19 FEBRUARY 1974

DDCI ADDRESS FOR
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

GREAT POWER RELATIONS IN THE 70s

Thirty one years Ago

FORTUNATELY A LOOK AT PROSPECTS FOR GREAT POWER RELATIONS IN THE MID-1970S REQUIRES NO CRYSTAL BALL--ONLY A GOOD SET OF EYES AND EARS--AND A SENSE OF EQUILIBRIUM TO KEEP ONE'S BALANCE AT A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE. FOR NOW IN FEBRUARY 1974, THE MID-70S ARE WELL UPON US ALREADY. AS WE SAY IN WASHINGTON REDSKIN COUNTRY, "THE FUTURE IS NOW." YET WE ARE STILL TRYING TO ADJUST TO THE MAJOR SHIFTS IN GREAT POWER RELATIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, ALTERING THE SET PATTERN THAT HAD LARGELY PREVAILED SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

BUT INTELLIGENCE MUST LOOK AHEAD SO THAT WE CAN PLAN AHEAD--AS MID-70S GRADUALLY MERGE INTO THE LATE 70S AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE. SO LET US LOOK CAREFULLY ABOUT US AND SEE WHERE WE STAND WITH THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS, IN POLITICAL, STRATEGIC, AND ECONOMIC TERMS, AND HAZARD A FEW PROJECTIONS INTO THE YEARS AHEAD.

FIRST--SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION THAT

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HAS COME TO PREVAIL IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIANS. THE WORD "DETENTE" HAS GAINED ACCEPTANCE, AND IS INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV. WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE SOVIETS' POLICY OF DETENTE, HOWEVER, A CAREFUL DEFINITION IS IN ORDER.

DETENTE DOES NOT MEAN A CHANGE OF HEART. NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT MOSCOW HAS ABANDONED ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES. DETENTE DOES MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A REASSESSMENT OF THEIR SITUATION, SORTED OUT THEIR PRIORITIES MORE CAREFULLY, AND ADJUSTED THEIR BEHAVIOR ACCORDINGLY.

THIS REASSESSMENT HAS HIGHLIGHTED TWO BASIC FACTS FOR THEM. ONE IS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN CLOSING THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP. THEY HAVE NOW ACKNOWLEDGED TO THEMSELVES THAT, IF THEY ARE TO BEGIN CLOSING IT, THEY NEED TO IMPORT AND ABSORB LARGE AMOUNTS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. THE SECOND BASIC FACT IS HOSTILITY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR. MOSCOW SEES PEKING AS REBUFFING ALL SOVIET OVERTURES FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND THE BORDER NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN AT SQUARE ONE.

BOTH THE ECONOMIC FACTOR AND THE CHINESE FACTOR ARE THUS FAIRLY LONG-TERM ONES, AND BOTH WORK IN THE

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SAME DIRECTION ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. OBVIOUSLY, NORMAL AND AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ARE NECESSARY IF THE SOVIETS ARE TO PROMOTE THEIR ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES. MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE WEST WOULD UNDERMINE THE CHANCES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL GAIN. Soviet Story

TENSE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST WOULD ALSO EXPOSE THE USSR TO THE RISK OF PRESSURE ON TWO FRONTS: WESTERN AND EASTERN. SO LONG AS CHINA REMAINS ACTIVELY HOSTILE, THE SOVIETS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN KEEPING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON AN EVEN KEEL. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WANT TO GIVE AS LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT AS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE US--WHICH APPEARS TO THE RUSSIANS AS COLLUSION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE POSITIVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES AS WELL. DETENTE PROVIDES A USEFUL CLIMATE FOR THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE. IT ALSO SUPPORTS MOSCOW'S CLAIM OF ITS RIGHT TO BE INVOLVED IN ALL INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST.

THESE CURRENT PRIORITIES HAVE SOME IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH THE US. MOSCOW IS NO LONGER SO AUTOMATIC IN OPPOSING US POLICY IN EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE. THIS HAS HELPED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIA-

TIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT HAS NOT, OF COURSE, SOLVED MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE AREA, NOR DO THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DO THAT.

BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE IS COMMITED TO DETENTE. LAST YEAR HE MADE HIS BIGGEST GAINS WITH HIS TRIPS TO BONN AND WASHINGTON. ALL BREZHNEV'S POLITBURO COLLEAGUES NOW ACKNOWLEDGE HIS PREEMINENT POSITION, BUT HE IS AWARE HE CANNOT GET TOO FAR AHEAD OF THEM, AND MUST SHOW SOME FRUITS OF DETENTE. COPING WITH DISSIDENTS LIKE SOLZHENITSYN POSES A CONTINUING DILEMMA OF HOW TO SQUARE THE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE WITH FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, RECORD GRAIN PRODUCTION LED TO A COMEBACK FROM A DISMAL 1972 SHOWING, BUT MOSCOW'S GOAL OF OVERTAKING THE US REMAINS AS DISTANT AS EVER. THE USSR STILL PRODUCES ONLY ABOUT HALF AS MUCH GOODS AND SERVICES AS THE US WITH A LABOR FORCE 50 PERCENT LARGER.

LOGICALLY, DETENTE SHOULD ALSO LEAD TO A FURTHER EASING OF THE ARMS RACE. BUT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED YET. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS REPRESENT A POWERFUL COMPETITIVE THRUST IN THE AREAS NOT COVERED BY SALT AGREEMENTS, MAINLY IN THE AREA OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. THUS FAR, MOSCOW SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT

IT CAN PROCEED ON A VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF WEAPONS MODERNIZATION WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY GETTING THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DETENTE.

SO, IN HIGHLIGHTING OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, I WILL ADDRESS THREE QUESTIONS:

--WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS DEVELOPING NOW?

--WHAT NEW SYSTEMS WILL THEY DEPLOY?

--WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE TO THE US-SOVIET BALANCE DURING THE COMING YEARS?

ONE OF OUR VERY RECENT JUDGMENTS IS THAT THE PACE AND SCOPE OF CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IS UNPRECEDENTED, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF ICBM DEVELOPMENT. THE RUSSIANS ARE ENGAGED IN A BROAD RANGE OF PROGRAMS TO AUGMENT, MODERNIZE, AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK. LET ME PLACE THESE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEXT:

FIRST, THE LARGE SCALE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS OF THE SIXTIES LED THE SOVIETS TO A POSITION OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN FACT, IT PLACED THE SOVIET UNION AHEAD OF THE US IN NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND LEFT THE SOVIETS IN THE PROCESS OF TAKING THE LEAD IN SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES.

