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TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington

TAB 1

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October 28, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 1957

The semiannual report of the President's Board of Consultants, above referred to, as presented to the President on October 24, 1957, contained the following recommendation:

Recommendation No. 2

"That, in order to achieve a better integration of our national intelligence resources (1) the policy, coordinating and supervisory responsibilities presently being discharged separately by the USCIB and IAC be vested in a single Board (to be known as the *USIB) established at the present level of the USCIB, with appropriate membership, under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence and responsible directly to the National Security Council, (2) the operation of the National Indications Center be made the direct responsibility of the new Board, and (3) the remaining functions of the USCIB and IAC (and their subcommittee) be redistributed on the advice of the Special Comint Committee and the Director of Central Intelligence respectively."

Attached hereto is a quotation from the above mentioned report in which the Board discusses this recommendation.

Before the President takes action on this recommendation, he requests that you consult with the USCIB and IAC agencies and furnish to the National Security Council your views and comments on this recommendation.

It is noted that the above quoted recommendation is concerned with existing NSC Intelligence Directives (Numbers 1, 9 and 17), all of which are undergoing IAC review at this time, preparatory to the submission to the National Security

*United States Intelligence Board

MORI/CDF Pages 3-4, 14-17

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
Members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

24 Oct. 1957

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4 Major General Millard A. Lewis, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force
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6 Mr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission
7 Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Federal Bureau of Investigation
8 Captain Allyn Cole, Executive Secretary, USCIB
9 General G. B. Erskine, OSO/OSD
10 Director, National Security Agency
11 Director of Central Intelligence
12 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
13 Deputy Director (Coordination)
14 Inspector General
15 Mr. John Heires, Secretary, IAC
16 Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Via General Cassidy)
17 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
18 General Cutler w/copy of T.S. 167329 (to be dispatched by DCI)
19 Assistant to the DD/C (323 Admin)
20 — AD/CI
21
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DCI signed draft 3/21/58
NSC approval for reproduction of documents received 3/25/58
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

Office of the Director

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T.S. 141744 Cy # 15
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25 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: MEMBERS OF THE U. S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT : Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Executive Secretary, National Security Council dated March 14, 1958

1. I have arranged with General Hull, Chairman of the President's Board of Consultants and General Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to meet with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board in Executive Session after General Hull returns to Washington about April 17. The purpose of this meeting is to permit General Cutler and General Hull to discuss with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board the objectives in mind in making Recommendation No. 2 of 24 October relative to the IAC and USCIB, and the National Security Council action on the subject dated March 14, 1958.

2. In order to insure that all members of the USCIB and IAC have all action papers relating to this subject available for such meeting, I am transmitting herewith in a single folder single copies of these papers for the use of each member.

3. I am most hopeful that this meeting* will provide the Intelligence Community with the guidance we need in solving the problem which has been referred to us.

/S/

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

*Tentative date of meeting
22 April 1958

Attachment

Document No. .....
No Change in Class. ☐
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Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date: .....
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: 11-13-91 By [redacted]

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Council of a report thereon in January, 1958. It is also noted that the above-quoted recommendation is concerned with areas of COMINT and ELINT activities, which have been the subject of recent study and recommendations by a Special Panel (Baker Panel) of ODM's Science Advisory Committee. Because the subject recommendation and the aforenoted matters overlap one another to some degree, it is suggested that in complying with the President's request you take into account, to the extent applicable, the current review of the NSCIDs and the actions which are underway with respect to the report of the Baker Panel.

So that this suggestion can be implemented by you, it is requested that your report on the subject recommendation be provided to this office for National Security Council consideration not later than January 15, 1958.

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Executive Secretary

Recommendation No. 2

" Our national intelligence is obtained principally through two means:

(1) The use of communications intercept techniques and direct follow-on processes.

(2) All other intelligence resources.

" Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), which is of growing importance, is obtained through a third and separate effort.

"Policies related to the coordination of Communications (and ELINT) Intelligence operations stem from the USCIB. The coordination of other operations is effected through the IAC. The organizational levels, charters, and methods of operation of these two coordinating bodies bear little resemblance to each other, yet the respective components for which they furnish guidance all operate to produce intelligence related to the national security. With the exception of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all key elements of the Intelligence Community are represented on both bodies - under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee but not on the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board. The reverse is true of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We see no good reason why these two groups should continue to operate as separate entities. On the other hand there are many reasons why they should be reconstituted into a single body functioning under a charter which will provide for appropriate advice and assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his coordinating function. We recommend that action be initiated to bring this about."

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

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6 January 1958

TAB 2

MEMORANDUM TO: Members of USCIB and IAC

SUBJECT : Report of Discussions relative to Recommendation No. 2 of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence from Executive Secretary, National Security Council dated 24 October 1957

1. The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities would merge the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board by vesting their respective policy, coordinating and supervisory functions in a single board to be known as the United States Intelligence Board, under a charter which would provide for appropriate advice and assistance to the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his coordinating function.

