Penkovskiy was an agent of American and British Intelligence.

b. No information will be supplied that will tend to confirm Soviet allegations concerning intelligence activities on the part of U. S. officials or the citizens of Western countries whose names may be mentioned in relation to the case.

c. Information concerning Penkovskiy available to us will be used extensively within these limitations, ascribing its sources to persons in Turkey and unnamed persons in the West who have met Penkovskiy or are familiar with his activities, including an "unnamed former Soviet official who has defected to the West."

d. Certain documents pertinent to the general subject of Soviet espionage in the West will be released for surfacing provided it can be done without risk of direct attribution to Penkovskiy.

3. Specific Plans:

a. For Publication at the Beginning of the Trial: An article will be placed in Turkey which will cover Penkovskiy's biography as extensively as the ostensible sources will permit. A photograph of Penkovskiy in uniform with decorations will be printed with the article. The main subjects to be stressed will be Penkovskiy as a professional military officer, decorated for valor during WWII and dedicated to the best interests of his service and his country. His affiliation with the GRU will be spelled out.

b. Followup on Initial Article: The initial article will be replayed in major western media to the greatest extent possible. Articles of commentary and opinion in which the basic facts may be somewhat broadened, citing unnamed acquaintances of Penkovskiy's or an unnamed Soviet defector, will amplify the political aspects of the Penkovskiy trial, relating it to the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, the position of the Soviet Armed Forces in relation to the leadership of the Communist Party and the security police, etc. Penkovskiy will be cast in the role of a patriot struggling against tyranny, but not as a spy.

c. Defensive Briefings: Some western contacts of Penkovskiy's even though the involvement was to no degree compromising, who might be cited in the trial, will be briefed as to what they might say about their relations with him in the event that they receive publicity and are asked by the press for comment.

d. U. S. Official Statement and Release of Documents: In the event that the trial takes a strong anti-American turn in its propaganda, it may be appropriate for a high U. S. Government spokesman to make a comment. The outline for such a comment following the guidelines and strategy mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be prepared. In addition, two Soviet documents, GRU lectures on Soviet intelligence techniques in the U. S. and on the techniques used for conducting meetings with agents will be prepared for release to the press as documentary evidence of the nature of Soviet espionage. The first of these documents is particularly significant for its content, and the latter because the author is currently assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

e. Further Release of Documents on Soviet Military Plans: Although this proposal will require careful review in the light of our long-range publicity plans in addition to numerous other considerations, the question of the release of two other documents is also being given attention. One of these is an extremely belligerent exposition of Soviet strategy and the second is a description of Soviet chemical warfare planning. Release of these documents might be most appropriately effected through the Department of Defense. The release would go a long way toward supplying documentary proof of the aggressive nature of the Soviet regime.

4. Plans for Long-Term Exploitation: Preliminary discussions between the British and ourselves concerning long-term exploitation have taken place already. Our plans will be reviewed in detail in conversations to take place in London at approximately the time of the Wynne trial in Moscow. As presently foreseen, the major effort will be the preparation of the "memoirs" of Penkovskiy, based upon the voluminous information from contacts with him, to present as thoroughly and as carefully as possible Penkovskiy's own views on the nature of the Soviet regime, its history and its prospects. To accompany these memoirs, appropriate documents will be selected from those available to us for release to the public. These two items, the memoirs and the documents, would then be made public with the explanation that they had been left in

the West in the personal possession of a confidant who was charged by Penkovskiy with making them public in the event his efforts to struggle against the party dictatorship in the Soviet Union led to his arrest. This explanation will stress the idea that Penkovskiy's arrest and trial stemmed not from service as a western intelligence agent, but rather from his burning desire to fight the Soviet regime as currently established. In addition to other considerations, putting this plan into effect would have to await a final resolution of the fate of Wynn. In the meantime, however, preparatory work on the memoirs has begun in London.