AS OF THE FIRST OF THIS MONTH, THE SOVIETS HAD

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A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 1,500 OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS. IN ADDITION, ABOUT 100 MORE LAUNCHERS WERE UNDERGOING CONSTRUCTION OR MODERNIZATION. THE NUMBER OF US ICBM LAUNCHERS REMAINS AT 1,054.

IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MAKING GREAT EFFORTS IN THE NAVAL AREA. THEY NOW HAVE SOME 580 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, CARRIED ABOARD A FLEET OF 44 NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES. APPROXIMATELY 200 ADDITIONAL LAUNCHERS ARE ON SUBMARINES NOW IN VARIOUS STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION. THE US POSSESSES 656 LAUNCHERS ON 41 NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES.

THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER FORCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE EFFORT TO ATTAIN STRATEGIC EQUALITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. AND THE US RETAINS A GREAT LEAD IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND BOMBS BY A RATIO OF ABOUT SEVEN TO TWO.

NOW, IN THEIR CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ROUND, THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUR NEW LAND-BASED ICBMS IN THE FLIGHT TEST STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. THREE HAVE BEEN FLIGHT TESTED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES--MIRVS--AND THE FOURTH MAY ALSO HAVE A MIRV CAPABILITY. IF TESTING PROCEEDS SMOOTHLY, ALL FOUR SYSTEMS COULD BE READY TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. HARDER LAUNCH SILOS, WHICH

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WILL IMPROVE ICBM FORCE SURVIVABILITY, ARE ALSO PART OF THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

AS FOR SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, LARGER AND IMPROVED SUBMARINES, SUCH AS THE D-CLASS, ARE COMING OFF THE WAYS. THE D-CLASS, WHOSE DEPLOYMENT BEGAN IN 1973, CARRIES A MISSILE WITH AN OPERATIONAL RANGE OF 4,200 NAUTICAL MILES--OVER THREE TIMES GREATER THAN THE ONE CARRIED IN THE Y-CLASS, THE SOVIET VERSION OF OUR POLARIS. THIS NEW MISSILE COULD REACH MUCH OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES EVEN IF FIRED FROM OR NEAR HOME PORTS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IN SHORT, SOVIET PROGRAMS OF THE SIXTIES CONCENTRATED ON QUANTITY. THEIR NEW ROUND OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IS FOCUSING MAINLY ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE NEW ROUND OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WAS CONCEIVED LONG BEFORE THE MAY 1972 SALT INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITING CERTAIN STRATEGIC ARMS. MOST OF THE NEW PROGRAMS INVOLVED WERE EVIDENT OR FORSEEABLE AT THAT TIME. THOSE THAT WE NOW SEE DO NOT VIOLATE THE SALT ONE AGREEMENT.

WHY, SOME MAY ASK, HAVE THE SOVIETS ENGAGED IN

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SUCH AN ENERGETIC EFFORT, PARTICULARLY AFTER THEY HAD ALREADY ATTAINED A CONDITION OF RECOGNIZED STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE US?

WE JUDGE THAT MUCH OF THE ACTIVITY REFLECTS INTERNAL BUREAUCRATIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MOMENTUM--PLUS A CONSCIOUS SOVIET LEADERSHIP DECISION TO TRY TO KEEP UP WITH THE COMPETITION. IN THE AREA OF MIRVS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG INDICATED A FEELING THAT THEY MUST CATCH UP IF THEY ARE TO BE ACCEPTED AS FULL STRATEGIC EQUALS OF THE US. THE SOVIETS' EMPHASIS ON MIRVS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS A NEED TO PLAN FOR VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES--INVOLVING CHINA AND OTHER PERIPHERAL TARGETS, AS WELL AS THE US.

BUT, THE CURRENT ROUND OF DEVELOPMENT ALSO INVOLVES AN ELEMENT OF OPPORTUNISM--TO PRESS AHEAD, TO SEE WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR, TO TRY TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITION RELATIVE TO THE US. TO GO BACK TO THE MIRV EXAMPLE, THEY SURELY RECOGNIZE THAT EXTENSIVE MIRVING OF THEIR ICBMS WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN TO LEAVE THE US BEHIND IN DELIVERY VEHICLES.

NOW TO THE SECOND MAIN QUESTION: WILL THE SOVIETS DEPLOY WHAT THEY ARE DEVELOPING? THE ANSWER

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COULD WELL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT LAST JUNE, YOU RECALL, PRESIDENT NIXON AND BREZHNEV AGREED TO SEEK A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

FACTORS THAT MAY INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO CONCLUDE A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT ARE:

--A BELIEF THAT A NEW ROUND IN SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD PROVOKE OFFSETTING US REACTIONS WHICH WOULD DENY THEM ANY STRATEGIC GAIN, AND PERHAPS EVEN WORSEN THEIR POSITION, AND

--CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET RESTRAINT WOULD BE RECIPROCATED ON TERMS THAT WOULD GIVE THE USSR BOTH THE IMAGE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF EQUALITY.

OF COURSE, WE CANNOT PREDICT IN DETAIL THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS OF A SALT II AGREEMENT. SOME FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO BE PERMITTED UNDER ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL REPLACE MANY OF THE EXISTING STRATEGIC FORCES WITH THEIR NEWER, MORE ADVANCED SYSTEMS.

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IF A NEW SALT AGREEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED, THE SCOPE OF THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT IS LIKELY TO BE GREATER. BUT AS I MENTIONED JUST A MOMENT AGO, A MAJOR SOVIET PUSH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR THEY COULD PRESS AHEAD WITHOUT PROVOKING US COUNTERACTION.

IN ANY CASE, THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF SOVIET MISSILE FORCES IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO INCREASE BY SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS DURING THE COMING YEARS.

THIS TAKES US TO THE THIRD QUESTION: WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IMPROVED SOVIET CAPABILITIES MAKE TO THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW STRATEGIC BALANCE?