2. Discussions with the members indicate that they would oppose any over-all Board which would impair in any way the national intelligence production functions presently under the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The concept of merged boards would be that of a single 10-man Board rather than two 8-man Boards as at present. Members would be expected to participate actively to the extent that responsibilities and capabilities of their individual agencies might be involved, and to profit from a wider exposure to problems of the intelligence community as a whole when their agencies are not directly involved.

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3. Discussions have indicated that such a merger should facilitate better coordination in such matters as over-all collection efforts, intelligence security, intelligence communications--particularly in the field of early warning and critical intelligence, various administrative support activities, and the like. The principal advantages mentioned have included:

a. probable improved stature of the intelligence community within the over-all governmental structure;

b. possible improvement in the intelligence product and in the attention paid thereto by policy levels;

c. more effective community support for extraordinary budgetary requirements of the intelligence community as a whole--for example for improved early-warning communications facilities;

d. simplification of the intelligence community's structure and wider participation in certain activities by intelligence agencies not hitherto directly involved--for example the Atomic Energy Commission has indicated increasing interest in the USCIB product as a whole, with a specific particular interest in ELINT activities;

e. "cross-fertilization" of ideas resulting from closer and more intimate relationships among the members of both communities; and

f. expedited consideration of matters pertaining to over-all intelligence policies and coordination.

The principal disadvantages mentioned have included:

a. possible impairment of security for special intelligence;

b. undesirability of combining dissimilar functions--"oil and water";

c. separation of internal assignments of responsibilities for different functions, and

d. different policy responsibilities.

4. All representatives were fully aware that this proposed merger would necessitate some changes in organizational procedures and methods, for example in those established by the existing NSCID 1 and NSCID 9. However, no representative objected to the proposal on this score. In summary, four representatives appeared to favor the merger proposal; four expressed views which varied from mildly favorable to neutral or mildly negative; and two were definitely opposed to the proposal.

5. Two lines of action seem open to the Director of Central Intelligence:

One, non-concurring in the recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities that the IAC and USCIB be merged, and recommending that the President disapprove the recommendation.

In view of the importance which has been attached to various reports made by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, a recommendation for unfavorable consideration clearly should be supported by the most cogent reasons.

Two, concurring in the recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities that the IAC and USCIB be merged, and recommending that the President approve such merger in principle.

In view of the fact that some revision of the provisions of several NSCIDs would also be required, the President should be advised that if the recommendation is approved in principle a task force, or study group, representative of both Committees would be established to develop detailed plans for implementation. Meanwhile, merged sessions could be held as desirable and such merged sessions would be of assistance in developing techniques for the merged United States Intelligence Board.

(Signed)

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Retired)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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21 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: USCIB MEMBERS

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Merger of IAC and USCIB)

TAB 3

1. References:

a. USCIB 4./6, 7 January 1958

b. USCIB 4./4, 6 November 1957

2. It is the considered judgment of the Army that a merger of USCIB and IAC would have an adverse effect on national security, and would impede the effective conduct of both US COMINT operations and the production of national intelligence.

3. A basic concept of US security is that US COMINT activities, at all levels of operation, must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intelligence activities. This long-standing concept was reaffirmed and incorporated into NSCID No. 9 by the Brownell Committee after an exhaustive examination of all aspects--contemporary and historical--of US COMINT activities. This compartmentation is exemplified at the NSC level, in that NSCID No. 9 has established the Special Committee of NSC to act on COMINT matters.

4. USCIB, as the body acting for and under the Special Committee of NSC charged with establishing policies governing COMINT activities, has a clearly defined COMINT mission limited to the compartmented field of those activities. Membership on USCIB is limited by NSCID No. 9 to those departments or agencies authorized to engage in COMINT activities. It is emphasized that COMINT activities by definition do not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence. Accordingly, USCIB's responsibilities do not apply to the activities of the US intelligence community in production and dissemination of finished intelligence based on COMINT, except that principles established by USCIB for the security and handling of COMINT apply to intelligence which is derived from COMINT.

5. USCIB's ELINT mission, assigned by NSCID No. 17, is the establishment of national policy governing US ELINT activities. USCIB's membership includes all US agencies engaged in ELINT activities. Again, ELINT activities by definition do not include the production and dissemination of finished intelligence based on ELINT.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

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SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Merger of IAC and USCIB)

6. US COMINT policy requires that COMINT and matters related to COMINT be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. A large proportion of matters discussed by USCIB can be shown only to cleared persons and must be handled in COMINT channels. The USCIB mission, structure, and procedures are such as to permit the use of a minimum number of cleared COMINT and ELINT specialists within the USCIB member agencies in the staffing of items on USCIB agendas.