THIS IS A QUESTION OF TECHNOLOGY, OF STRATEGY, AND ALSO OF POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY, BECAUSE, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOW WE AND THEY PERCEIVE THE BALANCE IS MOST CRUCIAL TO DETERRENCE AND THE EXERCISE OF POWER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THE MAJOR US STRATEGIC CONCERN OVER SOVIET FORCE IMPROVEMENT IS HOW IT AFFECTS THE SURVIVABILITY OF OUR OWN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT BELIEVE THAT BY DEPLOYING MORE--AND INCREASINGLY ACCURATE--MISSILES, THEY CAN IMPROVE THEIR ABILITY TO ATTACK US MISSILE SILOS.

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GIVEN THE SIZE AND DIVERSITY OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES DEPLOYED BY BOTH SIDES, HOWEVER, WE JUDGE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR EITHER SIDE TO ACQUIRE A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST THE OTHER IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. AT PRESENT, FOR INSTANCE, THE SOVIETS CAN POSE ONLY A NEGLIBLE THREAT TO OUR POLARIS AND POSEIDON SUBMARINES. THE SOVIET NAVY LACKS A DETECTION SYSTEM FOR LOCATING ENEMY SUBMARINES IN THE OPEN OCEAN, AND ITS OWN ARE UNABLE TO TRAIL THE QUIETER US MISSILE SUBMARINES. SOVIET EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THIS SITUATION ARE, AT BEST, STILL IN THE R&D STAGE.

NEVERTHELESS, THE NEW ROUND OF SOVIET DEVELOPMENT POSES UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THEIR PROGRAMS. OUR EFFORT IN SALT II IS DIRECTED AT REDUCING THESE UNCERTAINTIES.

BEAR STORY

Paris

NOW, JUST A FEW WORDS ON CHINESE STRATEGIC PROGRAMS BEFORE TURNING TO SOME OF THE POLITICAL DYNAMISM GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AND PEKING. CHINA IS MOVING UP, BUT WITH DELIBERATION. BY LAST SUMMER IT BECAME APPARENT THAT A MARKED SLOWDOWN HAD OCCURRED ABOUT LATE 1971-EARLY 1972 IN A NUMBER OF CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND TESTING

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PROGRAMS. THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS NOT BEEN TESTED SINCE 1971. CHINA'S ICBM, WITH A 7,000 NAUTICAL MILE RANGE, HAS BEEN TESTED ONLY FOUR TIMES, MOST RECENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO ORBIT A SATELLITE. ONLY THE FIRST LAUNCH WAS SUCCESSFUL. FINALLY, IN 1972 MONTHLY PRODUCTION OF THE TU-16 MEDIUM BOMBER WAS CUT BACK FROM TWO TO ONE, AND APPARENTLY SUSPENDED ALTOGETHER IN THE LATTER HALF OF LAST YEAR, AFTER ONLY ABOUT 60 HAD BEEN DEPLOYED WITH OPERATIONAL UNITS.

THUS, PEKING'S DETERRENT FORCE FOR THE MOST PART WILL REMAIN MARGINAL. AS FAR AS THE US IS CONCERNED, CHINA'S NUCLEAR THREAT THROUGH MID-1978 WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND ALMOST ENTIRELY ON A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE ONLY THOSE US BASES AND OUR ALLIES LOCATED IN EAST ASIA.

IN RESPECT TO THE RUSSIANS, PEKING THROUGH MID-1978 WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON A MINIMUM NUCLEAR DETERRENT, AND ON A DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY IN DEPTH AGAINST A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

NEVERTHELESS, CHINA'S NUCLEAR ATTACK CAPABILITY HAS INFLUENCED SOVIET MILITARY PLANNERS, AND SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE HAVE RESULTED. WE SHOULD NOTE THAT SOME OF THE SOVIET

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ICBMs AND IRBMs--AND PRESUMABLY SOME OF THEIR MEDIUM BOMBERS AND OLDER DIESEL POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AS WELL--ARE TARGETED AGAINST CHINA. ALSO, SOVIET THEATER FORCES DEPLOYED ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROVIDE BOTH A CONVENTIONAL AND A TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY FOR COMBAT IN SINKIANG, OUTER MONGOLIA, AND MANCHURIA. TACTICAL NUCLEAR SUPPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED BY SCUD AND FROG TACTICAL MISSILES AND BY THE LONGER RANGE SCALEBOARD MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEM.

AS FOR THE CHINESE, THERE IS GENUINE FEAR IN PEKING THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT SPRING A SURPRISE ATTACK. IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT FORESEE A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE BY EITHER SIDE IN ANYTHING APPROACHING THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

CHINESE DEPLOYMENTS SHOW AN AWARENESS OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY, AND ARE FOCUSED ON DEFENSE. HAVING LEARNED THE VIRTUES OF RESTRAINT FROM THEIR DIFFERENCES ALONG THE BORDER IN 1969, THE CHINESE SEEM LIKELY TO RESIST ANY TEMPTATION TO TEST MOSCOW'S TOLERANCE.

FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE ARE STRONG MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD MAKE A PREMEDITATED ATTACK UNLIKELY. MOSCOW HAS TOLD ITS PEOPLE THAT A DISARMING NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST CHINESE STRATEGIC

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MISSILE LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE WITHOUT RETALIATION, AND A LAND INVASION COULD VERY WELL GET BOGGED DOWN. POLITICALLY, A MAJOR SOVIET MOVE WOULD END ANY POSSIBILITY OF RECONCILIATION WITH CHINA, AND COULD JEOPARDIZE DETENTE WITH THE US.

EVEN WITHOUT MILITARY CONFLICT, PERSISTENT, OFTEN ACUTE, SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS LIE AHEAD. CHINA HAS SERIOUS PRETENTIONS TO BEING A GREAT POWER (ALTHOUGH IT DISCLAIMS ANY PLANS FOR BECOMING A "SUPERPOWER"). AS IT SEES THINGS, ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS CLASH ALMOST EVERYWHERE IN ASIA WITH THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. PEKING CONSIDERS BREZHNEV'S IDEA OF AN ASIAN SECURITY PACT AS A DIRECT CHALLENGE, CAPPING THE SOVIETS' LONG-TERM STRUGGLE TO GAIN PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA--AT CHINESE EXPENSE. PEKING FEARS THAT MOSCOW WILL TRY TO EXPAND ITS PRESENCE THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THAT IT IS ALREADY WORKING TO DRAW JAPAN INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT.

IF THESE FEARS WERE REALIZED, MOSCOW WOULD EFFECTIVELY RING CHINA. AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO THINK

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THAT THE USSR IS AT ONCE LESS PREDICTABLE AND MORE BRUTAL THAN THEY BELIEVED THE US TO BE EVEN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR. ABOVE ALL, CHINA IS STUCK WITH ITS LONG, HARD-TO-DEFEND BORDER WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

NOW, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT IF RELATIONS WERE IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD NO LONGER HAVE MUCH REASON TO PURSUE A POLICY OF "ENCIRCLING" CHINA AND MIGHT BE LESS EAGER TO FLEX THEIR MILITARY MUSCLE ALONG THE BORDER. BUT TO PURSUE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOSCOW CHINA WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETELY REORIENT ITS PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY--THE MOST SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE COMING TO POWER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY AGO.

EVEN IF RAPPROCHEMENT WERE SUCCESSFUL, CHINA WOULD STILL BE THE FAR WEAKER PARTY IN A NEW ENTENTE, AND CHINA MIGHT END UP IN MANY RESPECTS AS A SATELLITE OF THE USSR. THE CHINESE THINK THAT DURING THE 1950S, MOSCOW SACRIFICED PEKING'S INTERESTS AT EVERY CRUCIAL TURN. THIS IS THE CORE OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S ARGUMENT AGAINST ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

CONCERNED ABOVE ALL WITH THE THREAT THEY PERCEIVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THE CHINESE FIND THE UNITED

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STATES A USEFUL COUNTERWEIGHT TO MOSCOW. NOW THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER ISOLATED, THEY ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OUR REACTIONS INTO ACCOUNT IF THEY WERE TO CONSIDER STEPPING UP THE PRESSURE ON CHINA. IN FACT, THE CHINESE PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT IF THEY CONTINUE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES--AND ANY SLOWDOWN IN THE US-SOVIET DETENTE WOULD BE MUCH TO PEKING'S ADVANTAGE. IN ANY EVENT, THEY BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US, BOTH SUPERPOWERS WITH WORLDWIDE INTERESTS, ARE ENGAGED IN A PERMANENT COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE, DETENTE NOTWITHSTANDING. THE CHINESE HOPE TO MAKE DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC HEADWAY ON THE MARGIN OF THAT COMPETITION, JUST AS THEY SEE US DOING ON THE MARGIN OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY.

THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE ADAGE "MAKE FRIENDS WITH DISTANT STATES IN ORDER TO OPPOSE NEIGHBORING STATES" ALSO COMES INTO PLAY HERE. IN FACT, GIVEN THE CHINESE PREOCCUPATION WITH MOSCOW, PEKING NOW SEES A CONTINUING US PRESENCE IN ASIA--AND ELSEWHERE--AS A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE. THE CHINESE HAVE ACCEPTED THE LOGIC THAT THE US POSITION IN JAPAN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE--AND TO A

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LESSER EXTENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST--IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SOVIET POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC GAINS IN THOSE AREAS. THEY HAVE ARGUED THIS CASE WITH SUCH FORMER FRIENDS AS THE JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE "MARXIST-LENINIST" PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE.

THE CHINESE ASSUME THAT THE US IS SLOWLY WITHDRAWING FROM FORWARD POSITIONS IN ASIA--FOR EXAMPLE, INDOCHINA--AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY WASHINGTON POSES NO DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT. ON THE CONTRARY, PEKING SEEMS TO HOPE THAT ANY US WITHDRAWAL FROM FORWARD ASIAN POSITIONS WOULD BE A DELIBERATE AND LONG-TERM MOVEMENT; A RAPID DEPARTURE WOULD MERELY CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOSCOW TO ATTEMPT TO FILL THE VACUUM.

IT IS ENTIRELY LIKELY, OF COURSE, THAT OVER THE LONG TERM THE CHINESE HOPE AND EXPECT TO INHERIT THE US POSITION, NOTABLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND TAIWAN. DURING THE TRANSITION, PEKING SEEMS TO BELIEVE ITS OWN INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY NOT PRESSING TOO HARD, LEST IT CREATE UNDUE FRICTIONS WITH WASHINGTON, OR EVEN LEAD NATIONS ON ITS SOUTHERN AND EASTERN PERIPHERY TO TURN TO MOSCOW FOR PROTECTION.

IN SHORT, THE SINO-US RELATIONSHIP AS IT IS NOW

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Chou's personal leadership

DEVELOPING IS ALMOST EXACTLY THE REVERSE OF THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. CHINESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES, IN THE LARGER ESSENTIALS, ARE CONGRUENT, NOT CONFLICTING. THEY RUN ON PARALLEL LINES, AND BECAUSE THEY DO, THE POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS FRICTION HAS DIMINISHED. AND BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING HERE WITH BROAD QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST, IT ALSO SEEMS LIKELY THAT WHOEVER SUCCEEDS MAO AND CHOU EN-LAI IN POWER IN PEKING IS GOING TO DISCOVER THAT THERE ARE STRONG, PERHAPS COMPELLING, REASONS TO KEEP THE SINO-US DETENTE ON COURSE. THESE REASONS PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE SO LONG AS TENSIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW REMAIN HIGH, OR UNTIL CHINA FEELS ITSELF STRONG ENOUGH NOT TO NEED POWERFUL FRIENDS--A DISTANT PROSPECT INDEED. — Huang Chen. I drink to your success

BEFORE TURNING FROM CHINA, WE SHOULD GIVE SOME ATTENTION TO THE VENERABLE KEY PERSONALITIES IN PEKING. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DENY THAT MAO TSE-TUNG'S WELL DEVELOPED ANTI-SOVIET BIASES PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT PART IN PRECIPITATING THE PRESENT DISPUTE AND IN SHAPING ITS DEVELOPMENT. THE REMOVAL--THROUGH DEATH OR INCAPACITATION--OF THIS ELEMENT OF PERSONAL ANIMUS FROM THE SINO-SOVIET EQUATION WILL CERTAINLY AFFECT

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THE STYLE OF THE CHINESE APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION, AND IT MIGHT AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE AS WELL. MAO HIMSELF SEEMS ACUTELY AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY. IN THE PAST YEAR OR TWO HE APPARENTLY HAS BEEN MANEUVERING TO ENSURE THAT CHINA DOES NOT BACK AWAY FROM THE DISPUTE WITH MOSCOW EVEN AFTER HE HAS LEFT THE SCENE.

I SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO GET MAO ALONE IN A CORNER OVER A GLASS OF MAO-TAI, HE WOULD READILY ADMIT THAT ANY LEADER HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY WILLING HIS OWN POLICIES TO HIS SUCCESSORS. THERE IN FACT ARE SOME ARGUMENTS FOR A DECIDED IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, AND THEY ARE NOT HARD TO DISCERN.

CONTINUED EXACERBATION OF TENSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, RUNS THE RISK THAT FIRE-EATING ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW MAY AT SOME POINT CONCLUDE THAT, RATHER THAN ALLOW THE DISPUTE INDEFINITELY TO DRAIN SOVIET ENERGIES, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CAUTERIZE THE WOUND.

ALSO, SOME CHINESE LEADERS MAY BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOSCOW, PEKING AND WASHINGTON WORKS TO CHINA'S DISADVANTAGE, WITH WASHINGTON PLAYING OFF ONE COMMUNIST STATE AGAINST THE OTHER.

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FINALLY, THERE MAY BE AN IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND: IT IS BETTER TO COOPERATE WITH EVEN A "DEGENERATED" SOCIALIST STATE THAN WITH THE ROTTEN CAPITALISTS. 800 million.

THE CHINESE THEMSELVES CLAIM THAT SOME AT LEAST OF THESE ARGUMENTS WERE RAISED BY LIN PIAO--MAO'S OFFICIAL SUCCESSOR--BEFORE HIS FALL IN 1971. THERE ARE, MOREOVER, TENTATIVE SIGNS THAT MAO AND CHOU BELIEVE THAT SOME ELEMENTS IN THE LEADERSHIP STILL HARBOR SIMILAR THOUGHTS. IF SO, IT IS LIKELY THEY ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE MILITARY, LIN PIAO'S FORMER BASE OF POWER. IN FACT, IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SOME MILITARY FIGURES COULD ARGUE THAT THE QUICKEST WAY TO INCREASE CHINA'S MILITARY STRENGTH WOULD BE TO REACH A LIMITED UNDERSTANDING WITH MOSCOW, THUS MAKING THE SOVIET UNION AVAILABLE AS A SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF MILITARY HARDWARE. IF ARGUMENTS OF THIS SORT CAN BUBBLE UNDER THE SURFACE WHILE MAO LIVES, IT IS ALL THE MORE POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL FLARE UP ONCE HE IS GONE.

AT THAT TIME, CHINA'S LEADERS MIGHT TRY FOR SOME RELATIVELY MINOR AMELIORATION OF THE PRESENT

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TENSION IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE SOVIET PRESSURE. MOSCOW, FOR ITS PART, IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN CHINESE ATTITUDE, JUST AS PEKING DID FOLLOWING THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV. BUT CHINESE AND SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD STILL BE CONFLICTING, AND THIS IS LIKELY TO BE THE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN ANY EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

LET US TAKE ALL THIS A STEP FURTHER. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER NOT ONLY MAO BUT CHOU EN-LAI WAS NO LONGER ON THE SCENE? GIVEN THE RECORD OF THE PAST EIGHT YEARS, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO EXPECT A PERIOD OF INSTABILITY. ONE OR ANOTHER ELEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER MIGHT WELL RAISE QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY AS A MEANS OF GAINING AN ADVANTAGE OVER RIVALS.

NOW, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR POWER WOULD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ADVOCATE A FULL-SCALE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MOSCOW. THIS COULD BE PAINTED AS A "SELL OUT" TO THE REVISIONISTS. BUT SOME CONTENDER MIGHT WELL CLAIM THAT A RIVAL HAD DONE JUST THAT, AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN FOLLOWING DOMESTIC CHINESE POLITICS--YES, EVEN MORE THAN WE DO--MIGHT IN TURN

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MISREAD THE ACCUSATION FOR A FACT. CONVERSELY, MOSCOW MIGHT CALCULATE THAT A PROLONGED INTERNAL STRUGGLE HAD LEFT CHINA VULNERABLE TO THE APPLICATION OF INCREASED PRESSURE. THIS TOO, I THINK, WOULD BE A MISREADING; NOTHING WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO UNITE WARRING FACTIONS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY THAN A BRUTAL SOVIET POWER PLAY. BUT THE POINT REMAINS: IN THE EVENT OF INTERNAL CONTENTION IN CHINA IN THE WAKE OF THE DEATH OF BOTH MAO AND CHOU, A MISCALCULATION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD LEAD TO INTERVENTION OR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA. Nixon Brezhnev Story

COMPLETING MY PROSPECTUS ON GREAT POWER RELATIONS IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, I SHALL RETURN TO EUROPE, THE PRIME AREA OF OUR TENSIONS WITH MOSCOW FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES. BECAUSE OF THE MASSIVE FORCES IN US AND SOVIET HANDS FOR MUTUAL DETERRENCE, AND THEIR LEADERS' INTERESTS IN AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR, I WILL HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE ISSUES AND ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN A HYPOTHETICAL WARSAW PACT-NATO CONFLICT SHORT OF AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

WE SHOULD NOTE, TO START, THAT SOVIET DOCTRINE ON THE ESCALATION OF A EUROPEAN CONFLICT HAS BEEN MODIFIED SINCE THE MID-SIXTIES. THE EARLIER POSITION

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THAT ANY WAR INVOLVING NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ESCALATE DIRECTLY TO THEATER-WIDE NUCLEAR WAR HAS BEEN ALTERED TO ALLOW FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. SOVIET MILITARY WRITERS HAVE PAID INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING ARMED FORCES EQUIPPED AND TRAINED FOR CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE.

IN EITHER A NUCLEAR OR A CONVENTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT RAPID OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IN ITS FORWARD AREAS, THE WARSAW PACT MAINTAINS FORCES--SOME 33 DIVISIONS--IMMEDIATELY READY FOR COMBAT, BUT EACH IS MUCH SMALLER THAN A US DIVISION. THESE FORCES ARE DESIGNED TO BLUNT A NATO ATTACK AND THEN TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. IN ADDITION, THE PACT HAS ALMOST 30 MORE DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, OPPOSITE THE NATO CENTRAL REGION. THESE ARE UNDERSTRENGTH DIVISIONS, HOWEVER, THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE FLESHED OUT BY MOBILIZATION. AT BEST THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY WOULD BE SOMEWHAT SUSPECT, AND IF THEY WERE COMMITTED BEFORE MOBILIZATION, THEY WOULD HAVE ONLY LIMITED OFFENSIVE EFFECTIVENESS AND ENDURANCE.

THE STRUCTURE, EQUIPMENT, AND POSTURE OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES ACCENTUATES INITIAL COMBAT AND

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SHOCK POWER. THE DIVISIONS ARE HEAVILY ARMORED AND HAVE GOOD TACTICAL MOBILITY, ALTHOUGH LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS RELATIVELY AUSTERE. MAJOR GROUND FORCE UNITS HAVE A TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. MOST OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BASED WITHIN THE WESTERN USSR ARE MEDIUM BOMBERS AND FIRST GENERATION MRBMS AND IRBMS. THE SIZE OF THIS MISSILE FORCE HAS BEEN DECLINING IN RECENT YEARS, BUT THE DECLINE HAS BEEN OFFSET BY THE ADDITION OF SOME SS-11 ICBMS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE TARGETED ON THE EUROPEAN THEATER.

AS TO THE FUTURE COMPOSITION AND WEAPONRY OF THE FORCES, THE PACT IS INCREASING AND MODERNIZING TANK FORCES AND ITS INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED IN RECENT YEARS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY, NOW IN TROOP TESTING,WILL PROBABLY SOON BE INTRODUCED. AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ARE BEING ENLARGED AND MODERNIZED--TACTICAL AIRCRAFT WITH BETTER LOW-LEVEL ATTACK AND LOAD-CARRYING CAPABILITIES ARE BEING INTRODUCED, AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES ARE BEING IMPROVED. ALSO, SOVIET MAJOR SURFACE SHIP CONSTRUCTION WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE MULTIPURPOSE SHIPS. FINALLY, THE NEW HIGH-PERFORMANCE, SWING-WING BACKFIRE BOMBER WILL SOON ENTER THE FORCE, ENHANCING

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THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. THE BACKFIRE IS ALSO LIKELY TO BE DEPLOYED WITH SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION.

TALK OF THE NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL HEALTH OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WE READILY FIND THAT THE SAME TIDE OF EVENTS WHICH IS SWEEPING THE US AND CHINA ALONG CONGRUENT COURSES ALSO THREATENS TO WASH AWAY THE FAMILIAR LANDMARKS OF THE ALLIANCE. THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO MEND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST--BOTH THE US AND EUROPE--PRESENTS PROBLEMS AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR ITS EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS.

PARADOXICALLY, THE MORE THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF WORKING HAND IN HAND, THE LESS THE EUROPEANS ADMIT THE VALIDITY OF THE PRIORITY WASHINGTON ATTACHES TO ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, AND THE MORE THEY DECRY THE POSSIBILITY OF A "CONDOMINIUM" THAT THEY FEAR MAY SLIGHT EUROPEAN INTERESTS.

IF THE EUROPEANS RETAIN THE POTENTIAL FOR A "SPOILER" ROLE AMONG THE GREAT POWERS, IT IS NOT BECAUSE THEY CAN OUTBID THE US FOR CLOSER TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, ONE DANGER IS THAT EUROPE MIGHT DIVERGE ENOUGH FROM A COMMON WESTERN LINE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT FEEL IT POSSIBLE TO MEDDLE AND EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

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ANOTHER DANGER IS THAT EUROPE'S CAPACITY FOR INDEPENDENT ACTION MIGHT UPSET UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

EUROPE'S CURRENT SEARCH FOR OIL AND INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD ILLUSTRATES THE POINT. THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF UNRESTRAINED EUROPEAN PROVISION OF ARMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEEDS HARDLY TO BE STRESSED. THE EUROPEANS' FLIRTATION WITH JAPAN--OR, EVENTUALLY WITH CHINA--ALSO SHOWS THEIR FEELING THAT THEY SHOULD NOT GIVE UP THE OPTION OF WORKING TOGETHER IN ORDER TO OFFSET--IN HOWEVER VAGUE A WAY--EXCESSIVE COZINESS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

WE SHOULD NOW ASK HOW THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A UNITED EUROPE AFFECTS A EUROPEAN ROLE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS?

IT MUST BE SAID AT THE OUTSET--AND ESPECIALLY AT THIS TIME OF DISARRAY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY--THAT THE EVENTUAL SHAPE OF A WESTERN EUROPE UNION WILL PROBABLY NOT BE CLEAR EVEN WITHIN THIS DECADE. SO BOTH WE AND THE RUSSIANS WILL LEARN TO LIVE WITH--AND BE TEMPTED TO EXPLOIT--A EUROPE OFTEN AT ODDS WITH ITSELF.

PERHAPS, THOUGH, I MIGHT VENTURE A FEW GUESSES ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE UNITY MOVEMENT.

THE CENTRIPETAL FORCES--NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH ARISE FROM HAVING TO COMPETE WITH OTHER POWER CEN-

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TERS--WILL PROBABLY OUTWEIGH THE FRAGMENTATION OF EUROPE EVIDENT IN TODAY'S HEADLINES ABOUT INDIVIDUAL SCRAMBLING FOR OIL, DISARRAY OVER MONETARY POLICIES, AND DISPUTES OVER CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMON EC FUNDS. TENSIONS WILL NEVERTHELESS REMAIN WITHIN THE COMMUNITY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING SOME FORM OF FEDERATION AND THOSE SEEKING TO RESTRICT THE AUTONOMY OF A BUDDING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT.

THE END OF THE DECADE MAY WELL SEE SOME REINFORCEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL AUTHORITY, BUTTRESSED BY AN INCREASINGLY OUTSPOKEN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. A CONSOLIDATED EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE, HOWEVER, WOULD SEEM TO DEPEND ON A STRONG EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT THAT COULD--AS THE SAYING GOES--"PULL THE TRIGGER." WHILE THIS KIND OF A PLUNGE SEEMS A GOOD MANY YEARS OFF, A PERSISTING THREAT FROM THE EAST--ESPECIALLY IF PARALLELED BY US DISENGAGEMENT--WILL FOSTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF DEFENSE UNITY.

IN THE FAR EAST, JAPAN, AS BY ALL ODDS THE SINGLE STRONGEST NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRY, PRESENTS QUITE A DIFFERENT PICTURE. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS, IT HAS HAD THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS--THE BENEFITS OF THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US, COUPLED WITH NON-INVOLVEMENT IN OUR STRUGGLES WITH THE COMMUNIST POWERS. WITH THE RELAXING OF MAJOR POWER TENSIONS, HOWEVER, TOKYO HAS BEEN SHIFT-

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ING TOWARD A MORE ASSERTIVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY CALCULATED TO ENSURE ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS, VITAL FOR ITS INDUSTRY. JAPAN, PARADOXICALLY, HAS BECOME MORE VULNERABLE AS ITS LIVING STANDARDS HAVE RISEN.

LONG ON THE SIDELINES IN THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE FAR EAST, TOKYO NOW FINDS BOTH PEKING AND MOSCOW INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO MAKE USE OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC MUSCLE. AT THIS POINT, JAPAN IS WELL SITUATED. IT HAS MORE TO OFFER CHINA AND THE EASTERN USSR IN TERMS OF FINANCIAL, TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES THAN EITHER CAN OFFER JAPAN.

INDEED, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC POSITION--BOTH POWERFUL AND VULNERABLE--POINTS UP THE NEW DIMENSION THAT IS SCRAMBLING SOME OF OUR OLD CONCEPTS OF MAJOR POWER RELATIONS. THE GROWING WEALTH OF THE ARABS, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL GIVE THEM A POTENTIALLY DOMINANT ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND MONETARY MARKETS. THIS YEAR ALONE, WE CALCULATE THAT OIL-EXPORTING STATES WILL ACCUMULATE $40 BILLION MORE THAN THEY CAN SPEND. THESE FUNDS COULD BE USED TO CREATE SEVERE PRESSURE ON EXCHANGE RATES AND INTEREST RATES IF THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS CANNOT PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE GOODS OR INVESTMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS.

THE SPECTER OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION ALSO

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ARISES WITH AGRICULTURE--PARTICULARLY WHEAT, THE PRINCIPAL FOOD GRAIN TO FEED THE WORLD'S HUNGRY. AS WORLD DEMAND HAS GROWN, EXPORTERS LIKE THE US AND CANADA HAVE BEEN DRAWING DOWN THEIR STOCKS SO THAT BY JULY 1 THE RESERVES WILL BE ALMOST EXHAUSTED. BREZHNEV'S PROGRAM TO GIVE THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE A BETTER DIET IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS MOUNTING DEMAND. AT THE SAME TIME, IN GOOD CROP YEARS LIKE 1973, MOSCOW HAS READILY USED GRAIN EXPORTS FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES, SUCH AS IN "LOANING" 2 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT TO INDIA.

THE USSR AND CHINA ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED FROM THE FLUCTUATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, AND LARGELY SELF-SUFFICIENT IN PETROLEUM. BUT, AS I MENTIONED AT THE OUTSET, THEY FACE AN UPHILL STRUGGLE IN THEIR AVOWED GOAL OF SURPASSING INDUSTRIALIZED WESTERN COUNTRIES IN TECHNOLOGY. COMMUNIST PLANNERS ONCE BELIEVED THAT DOMESTIC R&D PLUS "BORROWING" THE LATEST WESTERN TECHNOLOGICAL IDEAS WOULD LEAD RAPIDLY TO "BURYING" CAPITALISM. HOWEVER, THEY UNDERESTIMATED THE PACE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, PARTICULARLY IN the U.S. GERMANY AND JAPAN, AND OVERESTIMATED THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR OWN R&D EFFORT. AS A RESULT, THE GAP BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES ACTUALLY HAS WIDENED, AND COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

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HAVE INTENSIFIED. I MIGHT ADD THAT, ESPECIALLY IN RUSSIA THIS ACROSS THE BOARD TECHNOLOGICAL GAP--FROM ELECTRIC RAZORS TO ICBM SYSTEMS--HAS BECOME A POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO THE SOVIET LEADERS. INCREASING CONTACTS WITH THE MORE DEVELOPED WEST HAVE MADE THIS DEFICIENCY HARDER TO HIDE, AND PUBLIC LECTURERS IN MOSCOW ARE CONSTANTLY BADGERED BY SOVIET CITIZENS WHO WANT TO KNOW WHY THE USSR CANNOT PRODUCE THE GADGETS WESTERNERS AND EVEN SOME OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE SO ACCUSTOMED TO.

THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO CLOSE THE GAP BY ACQUIRING TECHNICAL DATA, BY EXPANDING CONTACTS WITH WESTERN FIRMS AND SCIENTISTS, BY MAKING FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND--ESPECIALLY--BY PURCHASING MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. NONE OF THESE CHANNELS HAS LIVED UP TO COMMUNIST EXPECTATIONS. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, WESTERN EQUIPMENT FREQUENTLY IS NOT AS PRODUCTIVE IN A COMMUNIST SETTING AS IT IS ON NATIVE GROUND. ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL DATA OR COPY FOREIGN MACHINERY HAVE HAD MIXED SUCCESS. IN SOME MILITARY-RELATED FIELDS, THE RESULTS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING HAVE BEEN GOOD; IN CIVILIAN SECTORS, THE OUTCOME HAS BEEN LESS FAVORABLE.

THE ONSET OF DETENTE HAS DISMANTLED SOME OF THE TRADITIONAL OBSTACLES TO SOVIET ACQUISITION OF US

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TECHNOLOGY. MEDIUM-TERM AND LONG-TERM CREDITS EXTENDED BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE 1972 SUMMIT RESULTED IN A LARGE INCREASE IN SOVIET IMPORTS OF US EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THE RELAXATION OF SOME US EXPORT CONTROLS SINCE DETENTE CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISE IN IMPORTS, ALTHOUGH CONTROLS CONTINUE TO LIMIT ACCESS TO VERY SPECIALIZED AND SOPHISTICATED FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY.

THE SOVIET UNION FAR OUTSTRIPS CHINA IN ITS ABSORBTION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, BUT PEKING ALSO HAS GREATLY STEPPED UP ITS PURCHASES OF MACHINERY AND TECHNOLOGY. IN 1973, CHINA SIGNED CONTRACTS WITH US, JAPANESE AND WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS FOR A RECORD $1.2 BILLION WORTH OF COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS TO BE DELIVERED OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. MOREOVER, IN A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM A LONG-STANDING POLICY OF AVOIDING FOREIGN DEBT, DEFERRED PAYMENTS ARE BEING USED TO FINANCE TWO-THIRDS OF THE COSTS.

DESPITE SUCH SHIFTS TO HASTEN MODERNIZATION AND TO ASSURE LONG-TERM SELF-SUFFICIENCY, THE REST OF THE WORLD WILL NOT BE STANDING STILL. IN SOME FIELDS--FOR EXAMPLE, THE MORE ADVANCED ASPECTS OF MISSILERY AND AEROSPACE, ELECTRONICS, AND LASER TECHNOLOGY--THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP IS ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO NARROW.

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AS BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING TRY VAINLY TO CATCH UP WITH THE WEST, THE COMPETITION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY SECTORS IS PROBABLY NO LESS ACUTE THAN HERE IN THE US. IN FACT, RUSSIAN CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN FARING BETTER IN RECENT YEARS. DESPITE AN AVERAGE 3 PERCENT GROWTH IN SOVIET DEFENSE AND SPACE SPENDING SINCE 1960, THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN GROWING EVEN FASTER. THE MILITARY SHARE OF THE SOVIET GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT HAS DECLINED TO 6 PERCENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS GRADUAL DECLINE WILL CONTINUE. EVEN SO, DEFENSE NEEDS WILL STILL COMMAND RUSSIA'S BEST MATERIALS AND HIGHEST QUALITY MANPOWER.

IN CONCLUDING MY SURVEY OF GREAT POWER RELATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH MOSCOW, PARTICULARLY, MUST BALANCE SKILLFULLY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS. I SPEAK OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DETENTE AND DOMESTIC DISCIPLINE--WHICH GOES TO THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.

IN THE EARLY STAGES OF NEGOTIATION, WHEN THE WHOLE THING WAS NEW AND TENUOUS, THE SOVIETS TIGHTENED UP WITH A TOUGH LINE ON INTELLECTUAL DISSENT, AND ISSUED SHRILL WARNINGS ABOUT THE DANGER OF WESTERN IDEAS. MORE RECENTLY, THEY SEEM TO BE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR SOCIETY IS NOW STABLE ENOUGH TO

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SURVIVE SOME VERY LIMITED RELAXATION OF CONTROLS. THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE STILL NOT SURE ABOUT IT, HOWEVER, AND ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW MUCH CHANGE THEY CAN AFFORD. THE EXPULSION OF SOLZHENITSYN TWO WEEKS AGO SHOWS THEY ARE NOT READY TO GO VERY FAR. Sentenced to death earlier. Devine story.

LAST SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIET UNION STOPPED JAMMING THE VOICE OF AMERICA, THE BBC AND THE WEST GERMAN RADIO, DEUTSCHE WELLE. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE TO JAM RADIO LIBERTY, WHICH HAS A MORE AGGRESSIVE EDITORIAL POLICY ABOUT SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS THAN THE OFFICIAL RADIOS DO, AND THIS MONTH THEY RESUMED SELECTIVE JAMMING OF DEUTSCHE WELLE BECAUSE IT WAS BROADCASTING EXCERPTS FROM SOLZHENITSYN'S NEW BOOK, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO. BUT MORE NEWS IS STILL GETTING INTO THE SOVIET UNION THAN DID BEFORE DETENTE BECAME AN ESTABLISHED POLICY.

THE SOVIET PRESS HAS ALSO BEGUN TO CARRY SLIGHTLY MORE ACCURATE PICTURES OF THE WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, PRAVDA IN JANUARY RAN A SERIES ON THE US CONGRESS THAT WAS NOT TOO BAD IN TERMS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS. IT WAS CERTAINLY AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE OLD STEREOTYPE OF "CAPITALIST-BANKERS" CONTROLLING EVERYTHING BEHIND THE SCENES.

IN AN EVEN MORE CAREFUL AND UNEASY FASHION, THE POLITBURO HAS BACKED INTO ALLOWING SOME SELECTIVE EMIGRATION. SINCE 1970, ABOUT 72,000 JEWS HAVE BEEN

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PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE. THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE PERMITTED THIS GRUDGINGLY AND UNGRACEFULLY, AND THEY HAVE HELD BACK ON SPECIAL CASES, BUT THE FLOW HAS CONTINUED EVEN THOUGH IT ANNOYS THE ARABS AND COMPLICATES SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

BREZHNEV AND HIS POLITBURO COLLEAGUES ARE WELL AWARE THAT THEIR CONTROL DEPENDS STILL MORE ON MAINTAINING POPULAR SATISFACTION THROUGH IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS. THE EXAMPLE OF POLISH WORKERS PROTESTING INCREASES IN FOOD PRICES IN DECEMBER 1970 GAVE THEM A FRIGHT. THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN ADOPTED SOON AFTERWARDS GAVE INCREASED ATTENTION TO CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES. THE HARVEST FAILURE IN 1972 FORCED CUTBACKS IN THE CONSUMER SECTOR, BUT THE KREMLIN IS DOGGEDLY STICKING TO THE PLAN'S ORIGINAL GOALS AND IS TRYING TO GET BACK ON THE TRACK. THE CONSUMER SECTOR HAS BEEN STARVED FOR SO LONG THAT MUCH OF THE POPULACE APPRECIATES EVEN MODEST IMPROVEMENTS.

OVER THE LONG TERM, DETENTE IS CLEARLY GOING TO BRING CONSIDERABLE CHANGES TO THE SOVIET UNION--WITH POSSIBLE DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES FOR GREAT POWER RELATIONSHIPS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE AS YET JUST WHAT THESE CONSEQUENCES MAY BE, BUT THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE CLEARLY GAMBLING THAT THEY CAN DIRECT

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THE CHANGES, CONTROL THE PACE, AND PRESERVE THEMSELVES AND THEIR IDEOLOGY. SO FAR, SO GOOD--BUT OVER HALF OF THE 70S REMAIN BEFORE THEM.

Brazil.

Sun Tzu. Other Grams of War.

How good we are. U.S. Army has met every Challenge in our Nations History. Environment Today is no Worse than during most of the Peace time years since Valley Forge.

Thirty four years ago I made the Army my Choice. I have never regretted it. As I look at you the tomorrows of our Army and our Nation I only wish that the years of your Service Will for you be as rewarding and fulfilling as mine have been. To all of you as you go forward to a brighter tomorrow Good luck