7. The IAC, by the terms of NSCID No. 1 and NSCID No. 4, has the well-defined mission of providing a mechanism for facilitating coordination of intelligence activities among the intelligence agencies and achieving, at the highest level, a community-wide view on intelligence opinion affecting the national security. A primary responsibility of the IAC is to consider and approve National Intelligence Estimates. IAC properly has cognizance over (1) the production and dissemination of finished intelligence based on COMINT and ELINT, as well as all other sources of information, and (2) the establishment and review of national intelligence objectives which affect directly the requirements placed on COMINT and ELINT activities, as well as on other information collecting and producing operations.

8. IAC's membership includes the appropriate agencies engaged in producing and disseminating finished intelligence. IAC meetings cover a broad area of interests, and staffing of agenda items may involve a relatively large number of offices and individuals within the respective intelligence agencies. IAC papers pass through normal channels (only occasionally through special channels, when intelligence based on COMINT is involved), and frequently require wide distribution and handling.

9. Accordingly, a merger of USCIB and IAC would:

a. Tend to break down two established principles--need-to-know and compartmentation of COMINT activities, and tend to increase the total number of individuals cleared for COMINT, in opposition to the recommendation of the President's Board to reduce drastically the number of such clearances.

b. Fail to achieve economy or eliminate confusing or conflicting decisions, since the two organizations have well-defined and distinct responsibilities.

c. Result in heavy, heterogeneous and disparate agendas of meetings, and consequently slow down action. Certain items on each agenda would be of no concern to one or more of the members not

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SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Merger of IAC and USCIB)

now represented on USCIB or IAC, and their advisers; their presence, however, at the meetings as members of the merged Board would still be necessary. The number of persons unnecessarily and wastefully tied down by meetings would be increased.

10. The Army member of USCIB, therefore, recommends that USCIB non-concur with the proposed merger of USCIB and IAC as stated in Recommendation No. 2 of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

/s/
ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General, GS
ACofS, Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

Office of the Director

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29 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Executive Secretary, National Security Council dated 28 October 1957

TAB 4

1. In accordance with your instructions I have consulted with the IAC and USCIB agencies with regard to the subject recommendation, in the reference memorandum, that the two committees be merged. The members of both groups were given ample time prior to final consultation on the subject to give this matter the fullest consideration and each member was consulted individually by General Truscott.

2. The three service agencies, Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, believe that the merger would entail grave disadvantages. Among the remaining agencies, leaving aside for the moment my own position, the attitudes ranged from favorable in the case of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, to unfavorable in the case of the representative of the Joint Staff. The representative of the Department of Defense believed that in view of the shift of responsibilities involved it was not appropriate for him to make a decision without more specific detail on how the recommendation would be implemented. The Director of NSA felt that so long as he received adequate and authoritative policy guidance, he could operate under the merger or under the present situation equally well, but indicated that he himself would not wish to participate in the consideration of National Estimates and other related work of the IAC. However, he would have a representative present on any merged committee to gain any intelligence information as to priorities and collection objectives which might be useful to him in his work, and to give his support. The representative of the FBI expressed a neutral view.

3. Members opposing the merger concept advanced a number of points which they considered to be disadvantages. In summary they believed that such a merger would:

a. violate the principle that the U. S. COMINT effort must be compartmented and treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other intelligence activities. They believe that this activity should remain under the control of USCIB as a separate body, and that the principal role of the DCI in this field is to insure that intelligence production and other "normal" intelligence operations are coordinated with the separate COMINT operation. Furthermore, it would in their view down-grade the present USCIB structure to place it in the same position vis-a-vis the DCI and the NSC as is now the case with other foreign intelligence activities;

b. tend to increase the number of individuals cleared for and having access to COMINT information, thus jeopardizing security;

c. involve agencies and offices in the production of national intelligence that have no concern therein or capability therefor;

d. result in longer agendas, require larger attendance at meetings, and therefore waste time and personnel;

e. impair the favorable status of USCIB in international relationships in the field of COMINT;

f. combine functions which are essentially dissimilar, i.e., the development of policy and procedures with respect to the operation and security of the COMINT effort in contrast with the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

4. Members who looked with favor upon the merger concept generally favored further study to determine more specifically appropriate charter responsibilities and operational procedures, and to delimit certain safeguards prior to any final decision. They pointed out that a merger would be in harmony with a general trend toward better integration and more central direction of all government activities related to the national security, and that it would promote closer understanding and better knitting-together of activities within the Intelligence Community as a whole. With adequate safeguards, provision of which was considered to be entirely feasible and practicable, those representatives who were inclined to look with favor upon the merger

concept considered that some of the advantages which could be expected to ensue from such a merger include:

a. probable improved stature of the Intelligence Community in the over-all governmental structure and possible improvement in the attention paid to the intelligence product by policy-determining levels;

b. expedited consideration of matters pertaining to over-all intelligence policies, coordination, and supervision; and more effective community support for requirements -- budgetary and otherwise -- affecting the over-all Intelligence Community;

c. improvement in the intelligence-production process, by reduction of artificial barriers caused by greater compartmentation than actually required for security;

d. improved relationships and intelligence product resulting from "cross-fertilization" of ideas and more intimate associations and appreciations of intelligence problems.

5. It is my own conclusion that, while there is much to recommend a merger and it may eventually be desirable, it should not be directed at this time.

6. I reach my conclusion because (1) there is strong and sincerely motivated opposition on the part of many of the most important members of USCIB; (2) the two Boards are now functioning smoothly and in close coordination; (3) a consolidation of the two Boards would not in my opinion result in any early saving of time or effort. Possibly it would initially lead to a waste of time since the present supporting technical staffs and subcommittee structures of the IAC and USCIB are wholly distinct and the joint meetings would require both staffs to be available while waiting for their respective items on the agenda of the merged Board; (4) the merger would call for a prior major decision in principle with regard to the position of the Director of Central Intelligence. As Chairman of the IAC, the IAC member agencies are advisers to him, whereas in the case of USCIB he is the non-voting Chairman. A decision as to a change in the DCI's status, if it is desirable, should in my opinion be reached independently and prior to undertaking a merger.

7. I am further influenced in my conclusion by the fact that important and, I believe, very salutary developments in the coordination of the Intelligence Community's work are taking place, both through the

revision of the NSCIDs and otherwise, and a great measure of agreement in the Community is being evidenced. I should prefer to give these new measures a period of trial before a final decision on the merger is reached, including a revised draft of NSCID No. 9 covering USCIB's work, when agreed upon. It is also to be taken into account that certain reorganization steps are understood to be contemplated within the Department of Defense which may or may not have some bearing on the intelligence structure within that Department and hence on a proposed merger.

8. Accordingly, I recommend that action on Recommendation No. 2 of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities be deferred, and that I be directed to make further recommendations on this subject when we have had an opportunity to test the revised NSCIDs, and after the extent and scope of the reorganization steps referred to above have been clearly defined.

/S/

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

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THE PRESIDENT'S BOARD OF CONSULTANTS
ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

4 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Recommendation #2, Report of The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : Memo from DCI, 29 January 1958, Same Subject

TAB 5

We are pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the memorandum, 29 January 1958, of the Director of Central Intelligence in the above reference.

It is apparent from his memo that there is some misunderstanding on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to the purpose and intent of the Board's recommendation - i.e., the establishment of a single group at an appropriate level of government to assist and advise him in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations, concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the U.S. Such a group would be concerned principally with policy and guidance matters.

Operational and other non-policy functions now being performed by the IAC and the USCIB separately should be dealt with by appropriate committees at the Departmental level. These could continue to be handled on a compartmented basis to the extent that that might be desirable for security reasons.

For your information the Board discussed its views with the Director of Central Intelligence at its 28 February meeting and now recommends that he be directed to study ways and means of achieving the purposes of the Board's recommendation and report to the National Security Council within six months.

Chairman

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EXCERPT FROM NSC ACTION 1873 - March 13, 1958

Re Recommendation No. 2 of President's Board ---- IAC/USCIB Merger

f. Noted that the President had approved a recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities that there be established a single group to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States; such single group to be assigned the policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees). Further noted that the President had approved a directive to the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board, and to submit within six months for Council consideration, a draft NSCID to carry out the above-approved recommendation; and that, following the approval of an NSCID to the above effect, it would be necessary to review and modify appropriately certain of the draft NSCIDs referred to in a to e above.

TAB 6

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington

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March 14, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated October 24, 1957

REFERENCES:
A. Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated October 28, 1957
B. Memo from the Director of Central Intelligence for the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated January 29, 1958
C. Memo for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated March 4, 1958
D. NSC Action No. 1873, March 13, 1958

On March 12, 1958, the President, following consideration of the reference memoranda, directed implementation of the subject recommendation along the lines proposed by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

This approved recommendation, as indicated in References A and C, and noted yesterday by the Council in Reference D, contemplates that there be established a single group to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States; such single group to be assigned the policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees).

TAB 7

In line with the President's directive, it is further requested that the Director of Central Intelligence prepare, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the U. S. Communications Intelligence

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Board, and submit within six months for Council consideration, a draft National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) to carry out the subject recommendation.

As further indicated by NSC Action No. 1873-f, it will be necessary, following the approval of an NSCID to the above effect, to review and modify appropriately certain of the draft NSCIDs referred to in paragraphs a through e of NSC Action No. 1873.

25X1

Executive Secretary

cc: Members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
Members of the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board
The Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities