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This document consists of 80 pages, copy 73 of 100 copies, Series B.

THE ARMY SECTION PLAN for the ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

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THE ARMY SECTION PRELIMINARY PLAN for the ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

I. PROBLEM

1. To design in specific terms the Army section of a practical, effective and comprehensive armament and armed force inspection system within the USSR (and its satellite states) which does not depend on good faith for effective operation, and the reciprocal pattern of which would be feasible and acceptable within the United States (and its Western Allies), for the purpose of improving the prospects of a durable peace

a. through identifying violations of agreements,

b. limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attack, and

c. providing an effective early warning system.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Memorandum: "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419", revised 5 August 1955, is the basis for this report.

3. Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, on August 30, 1955, proposed to the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission an outline

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plan for the implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential proposal at Geneva regarding disarmament. (Appendix A).

III. DISCUSSION

4. Objective. The primary objective to be accomplished by an inspection system must be to insure against the possibility of a surprise attack by nuclear or conventional means. The long range objective is to improve the prospects of a durable peace by verification of compliance with all disclosures and agreements relative to armaments within the USSR and its satellites.

5. Assumptions. It is assumed that the U. S. and USSR (and in all likelihood, other nations within both the Western Powers Group and the Russian orbit) have agreed,

a. To the exchange of "Blueprints" of armaments and armed forces in accordance with the President's proposal at Geneva and within the terms of a negotiated agreement pursuant thereto.

b. To a limitation of armaments at a mutually satisfactory level, which could possibly lead to later reductions.

c. Reciprocally, to establish the herein described inspection system in the stages proposed, with appropriate inspection elements in being and ready for operation prior to the initial and each successive disclosure stage.

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6. Principles for the Development of the Inspection System. The following principles are considered essential to the development of a comprehensive and effective inspection system.

a. The primary purpose of the Inspection System is to provide against surprise attack by detecting at inception any and all evidences of evasion of agreements or hostile intent.

b. Aerial surveillance supplemented by information derived from aerial photography and other aerial detection media is not in itself adequate to the accomplishment of the inspection objectives. A widely dispersed inspection organization employing integrated military ground, sea and air as well as civilian elements is necessary.

c. The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization consisting jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

d. The inspection organization should be controlled centrally with over-all direction exercised by the U. S. from Washington through a single command channel. Accordingly, the U. S. should seek agreement with other signatory Western Powers by which the U. S. would be delegated the executive authority for the management of the inspection system. In the event this is not agreed, all peculiarly American interests should

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be controlled and coordinated through a single chain of command.

e. The personnel of the various headquarters, and of the verification and observation teams of the inspection system should be predominately American because of the high stake of the U. S. in the undertaking.

f. Submitted military blueprints should be verified by the use of:

(1) An aerial inspection program.

(2) An on-the-ground team inspection organization with observers and technical inspectors positioned prior to the beginning of the verification processes and remaining in adequate numbers at least until some concrete hope of reaching ultimate goals is in sight.

g. Inspection should be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages; action in each stage to be initiated and proceed simultaneously within the several countries being inspected. Definite time limits should be established for the completion of each stage so as to expedite the inspection processes.

h. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among the field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries should be established.

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i. Logistical support for the inspection system and its personnel should be provided on a national basis insofar as practicable. Support for the American elements should be by a designated armed service on a reimburseable basis.

7. Test of the Inspection System. In the formulation of this plan the adoption initially of some limited form of inspection for test purposes has been considered. The British have made a concrete proposal in this regard. Another proposal much more restricted in its aspects has been under study by American elements. While such a test would be valuable in that it would afford a dress rehearsal of a cross-section of a possible final type system, it has the following obvious inherent disadvantages:

a. The basic purpose of the system (i.e. warning of surprise attack) could not be accomplished, and

b. Cooperation by USSR during the test would not necessarily assure cooperation during a later full implementation of the system.

Further, it would delay for a considerable period, possibly for several years, the installation of a fully desirable system. All the benefits to be derived from such a test inspection could be achieved better during the initial stage of a fully implemented system. Furthermore, under these circumstances,

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procedural defects could be determined more readily and timely on-the-spot corrective action facilitated.

8. Participation of Other Powers. It is difficult to conceive that any inspection system could be limited to the U. S. and USSR even in the beginning. Many U. S. bases are on foreign soil. The USSR could neither be expected to exclude these bases of potential surprise attack, neither could the U. S. agree to inspection of such bases without consulting the countries in which they are located. Likewise, the USSR could not be expected to exclude the armaments and armed forces of other Western Powers, especially the major powers. While the U. S. and USSR conceivably might be the principals in an original inspection agreement, any subsequent agreements to be fully effective, would have to be international in scope, involving as a minimum, the Western States on the one side, and Soviet satellite countries on the other. Accordingly, this plan assumes that Western Power countries and the USSR satellite countries will participate in the inspection system from its inception. If, for any reason, participation in the system is initially limited to the U. S. and the USSR, the plan described herein could be placed into effect with minor modifications. However, any such limited system would be totally incapable of assuring early warning against a surprise attack which could be mounted or supported

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from within satellite countries.

9. Reciprocal Provisions of the System. It is important to bear in mind that the provisions of any armaments convention and inspection system ensuing therefrom are to be reciprocal in all aspects. This applies to such things as internal organization of the system, number and locations of on-the-spot observers, stages of disclosure and verification, and the rights, powers and privileges of the inspection organization and its personnel. For example, if the U. S. plan provides for six intermediate (area) headquarters within USSR, we should expect the Russians to insist on a like number of the same type headquarters in the U. S. If insistence is placed upon the inclusion of the armaments and armed forces of the Russian satellite states, then in the most literal manner must we expect that the Russians will insist that the system cover our allied countries. It is of primary importance, therefore, in negotiating any agreement for an inspection system, that constant consideration be given to the impact of reciprocal arrangements upon the American people and the American military establishment.

IV. CONCEPT - JOINT INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

10. General. The over-all inspection organization should be joint and incorporate the requirements of all its component elements. There follows an outline of such an organization

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which insures accomplishment of the inspection mission at minimum cost in personnel, time, and funds, and should be acceptable on a reciprocal basis as between the U. S.(Western Powers) and the USSR (Soviet satellites).

11. Basic Principles of the Organization. The concept of the Joint Inspection Organization is based on the following principles.

a. An inspection organization including integrated military ground, sea and air, as well as specialized civilian elements is necessary.

b. The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization, insofar as its incorporated missions permit, and consist jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

c. The personnel of the various headquarters, and inspection and observer teams of the inspection system should be predominately American because of the high stake of the U. S. in the undertaking.

d. All echelons and units of the inspection organization, both within the U. S. and USSR and its satellites should be staffed and operated on a joint basis with appropriate, and proportionate representation from military and specialized civilian elements.

e. The inspection organization should be controlled centrally with over-all direction exercised by the U.S. from Washington.

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f. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among the field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries should be established.

g. Logistical support of the inspection organization and its personnel should be provided on a national basis insofar as practicable. Support of the American element should be by a designated armed service on a reimburseable basis.

12. The Organization to Support the Objective. (See Appendix B, Inclosure 1, Chart - "U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System)."

a. The inspection organization schematically charted in the above-mentioned annex is in line with the principles stated in paragraph 6, above. Detailed organizations of the various headquarters and teams along with a statement of major functions are listed as follows:

Appendix B, Incl. 2	International Armaments Commission
Appendix B, Incl. 3	U.S. (Western Powers Inspection Headquarters
Appendix B, Incl. 4	U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission
Appendix B, Incl. 5	U.S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters
Appendix B, Incl. 6	Military District Inspection Groups
Appendix B, Incl. 7	Verification Teams
Appendix B, Incl. 8	Observer Teams
Appendix C	Major Functions of Organization Subdivision

b. It is contemplated, on the basis of best information available, that headquarters of the above-listed subdivisions will be located as follows:

International Armaments Commission--Switzerland.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters--Washington, D. C.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission--Moscow (USSR).
U.S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters (See Appendix D for Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).

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U.S. Military District Inspection Groups. (See Appendix D, for Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).

c. It is emphasized that the above-described organization, including on-the-spot observers, must be in place and ready to function on the date agreed upon for commencement of the inspection system.

13. Extent of Disclosure and Verification:

a. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one-time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements and hence would require a continuing program. Therefore, it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be permanent, or at least on a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

b. The disclosure, verification and on-the-spot surveillance must cover all armed forces and armament of every kind including para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments including nuclear. It is obvious that disclosure of such information to a foreign power is contrary to U. S. laws and no doubt the same fact applies to Russia and other foreign powers. Since we would have to secure Congressional approval, we may encounter difficulties on the political front. It is likely that

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necessary legal approval would present fewer obstructions to the authoritarian Communist Government. Other parliamentary systems may be confronted with problems approaching those of the U. S. in difficulty.

14. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.

a. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been completed satisfactorily by the signatory nations. A definite time limit should be established for the completion of each stage.

b. Appendix E, sets forth in outline the extent of forces and armaments to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed.

c. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the figure five was determined to represent the minimum number consistent with the following considerations:

(1) Disclosure and verification should proceed from the less secret areas in the early stages to the more secret areas.

(2) A phasing of this nature, in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all states, would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.

d. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously, go forward at approximately the same tempo, and be concluded with the utmost dispatch.

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15. Communications. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among all field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries is an absolute necessity.

16. Administrative and Logistical Support. Appendix F, contains a plan for the Administrative and Logistical Support to the Inspection System. In arriving at this plan, consideration was given to the following principles:

a. Administrative and logistical support will be provided by a designated Armed Service on a reimburseable basis.

b. The designated Armed Service will be responsible for support of all elements of the inspection service.

c. Acceptable standards for installations and facilities in general will be that established for military posts throughout the United States.

d. Initially, installations and services may be acquired on a rental basis through USSR authorities. In event rental facilities are inadequate, a construction program which would provide installations and facilities of American standards should be initiated. Planning to this end should begin as early as possible.

e. In event Western Powers personnel participate in the inspection system, logistical support primarily will be on a national basis.

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f. Provisions of logistical support should be based principally on U. S. military depots in West Germany and France. A special agreement with each of those countries to make this possible may be necessary.

V. CONCEPT--ARMY SECTION OF THE JOINT INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

17. General. The mission of the Army Section of the Armaments and Armed Force Inspection System is to:

a. Verify disclosed data on Army installations, armament and armed forces including organized reserves, para-military, security and police forces; perform such other inspection and surveillance tasks as it can or may be called upon for other elements of the inspection system.

b. Detect any

(1) Indications of surprise attack, nuclear or conventional, evidenced by but not confined to:

(a) Undue or threatening troop or weapon buildup, concentrations or related activities.

(b) Abnormal movement of armaments or armed forces.

(c) Indication of production of armaments in greater numbers than required for normal replacement and for normal reserve stockpiles.

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(d) Undisclosed research and development or testing which could be expected to have military implications.

(e) Evasion of agreements or evidence of clandestine hostile action.

18. Organization for Accomplishing the Mission. (Appendix B, Inclosure 1,) "U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System", describes the over-all organization essential to the accomplishment of the inspection mission. Major organizational elements of this system are jointly and proportionately staffed by incorporated American elements and may, at any point, include personnel of signatory Western Powers. The organization described below considers only the Army aspects of the inspection system and its requirements at each organizational level.

a. Area sub-divisions. For the purposes of facilitating control, USSR will be divided into six (6) areas and each headed by a U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters (Appendix B, Inclosure 5). In determining these areas consideration has been given to such factors as territorial military subdivisions, troop density, road and rail systems as well as to the reciprocal impact of a similar Russian organization upon the U. S. In addition to the six areas in the USSR proper, one (1) Area Headquarters will be established in East Berlin (Germany) for the supervision of Military District inspection activities within the USSR satellite

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countries. Basically, each Area Headquarters will direct its inspection activities through its subordinate Military District Inspection Groups.

b. Military District Inspection Group Sub-divisions. The area sub-divisions which lie within the USSR will be sub-divided into twenty-three (23) inspection districts and each headed by a Military District Inspection Group (Appendix B, Inclosure 6). The East Berlin Area will include the four (4) Military Districts which lie within the satellite countries. The selection of these districts takes into consideration the same factors that were utilized in the selection of areas. Each District Headquarters is responsible for verification and surveillance activities pertaining to the Soviet Army within its respective territory.

c. Verification Teams. (Appendix B, Inclosure 7). Verification Teams, under the direction of respective District Headquarters would verify military blueprints submitted as a part of the agreed reciprocal exchange. In addition, these teams would be required to inspect areas which, by virtue of aerial reconnaissance, were suspected of including installations either undisclosed on the military blueprint or of such size as to indicate inaccuracy or inadequacy in disclosed information.

d. Observer Teams. (Appendix B, Inclosure 8). In addition to the Verification Teams in each District, there would be included an appropriate number of Observer Teams. These Teams

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would be posted at key locations such as mobilization centers, military depots, road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, specified military establishments, and guided missile centers, with free access to such other objects or indicators of surprise attack as might need to be held under observation. In addition, these teams would perform such verification functions as might lie within their capabilities. The primary purpose of these teams is to give early warning of evidences of hostile intent, evasion of the agreement, clandestine operations, and significant repositioning of ground forces.

(1) Verification and observation will be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages (Appendix E). Action in each stage will be initiated simultaneously and proceed concurrently within

(a) the USSR and U.S. if accomplished under an exclusive bilateral agreement, or

(b) the states of the signatory Western Powers and those of the Russian satellite countries under a multi-national agreement.

(2) Information obtained by the Verification and Observer Teams will be transmitted to the District Headquarters. There it will be correlated, consolidated, analyzed and transmitted to the Area Headquarters for evaluation and forwarding to the U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission in Moscow.

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19. Communications. For the verification and observation of USSR units and facilities to be of maximum value it is essential that a communications network be established which will permit flash warnings as well as routine transmission of information gathered to higher headquarters. Each Verification and Observer Team should have free access at any stage of the inspection to such areas or installations as necessary to assure that the coverage contemplated by the terms of the agreement for that particular stage is complete. Each team should be provided with mobile radio equipment capable of transmitting warning and reports to the District Headquarters and to a control location within a signatory Western Power in an emergency. Communications equipment at District and higher headquarters should be of the fixed type and capable of transmission with all U. S. (Western Powers) networks in the European area. Appendix G provides a detailed synopsis of communications requirements.

20. Personnel. Appendix H, presents a detailed summary of Army personnel requirements.

a. The basic estimate of personnel for implementation of the Army element of the inspection organization does not include communications personnel at the headquarters of the twenty eight (28) Military Districts, the seven(7)Area Headquarters and the headquarters in Moscow, since it is probable that many of these

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facilities would be jointly manned. Further, commercial facilities together with the necessary personnel may be employed. However, in event that solely Army facilities are installed, additional personnel would be required in the numbers shown in the Grand Total.

b. The problems of obtaining suitable qualified personnel, both military and specialized civilian, for an organization of this type would be similar to those encountered in staffing of projects in other areas of the world, however, due to the unique aspects of the proposed inspection system, the difficulties may be expected to be considerably aggravated. This problem is discussed in greater detail in Appendix L.

21. Administrative and Logistical Support. Appendix F, provides a plan for the Administrative and Logistical Support of the Inspection System, and Appendix I, presents estimates of initial requirements of major items of equipment.

22. Cost Analysis. A generalized analysis of initial and annual recurring costs of the Army element of the inspection organization is set forth in Appendix J. In view of the many intangibles, such as the exchange rate, lack of definite determination of number, type and source of installations, the costs cited are subject to revision as better information becomes available.

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23. Rights, Powers, and Privileges. Appendix K, outlines the rights, powers and privileges of Inspection Elements and assigned personnel and defines their status in general terms. These will have to be supplemented and spelled out carefully in the terms of the agreement.

24. Supplementary Information. Section IV of the Memorandum "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419, revised August 4, 1955", the basic directive for the Army Task Group, requested information on several specific subjects. While these matters are treated generally throughout this preliminary plan, for clarity and emphasis the answers are consolidated in Appendix L.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

25. Incident to the formulation of the Army section of the plan for an Armament and Armed Force Inspection System within the USSR (and its satellite states) it is concluded that:

a. Objective: The immediate and continuing objective is to insure against the possibility of a surprise attack by nuclear or conventional means. The long-range objective is to improve the prospects of a durable peace by verification of compliance with all disclosures and agreements relative to armaments within the USSR and its satellites and thereby establish, through demonstration of good faith, a sound foundation for a further arms limitation program.

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b. General Principles.

(1) A widely dispersed inspection organization employing integrated military ground, sea, air and specialized civilian elements is necessary to the accomplishment of the inspection objectives. The numerical strength of the organization will depend upon the extent of the inspection coverage at any one time.

(2) The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization consisting jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

(3) The inspection organization should be controlled centrally by the U. S. from Washington through a single command channel. In implementation of this, the U. S. should seek agreement with other signatory Western Powers whereby the U. S. would be delegated executive authority for the management of the inspection system.

(4) Personnel of the various headquarters, and verification and observer teams of the inspection system should be predominately American.

(5) Submitted military blueprints should be verified by the use of:

(a) An aerial inspection program.

(b) An on-the-ground inspection and verification organization positioned prior to the beginning of the verification processes.

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(6) Inspection should be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages. A definite time limit should be established for the completion of each stage.

(7) A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information is required.

(8) Logistical support of the inspection system should be on a national basis. American elements should be supported by a designated service on a reimburseable basis.

c. Test of the Inspection System. Any test of the system prior to actual implementation, even in limited form, would be of dubious value. Further, such a test would delay for a considerable period, possibly for several years, the installation of a fully desirable system. All the benefits to be derived from such a test could be reached better during the initial stage of a fully implemented system.

d. Participation of Other Powers. Inasmuch as both the U.S. and USSR have military bases on foreign soil, any inspection system which does not include the Western Powers and Russian satellite countries would be totally incapable of assuring early warning against surprise attacks.

e. Reciprocal Provisions of the System. In negotiating any agreement for an inspection system, constant consideration must be given to the impact of reciprocal arrangements upon the American people and the American military establishment.

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f. Organization to Support the Objective. The organization described in Appendix B, formulated in line with the principles listed in sub-paragraph b, above, and with functions as stated in Appendix C, is designed to carry out the objective of the inspection system.

g. Extent of Disclosure and Verification. Disclosure, verification and on-the-spot surveillance must be on a continuing basis and cover all armed forces and armament of every kind including para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments including nuclear.

h. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.

(1) Disclosure and verification

(a) Must be carried out step by step with provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed by the signatory nations. Definite time limits should be established for the completion of each stage so as to expedite the inspection process.

(b) Should proceed by steps from the less secret stages to the more secret areas.

(c) While testing the good faith of participating states, should cause the minimum degree of interference with the internal life of their people.

(2) The number of stages most consistent with the above considerations is five.

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i. Administrative and Logistical Support.

(1) An Armed Service should be designated to provide administrative and logistical support for the inspection organization.

(2) Uniformed personnel, in numbers and types required, will be supplied by the Department of Defense under established policies and within special overstrength authorizations.

(3) Acceptable standards for installations and facilities in general will be that established for military posts throughout the United States. Rental facilities, equipment and services may be acquired initially. To the extent necessary these may be supplemented by an accellerated construction and supply program.

(4) Logistical support should be based principally on U. S. military depots in West Germany and France. A special agreement with each of these countries to make this possible may be necessary.

j. Army Personnel Requirements. Approximately 13,000 uniformed and/or civilian personnel will be required to staff the Army element of the proposed organization for accomplishing the inspection objectives. This estimate does include communications personnel at District and higher headquarters.

k. Cost Analysis. The costs of the Army element of the inspection organization are stated in Appendix J.

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1. Rights, Powers and Privileges. The rights, powers and privileges set forth in Appendix K, should be delineated carefully in the terms of the agreement.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

26. That the above conclusions constitute the Army Section Plan for the Armament and Armed Force Inspection System.

Inclosures: Appendices A to L

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UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

DC/SC.1/31
30 August 1955
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 21 JULY 1955 PRESIDENTIAL PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT

1. Purpose. The purpose of this outline plan is to translate the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 21 July at Geneva into terms of reference, a concept, and an outline of procedures. The details are subject to negotiation within the principles stated by the President.

2. Terms of Reference.

a. The term "blueprint of military establishments" is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

b. Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.

c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by visual, photographic, and electronic means by the other country.

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3. Concept. The United States and the USSR will exchange all data relative to military forces and installations which, coupled with measures for verification and surveillance, are essential tp provide against the possibility of surprise attack. This exchange is to be accomplished in progressive steps as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments. Among the elements of information considered essential to preclude surprise attack and to be sought by an exchange between the Governments and to be verified and maintained under surveillance are:

a. Weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attack.

b. Transportation and telecommunications.

c. Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces.

d. Additional facilities as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

4. Initial Procedure.

a. Exchange of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) The Governments of the United States and the USSR will each prepare lists of major military forces and establishments, showing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities by geographical co-ordinates.

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(2) Schedules will be drawn for time phasing of exchanges to assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each Government, and completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase. Provision for immediate spot-checking will be included.

b. Verification of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) Arrangements will be made for the posting of on-the-spot observers with operating land, sea, and air forces, at their supporting installations, and at key locations as necessary for the verification, continued observation, and reporting of each category of information. The number and location of the observers will be as mutually agreed upon prior to the exchange of information, and provisions will be made for changes in the location should the initial arrangements prove to be inadequate.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each inspecting country on an unrestricted, but monitored, basis to augment the efforts of the posted observers. Each inspecting country will utilize its own aircraft and related equipment. Liaison personnel of the country being in-

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spected will be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.

c. Facilities and services to be provided.

(1) Each sub-list of military installations will include the designation of one or more airfields or bases at which facilities will be made available for support of the aerial reconnaissance aircraft and crews.

d. Checks and controls.

Procedures will be established for:

(1) Designation of ports of entry and egress for incoming and departing observers and reconnaissance aircraft.

(2) Clearance of incoming and departing observers, aircraft and crews and arrangements for monitored passage to and from home territory.

(3) Check and identification of observers and reconnaissance aircraft, personnel and equipment engaged in this activity.

(4) Orientation of observers and reconnaissance personnel.

(5) Air traffic control of inspecting aircraft by host Government.

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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 1

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System



Inclosure 1
APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 2

International Armaments Commission



Inclosure 2
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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 3

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters



*Continental United States

Inclosure 3
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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 4

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission



Inclosure 4
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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 5

U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters



Inclosure 5
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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 6

Military District Inspection Group



Notes

Inspection teams represent a joint effort of Army, Navy, Air, and technical civilian experts if and when needed. May also include liaison personnel of Western Powers.

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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 7
Verification Team

*Commanding Officer

**Administration

***Operations

Nuclear

Signal

Ordnance

Quartermaster

Engineer

Medical

Transportation

Chemical

Total — 11 Officers

Notes
* G-3 Background
** G-1 Background
*** G-3 Background

Inclosure 7
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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 8

Observer Team



Total - 10 — 3 Officers
7 E. M.

Notes

Team based upon 24 hour surveillance — 2 Observers (1 Officer and 1 E. M. and Radio Operator) for each 8 hours.

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APPENDIX C

MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SUB-DIVISIONS

International Armament Commission

Composed of representatives of participating nations. Located at agreed-upon site (in Switzerland or within partnership countries on a rotational basis). Sets policy and supervises enforcement of terms of the agreement. Receives and transmits disclosures and reports of verification. Receives complaints and arbitrates disputes.

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters

Composed of representatives of U. S. and associated allied countries. Located in Washington, if organized under an exclusive U.S.-USSR agreement--otherwise, at a site agreed upon by the partnership Western Powers. Compiles and transmits U. S. disclosures by stages; reports in advance to the International Armament Commission movements of U. S. standing armament in international air or water or on foreign land, water or air; receives and processes similar reports from the USSR; receives and processes Russian disclosures; supervises the operation of, and administers the U.S. Inspection Organization; orients, trains and indoctrinates assigned personnel; receives, analyzes and interprets reports received from the field agencies; formulates and presents complaints, if and as

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they arise, to the International Armament Commission; maintains close liaison with, and receives maximum assistance from appropriate established U. S. Governmental agencies; institutes and maintains an active, effective, public relations and information program; directs the activities of and is the headquarters for the U. S. liaison group with the Russian Inspection Organization.

U. S. Liaison Groups With
Russian (Orbit) Inspection Mission

Provides proper administrative assistance and logistical support for the Russian (Orbit) Inspection Mission. Insures complete understanding on the part of the Russian (Orbit) Mission as to the extent of inspection coverage at each stage. Briefs inspectors prior to each inspection visit and provides a U. S. representative throughout the course of each inspection to facilitate their operations and hold them within inspection bounds. Accepts and processes Russian (Orbit) complaints; authorizes field liaison officers to make "on-the-spot" decisions; formulates and forwards to the International Control Headquarters complaints regarding the activities of the Russian (Orbit) personnel. Maintains surveillance over Russian (Orbit) personnel to guarantee knowledge of their activities and whereabouts at all times. Alerts each location to be inspected sufficiently in advance to insure readiness; transmits all pertinent instructions and Russian (Orbit) requests incidental to the scheduled inspection. Arranges for the conduct of press relations

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relevant to inspection activities; empowers field liaison officers, under proper instructions, to deal directly with public and with local press representatives.

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission (USSR)

Composed of representatives of all American (Western Powers) inspection elements. Located at the seat of the Russian Government. Directs and controls activities of all U. S. Missions and their field elements; coordinates their administrative and logistical support. The Army Section, in addition to its responsibility for the inspection and surveillance of direct Army interests, conducts inspections of as much armaments production, research and testing, budget, procurement, medical, transportation, etc., activities as affect the Russian (Orbit) ground forces; cooperates with other sections in the discharge of the total Mission responsibility.

U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters

Composed of representatives of all American (Western Powers) inspection units. Located so as to afford best control of the military districts which are within its jurisdiction. Directs, supports and processes the business of assigned military districts; assists and coordinates activities of attached personnel and of all others discharging inspection system responsibilities within its geographical area.

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Military District Inspection Groups

Composed of representatives of all interested U. S. (Western Powers) elements. Located at Headquarters, Russian Military Districts. Ground Forces section conducts inspections of all specified activities within each Disclosure and Verification stage; remains constantly alert to and reports promptly any evidence of bad faith or hostile intent. Renders periodic report of findings; makes flash reports of significant repositioning of ground force units, undue supply buildup, indications of evasion or of clandestine operations.

Verification Teams

Operate within the delegated authority and responsibility of the District Inspection Group to which assigned. Principal duties are to (1) check and report on adequacy and accuracy of disclosed Army data at each stage; perform such other inspections as may be requested by other inspection groups, (2) and remain constantly alert to and report promptly all evidences of surprise attack.

Observer Teams

Operate within the authority and responsibility of the District Inspection Group to which assigned. Posted at selected key locations (such as mobilization points, supply depots, road, rail and telecommunications, airdromes, ports, troop locations. Principal duties are to (1) detect any significant violation of terms of agreement and to give early warning of evidences of evasion, hostile intent or clandestine operations; and, (2) assist in the accomplishment of verification functions to the extent that it does not interfere with their primary assignment.

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APPENDIX D

STATION LIST
JOINT AND ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

Headquarters	Name Military Dist.Groups	Location	*Army Personnel
International Armaments Commission		Switzerland	Unknown
U.S.(Western Powers) Inspection Hqrs.		Washington	115
U.S.(Western Powers) Inspection Mission		Moscow	109
U.S.(Western Powers) Area Headquarters			
Northern European		Minsk	224
	Baltic	Riga	353
	Belorussian	Minsk	353
	Carpathian	Lvov	353
	Leningrad	Leningrad	353
	Northern	Petrozavodsk	353
Central		Moscow	224
	Moscow	Moscow	353
	Gorki	Gorki	353
	Volga	Kuybyshev	353
	White Sea	Archangel	353
Southern		Stalingrad	224
	Turkestan	Tashkent	353
	South Ural	Chkalov	353
	North Caucasus	Rostov	353
	Trans Caucasus	Tiflis	353
Siberian		Novosibirsk	224
	East Siberia	Irkutsk	353
	West Siberia	Novosibirsk	353
	Ural	Sverdlovsk	353
Far East		Kahabarorsk	224
	Far East	Kahabarorsk	353
	Transbaikal	Chita	353
	Maritime	Vovoshilor	353

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Headquarters	Name Military Dist.Groups	Location	*Army Personnel
Southern European		Kiev	224
	Kiev	Kiev	353
	Odessa	Odessa	353
	Tauric	Simferopol	353
	Voronezh	Voronezh	353
Satellite		E. Berlin	224
	E. Germany	Zossen Wundsorf	353
	Poland	Liegnitz	353
	Czechoslovakia	Prague	353
	Hungary	Budapest	353
	Romania	Constanta	353

Totals:	Area Headquarters	1,568
	District Headquarters	9,884
	Mission Headquarters	109
	Inspection Headquarters	115
	TOTAL	11,676

*Exclusive of 1254 communications personnel at fixed stations which Army may be required to furnish

Communications personnel all echelons	1,526
GRAND TOTAL	13,208

NOTES:
Communications requirements are:
a. Subject to reduction in accordance with the number of joint installations staffed on a pro rata basis by using elements.

b. Figures listed above represent requirements for normal continuing operations during the Stage I, assuming six months for completion. They will vary with the extent of coverage and the tempo of inspection processes in succeeding stages.

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APPENDIX E

STAGES OF DISCLOSURES AND VERIFICATION

STAGE I

Disclose:

a. Over-all manpower strength; composition (by component unit); disposition of regular and reserve military forces to include para-military, security and police forces.

b. Planned maneuvers and large scale troop movements during the period covered by this stage.

c. Location of military installations and mobilization facilities, (posts, camps, stations, training establishments, depots, ports, airdromes, rail and road centers) excluding nuclear, proving grounds, and research and development centers.

d. Details of those parts of the budget which pertain to armed forces less allocations for Research and Development and for nuclear purposes.

Verify by:

a. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data supplemented by actual physical checks of troop units and installations by ground inspection teams. To complete the check and at the same time ascertain the basic military pattern but primarily to give early warning of pending attack, observers will be in place at critical points, i.e. mobilization centers, military depots, road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, airdromes, ports, guided missile centers, training areas on the date the agreement becomes effective.

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b. Direct examination of the various installations (type of construction, physical dimensions, station overhead, power consumption, supplies on hand, traffic, type of activity, etc.) by ground inspection teams.

c. Examination and comparison of previous, present and proposed national budget and reconciliation of authorization with actual expenditures.

NOTE: (a), (b) and (c)--Inspectors and observers to have access to the entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations of type listed have been declared. They will be provided with facilities for uninterrupted communications. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

STAGE II

Disclose:

a. Plans and procedures for large scale mobilization of conventional means of warfare.

b. Detailed internal organization and composition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.

c. Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strength disclosed in Stage I, except units equipped with novel weapons).

d. Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

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Verify by:

a. Examination of relevant documents.

b. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data in comparison with findings of observations in Stage I and supplemented by actual physical checks of units as considered necessary.

c. Analysis of disclosed data in comparison with tables of organization and equipment supplemented by physical checks of units and installations.

d. Cross-checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.

NOTE: (a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

STAGE III

Disclose:

a. Production facilities (military arsenals, civilian plants) for the manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I (excluding novel weapons) including location, type and quantity of armament produced, and maximum annual capacity.

Verify by:

a. Actual physical inspection of plant to include observation of plant's physical dimensions, raw material on hand, end product, and labor force employed. Analyze these observations against available production records, input of raw material, power consumption, employment statistics and financial reports.

NOTE: (a) By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

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STAGE IV

Disclose:

a. Research and Development program.

b. Equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.

c. Location of installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons including production rates.

d. Plans and procedures for employment of nuclear means of warfare.

Verify by:

a. Analysis of the present and past production records, inspection of production facilities and examination of prototypes.

b. Examination of pertinent plans and records.

c. Cross-checks of information contained in present disclosures with units denied access to in Stage I. Supplement these checks by physical checks of these units as well as those in reserve at other locations.

d. Actual inspection of physical dimension of plants, and conformation of records pertaining to input of raw materials, type and disposition of finished product, rate of production, labor employed, power consumption, and financial records.

NOTE: (a) and (c) - By aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

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STAGE V

Disclose:

a. Quantities and types of novel weapons and delivery systems on hand.

b. Testing programs.

Verify by:

a. Examination and analysis of quantitative reports (showing quantity, type, date of manufacture, location and physical condition) of novel weapons supplemented by (1) actual physical count of stockpiles and examination of delivery systems and (2) constant observation to disclose withdrawals from or additions to the stockpile, displacement of delivery systems.

b. Check testing program.

NOTE: (a) Aerial survey to disclose additional stockpiles and delivery sites.

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APPENDIX F

A PRELIMINARY PLAN for the ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

I. MISSION

1. To provide administrative and logistical support to the U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Organization located in USSR and its satellite countries.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

2. U. S. Inspection headquarters located in Washington and at various locations in USSR will be staffed and operated (single chain of command) on a joint basis--viz. Army, Navy, Air Force and specialized civilian elements.

3. a. Administrative and logistical support on a reimburseable basis will be provided by an Armed Service to be designated by the Department of Defense. The Armed Service so designated will be responsible for support of all elements of the inspection service (i.e. Army, Navy, Air Force and specialized civilian elements).

b. Acceptable standards for installations and facilities in general will be that established for military posts throughout the United States.

c. Initially, installations and services may be acquired on a rental basis through USSR authorities. In the event that rental

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facilities are inadequate, a construction program which would provide installations and facilities of American standards should be initiated as soon as practicable. It is not desirable for USSR to provide installations rent-free because (1) of differences in U.S. and USSR standards of living, and (2) reciprocal provisions would be required for personnel of the USSR inspection system located in the United States. Purchase of installations will be exceptional and will require U. S. Inspection Headquarters approval.

4. In event Western Powers personnel participate in the Inspection System it is contemplated that logistical support will be on a national basis generally.

III. DISCUSSION

5. General. Support of U. S. groups similar to that of the Inspection Organization in foreign countries by the armed services has precedence. Since World War II, support has been provided Military Missions, Military Aid Assistance Groups, and often-times strictly civilian organizations generally through the nearest U. S. military service having logistical responsibilities.

6. Specific Considerations. Support of the Inspection Organization in the USSR, while unique as regards unusually lengthy main supply routes and the extensive area to be covered, would offer no insurmountable problems. The U. S. Army Europe and the U. S. Air Force Europe, both with headquarters and logistical installations in

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West Germany, are capable separately or jointly, of performing this support mission. It must be kept in mind, however, that if logistical support is to be furnished from bases in Western Germany or elsewhere overseas, a special agreement must be reached to make this possible.

7. Policy on Support Factors Include:

a. Administrative matters such as provision of military and civilian personnel replacements, internal security, recreational, religious and welfare activities, public relations, dependent schools when required, Post Exchanges and postal services, military justice.

b. Logistical matters such as provision of installations, all classes of supplies, communications, troop and dependent housing, medical, evacuation and mortuary services, transport and movements.

IV. MAJOR SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES

8. By item and responsible agency are,

Item	Responsible Agency	Remarks
	ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS	
1. Military replacements including civilian technicians in military units	U.S. Inspection Hqrs.	Centralize requirements and requisition on respective armed service (Incl. 1).
2. Internal security	" " "	Policy to be established by Washington headquarters and operation responsibility redelegated to subordinate echelons.

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Item	Responsible Agency	Remarks
3. Religious activities	U.S.Inspection Headquarters	Chaplains, as appropriate, will be included in Tables of Organization.
4. Public relations	" " "	Provision to be made for friendly cooperation with Russian population consistent with accomplishing mission.
5. Recreation and welfare activities	Dept.of Defense	Base on Armed Forces program in Germany insofar as practicable. Make use of local facilities to maximum.
6. Dependent schools and commissaries	" " "	Plan to be developed by Department of Defense based on policy that dependents will be permitted after a short time.
7. Post Exchanges	" " "	Extension of Post Exchange system in Germany.Number of exchanges to minimum.
8. Postal Services	" " "	In accordance with existing regulations.
9. Military Justice	" " "	Handle in accordance with existing policy.
	LOGISTICAL MATTERS	
10. Installations-office & billeting space	" " "	Rental basis until adequate construction has been completed.Standard same as on military posts in U.S. Initially consider hotel with services as combined offices and housing for key personnel.Troop units into barracks.

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Item	Responsible Agency	Remarks
11. Supply (Classes as required)	Dept. of Defense	Dept. of Defense to develop detailed supply plan in co-ordination with armed services and U.S. Inspection Headquarters. Consider: reimburseable basis, base supply on depots in W. Germany, move direct from Germany to Area and District Inspection Groups, maximum 60 day level all classes. (Incl. 2)
12. Communications (Internal)	" " "	Dept. of Defense develop detailed plan and transmit to Communications Task Force (which has over-all responsibilities for communications).
13. Medical, evacuation and mortuary services	" " "	Dept. of Defense develop detailed plan. Consider use of Russian facilities as feasible.
14. Transport and movements a. Motor transport for Internal use	Hq. U.S. Inspection Mission	Consider rental of Russian vehicles along with maintenance services. Use U.S. drivers only.
b. Air transport for Internal use	Dept. of Defense	Provide air transport for special purposes.

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9. Echelons of the U. S. Inspection System would receive the following support:

Echelon	Type of Support	Responsible Agency
1. U.S.Inspection Headquarters	Administrative(supplies, equipment, communications and internal operation of headquarters).	Dept. of Defense should make provisions for administrative support in its annual budget.
2. U.S.Inspection Mission	Administrative and logistical (See para.8, above for items involved).	Dept. of Defense except as stated (see para.8, above for exceptions).
3. Area Headqrs.	" " " "	" " " " " " "
4. Military District Inspection Groups	Administrative and logistical (see para.8, above for items involved).	Dept. of Defense except as stated (see para.8, above for exceptions).
5. Verification Teams	Administrative and logistical.	Based on Military District Inspection Groups.
6. Observer Teams	Administrative and logistical.	Although based on the Military District Inspection Groups, observers will normally live on the local economy.

V. CONCLUSIONS

10. The U. S. Inspection Organization can be supported administratively and logistically.

11. The Department of Defense should designate an Armed Service as executive agent for the administrative and logistical support of the U. S. Inspection Organization.

12. Specific responsibilities for administrative and logistical matters should be as delineated in Section IV, above.

13. Specific support plans should be prepared by the designated executive agent in coordination with other interested services and agencies.

Inclosures:
1.-Replacements
2.-Development of Supply Plan

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APPENDIX F -- INCLOSURE 1

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REPLACEMENTS

1. (See Appendix L). The problems of obtaining suitable replacements, both military and civilian for the inspection system, are similar to those encountered in staffing projects in other areas of the world. Military personnel may be ordered to the inspection organization--civilian technicians and specialists, however, must be recruited which at best is time-consuming and frequently ineffective without suitable incentives.

2. Some incentives for consideration are:

a. For the military: Adequate Displacement and Station (living) allowances, shorter than normal overseas tours, authorization for dependents, better than normal living and recreational accomodations, opportunities for travel.

b. For civilian technicians: In addition to those listed for the military, higher ratings and rates of pay than for similar positions in the United States, periodic free transportation to and from USSR for dependents, provision for leave in the United States at end of tour, and logistical support on same basis as military.

3. It is essential that replacement requirements be anticipated well in advance of the time required and that every effort be made to provide qualified and trained replacements, both military and civilian, in sufficient time to provide an over-lap in duties.

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APPENDIX F -- INCLOSURE 2

DEVELOPMENT OF A SUPPLY PLAN

1. The Department of Defense should designate one Armed Service as executive agent to be responsible for the logistical support of the U. S. Inspection Organization.

2. The Armed Service so designated should develop a detailed supply plan in coordination with the U. S. Inspection Headquarters. The following principles should be considered in the development of such a plan:

a. Budgetary and/or reimburseable procedures should be agreed upon by all interested services and/or agencies in advance of actual establishment of the inspection system. Furthermore, to avoid confusion and delays, these procedures should be thoroughly understood by all elements of each service and be rigidly enforced.

b. Since procurement lead-times for many supply teams are 18-24 months, supply requirements should be anticipated sufficiently in advance to insure availability WHEN and WHERE needed. Supply installations in West Germany should be expanded if necessary to carry the additional stocks.

c. Cross-servicing is anticipated on items peculiar to the armed services.

d. Accumulation of supplies in excess of amounts authorized should be strictly prohibited.

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e. Periodic requisitions should be checked, consolidated and forwarded to the designated executive agent by the U. S. Inspection Headquarters.

f. Supplies should be moved from West German supply installations direct to the ultimate consumers insofar as practicable. Evacuation of personnel and material should follow the same channels.

g. Indigenous personnel should be used insofar as practicable.

3. Personnel required for logistic support should be kept to a minimum. The chiefs of the armed services and the government budget authorities, however, should realize that adequate support cannot be provided without adequate funds, personnel and perhaps installations. Accordingly, it is essential that careful, early and realistic consideration be given to the logistics implications of this project. Estimates of the cost should include:

a. Personnel for the following duties:

(1) Storage and maintenance of supplies in depots.

(2) Processing requisitions and outloading of supplies from depots.

(3) Movement of supplies to airfields.

(4) Air movement of supplies to various inspection headquarters.

(5) Off-loading and movement by motor transport to local supply installations in USSR.

(6) Storage, maintenance and issuing.

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b. Monetary costs.

NOTE: a. Types of service units and actual numbers of personnel required for the support of the inspection system should be determined as the logistical plan is further developed.

b. Monetary costs will be computed as the plan develops.

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APPENDIX G

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System

Signal Communications Plan

Army Elements

Headquarters or Element	Contact	Type of Equipment	Remarks
Observer Teams	Military Districts	1 - Radio Truck (Voice and C.W.) for contact with District Headquarters. 2 - Radio (Walkie-Talkie Type) for contact between observers and Radio Trucks.	Observers will contact District Headquarters on a fixed schedule. Flash type contacts will be used to signal indications of surprise attack.
Verification Teams	Military Districts	Radio Truck (Voice and C. W.) for routine or emergency contact with District Headquarters.	As above
Military Districts	U. S. Inspection Mission (Moscow) and Directing Area Headquarters	Fixed equipment capable of communication with — a - Observer Teams b - Verification Teams c - U. S. Inspection Mission d - U. S. Army Europe (Heidelberg) or Army elements in Pacific	Lateral communications will be maintained with corresponding Air Force and Navy Headquarters if and as required.
Area Headquarters	U. S. Inspection Mission (Moscow) and Military Districts within Area	Fixed equipment capable of communication with — a - Military Districts within area b - U. S. Inspection Mission c - U. S. Army Europe (Heidelberg) or Army elements in Pacific	Lateral communications will be maintained with other Area Headquarters and corresponding Air Force and Navy Headquarters.
U. S. Inspection Mission	1 - U. S. Inspection Hdqrs. (Wash.) 2 - Hdqrs. U.S. Army Europe 3 - All Area Headquarters 4 - All Military Districts	Fixed equipment suitable for communication with headquarters listed.	

Notes

- Messengers, using ground and air transportation, will augment above.
- Diplomatic pouch to be used as expedient.
- Air mail for routine matters will be employed.
- Telephone (indigenous) where practicable for unclassified matters.
- Equipment (Signal Corps) devised to be subject to minimum interference.
- Suitable codes for maximum security to be used as needed.

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APPENDIX H

Army Personnel Requirements

Headquarters	Number of Units	Officers or Key Civ.	Secretaries Wac's or Civ.	Enlisted Men	Total
U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters (4)	1	40	75		115 (4)
U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission (4)	1	68	41		109 (4)
U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters	7	161		1407	1568
Military District Inspection Groups (1)	28	2044		7840	9884
Verification Teams (2)	56	(616) (5)			
Observer Teams (3)	280	(840) (5)		(1960) (5)	
Communications Personnel all echelons		240		1280	1520
Totals	373	2553	116	10,527	13,196

Notes

(1) Basis — 73 officers and 280 enlisted men per District including verification and observer teams.
(2) Basis — 11 officers per team.
(3) Basis — 3 officers and 7 NCO's per team.
(4) Does not include Army portion of station complement.
(5) Included in District totals.

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APPENDIX I Initial Requirements For Major Items of Equipment Army Element of U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System

(Estimated)

Equipment (Units)	U. S. Inspection Hqrs. (1)	U. S. Inspection Mission (1)	U. S. Area Hqrs. (7)	U. S. Military District Inspection Groups (28)	Verification Teams (56)	Observer Teams (280)	Total
Airplane, liaison		6/ 6	2/ 14	4/ 112			132
Helicopter, psgr.		4/ 4	2/ 14	3/ 84			102
Car, 5 psgr. med. sedan		1/ 1					1
Car, 5 psgr. lt. sedan		12/ 12	2/ 14	3/ 84	3/ 168	1/ 280	558
Radio, long dist.	1/ 1	1/ 1	2/ 14	2/ 56			72
Radio, walkie-talkie						1/ 280	280
Truck, 1/4 ton		6/ 6	4/ 28	6/ 168	2/ 112	1/ 280	594
Truck, 3/4 ton, cargo		12/ 12	6/ 42	6/ 168			222
Truck, 3/4 ton, amb.		2/ 2	1/ 7	1/ 28			37
Truck, 3/4 ton, sig. rep.		2/ 2	1/ 7	1/ 28			37
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, cargo		12/ 12	6/ 42	6/ 168			222
Truck, 4 ton, wrecker		1/ 1	2/ 14	2/ 56			71
Truck, communication		2/ 2	2/ 14	2/ 56	1/ 56	1/ 280	408

Notes

Passenger and cargo motor vehicles including maintenance services to be rented, or purchased, from USSR, if practicable and economical.

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APPENDIX J

COST ANALYSIS

I. PROBLEM

1. To determine the cost of the Army element of the U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Organization.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

2. In arriving at this estimate of costs it was assumed that,

a. Army personnel charged to the organization totals

(1) Actual operating	13,000 persons
(2) In the pipeline	8,000 persons
Total	21,000 of which 30% are

officers and 70% enlisted, or comparable civilians.

b. Personnel requirements for line of communications operations are not included since

(1) The Department of Defense should designate an Armed Service as Executive Agent to be responsible for administrative and logistical support of the Inspection Organization.

(2) It is believed that existing line of communications personnel, whether Army and/or Air Force, can provide logistical support from U.S. bases in West Germany and/or France without appreciable increase in strength.

c. Incentives in the form of adequate station allowances for military personnel and higher rates of pay for civilian technicians are essential.

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d. In connection with facilities,

(1) No "free-of-cost" administrative or housing installations will be made available by the USSR.

(2) Rental facilities, as and if available, will be used pending completion of an adequate construction program.

(3) Acceptable construction standards for installations and facilities will be those established for military posts throughout the U.S., insofar as practicable.

(4) Construction will be accomplished by USSR agencies employing local contractors and using local materials.

(5) Cost index for Russia is 1.5 (50% greater than United States cost).

III. DISCUSSION

3. General. The cost estimates contained in this appendix are based on the plan for the operation of the Army element of the inspection organization as proposed in this report. As the details of this plan are further developed, corresponding adjustments should be made in the costs.

4. Types of Cost. For the purpose of this report, cost estimates are considered in two classifications -- initial costs, and annual operating (recurring) costs.

a. Initial costs are incurred incident to the establishment of the organization. They include such items as orientation of

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personnel, movement of personnel and equipment, construction of offices and troop housing, and costs of initial issue of major items of equipment.

b. Annual Operating Costs are incurred incident to the operation of the organization on a yearly basis. They include such items as,

(1) Direct Costs -- which include pay and allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, movements, organizational equipment, and other military personnel costs.

(2) Indirect Costs -- which include maintenance and operations such as command and management, training, supplies and equipment, medical care, and installation support.

IV. SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF COSTS

5. An estimate of costs, developed along the line discussed in the preceding section, are incorporated as follows:

Inclosure 1 -- Initial Costs
Inclosure 2 -- Annual Operating Costs.

As stated in these inclosures, the total costs for the Army element of the inspection system organization is:

a. Initial Costs to Get Organization in Position:	
(1) Without family housing	$ 105,031,000
(2) With family housing	224,310,550
b. Annual Operating Costs After Organization is in Position:	
(1) Without dependents	$ 271,022,975
(2) With dependents	291,423,460

Inclosures: 2

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INCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX J

ESTIMATED INITIAL COSTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMY ELEMENT OF THE U. S. INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

1. Definition. Initial costs are incurred incident to the establishment of the organization. Included are such items as orientation of personnel, movement of personnel and equipment from home stations to overseas stations, construction of offices and troop housing, costs of initial issue of major items of equipment.

2. Estimate of Initial Costs to Get Organization in Position

a. Specialized training of key personnel.

(1) One year language course (1,000 persons X $10,000) = $ 10,000,000

(2) 30 days orientation key personnel (2,000 persons X $2,000) = 4,000,000

NOTE: Above costs include pay and allowances, subsistence, clothing, maintenance and operation and overhead of installation.

b. Movement of personnel and equipment from home stations to overseas stations.
13,000 persons X $1,000 average per person = 13,000,000

c. Construction of housing and facilities.

(1) Facilities other than family housing--assuming 100% officers and enlisted men in Bachelor Officer Quarters and barracks.

(a) Troop housing (barracks, kitchen, mess hall, administration, storage and recreation).
$1,600 per enlisted man X 9,100 men = 14,560,000

(b) Bachelor Officer Quarters with mess
$2,850 per space X 3,900 officers = 11,115,000

(c) Supporting facilities (Post Exchange, chapel, theater, service club, bakery, library, officers mess, administrative services)
60% X $25,675,000 = 15,405,000

(d) Cost index for Russia (1.5)
$41,080,000 X 50% = 20,540,000

(e) Total Cost = $61,620,000

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(2) Facilities other than family housing--assuming 10% officers and 81% enlisted men.

(a) Troop housing (barracks, kitchen, mess hall, administration, storage and recreation).
$1,600 per enlisted man X 9,100 men X 81% = $ 11,793,600

(b) Bachelor Officer Quarters with mess $2,850 per space X 3,900 officers X 10% = 1,111,500

(c) Supporting facilities (Post Exchange, chapel, theater, service club, bakery, library, officers mess, administrative services) from para. 2 c (1)(c), above = 15,405,000

(d) Cost index for Russia (1.5)
$28,310,100 X 50% = 14,155,050

(e) Total cost $42,465,150

(3) Family housing -- assuming 90% officers and 19% enlisted men entitled.

(a) Officer family housing.
$20,000 per unit X (3900 officers X 90%) X 80% (Dept. of Army authorization of total requirement). = $56,160,000

(b) Enlisted family housing. $15,000 per unit X (9,100 men X 19%) X 80% (Dept. of Army authorization of total requirement). = 20,748,000

(c) Supporting facilities (Post Exchange, chapel, theater, service club, bakery, library, officers mess, administrative services) 20% X $76,908,000 = 15,381,600

(d) Cost index for Russia (1.5)
$92,289,600 X 50% = 46,144,800

(e) Total Cost $ 138,434,400

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d. Initial Issue of Major Items of Equipment. Appendix I, lists major items of equipment for the Army element of the U. S. Inspection Organization -- these items consist of liaison airplanes, helicopters, passenger cars, trucks for personnel, cargo and communications, and radio equipment. It is estimated that the total cost of this equipment is $16,411,000. In event it is practicable to rent motor vehicles from USSR sources, the above total may be reduced by approximately $4,875,000.

3. Recapitulation. The initial costs for getting the organization into position are summarized under two contingencies - Plan A, and Plan B.

a. Plan A: No family housing (100% personnel in quarters and barracks).

b. Plan B: Family housing provided for 90% officers and 19% enlisted men.

Initial Cost Item	Plan A	Plan B
1. Language course, 1 yr.--1,000 persons	$ 10,000,000	$10,000,000
2. Orientation course, 30 days, 2,000 "	4,000,000	4,000,000
3. Movement 13,000 persons overseas	13,000,000	13,000,000
4. Construction of housing & facilities		
a. Plan A (no family housing)	61,620,000	--
b. Plan B		
(1) Family housing: 90% officers and 19% enlisted men	--	138,488,400
(2) Other facilities: 10% officers and 81% enlisted men		42,465,150
5. Major Items of Equipment	16,411,000	16,411,000
6. GRAND TOTAL	$105,031,000	$224,364,550

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INCLOSURE 2 TO APPENDIX J

ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS OF THE ARMY ELEMENT OF THE U. S. INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

1. Definition. Annual operating costs are incurred incident to the operation of the inspection organization on a yearly basis. Included are such items as:

a. Direct Costs - which include pay and allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, movements, organizational equipment, and other military personnel costs. For personnel outside the U. S. these costs average per annum as follows:

(1) Officers - $8,052
(2) Enlisted Men - $3,213

b. Indirect Costs - which include maintenance and operations such as command and management, training, supplies and equipment, Army-wide services, medical care, and installation support. For personnel outside the U. S. these costs average as follows:

(1) Officers - $2,609
(2) Enlisted Men - $2,609

c. Station Allowances. The matter of special incentives is discussed in considerable detail in Appendix L. It is imperative that adequate station allowances be authorized for both military personnel and civilian employees. Department of Defense Joint Travel Regulations authorize the following station allowances:

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	With Dependents		Without Dependents	
	Subsistence	Quarters	Subsistence	Quarters
Enlisted	$11.05	$3.80	$9.45	$4.60
Officers	$15.00	10.00	9.10	8.10

Inasmuch as these allowances appear inadequate, it is suggested that the Department of Defense study the problem for the purpose of determining realistic allowances for this specific project.

d. Rental of Installations and Facilities. Pending completion of a construction program it is contemplated that installations and facilities will be rented from USSR authorities. It is estimated that rental will be required for thirty-six (36) major headquarters, along with billets for 3,900 officers and 9,100 enlisted men or comparable civilians, along with supporting facilities. It is estimated that rental for such installations and facilities will approximate $1,500,000 annually.

2. Computation of Annual Costs.

a. Personnel: 13,000 actual operating personnel and 8,000 in the pipeline for a total of 21,000. Of this total: 30% (6300) are officers and 70% (14,700) enlisted men, or comparable civilians. Costing is as follows,

(1) Direct Costs:	
Officers: 6,300 persons X$8,052	$50,727,600
Enlisted Men: 14,700 persons X$3,213	$47,231,100
TOTAL	$97,958,700
(2) Indirect Costs:	
Officers: 6,300 X$2,609	$16,436,700
Enlisted Men: 14,700 X$2,609	$38,352,300
TOTAL	$54,789,000

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b. Station Allowances: (Paragraph 1c, above)

(1) Dependents not authorized:

Officers: 6,300 persons X $18.00 X 365 days	=	$ 41,391,000
Enlisted Men: 14,700 persons X $14.05 X 365 days	=	75,385,275
TOTAL		$ 116,776,275

(2) Dependents authorized:

(a) With dependents:

Officers: 6,300 persons X 90% X $25.00 X 365 days	=	$ 51,738,750
Enlisted Men: 14,700 persons X 19% X $19.85 X 365 days	=	20,235,965
TOTAL		$ 71,974,715

(b) Without dependents:

Officers: 6,300 persons X 10% X $18.00 X 365 days	=	$ 4,139,100
Enlisted Men: 14,700 persons X 81% X $14.05 X 365 days	=	61,061,945
TOTAL		$ 65,201,045

c. Rental of Installations and Facilities. Installations and facilities required for thirty-six (36) major headquarters, and billets for 3,900 officers and 9,100 enlisted men or comparable civilians all with supporting facilities at estimated annual cost rental -- $1,500,000.

3. Recapitulation. The annual operating costs incurred after the inspection organization is in place are summarized under two contingencies: Plan C and Plan D.

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a. Plan C: Dependents not authorized.

b. Plan D: Dependents authorized.

Annual Cost Item	Plan C	Plan D
1. Personnel		
a. Direct costs	$ 97,958,700	$ 97,958,700
b. Indirect costs	54,789,000	54,789,000
c. Station allowances		
(1) Plan C	116,776,275	
(2) Plan D		
(a) With dependents: (90% officers, 19% EM)		71,974,715
(b) Without dependents: (10% officers, 81% EM)		65,201,045
2. Rental of Installations and Facilities Facilities	1,500,000	1,500,000
3. GRAND TOTAL	$271,022,975	$291,423,460

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APPENDIX K

OUTLINE OF RIGHTS, POWERS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE INSPECTION ORGANIZATION AND ITS PERSONNEL

(To be supplemented and delineated carefully in the terms of agreement)

1. To assure that the various units and accredited personnel of the inspection organization are capable of discharging their functions freely at all times, and, to define their status, the following will govern:

a. The Host Government shall --

(1) Provide all necessary protection and normal assistance to inspection elements and assigned personnel located within its national boundaries.

(2) Furnish upon request such logistical support as may be agreed upon, to include installations, transportation, communications, and such other facilities and services as may be necessary in the performance of inspection tasks.

(3) Permit and facilitate the establishment and operation of such headquarters, inspection and observation posts as may be required for the proper accomplishment of the inspection system mission.

(4) Have the right to examine personal baggage and effects, supplies, equipment, vehicles, ships and aircraft of the inspection organization and associated personnel upon each entry into its territory.

(5) Have the right to monitor the activities of personnel of the inspection mission to the extent that no undue interference

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with the performance of their prescribed duties nor with their personal freedoms results.

b. The Inspection Organization and its authorized and identified representatives, shall, as applicable below, --

(1) Have the right, within the letter and spirit of the agreement, to inspect and observe by land, sea or air means, all items under inspection at any stage.

(2) Be furnished specific means of identification.

(3) Enjoy inviolability of person, property, premises, archives and equipment and the protection of classified matter and materiel.

(4) Have ready access to all items subject to verification and surveillance and to all records pertinent thereto.

(5) Have the right to import, acquire, possess and use such property, facilities and services as may be essential to the proper functioning of the inspection system and the comfort of its personnel.

(6) Have certain specified exemptions from taxes, customs requirements and individual controls.

(7) Have access to designated telecommunications facilities for the conduct of proper official and personal business.

(8) Have the right of ingress, egress and transit across and over the host country with free access to transportation means incidental thereto.

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(9) Be liable to extradition for crimes or offenses committed within the territory of the host government while assigned to the inspection organization but be subject only to the processes of the laws of the United States.

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APPENDIX L

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The questions listed in Section IV of the 4 August 1955 revision of the Basic Directive together with the answers thereto follow:

1. QUESTION: What portion of the personnel should be U. S. Nationals as compared to the nationals of other free countries?

ANSWER: a. Under an exclusively bilateral agreement as between the U.S. and USSR by which inspection operations would be confined to the national areas of the respective two States, personnel of other free countries would be present, if at all, only as observers on an invitational basis.

b. Under a bilateral agreement which would provide for more extended inspection operations to encompass U.S. bases on foreign soil on the one hand and bases within the Russian satellite areas on the other, nationals of other free countries would be present in numbers (prescribed in the terms of agreement) sufficient only to protect the interests of the separate states involved.

(1) Under a multi-national agreement the extent of participation of nationals of other free countries should be as determined by the separate signatory states, but within limitations prescribed explicitly in the agreement.

(2) Because of the high stake of the United States, the personnel of the inspection system should be predominately American,

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and the United States, through agreement among signatory free states, should be the Executive Agent.

2. QUESTION: What would be the range of magnitude of the approximate cost of the installations?

ANSWER: Installations will be required in the USSR and its satellites to support thirty-six (36) Army (or joint) headquarters -- 13,000 individuals both civilian and military, including 3,900 officers and 9,100 enlisted categories. Inasmuch as existing installations for offices and housing (officer, enlisted, and family) are probably inadequate, it may be necessary to initiate a construction program which will provide installations comparable to American standards. Pending completion of such a program rental facilities, although inadequate, must be used. Costs are estimated as follows:

a. Rental:	(annually)	$ 1,500,000
b. New construction		
(1) Total requirements less family housing		$ 61,620,000
(2) Total requirements including family housing		$180,853,550

Attention is invited to Inclosure 1, Appendix J, for detailed estimates of the cost of installations.

3. QUESTION: What would be the range of magnitude of the approximate cost of the annual operation of the inspection system?

ANSWER: It is estimated that the annual operating costs for the Army element of the inspection system are as follows:

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a. Annual costs assuming dependents not authorized $ 271,022,975

b. Annual costs assuming dependents authorized after a reasonable time $ 291,423,460

Attention is invited to Inclosure 2, Appendix J, for detailed estimates of annual operating costs.

4. QUESTION: What special problems of recruitment of the necessary skills or of maintenance of the required installations is anticipated?

ANSWER: (1) Recruitment of necessary skills. Assuming that the Department of the Army, under established procurement policies and within special over-strength authorizations can and will supply the uniformed personnel essential to the operation of the Inspection System, the problem of civilian recruitment particularly in the procurement of required skills and in its language and security aspects will still present numerous difficulties. Later administrative phases will be complicated by the high rate of turnover that must be anticipated. Because of the unique nature of the venture which they would be asked to undertake, the uncertainty of job tenure and the conditions of relative self-denial under which service would have to be performed, there is cause for doubt that substantial and qualified civilians would be attracted in anything like the numbers and in the types needed. Real incentives in the way of high rates of pay, guaranteed personal privileges amounting to diplomatic immunity and special

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career guarantees would have to be held out. To avoid discrimination, the Department of Defense should make comparable provisions for its uniformed personnel. These should include special displacement and cost of living allowances, dependents privileges, shortened tours of duty when separated from families, leave and travel opportunity, etc. In setting up the recruiting mechanism, full use should be made of existing governmental personnel agencies. This will require prior agreements and decisions. Since a considerable period, estimated at not less than a year, will be required to recruit, check, indoctrinate, train, move and settle personnel, the necessary machinery should be set in motion at the earliest feasible moment.

ANSWER: (2) Maintenance of the required installations. No special problems are anticipated in the maintenance of installations for the Army elements of the inspection organization. During the rental phase, maintenance will be performed by the rental agency. After the construction program is completed, maintenance should offer no unusual problems inasmuch as USSR labor and materials are to be used in the construction of the installations.

5. QUESTION: Would a variation in the precise agreed level of armaments cause any major alteration of the recommended inspection system? If affirmative, describe the effect in general terms.

ANSWER: It is believed that a variation in the level of armaments, particularly in the early stages, would not have any major

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bearing on the Army elements of the Inspection System. The essential purpose of the system is to guard against surprise attack. This can be done only if the necessary elements of the system are retained in place and function until all chances of surprise attack disappear. The system recommended herein, based, as it is, on full territorial coverage, could at any time be adapted readily to any new set of circumstances.

V. QUESTION: Would the reciprocal facilities, installations, privileges, personnel and reports within the United States be feasible?

ANSWER: It is believed that reciprocal facilities, installations, privileges, personnel and reports within the United States would be entirely feasible from the military point of view. To make it acceptable to the American public, however, an intensive public indoctrination program should be initiated early, and maintained actively to condition our people to the presence and movements of the Russian Inspection Mission personnel within this country, and Congressional action would doubtless be necessary. The rights and privileges of Russian personnel should be specified carefully in the agreement and their whereabouts in this country accounted for at all times.

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APPENDIX L

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Navy

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Part I - 1

Part I - the Problem

A. Introduction

The basic directive for the Task Force on Navy Inspection is contained in Memorandum: Implementation of NSC Action No. 1149, dated July 5, 1955, Revised August 4, 1955.

TFNI's task is evolved from and a part of the overall assignment to:

> "Design in specific terms a practical, effective, and comprehensive armament and armed force inspection system within the USSR which does not depend on good faith for effective operation, the reciprocal pattern of which would be feasible and acceptable within the U.S. Its purpose is: to improve the prospects of a durable peace through identifying violations of agreements, limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attack; and providing an early warning system."

This assignment, implicit in its broad language and confirmed in the accompanying assumptions (to be discussed) covers a range of end objectives from an effective inspection system to reduce to an acceptable degree the possibility of signatory nations mounting a surprise attack (meaning of which to be discussed) to that of limitation of armaments at a level at which neither has the capacity to annihilate the other, although each has ample strength to

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Part I-2

deter the other from attempted aggression, and substantial nuclear weapons stockpile and means of delivery, similar in total to present levels of armament.

Although an approximate yardstick, present levels of armament, is prescribed in the basic directive; and limitation of armament, rather than reduction, is referred to, it must be realized that (1) some reduction may now or might shortly be required to remove the capability of annihilation, and (2) the USSR is insisting and may well continue to insist upon some agreement with respect to reduction of armaments, and particularly nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Assignment should be viewed as ultimately comprehending inspection and control of an agreement with "disarmament" features.

From the extremes of these broad objectives, i.e., inspection and control of some form of "disarmament" agreement on the one hand and inspection and control to guard against surprise attack on the other, it is deemed desirable to derive with some exactness the task of the TFNI in this, its initial effort.

B. Derivation of the Problem

Bearing in mind that reliance upon good faith is discarded as an adjunct of the plan, and that it is believed to be current national policy that effective inspection must be the foundation of any plan for limitation of atomic or conventional armament and/or armed forces, it would seem to follow as a necessary postulate that plans, effective plans,

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must be put into effect by phases, i.e. that inspection and control as a means of relieving tension and improving the prospects of a durable peace must, in the first instance, prove itself as a feasible concept. To use a pedestrian figure of speech, inspection and control must learn to walk before it can run.

The President's Geneva statement and other pronouncements all stress the importance at the beginning of (1) an exchange of "blueprints" of armament and armed forces and verification thereof, and (2) free aerial reconnaissance. The thesis in this connection with respect to nuclear weapons is that they are so concealable that effective inspection should be directed at means of delivery, rather than inventories of weapons.

It is the view of the TFNI that, while nuclear weapons constitute the major threat, a surprise attack by USSR will, for reasons to be later discussed, comprehend operations of conventional type (1) as vital supplements to the nuclear attack and (2) as a necessary part of the Soviet plan to protect against our massive retaliation.

These considerations lead us to delimit for the time being the agreement articulated in II-Assumptions of the basic directive. Those Assumptions are set aside which go beyond an agreement for (1) disclosure and verification of a blueprint inventory of the status and location of armament and armed forces, and (2) an inspection and control system

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Part I-4

which will decrease to an acceptable degree the threat of a surprise attack.

It may be argued that the preparation of a comprehensive plan, covering the full range of possible objectives of an agreement with USSR, should be undertaken at the outset -- that the phasing becomes a factor in negotiation and execution. TFNI sees three objections to this approach to its planning problem. First, as complex as is the preparation of a plan for effective inspection and control to guard against surprise attack, preparation of a plan to police an agreement to limit or reduce armament, embracing production, technological development, research, and so forth, is infinitely more complex and hence can better be approached subsequently. Secondly, lessons learned while working out the details of a first stage plan, including its integration with other task force plans, will be helpful in preparing the best plans for successive stages. Finally, it is recognized that preparation of the ultimate plan to develop an effective inspection and control system for a limitation, or reduction, of armament agreement may well require a reorganization of task forces, to bring together at the working levels the various technical and professional capabilities required.

The agreement then to which this plan is addressed consists of the following assumptions:

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Part I-5

"To disclose in parallel stages a blueprint inventory of the status and location of armament and armed forces. (II-2)

"To report in advance to an international Armaments Commission movements of their standing armament in international air or water, or on foreign land, water or air." (II-3)

Note two things here - (1) whether or not reports are made to an international Commission is not too significant at this point, for we approach the problem initially as though the agreement would, in the practical sense, be bilateral -- and (2) reports of movements in international or foreign waters only are covered, whereas movements of major significance to us may occur in USSR or satellite waters.

"To permit the establishment within their national borders of an effective inspection service, including land, sea and air survey, and the use of scientific instruments such as radar, sonic, photographic, and radiation detection devices, for the following purposes (II-5):

"a. To assure that standing armament would not be used for surprise attack, or otherwise used without warning, or in violation of the United Nations Charter,

"b. To verify the levels and positioning of standing armaments as disclosed in the national reports,

"d. To verify the completeness and accuracy of reports of international armament movements under paragraph 3 above,

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Part I-6

"e. To currently communicate with headquarters beyond national borders without interference,

"f. To otherwise ascertain the good faith compliance or bad faith evasion of the terms of the armament agreement.

"That each nation is to make such reports to the inspection service as may be necessary to the efficient fulfillment of the inspection task. (II-6)

"That the available relevant intelligence data on USSR facilities is reasonably accurate in magnitude and geographic location (II-7)."

Note: We are puzzled as to what this means as a part of the agreement.

C. Solution Required (III)

"1. Give specific detailed preliminary estimates of the personnel (including technical competence by types) facilities, installations, reporting and inspecting systems within the USSR, and the rights, powers, and privileges of the control mechanism which would be required to implement such an agreement:

a. With particular reference to the necessary rapid continuous reliable communications arrangements without interference.

b. To verify the disclosed and agreed status of air forces, aircraft and missile armament, and bases

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incident thereto, and to promptly detect any significant violation of the agreement in this respect.

c. To verify the disclosed and agreed status of the Navy, including particularly submarines, and to promptly detect any significant violation of the agreement in this respect."

k. "To maintain continuous knowledge of the positioning of substantially all of the long range weapons delivery aircraft and missiles, and to assure to the maximum degree feasible against a surprise attack being launched through such delivery systems."

Note - to this should be added "delivery ships."

2. To assemble the inspection, reporting, and communications requirements of the portions of the total problem into one comprehensive inspection system with interrated contribution to the total effectiveness.

Note - IV and V must subsequently be considered, after a preliminary draft of the initial plan has been developed. They are commented upon in Part IV - D hereof.

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Part II - Soviet Intentions

A. Introduction

The next step in the development of an effective plan to assure that standing armament is not used for a surprise attack is to estimate Soviet intentions with respect to such an attack.

It must always be kept in mind that agreement for reduction of armaments, their limitation, or any other agreement, including one to establish a disarmament and inspection system, should any or all be achieved, will not of themselves insure peace. In all our planning, we must not forget what the Communists have said over and over: that their system, as they conceive it, and ours cannot survive together; and therefore that their unchangeable goal is to destroy the U.S. as the leader of the so-called "Capitalistic World."

Against this background we should look at the full meaning of the USSR "Surprise attack," to the launching of which this plan, in addition to disclosure and verification, is directed.

Any agreements with respect to inspection and control, made with the USSR at this time, must be regarded as establishing a "truce," during which they will seek by any and every means, not inimicable to their own interests, to improve the balance of power of the USSR vis à vis the United States and its western allies.

At such time as the USSR has improved, through deception and/or western complacency, its military posture to the point that Soviet

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Part II - 2

leaders believe they have achieved their end of attaining a world power position from which the final step in world domination can be undertaken, that step will follow. It is this final step, initiated through a "surprise attack" to attain the maximum initial advantage, to which we now direct our attention.

The TFNI adopts, as its concept of such an attack, the commencement of global warfare, through a planned and coordinated program of massive destruction, accompanied by operations of every conceivable type, conventional and unconventional, which, in the judgment of Soviet leaders, could be undertaken with a high degree of surprise. It should be commented that the TFNI does not rule out so-called "small wars," but guarding specifically against their surprise commencement is not a part of our assigned problem, although detection of Soviet intentions in this respect should be viewed as a by-product of a comprehensive inspection and control system.

B. Estimate of Soviet Operations to Initiate the "Surprise Attack"

Should the Soviets move, they would seek to destroy as much allied strength as possible through the "surprise attack," while giving full attention to concurrent operations that would tend to neutralize our capabilities for massive retaliation. Operations would include the following:

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1) Massive nuclear attacks delivered by air, sea, and saboteurs against major U. S. bases, ports, arsenals, and key industrial centers.

2) Similar nuclear attacks against our overseas bases and those of our allies, with emphasis upon areas from which we could undertake massive retaliation.

3) Similar attacks against U. S. and allied carrier task forces, especially those deployed in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and in the waters adjacent to Great Britain and the Scandinavian peninsula.

4) Mass military operations against Western European nations.

5) Widespread sabotage and civil disturbance operations led in part by individuals dispatched from Russia on surface ships and submarines in advance of the initiation of war. Typical operations may call for destroying power plants and substations, contaminating water reservoirs by germ warfare, disrupting communications, instigating strikes, inciting riots, spreading false rumors, all to the end of creating confusion and panic.

6) Paratroop operations in major strength in support of large-scale military operations and in minor strength against lightly defended positions of strategic importance.

7) Short-range amphibious operations:

   a) In the Middle East - examples, Turkey (to get control of the Turkish straits), Iran (to get middle East oil)

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b) In the Baltic - example, coordinated with land operations against Western Germany and the Scandinavian countries

c) In the Far East - examples, Japan, U.S. positions (Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Shemya)

8) Operations against the sea lines of communications which make possible our supply and reinforcement of U.S. and allied forces overseas, and the exchange of critical raw materials between the U.S. and her allies so necessary in the prosecution of a war.

9) Defense of strategic sea areas from which attack, conventional and unconventional, from our carriers, guided missile ships and submarines would be expected.

10) Defense of Soviet sea areas, in order to maintain essential coastal lines of sea communications, and to protect amphibious operations from allied naval attack.

C. Estimate of Soviet preparations, Ashore and Afloat, to Execute Assigned Naval Tasks in the "Surprise Attack"

1) The Soviet Navy - Introduction

The Soviets are creating a large navy, and they are doing it with a definite object in view. Inasmuch as their Navy has been relatively small in the past, we can only assume that their new objective is a broader mission for Soviet naval power. From their building program it would appear that they aspire to dispute the U.S. Navy's mission, namely: to gain and maintain control of the seas and deny control to any enemy. This may well be their ultimate aim. Meanwhile

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the naval power they have built is sure to affect their strategy in global planning.

Since 1945 the Soviet Navy has been greatly strengthened by an intense and rapid building program; this program has not included aircraft carriers, battleships, heavy cruisers or amphibious craft, but has concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine fleet is now the largest in the world and is still growing; about half its strength consists of long-range craft of which a significant and increasing proportion are modern types. Most of the major surface ships and all the modern submarines will probably be kept active, but the present rate of new construction is such that the Soviets may elect to create a substantial reserve fleet of submarines. A reserve fleet of this type could be activated within six months.

Soviet Naval Aviation comprises about twenty percent of the total strength of Soviet military aviation. Recently they have converted Soviet Naval aircraft completely to jet aircraft in the fighter and light bomber categories. The number of jet reconnaissance aircraft in service has been increased. However, attack and transport aircraft continue to be piston engine type aircraft. For the time being, Soviet Naval Aviation is expected to remain approximately constant in strength, while continuing its program of modernization of equipment. Improved

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all-weather jet fighters will probably be introduced, and possibly jet medium bombers for attack, reconnaissance and antisubmarine operations.

a) Composition

At the present time it is believed that the total strength of the Soviet Navy consists of four old battleships, seven heavy cruisers, twenty-three light cruisers, 134 destroyers, fifty-six destroyer escorts, 374 submarines and 3390 aircraft. It is interesting to note that of the number of ships in the Soviet Navy - thirteen light cruisers, eighty-five fleet destroyers and 149 long-range submarines are of post war design. Naval construction in the USSR is presently estimated at about 175,000 tons a year which represents about 1/3 of Soviet capacity.

A breakdown by types and age of construction follows:

Soviet Naval Forces

Naval Vessels

Major Surface Ships	Overage (Over 20 yrs. of age)	Modern	Total Strength
Capital ships	4 (Old BBs)	0	4
Heavy cruisers	1	6	7
Light cruisers	3	20	23
Destroyers	7	127	134
Destroyer escorts	0	56	56
Total	15	209	224

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Part II - 7

Submarines	Overage	Modern	Total Strength
Long range (New Const.)	0	149	149
Long range	28	43	71
Medium range	21	22	43
Short Range	31	80	111
Total	80	294	374
Grand total	95 overage ships	503 modern	598 Grand total strength

Aircraft

Fighters	
Jet	1920
Piston	0
Attack	
Jet	0
Piston	130
Light Bomber	
Jet	770
Piston	0
Reconnaissance	
Jet	150
Piston	0
Transport	
Jet	0
Piston	190
Helicopter	40
Total	3390

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b. Organization and deployment, including problems of redeployment (inland waterways)

The principal weakness of the Soviet Navy derives from the wide separation of the sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its inability to control the sea routes between these areas. The USSR is thus deprived of the strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by naval powers, and is compelled to maintain four separate fleets together with their supporting facilities. The inland waterway system connecting the White and Baltic Seas now permits the interchange of vessels up to the size of small destroyers and all current submarine types. However, certain locks in the inland waterway system between the Black and White Seas limit the size of ships to 245 feet. This system would exclude the transfer of large destroyers and "Z" type submarines. It is expected that by 1957, improvements will extend this interchange capability to include the Black Sea. However, parts of the waterway system are open only on an average of five months a year because of weather conditions. Increased use of the Northern Sea Route, which is open for a six to eight week period in the summer, may also improve the situation. The lack of adequate supply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern areas is an additional handicap. Limitations on sustained offensive operations derive from the land-locked position of the fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas which contain roughly sixty percent of Soviet

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naval strength, the exits from which are controlled by Western Powers. Another weakness is the lack of advanced bases. Further, the long-range capabilities of the Soviet Navy are reduced by the lack of aircraft carriers, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, auxiliary vessels suitable for underway logistic support, and by the lack of experience in long-range operations. U.S. naval operations particularly in the Pacific in World War II proved the value of carrier task forces and amphibious forces in long-range operations. There is no force in the Soviet Navy comparable to the amphibious forces of the U.S. Navy, although the naval infantry components have received some training in amphibious warfare. While capable of mounting short range amphibious lifts in considerable force in the Baltic and Black Seas and in the Sea of Japan, the Soviet Navy does not possess sufficient amphibious craft to launch and sustain long-haul amphibious operations.

Composition and Deployment of Soviet Fleet

Modern Ships

	Baltic	Northern	Black Sea	Pacific	Total
Battleships/Carriers	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy cruisers	2	0	2	2	6
Light cruisers	10	4	6	0	20
Destroyers	46	26	23	32	127
Destroyer escorts	16	4	16	20	56
Total	74	34	47	54	209

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Part II - 10

Submarines	Baltic	Northern	Black Sea	Pacific	Total
Long range	60	71	34	27	192
Medium Range-	10	0	5	7	22
Short Range	33	3	14	30	80
Total	103	74	53	64	294
Grand Total	177	108	100	118	503
Overage Ships					
Battleships	2	0	2	0	4
Heavy cruisers	0	0	1	0	1
Light cruisers	1	0	2	0	3
Destroyers	0	3	2	2	7
Total	3	3	7	2	15
Submarines					
Long Range	7	11	4	6	28
Medium Range	4	0	3	14	21
Short Range	11	2	10	8	31
Grand Total	22	13	17	28	80
Grand Total (Overage Ships)	22	13	17	28	80
(Modern and Overage Ships)	202	124	124	148	598
Minor Surface Vessels	1018	211	215	412	1856

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c. Capabilities in terms of type operations

As yet, the Soviets do not have surface naval forces that will permit them to contemplate large scale operations for the seizure of overseas territories. Their fleet is geographically divided, lacks advance bases, does not have carrier based air arms, likewise modern amphibious-type ships -- all of which are necessary in overseas operations.

Their submarines have a long-range capability for attacking in U.S. territorial waters; they can be equipped to carry an assortment of weapons, including aircraft, guided missiles with nuclear warheads, and mines. Most likely, a large portion of the Soviet submarine forces would be employed against U.S. naval forces, especially a ainst carrier task forces with nuclear delivery capability. In addition, their submarines could, at least in the initial phase of the "surprise attack," inflict serious damage on U.S. overseas communications by attacks on shipping and offensive mining of ports and harbors of the U.S. and its western allies.

Because of the lack of aircraft carriers and long-range vessels suitable for amphibious warfare, large-scale Soviet amphibious attacks will be limited, as previously mentioned, to areas where air cover can be provided from Soviet-controlled territory and limited amphibious troop life would be required.

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However, amphibious raids by submarine-borne forces for the purpose of attempting the destruction or neutralization of key U.S. overseas installations are possible within a radius of 2,000 miles from Soviet submarine bases. Amphibious assault against the continental U.S. (except Alaska) is beyond Soviet capabilities. However, amphibious attacks in force up to six divisions could be made against U.S. installations in Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa provided adequate air support was available. Similar amphibious attacks in force up to four divisions could be made against Turkey, Denmark and Norway.

The operational efficiency of the Soviet Navy is still below that of the navies of the U.S. and its western allies because of the lack of certain types of ships and experience. We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that as their training and building program improves, and as they become skilled in sea warfare, their thinking and strategy will be materially affected by their increasing capability.

In brief, the Soviet is capable of the same types of operations as the U.S. Navy, with the exception of carrier task force operations and large scale overseas amphibious operations.

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2. Estimate of Naval Tasks Assigned

a. Submarine offensive operations against U.S. and allied naval forces, concentrating on carrier task forces and tankers.

b. Submarine offensive operations against U.S. and allied sea communications.

c. Submarines - launch guided missiles against targets in U.S. and allied coastal areas.

For overseas attack on the U.S., in some respects submarines would be more effective than aircraft. This is so because of their greater opportunity for surprise. They would proceed secretly in advance of D-Day to arrive undetected off our principal ports and bases. At the prescribed H-Hour without warning they would surface and launch guided missiles with nuclear warheads against our principal ports and defense areas on both coasts and Panama.

d. Submarines undoubtedly, and possibly other naval vessels and merchant ships, would be stationed as radar pickets to guide Soviet long-range aircraft to their targets in surprise attacks upon the U.S. and its western allies.

e. Soviet submarines - fire controlled run torpedo-mines with nuclear warheads into those harbors and channels where this is feasible. These would be set to actuate

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on D-Day, either automatically or by the passage of ships.

f. Soviet submarines and merchant ships - mine the approaches to our principal ports off both coasts and those of our allies in Europe and Asia.

g. Soviet submarines and merchant ships - land agents in the U.S. and allied nations, equipped with nuclear explosives, germ containers, and other weapons to be employed by them in initiating widespread sabotage.

These groups will be limited in number, and their contacts with subversive groups in the free nations will be as limited as possible.

In fact, to insure that secrecy is maintained, these and other sabotage operations may not be divulged to Communists in allied nations, except for a few trusted leaders. What is more likely is that immediately on the initiation of military operations and massive nuclear attack, the Soviets will broadcast orders to subversive groups to participate in wholesale sabotage, strikes, riot, civil disturbance, disruption of communications, spreading false rumors and inciting panic, activities for which they will have been previously indoctrinated. In certain countries additional Soviet agents may be

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landed by air and sea to participate in and direct these efforts at destroying the internal integrity of a country.

h. In carrying out the operations mentioned in d and g above, prior to the "surprise attack," Soviet submarines would be in position off both coasts for launching guided missiles against our principal cities and industrial centers during the "surprise attack."

i. Amphibious operations

1. Operations on a comparatively small scale, launched with secrecy at the outset would in numerous areas achieve results attainable only with much larger forces later in the war. Hence we could expect such attacks against lightly defended U.S. air facilities in the Western Pacific and Aleutians, e.g. Iwo Jima, Shemya, from which retaliatory nuclear attacks could be launched.

2. Operations, supported by air and sabotage, against more strongly defended areas, such as Hokkaido and Okinawa, are not to be ruled out.

3. Operations, supported by air and land, against the Turkish straits, control of which will be necessary to permit egress of the large number of submarines in the Black Sea. Such operations also would support a

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drive across the Iranian plateau to the Middle East oil fields. Amphibious operations in the Caspian Sea could also be expected in this latter connection.

4. Operations in the Baltic in support of the Soviet Army's drive across Germany and its drive into the Scandinavian peninsula.

j. Surface ship operations, other than amphibious

1. Offensive operations against U.S. and allied naval forces in the Black Sea, Baltic, Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, and other narrow seas.

2. Gun-fire, guided missile, and mining operations in support of amphibious landings and to destroy or neutralize bases and port facilities in the narrow seas and other targets of opportunity, such as Iceland and the Aleutians.

3. Gun-fire support on the flanks of Soviet armies.

4. Raiding operations against sea lines of communication.

k. Air operations

1. Bombing attacks, nuclear and conventional, against U.S. and allied naval forces, particularly carriers, from Soviet and satellite bases.

2. Similar attacks in support of amphibious operations and to destroy air bases from which retaliatory attacks can be undertaken.

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3. Coordinated operations with submarines and surface ships against sea lines of communication.

1. Defensive operations, to deny Soviet coastal sea areas. These operations will employ all naval types, including air, and all types of naval weapons including mines and guided missiles.

3) Necessary preparations ashore and afloat to carry out assigned tasks.

In order to carry out the necessary preparations ashore and afloat for the "surprise attack," the Soviets would increase the tempo of training operations, upkeep and logistical supply of ships and shore installations so that the daily, weekly, and monthly tasks will closely resemble the actual preparations for the "surprise attack." Otherwise any sudden change in routine activity at the various bases would be an indicator to the local inspection team.

All operations, air, amphibious, submarine and surface ship operations mentioned below will be carried out simultaneously at all facilities as far as practicable so that it will be more difficult for the chief inspector in Moscow to detect the real "surprise attack." Specifically they would carry out the following:

a. Submarine and surface ship operations

1. Increased independent operations, at sea for weeks at a time rehearsing mining, torpedo attacks, landing agents, amphibious operations, firing guided missiles, fueling, and the handling of nuclear weapons

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2. Task unit and Task Force operations embracing the different exercises mentioned above
3. Each time ships get underway they will make it a practice to take on a full load of fuel, ammunition and supplies
4. Ships would be drydocked frequently to appear as routine upkeep
5. Intensive training of personnel
6. Ships would always be up to war complements
7. Increased number of ships' exercises and firing practices

b. Amphibious operations

1. All ships would always take on full load of fuel, ammunition and supplies
2. Load to capacity with troops fully armed and with necessary equipment
3. Practice amphibious landings with personnel and equipment
4. Extended cruises lasting for three to four week periods
5. Intensive training in gunnery and ship board exercises with full war complement

c. Air operations

1. All planes would always fuel and arm to capacity
2. Long-range bombers will always take on full load of bombs (or dummies that closely resemble live weapons)

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3. Practice in long extended flights always with full war complements

4. In addition to individual plane exercises, planes will have frequent operations comprising air regiments

5. Increased number of gunnery exercises

6. Fueling exercises in the air

7. Simulated air operations in support of amphibious exercises

d. Shore Installations

1. Each time that naval units are getting underway - preparations of logistical supply will be carried out as a routine exercise; however, all units will always be furnished a full supply of fuel, food and ammunition

2. All bases will operate with full war complement

3. Bases will carry out frequent air alerts and emergency drills

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Part III - Intelligence Inventory

A. Introduction

The solution of the problem assigned requires the preparation of preliminary estimates of the personnel (including technical competence by types), the facilities, installations, reporting and inspection systems needed by the personnel within the USSR, and the rights, powers, and privileges of the control mechanism which would be required. In order to obtain the required solution we have restated specifically the assigned problem of the Task Force on Navy Inspection (PART I) and have analyzed the more probable deployments of the Soviet Navy in event of surprise attack (PART II). The next step is to make an estimate on the basis of available information of the data on the USSR naval establishment which should be requested from the USSR and then verified by our verification teams in the "blueprint" phase, and the data which must be collected continuously or periodically by our inspection teams to guard against surprise attack by Soviet armed forces. This information provides the basis for the required solution to our assignment, namely, the organization of the inspection and reporting system which will be necessary to perform the verification and inspection tasks noted above.

U.S. Delegate Harold E. Stassen has stated in connection with the United States' proposal for an inspection and

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reporting system: "The United States and the USSR will exchange all data relative to military forces and installations which, coupled with measures for their verification and surveillance, are essential to provide against the possibility of a surprise attack." And further: "Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information (information dealing with military installations) and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization."

The naval inspection and reporting organization must therefore be designed to fulfil the two related functions of:

1) conducting an initial verification survey of the existing strength of the USSR naval establishment as an integral part of the proposed exchange of information on military establishments under the "blueprint" formula, and

2) providing for the making of continuous or periodic inspections and reports, as may be considered necessary, on the various forces and activities of the USSR naval establishment with the primary objective of providing adequate early warning of impending surprise attack by Soviet naval or joint forces.

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B. Information to be Revealed by "Blueprint"

It is assumed that naval verification teams stationed in the USSR will undertake to verify by swift and reliable means the information disclosed by the USSR at each stage of the proposed "blueprint" exchange. These teams will have the task of certifying that the intelligence data submitted by the USSR on component activities of the Soviet naval establishment are accurate in terms of magnitude of activities, geographic location, and in other important respects. The verification function will thus serve the purpose of establishing the current status of the USSR naval establishment.

While the word "blueprint" has been broadly defined as those elements of information relating to "the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserve and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations with their locations," much more detailed data must be elicited on the various forces and facilities of the USSR in order that the "disclosed" status of the present naval establishment will provide a basis for estimating the capabilities of the Soviet Navy.

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This verification survey will serve several important purposes. It will provide:

1) a basis for evaluating the present capacity of USSR naval forces to prosecute hostile operations in the form of a surprise attack against the United States, independently of or jointly with other USSR military forces.

2) a basic reference level to aid in the detection of naval buildups which might culminate in a surprise attack.(The initial verification survey will assist in establishing routine patterns of naval activity ashore and afloat. Deviations from such schedules may then provide indications of impending buildup for surprise attack.)

3) an estimate of those routine operations afloat (and supporting activity ashore) which may have a capability of launching a surprise attack.

4) a standard of measurement for determining the rate of expansion of the USSR naval establishment.

5) an index of the reliability to be expected of USSR reports demanded during the Inspection phase.

The procedure for making these information determinations involves the use of Table A-List 1, (Shore Installations), Table B-List 2, (Forces Afloat), and Table C-List 3, (Personnel Organizations) which are appended hereto. These

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Tables and Lists provide a guide for assisting in the formulation of specific requests which must be made by the U.S. of the USSR for disclosure of information in the "blueprint" phase. Such requests on our part will have to be qualified to the extent that we will not be disposed to make a corresponding disclosure to the USSR.

These tables and lists, while particularly helpful in the solution of the verification phase of the problem, are also useful in the inspection phase. Table A, for example, is a list of the estimated types of shore installations within the USSR naval establishment. While it covers most types of installations and facilities which will probably be encountered, it is not necessarily all-inclusive. The purpose of Table A is to suggest the types of shore installations about which information should be elicited for strategic considerations.

List 1 is an enumeration of the types of information which the U.S. may wish to request concerning shore installations. It is sufficiently comprehensive so as to include the significant items of information which we may desire to obtain irrespective of the type or descriptive name given the installation (naval base, repair yard, communication station, etc.). In other words, it is a master list of information items which should suffice for most types of shore installations.

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In making an estimate of the data to be obtained and verified in the verification phase, the following procedure is involved. Taking a shore installation for illustrative purposes and employing appropriate working forms, the name, location, principal and secondary functions, and general description of the facilities located at the installation are noted from available information sources. The numbered information items on List 1 are then examined in order to determine which items refer to a facility or activity which is or may be located in or connected with the particular installation involved. In other words, List 1 is referred to for an approximate list of those information items which will probably be requested by the U.S. and submitted by the USSR in the "blueprint" exchange. By noting the items relevant to the particular installation the scope and nature of the verification task for that installation is obtained.

By following the same procedure but referring to Table B-List 2, and Table C-List 3, the scope and nature of the verification task for forces afloat (including naval air) and reserve personnel organizations, respectively, attached to, associated with, or operating out of or in the vicinity of the installation is similarly obtained.

The completion of this procedure for all significant shore installations, forces afloat, naval air, and reserve personnel components fairly accurately defines the scope of

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the verification task in the "blueprint" exchange phase, and thereby provides a reliable basis for estimating the size, positioning, qualifications of personnel, and facilities required for an adequate verification organization.

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C. Information to be collected against the "Surprise Attack"

The purpose of the second "related function" noted above is to devise a system of inspection and reporting for continuing surveillance with the primary purpose of detecting activity ashore or operations afloat which will warn of an impending surprise attack. This function involves the systematizing of routine inspection and reporting on the various activities of the USSR naval establishment with the objective of obtaining those information items, which, independently or when coordinated into overall patterns of military activity, may warn of impending surprise attack. It is reemphasized that the objective of the permanent inspection phase is to assure that the USSR naval forces can not be used for a surprise attack without our having advance warning. This is to be accomplished by the prompt reporting of any information indicating such an intent.

Just as the information inventory made by the procedure outlined in Section B provides the basis upon which an estimate of the personnel and facilities required for the "blueprint"-verification phase can be made, the extension of this procedure into the inspection - "surprise attack" phase provides that information inventory upon which an estimate of the permanent inspection and reporting organization can be based.

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There are several types of information with which the inspection organization will be vitally concerned during the continuing inspection phase of the information inventory problem. For example, reports by signatory nations made pursuant to the assumed "agreement" and furnished "in advance to an international Armaments Commission" with respect to "movements of their standing armament in international air or water, or on foreign land, water or air" will have to be checked for completeness and accuracy with respect to actual compliance. But the major portion of the inspection organization's resources will have to be devoted to an inspection routine which will extract, by continuous observation or periodic inspection, information concerning forces and installations of the USSR naval establishment which will be significant in terms of our estimates of Soviet activity, ashore and afloat, which will indicate preparation for the execution of assigned naval tasks in the "surprise attack" (Part II-C).

The procedure outlined in Section B above for the designation of useful information items in the verification phase is also of assistance in selecting significant information items to be continuously observed or periodically inspected during the inspection phase. Again taking a shore installation for illustrative purposes, List 1

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is consulted for items referring to activities or facilities which must be kept under continuous surveillance or occasionally inspected at the particular shore installation under consideration. Significant information items will of course depend upon the facilities and activities located on or connected with the particular installation. By noting the items relevant to the specific installation, the scope and nature of the inspection phase task for that installation can be approximately determined.

By following the same procedure but referring to Table B-List 2 and Table C-List 3, the scope and nature of the inspection task for forces afloat (including naval air) and reserve personnel components, respectively, attached to, associated with, or operating out of or in the vicinity of the installation is similarly obtained.

The completion of this procedure for all significant shore installations, forces afloat, naval air, and reserve personnel components defines the scope of the inspection task within acceptable limits, and thereby provides a reliable, though partial, basis for estimating the size, positioning, qualifications of personnel, and facilities required for an adequate inspection organization.

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While the foregoing procedure involving the use of Lists 1, 2, and 3, is satisfactory for estimating the scope and nature of the verification task, the information items suggested therein are not, as previously stated, sufficiently comprehensive to exhaust the full range of possibilities for useful observation, information collection and reporting which will provide adequate forewarning of surprise attack. There are many ramifications to the task of providing adequate warning of surprise attack. This task can be analyzed and described in several dimensions. The categories of information items noted in Lists 1, 2, and 3, are useful in suggesting numerous activities and operations in which a change in magnitude and intensity would constitute a significant indicator of contemplated surprise attack. Such change would not necessarily entail drastic shifts but might involve a gradual acceleration in the level of activity through a period of time.

Additional possibilities are evident. Rather than a significant change in a particular activity or schedule of operations, an important indication of surprise attack may arise from the fitting together of seemingly isolated information items. From such information a threatening pattern of activity may emerge which can eventually culminate in an attempted surprise attack. Another dimension of the indicator problem, as contrasted with pattern

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indicators, concerns the more immediate critical indicators which alone, or in conjunction with, one or more additional highly significant indicators, may constitute a danger alarm of surprise attack in the immediate future.

A more thorough appreciation of the opportunities which will probably be afforded inspection teams to detect signs of preparatory activity for surprise attack can be gained by a detailed consideration of probable Soviet behavior in connection with a specific type of installation and combatant force. Take, for example, possible types of indicators which may be obtained at a submarine operating base. Set forth below in table form are possible indicators, probable efforts which will be made by the USSR to disguise preparations, and the factors which should be of assistance in detecting these preparations:

Submarine Operating Base

Indicator: 1. Change in type of munitions loaded

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors that should aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Not only will the Soviets make training munitions similar in appearance to war munitions, but they may load submarines for training missions at night or on holidays -- as they may be expected to load them when preparing for war	The Soviets will naturally limit to a very small number those who will be informed of plans for the initiation of war. However, a considerably larger number will of necessity know when live nuclear munitions are being handled. There will thus be greater concern and seriousness among officers and technicians and greater attempts to conceal handling of the nuclear weapon. This change in attitude may become apparent to inspection teams.

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Indicator: 2. Capacity fueling

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors that should aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Long in advance of war, capacity fueling will probably be made routine for training	If the Soviets make capacity fueling routine, there will be little indication from fueling operations as to their intentions. However, it is possible that fuel shortages and inertia may cause them to slack off in capacity fueling. Therefore if they seem to revert to this at a number of bases it will be a warning.

Indicator: 3. Increasing readiness of submarines - repairs, drydocking, spare parts and so forth

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors that should aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
The Soviets will endeavor to maintain a constant pattern of keeping their submarines fully ready	Routine peacetime operations will inevitably cause neglect in various fields of readiness. Imminence of war will bring with it increased effort to eliminate deficiencies. This increase in effort will be of such a widespread character that inspection teams reporting from widely scattered bases may develop a significant pattern of change in attitude and action by the Soviets

Indicator: 4. Provisioning

Probable efforts to disguise	Factors that should aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Same as in 3. above	Same as in 3. above

Indicator: 5. Building up war complements

Probable efforts to disguise	Factors that should aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Same as in 3. above	Same as in 3. above

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Indications of Soviet preparations for surprise attack may appear in the form of deviations from the "normal" level of activity (as established in the verification phase) in the more important types of installations and in operations of forces afloat or naval air, as for example in:

Nuclear munition depots and assembly plants

Submarine bases

Long range naval aircraft bases - especially those located near the USSR coastline

Long range guided missile bases near frontiers and the coast

Major training stations and technical schools

Key supply, ammunition and weapon depots

There are many additional and more precise indications, however, which may be of paramount importance in detecting preparation for surprise attack, including:

1) Any concentration of forces which might compose a component of a surprise attack

2) Any deviation from "normal" level of naval base activity or in fleet or naval air operating schedules

3) Positioning of new long range naval aircraft at fields near the coast

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4) A change in command may also be of significance. Presumably some Soviet naval officers are better equipped than others to conduct a surprise attack operation

5) Shifts in communication frequencies, message load and message patterns

6) Concentrated overhaul schedule for submarines and long range aircraft

7) Weapon modification to combatant ships such as guided missile launchers on submarines

8) Influx of shipyard or navy base personnel as if, for example, the yard goes from one shift to three shifts

9) The addition of certain types of skilled workers at naval repair bases or of technicians afloat may indicate alterations in weapon design and use.

10) Increase in transportation to stockpiling areas

11) The stockpiling of fuel oil or aviation gasoline, especially in the Pacific sector will be of the utmost importance.

12) Changes in harbor/port defenses: addition of submarine nets, detection devices, etc. as suggested in List 1, may also be significant.

13) Increased coastal defense activity: laying of mine fields, etc.

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14) Personnel activity, especially that concerned with changes in ship complements. Items such as leave cancellation, liberty routine, transfers, clothes issue, etc. may also point to significant preparations.

15) The attitude of Soviet naval and naval installation personnel toward the U.S. inspection teams

16) Increase in calculated obstruction to inspection activities

17) A change in security practices or regulations may be of importance, perhaps as a decoy maneuver.

18) Sharp decrease in amount of Soviet merchant shipping at sea and in foreign ports.

19) Increase in inland waterway traffic - shift of submarines from Baltic to the White Sea

(Part III-C will be reorganized and substantially expanded in the final report)

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Part IV - Inspection System

A. Introduction

Part IV deals with the detailed task of determining the composition of verification and inspection teams, the technical and professional competence required, the positioning of teams, the duties assigned each team, the development of the sector and overall verification and inspection organizations to be stationed in the USSR, the designation of the USSR records and facilities to which the verification and inspection teams must have access, the number and type of mechanical and electronic devices needed for assisting in verification, surveillance, and inspection, the necessary transportation facilities, and the various privileges and services required for verification and inspection teams in order for them to perform satisfactorily their assigned duties.

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B. Verification Teams

1. Verification Organization

The organizational structure for the verification phase is identical with that for the continuing observation phase of the inspection and reporting system. Resident teams are to be placed at or near the most strategic USSR naval installations and operating areas. Personnel of these resident teams can be utilized when necessary to form special mobile units during either the verification or continuing observation phase to check facilities or activities at Soviet naval installations of secondary importance. Verification and inspection teams have been drawn up for all significant USSR naval installations although in a few instances, one team has been designated to perform the verification and inspection team functions at several small installations in close proximity.

Verification and inspection teams are grouped under a naval sector organization. Four of the five designated naval sectors correspond equally to the USSR fleet disposition and command structure; the fifth sector comprises the European satellite area.

Sector	Headquarters
Pacific	Vladivostok
Northern	Murmansk
Baltic	Leningrad

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Continued

Sector	Headquarters
Black Sea (including Caspian flotilla)	Sevastopol
Satellite (European)	Stralsund

The functions of the various sector headquarters are coordinated by Inspection Mission, Moscow, which will have a Navy section in the Inspection Mission Headquarters. This administrative command structure is to be distinguished from the recommended flow of communications (inspection reports) as set forth in the Navy Communications Plan, Appendix E.

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

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2. Locations of Verification and Inspection Teams.

BALTIC AREA: Senior Naval Inspector, Baltic Fleet Sector-Leningrad.

Leningrad. Also covers Uras, Makslakhden-Satama, Koyvisto, Lomonosov.

Riga. Also covers Parnu.

Baltiysk

Kronshtadt

State Shipyard 820 - Kaliningrad.

Tallin. Also covers Paldiski.

Klaipeda

Liepaja

Ventspils

BARENTS AND WHITE SEA AREA: Senior Naval Inspector - Northern Fleet Sector, Murmansk.

Murmansk. Also covers Polyarny, Vayenga, Guba Tyuva, Pechenga, Rosta, and Port Vladimir.

Belomorski

Dikson. Also covers Lgarka.

Archangelsk

Yokanga

Molotovsk

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BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA AREA: Senior Naval Inspector - Black Sea Fleet Sector (including Caspian Sea) and Sevastopol.

Sevastopol. Also covers Yalta, Balaklava, Feodosiya and Kerch.

Makhachkala. Also covers Baku, Krasnovodsk, Astrakhan.

Taganrog. Also covers Rostov, Marippol, Osipeuko and Yeisk.

Novorossiysk. Also covers Tuapse.

Poti. Also covers Batumi.

Marti Shipyard (Odessa)

Marti Shipyard (Nikolayev) Also covers Kherson

Albania: Durres which also covers Volnes.

Bulgaria: Burgas which also covers Stalin.

Romania: Constanta. Also covers Braila, Galati.

PACIFIC AREA: Senior Naval Inspector - Pacific Sector (Vladivostok).

Vladivostok

Nakhodka

Sovetskaya Gavan

Komsomolsk

Nikolaevsk

Otomari (Korsakov)

Petropavlovsk

Providentia

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SATELLITE: Area (European): Senior Naval Inspector (Stralsund).

Poland: Gdynia. Also covers Danzig.
Stettin. Also covers Swinemunde.

East Germany:
Warnemunde. Also covers Rostock, Wismar.
Stralsund. Also covers Wolgast, Sassnitz, Peenemunde, Ruegen Island.
Kiel. Also covers Lubeck.

INTERNAL USSR: Under Supervision of Navy Section of Western Inspection Mission.

Moscow

Gorkiy

Petropavlousk

3. Composition of Verification Teams: Summary

(Refer to Appendix F for a detailed personnel listing of specific Verification Teams.)

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ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY -- PACIFIC FLEET AREA

				Support Personnel		Total
Vladivostok 2 vehicles	Senior Inspector (Pacific)	Off.	13	Off.	0	13
		Enl.	4	Enl.	10	14
			17		10	27
2 planes 4 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	13	Off.	4	17
		Enl.	18	Enl.	52	70
			31		56	87
	Inspection Team	Off.	9	Off.	4	13
		Enl.	29	Enl.	46	75
			38		50	88
Nakhodka						
1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	7	Off.	2	9
		Enl.	10	Enl.	37	47
			17		39	56
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	1	6
		Enl.	14	Enl.	37	51
			19		38	57
Komsomolsk						
1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	8	Off.	1	9
		Enl.	8	Enl.	37	45
			16		38	54
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	1	6
		Enl.	11	Enl.	36	47
			16		37	53
Sovetskaya Gavan						
1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	11	Off.	2	13
		Enl.	18	Enl.	33	51
			29		35	64
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	18	Enl.	38	56
			23		40	63

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PACIFIC FLEET AREA (Cont'd)

				Support Personnel		Total
Otomari (Sakhalin)						
1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	9	Off.	2	11
		Enl.	9	Enl.	40	49
			18		42	60
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	1	5
		Enl.	18	Enl.	38	56
			22		39	61
Nikolaevsk						
1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	6	Enl.	29	35
			11		31	42
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	0	3
		Enl.	6	Enl.	23	29
			9		23	32
Petropavlovsk						
1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	9	Off.	2	11
		Enl.	18	Enl.	38	56
			27		40	67
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	16	Enl.	37	53
			20		39	59
Providentia						
1 vehicle	Verification Team	Off.	2	Off.	0	2
		Enl.	4	Enl.	12	16
			6		12	18
	Inspection Team	Off.	2	Off.	0	2
		Enl.	4	Enl.	12	16
			6		12	18

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ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY - NORTHERN FLEET (WHITE SEA) SECTOR

				Support Personnel		Total
Senior Naval Inspection Northern Fleet 1 Helicopter 3 vehicles	Inspection Team	Off.	12	Off.	3	15
		Enl.	10	Enl.	37	47
			22		39	62
Murmansk 1 plane 1 helicopter 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	8	Off.	3	11
		Enl.	30	Enl.	35	65
			38		38	76
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	3	8
		Enl.	60	Enl.	35	95
			65		38	103
Gorkiy 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	20	Enl.	28	48
			25		30	55
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	20	Enl.	28	48
			24		30	54
Petropavlovsk 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	4	Off.	0	4
		Enl.	19	Enl.	19	38
			23		19	42
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	0	4
		Enl.	19	Enl.	19	38
			23		19	42
Yokanga 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	2	Off.	2	4
		Enl.	19	Enl.	25	44
			21		27	48
	Inspection Team	Off.	2	Off.	2	4
		Enl.	19	Enl.	25	44
			21		27	48

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NORTHERN FLEET (WHITE SEA) SECTOR (Cont'd)

				Support Personnel		Total
Molotovsk 1 helicopter 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	21	Enl.	27	48
			26		29	55
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	21	Enl.	27	48
			25		29	54
Arkhangelsk 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	22	Enl.	29	51
			26		31	57
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	32	Enl.	29	61
			35		31	66
Belomorsk 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	3	Off.	1	4
		Enl.	20	Enl.	27	47
			23		28	51
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	1	4
		Enl.	30	Enl.	26	56
			33		27	60
Dikson	Verification Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	19	Enl.	25	44
			22		27	49
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	19	Enl.	25	44
			22		27	49

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NORTHERN FLEET (WHITE SEA) SECTOR (Cont'd)

Igarka:	Dikson team will handle.
Polyarny:	To be covered by Murmansk Inspection Team.
Guba Tyuva:	To be covered by Murmansk Inspection Team.
Pechenga:	To be covered by Murmansk Inspection Team.
Port Vladmir:	To be covered by Murmansk Inspection Team.
Vayenga:	To be covered by Murmansk Inspection Team.

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ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY - BALTIC AREA

				Support Personnel		Total
Chief Naval Inspector Leningrad		Off.	16	Off.	3	19
		Enl.	30	Enl.	23	53
			46		26	72
Leningrad						
2 planes	Verification Team	Off.	11	Off.	3	14
4 vehicles		Enl.	25	Enl.	41	66
			36		44	80
	Inspection Team	Off.	7	Off.	3	10
		Enl.	29	Enl.	42	71
			36		45	81
Riga						
1 plane	Verification Team	Off.	7	Off.	2	9
2 vehicles		Enl.	21	Enl.	28	49
			28		30	58
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	35	Enl.	28	63
			38		30	68
Baltiisk						
1 plane	Verification Team	Off.	7	Off.	2	9
2 vehicles		Enl.	21	Enl.	27	48
			28		29	57
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	27	Enl.	27	54
			31		29	60
Kronshtadt						
1 plane	Verification Team	Off.	9	Off.	2	11
2 vehicles		Enl.	25	Enl.	27	52
			34		29	63
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	25	Enl.	27	52
			30		29	59

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BALTIC AREA (Cont'd)

				Support Personnel		Total
Klaipeda 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	4	Off.	1	5
		Enl.	19	Enl.	26	45
			23		27	50
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	1	4
		Enl.	19	Enl.	26	45
			22		27	49
Tallinn 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	22	Enl.	26	48
			27		28	55
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	42	Enl.	26	68
			46		28	74
Kaliningrad 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	21	Enl.	26	47
			26		28	54
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	41	Enl.	26	67
			44		28	72
Liepaja 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	21	Enl.	26	47
			26		28	54
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	29	Enl.	26	55
			32		28	60
Ventspils 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	18	Enl.	26	44
			24		28	52
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	22	Enl.	25	47
			25		27	52

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ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY - BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA AREA

				Support Personnel		Total
Chief Naval Sector Sevastopol	Inspection Team	Off.	15	Off.	3	18
		Enl.	28	Enl.	25	53
			43		28	71
Sevastopol 1 plane 1 helicopter 4 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	8	Off.	2	10
		Enl.	28	Enl.	38	66
			36		40	76
	Inspection Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	73	Enl.	36	109
			79		38	117
Nikolayev 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	7	Off.	2	9
		Enl.	22	Enl.	28	50
			29		30	59
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	32	Enl.	28	60
			37		30	67
Poti 1 plane 1 helicopter 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	7	Off.	2	9
		Enl.	26	Enl.	31	57
			33		33	66
	Inspection Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	30	Enl.	31	61
			36		33	69
Novorossiysk 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	22	Enl.	26	48
			28		28	56
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	22	Enl.	27	49
			27		29	56

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BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA AREA (Cont'd)

				Support Personnel		Total
Odessa						
1 plane	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
2 vehicles		Enl.	22	Enl.	27	49
			27		29	56
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	22	Enl.	27	49
			25		29	54
Makhackkala						
2 planes	Verification Team	Off.	8	Off.	2	10
3 vehicles		Enl.	28	Enl.	36	64
			36		38	74
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	44	Enl.	36	80
			49		38	87
Taganrog						
1 plane	Verification Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
4 vehicles		Enl.	31	Enl.	33	64
			37		35	72
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	61	Enl.	33	94
			65		35	100

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SATELLITES

EAST GERMANY

				Support Personnel		Total
Stralsund 1 plane 4 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	8	Off.	2	10
		Enl.	19	Enl.	46	65
			27		48	75
	Inspection Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	39	Enl.	46	85
			44		48	92
Kiel 1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	25	Enl.	29	54
			30		31	61
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	35	Enl.	29	64
			39		31	70
Warnemunde 1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	15	Enl.	44	59
			21		46	67
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	25	Enl.	44	69
			29		46	75

POLAND

Gdynia 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	21	Enl.	27	48
			26		29	55
	Inspection Team	Off.	3	Off.	2	5
		Enl.	25	Enl.	28	53
			28		30	58

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SATELLITES - EAST GERMANY (Cont'd)

				Support Personnel		Total
Stettin 1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	13	Enl.	39	52
			18		41	59
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	13	Enl.	39	52
			17		41	58

ROMANIA

Constanta 1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	25	Enl.	30	55
			31		32	63
	Inspection Team	Off.	6	Off.	2	8
		Enl.	25	Enl.	30	55
			31		32	63

ALBANIA

Durres 1 plane 2 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	4	Off.	1	5
		Enl.	19	Enl.	27	46
			23		28	51
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	1	5
		Enl.	9	Enl.	37	46
			13		38	51

BULGARIA

Burgas 1 plane 3 vehicles	Verification Team	Off.	5	Off.	2	7
		Enl.	25	Enl.	30	55
			30		32	62
	Inspection Team	Off.	4	Off.	2	6
		Enl.	29	Enl.	30	59
			33		32	65

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TOP SECRET

CHIEF OF NAVAL INSPECTION - MOSCOW

Team			Support Personnel		Total
2 Planes 4 Vehicles	Off.	20	Off.	7	27
	Enl.	40	Enl.	57	97
		60		64	124

- - - - - - - - - - -

In addition to the Naval personnel assigned to Verification and Inspection teams at designated locations in the USSR, it is desired to assign Naval personnel to ground observer teams of the Army or Air Force as appropriate to the following places:

City	Product	No. Personnel
Kuybyshev	Naval Guns	1 - 1100/4 1 - Seaman (Driver) 1 - Interpreter 1 - Yeoman
Kemerovo	" "	Same
Stalingrad	" "	"
Kalpino	Armor Plate - Turrets	"
Saratov	Sub batteries	"
Kolomna	Deisel Engine	"
Severdlovsk	" "	"
Uralsk	Torpedoes	"
Alma Ata	"	"
Petropavlovsk	Mines	"
Derbyshki	Periscopes	"
Kazan	"	"
Kharkov	Turbines	"

Personnel Required for above locations: 13 Officers
13 Seamen
13 Interpreters
13 Yeomen

TOTAL: 13 Officers
39 Enlisted

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TOP SECRET

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4. COMMENTS

The procedure outlined in Part III (B) provides a reasonably comprehensive survey of those information items which should be verified in the "blueprint" phase. Having available those information items to be verified with respect to a particular shore installation, for example, it is a relatively simple matter to decide the technical and professional qualifications of the personnel required to make a satisfactory check of these items. The verification teams for all significant USSR naval installations have been drawn up following this procedure.

We have been attentive to the desirability of minimizing the number of personnel and the amount of equipment needed for the verification phase. Some shore installations will require only a brief check for the purpose of verifying a few quantitative information items, as for instance, naval airfields where it will probably be only necessary to verify the number and length of runways, the numbers and types of squadrons based at the field, and the repair facilities available. For example, while we suspect that there are many more naval airfields and naval air stations than the available information discloses, we feel that the naval aviation

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personnel assigned to the various verification teams will be capable of verifying the additional naval air facilities disclosed in the "blueprint" exchange or by aerial reconnaissance.

As a further example, the petroleum expert placed with the team in the Pacific Fleet sector has been assigned the duty of verifying the "blueprint" information submitted on fuel oil and aviation gas production, supply, storage and fueling facilities for all naval installations within the Pacific Fleet sector. Additional opportunities to economize on personnel will probably become apparent in the early stages of the verification phase.

Whether it will be necessary to maintain a full verification team at every naval installation so listed in the TFNI plan will depend upon the scope of the verification process as disclosed in the early stages of the "blueprint" phase, upon the time allowed for each stage of the disclosure and verification phase, upon the number of personnel initially assigned to the designated teams, upon the available means of access to certain shore installations, the instruments which will be made available to our teams (assuming that it

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will be permitted by the "agreement") for assistance in verification, and upon the channels available for making the verification reports. The verification teams, as composed in the TFNI plan, reflect both the skills required and tasks to be done. Hence, it is felt that the teams as constituted will be adequate to perform the verification function, assuming a reasonable time is allotted to the various stages of the verification process. It is not expected that our verification organization can be drastically reduced (as for instance by providing only one or two verification teams for an entire naval sector) unless the duration of the verification stages is made much longer by agreement than we contemplate.

The Inspection "Agreement" should provide that each stage will be completed in every detail by the verification teams prior to the commencement of the succeeding stage. The verification teams should be in place and ready to function prior to the initiation of the verification step of each stage of disclosure and verification.

Verification will be accomplished by an actual check-off of the disclosed information submitted by the USSR

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in the "blueprint" exchange. In addition, these teams should be permitted by the signatory nation and required by the inspecting nation to inspect areas which, by virtue of aerial reconnaissance, are suspected of including installations either undisclosed in the military blueprint or of such size as to indicate inaccuracy or inadequacy in disclosed information.

Sector headquarters will serve as the distribution point of the disclosed information which will be passed to the appropriate team for verification. It is expected that the verification teams will promptly verify the disclosed "blueprint" information and report back immediately to their naval sector headquarters. Reports will be handled in accordance with the TFNI Communications Plan, Appendix E. From the beginning, at all stages and phases, provision must be made by the Sector Commander for detection and reporting of any indicators of surprise attack.

In the development of the verification organization, one of our most important considerations has been to devise a system which will require a minimum of change in order to convert it for immediate use to the Inspection-Surprise Attack phase. In this connection we think it

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desirable to include as many members of the proposed inspection teams on the verification teams as practicable. This will operate to the advantage of the inspection team personnel, in that they will have an opportunity to become familiar with the various Soviet Navy installations and operating procedures with reference to which they will have to maintain continuing surveillance.

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C. Inspection Teams

1. INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

Described in Part IV, B-1 above.

2. POSITIONING OF TEAMS - LOCATIONS

Refer to Part IV, Section B-2 above.

3. COMPOSITION OF TEAMS: SUMMARY

Refer to Part IV, Section B-3 above

Refer to Appendix F for a detailed personnel listing of specific inspection teams.

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4. COMMENTS

Initially the same procedure suggested in Part IV (B-4) above for determining the composition of verification teams has been applied to the task of assembling the appropriate personnel for the various inspection teams. For the inspection teams, however, the information items selected by the procedure outlined in Part III (C) (items to be continuously observed or periodically inspected) are the basis for making personnel choices.

Inspection teams, in some instances, may require a greater number of personnel than initially envisaged for verification teams since the continuous surveillance which will be found necessary in some situations (radar watch on major ports and air stations) will require a 24 hour watch with consequent increase in personnel. Further, if we do set up our own radar stations for continuous observation we may decide to provide our own power supply (mobile generators) where feasible, so as to guard against the possibility of the Soviets cutting off the supply at critical moments. Facilities of this sort will require additional operators and repairman.

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On the other hand, the eventual size, personnel qualifications, and positioning of inspection teams will depend upon the information disclosed and verified during the verification phase. Nor should we lose sight of the possibility that some activities may be combined or some teams might be dissolved, and a few specialized personnel placed with an Army team. To the extent this may be feasible, there can be a corresponding reduction in the initially estimated number of personnel. We may find that a team can cover a greater or lesser area or scope of activity than herein assumed; and the number of personnel may vary in relation to the type and amount of electronic observing equipment that can be utilized within the USSR. For example, we have stationed a single team at Murmansk to cover naval activities in several locations. Because of difficult climatic and terrain conditions and resultant difficulty of rapid and easy movement of components of the team, it may become necessary to set up permanent sub teams at each naval establishment with a consequent increase in personnel. Our present estimates are adjusted to the activities to be inspected on the basis of the information now available to the TFNI.

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During the inspection phase the Navy organization is not envisaged as needing permanently constituted mobile teams. As stated above, when inspection is required at secondary installations to which no resident inspection team is assigned, a temporary mobile team can be made up of members of one of the resident inspection teams. If it is eventually decided, however, to place U.S. inspection personnel on a continuous basis at the various USSR naval air stations and seaplane bases, it may be necessary to arrange additional messing, berthing and transportation services to support these inspection units.

In both the verification and inspection phases such mobile teams will require communications equipment with which to report to the nearest permanent communications facility (resident team location). For certain highly significant observations during the inspection phase it will be necessary for the mobile team to have communications equipment sufficiently powerful to reach the nearest naval sector headquarters or peripheral naval communications facility. The type of transportation and servicing required by the various specially constituted mobile teams will, of

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course, depend upon the conditions of the particular locality. Ordinary vehicles, trailer trucks, small observation aircraft, helicopters, transport aircraft, patrol boats, etc. may be required depending upon the circumstances.

The procedures for the inspection phase (functions of the inspection/observation teams) are directed to the primary purpose of providing adequate advance warning of an impending surprise attack. Composition of the teams as set forth in the TFNI report show only slight variance between the verification and inspection phases. Hence, there should be no interruption in continuity in passing from the verification to the inspection (surprise attack) phase. Most of the verification personnel will continue as members of the various inspection teams. The types of significant indicators of hostile intent are elaborated upon in Part III of the TFNI Report and the means of reporting are set forth in the TFNI Communications Plan.

It is emphasized that the detailed analysis and presentation of verification and inspection teams for the Navy portion of the inspection system is not meant to serve as the final composition of the verification and inspection

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teams which will eventually be positioned in the USSR. We must continuously remind ourselves of the difference in the level of intelligence of the Soviets and ourselves. This detailed work has been done on the basis of the best information available in order to present a careful analysis of the types of skills that will be required and to enable the TFMI to come to a reasonably accurate estimate of the number of personnel required.

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D. COMMENTS ON EXPENSE, PERSONNEL POLICIES, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

1. COSTING OUT.

The cost estimates of the personnel and material requirements for the verification and inspection teams of the Navy portion of the inspection and reporting system are calculated on the basis of the verification phase lasting three months, after which the inspection teams will take over. The cost of the inspection teams is calculated for a twelve-month period.

Equipment assigned to the verification teams is included in the inspection team cost, as it is assumed that it will remain for their primary use.

Furnishing and repair costs are included in the verification team cost, which would initially be in the area. It is assumed that 90% of verification personnel will remain as part of the inspection teams. For the additional personnel brought in for the inspection teams, additional funds are added for furnishings and repairs.

For the second year, the estimated inspection team cost of $90,464,088. may be reduced by $9,750,000. This represents the initial cost of furnishings which does not become an annual expense.

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For second and subsequent years the estimated team cost may be further reduced by about one-third of the total aircraft and vehicle cost, or about $12,000,000. This is based on the assumption of replacement of one-third of the aircraft and vehicles annually. Cost of Naval Air Reconnaissance aircraft should likewise be reduced by one-third or $48,000,000 for second and subsequent years.

A cost summary is shown at the bottom of the second succeeding page.

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VERIFICATION TEAMS

Personnel 309 officers, 1973 enlisted -- Total 2282

Pay and Allowances (3 months)	$ 6,003,393
Maintenance and Operation	
3 months' rent and utilities	1,900,000
12 months' repairs and furnishings	9,500,000
Transportation (1 way) (2282 at $500)	1,141,000
TOTAL COST	$ 18,544,393

NAVAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS

2 Long-range Photographic Squadrons

2 Observation-type Photographic Squadrons

6 VP Squadrons (9 aircraft each)

It is assumed that the above planes require 2,000 men.

3 FASRONS are required for support for the above aircraft and those used by the "Inspection Teams."

Total personnel for the above squadrons and "FASRONS" is 2,640.

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INSPECTION TEAMS

Personnel 332 Officers, 2589 enlisted -- Total 2921 personnel

Pay and Allowances (Incl. Station) (12 months)	$ 30,201,888
Maintenance & Operation - 12 months' rent and utilities - plus additional furnishings for increased personnel.	12,437,500
Transportation-Personnel (2921 - 2054 = 867 x $500)	433,500
Equipment Procurement	
Aircraft (48)	35,900,000
Vehicles (111)	277,000
Equipment Transportation	129,300
Equipment Maintenance and Operation (Including garage and hangar rent)	11,084,900
	$ 90,464,088

COST SUMMARY

(a)	Naval Air Reconnaissance Squadrons	$220,555,200
(b)	Verification Teams (3 months)	18,544,393
(c)	Inspection Teams (12 months)	90,464,088
	GRAND TOTAL COST	$329,563,681

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PERSONNEL PAY & ALLOWANCES

CONNECTED WITH AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS & FASRONS

3 FASRONS (640)

FASRON Personnel Pay

15 officers x 3 - 45

15 x 7550 - - - - - - - - $	113,250
30 x 9710 - - - - - - - -	291,300

175 men x 3 - 595

395 x 4350 - - - - - - - -	1,718,250
200 x 5550 - - - - - - - -	1,110,000
	$ 3,232,800

10 Squadrons (2,000)

Personnel Pay

350 officers

50 x 7550 - - - - - - - - -	377,500
300 x 9710 - - - - - - - - -	2,913,000

1650 men

1000 x 4350 - - - - - - - -	4,350,000
650 x 5550 - - - - - - - -	3,607,500
	11,248,000

PAY AND ALLOWANCES $ 14,480,800

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M&O	54 P2V- - - - - -	11,100,000	(Includes overhaul & fuel)
	24 AV - - - - - -	7,500,000	" " "
	24 OE - - - - - -	500,000	" " "
		19,100,000	
Procurement	54 P2V- - - - - -	86,400,000	
	24 AJ - - - - - -	57,200,000	
	24 OE - - - - - -	2,160,000	
		145,760,000	
Base Support 3 Locations - - -		6,000,000	
Photo Equipment & Film - - - -		1,000,000	
		171,860,000	
Personnel Pay & Allowances		14,480,800	
(a) Total- - - - - - - -		$186,340,800	(Includes aircraft procurement and basic pay including flight pay)
(b) Living Quarters - - - -		19,800,000	(1st year only; Deduct $8,800,000 for 2nd year.)
Station Allowance - - - (For 2640 Personnel)		14,414,400	
Total Cost- - - - -		$ 220,555,200	
(c) Total Personnel - 2640			

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2. PERSONNEL POLICIES (Including Support).

The task of maintaining minimum acceptable standards of living for the teams will probably be one of the most difficult problems in the implementation of an effective inspection system. It could be found desirable to establish small, practically self-sufficient communities for American and allied personnel (and families, if included), particularly at the more important shore installations. It would seem elementary that the inspection system, however well designed, will not function satisfactorily unless competent people can be attracted to this type of duty. Living standards should at least provide for a minimum of those peace-time comforts and conveniences to which our service personnel have become accustomed. The more services provided, the larger and more expensive the inspection operation. Therefore, while setting up those services necessary, we must keep them to the minimum acceptable. Furthermore, with respect to assigning or selecting personnel for inspection duty, it will be advisable to choose those people with 1) relatively "even" dispositions who will be able to take petty and continuing annoyances in stride, and with 2) sufficiently stable personal qualities to fortify them against over-susceptibility to Soviet

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inducements toward laxity or irresponsibility on the job.

Clearly the logistics which must be provided the U.S. teams present a real problem.

The TFNI accepts the Army Task Force plan on Administration and Logistical Support Requirements with such modification as is noted in Appendix G herein. The TFNI wishes to suggest, however, an alternative means of logistical support which may prove highly satisfactory for servicing many of its teams and possibly Army and Air Force teams positioned at the same locations as the Navy teams (or in close proximity thereto). If feasible, a U.S. Navy unarmed ship might be moored at those USSR naval bases where verification and inspection teams are to be located. As to the type of ship to be used, it is believed that communication ships (AGC), small transports (AP) and ice breakers (AGB) would be suitable, depending on the contemplated location. Regardless of the type, it is important that the subject ship have suitable communication and radar equipment and a helicopter landing platform.

If such an alternative means of logistical support were used, it would have many advantages over basing teams ashore. The ship would provide a compact operating base with:

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facilities for rapid and secure communications, early warning radar observation of USSR naval fleet and air movements, boats and helicopters for routine and emergency observations, good security for equipment and publications, shops and technicians for the maintenance of equipment, ready means for collecting hydrographic and meterological data on the USSR, fully acceptable living quarters, medical services, and entertainment and leisure activities such as libraries and motion pictures. It would provide all these immediately without delay for installation. Of course there would be some disadvantages. In many locations there may not be wholly adequate mooring facilities. And in some ports, the ship might be icebound during the winter months which would render immediate recall impracticable. Such disadvantages, however, are believed minor in comparison with the advantages gained.

Should such a ship be provided, we would of course want to provide for periodic thorough inspection of the ship by the host country, in the likely event the Soviets should also base personnel on ships. The inspection proviso would thus provide some insurance against the introduction and storage of nuclear weapons in ships.

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3. RIGHTS, POWERS AND PRIVILEGES.

Careful consideration must be given to the rights, powers and privileges of the inspection organization, to be negotiated as part of the agreement.

Satisfactory completion of the verification phase will require that our teams be accorded the rights and privileges of substantially complete "freedom of movement" within defined land and sea areas, and in specified air spaces, in addition to reconnaissance rights. They must also be granted immediate access to the agreed "blueprint" materials, such as pertinent reports and records kept by various installations and operating commands of the Soviet Navy.

The "freedom of movement" and access problem in the inspection phase will differ in some respects from the verification stage. Perhaps the real difficulty will arise in connection with continuous or periodic inspections. Interpretative and personal conflicts are bound to arise in situations when the U. S. teams, feeling that a critical indicator may be involved, demands to make an immediate, unannounced inspection of a certain facility and is refused on the grounds that it is contrary to the "agreement", or is not within the defined areas of "freedom of movement", or for the reason that it is simply late at night

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and the inspection could have as easily been made during working hours, or some other specious excuse.

The following rights, powers and privileges are submitted for consideration:

(a) The host government shall have the right to examine personal baggage, supplies, equipment, ships, vehicles and aircraft upon entry into its country to preclude the introduction of arms, weapons, and propaganda. There should be similar examinations prior to departures of ships and aircraft to detect clandestine activities of inspection personnel.

(b) In order to insure that the personnel of each inspection organization are continuously in a position to fulfill their responsibilities, they must be granted the following rights, powers and privileges, except as provided in (a) above:

(1) Rights of duly accredited representatives to the facilities of ingress and egress into and from the territory of the other nation including rights of transit for persons and equipment across and through such territory.

(2) The right to use designated communication facilities of the host country to the extent necessary for the discharge of inspection responsibilities.

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(3) Such exemptions from customs and administrative regulations as may be necessary to effective operations.

(4) Inviolability of premises, (except for periodic inspection as provided in the agreement) property, and archives, including protection of classified equipment on downed aircraft.

(5) Unimpeded access to records pertaining to exchanged data ("blueprint") as specified in the agreement.

(6) The right to import, possess and use suitable transportation, communications, and logistical support to properly discharge inspection responsibilities.

(7) The right to observe and inspect on a continuing basis, (including the right to use photographic and scientific equipment) all armaments, armed forces and geographic areas in accordance with the terms of the agreement and to communicate resulting observations to respective governments without interferences.

(c) The Host Government will:

(1) Provide full protection and all necessary assistance and cooperation to the inspection organization located within its national boundaries in the carrying out of its functions and responsibilities.

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(2) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be mutually agreed by the participating governments.

(3) Permit the inspection organization to establish communication facilities, logistical facilities, base facilities, inspection posts, and on-the-spot observers wherever required to properly discharge its responsibilities.

(d) In the event of a serious violation of the inspection agreement, the agreement must provide for:

(1) Reversion to an earlier stage of the inspection procedure, or to

(2) Immediate abrogation of the agreement in its entirety, with cessation of inspection activities and withdrawal of inspection organization.

Regardless of the foregoing provision, our inspection organization will keep our government fully informed of all incidents so that it will be in a position to adjust the rights, powers and privileges accorded the USSR inspection organization as necessary.

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4. AIDS TO OBSERVATION AND REPORTING.

The following list is suggestive of means which may be employed in accomplishing verification and inspection tasks.

Means of Access, Transportation and Reporting

Transportation: Plane

Train

Ships and boats

Auto

Instrument assistance in access and reporting:

Aerial survey: interpretative photography

Radar

Sonar

Radiation detection

Closed circuit TV

Channels for reporting information:

Plane

Radio

Land Wire

Regular mail

Guard mail

Messenger

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In the inspection phase the transportation, instrument assistance and communications channel problems will have to be adjusted for continuous operation. Transportation pools - automobiles, planes, etc. - must be established. In those situations where continuous surveillance is required the most effective procedure may be to install our own radar or closed circuit television systems.

Naval Air Reconnaissance

The Naval Task Group adopts in substance for its Air Reconnaissance Plan the provisions of the Plan heretofore agreed upon by the Navy Department and the Air Force.

The U.S. Navy will participate with the U.S. Air Force in the Reconnaissance of targets of naval interest within the USSR. The Navy's initial contribution should be:

(a) Two long-range photographic squadrons which can be operated from land and sea bases as required.

(b) Two observation-type photographic squadrons which can be operated from land and sea bases as required.

(c) A total of 2,000 officers and men.

(d) Air-Sea Rescue aircraft and personnel as required.

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There will also be a need for continuous naval air reconnaissance to seaward of naval operating bases. This will require the use of suitable bases on the periphery of the USSR. The following material and personnel will be required:

(a) 1 Patrol Squadron (VP ron) (9 aircraft) - based in Norway to cover the Northern Fleet area particularly the White Sea and approaches thereto - 120 officers and men.

(b) 1 VP ron - Based in Germany to cover Baltic Fleet area.

(c) 1 VP ron - Based in Turkey to cover the Black Sea area.

(d) 1 VP ron - Based in Alaska to cover Bering Sea area.

(e) 1 VP ron - Based in Japan to cover Sea of Okhotsk.

(f) 1 VP ron - Based in Japan to cover Sea of Japan.

5. ACCESS TO FACILITIES, OPERATIONS AND REPORTS

Access has two important aspects that must be kept in mind:

(a) First, it must be directed above all to the goal of getting information early enough to prevent surprise attack. (or to reduce the possibility to an acceptable degree).

(b) Second, our own request for access to facilities, operations reports and records should weigh the general intelligence gains that may thereby be achieved for the United States against the benefits the Soviets might gain from reciprocal provisions.

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Our first requirement is to gain early warning of surprise attack. This requirement has been fully treated in the basic plan and in appendices. We need merely reiterate here that this is a difficult task that depends primarily upon a wide-spread ground inspection system tied in with aerial inspection tuned to detect changes in the day to day tempo of Soviet naval activity. Provision for access to facilities and reports must emphasize efforts to gain information on movements of nuclear weapons and carriers. For the Navy this includes mine and torpedo depots, guided missile, bomb and other ammunition depots. It includes especially submarine bases, medium range aircraft bases, medium range aircraft-guided missile bases and amphibious bases in such areas as the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and the Sea of Japan. It includes to a lesser degree key anti-aircraft and technical guided missile units. Lastly, it includes careful attention to all means of getting information concerning the operation of Soviet naval air, surface, and undersea craft which comprises not only visual and radar observation but access to and study of USSR naval employment schedules, ship disposition records, upkeep and overhaul plan, ship and aircraft movement reports and plotting boards in fleet and force operation centers.

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Changes in tempo of Soviet naval activity will be observed (if they are observed) from a combination of information obtained from operation plans and schedules and from personnel observations in those localities that will give the foregoing information. Some of these locations are submarine operating bases, naval air and guided missile bases, supply and ammunition depots (especially those related to nuclear weapons where this can be determined), naval arsenals (especially those where nuclear weapons might be assembled), and naval training stations (in particular those with nuclear training and operation centers).

The second factor, general intelligence, to be gained from access to facilities and reports has likewise been treated at some length in other parts of this study, especially Part III. In considering this factor we should take into account the higher level of existing Soviet Intelligence compared to ours. They now have and daily obtain a tremendous amount of information with respect to our military posture whereas we have little certain information concerning theirs. It might well be that we would be willing to accept certain otherwise undesirable provisions of reciprocal access, in order to gain information

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which the Soviets no doubt already have of the U.S.

In this connection exterior observation of such Soviet facilities as oil depots, shipyards, guided missile bases, submarine bases, waterways and roadsteads, dry docks and overhaul facilities, air bases, radar and radio transmitting stations, and the like, would provide us with a great deal of useful information that it may be expected the Soviets already have.

Likewise, we may consider that access to a multiplicity of reports and records would be merely confusing. For example, mutual access to most of the paper work generated in our corresponding Navy Departments would be of doubtful value. On the other hand, it would be useful to interchange such information as annual and quarterly reports of material and personnel bureaus, with adequate provision for checking. It would also be useful to have such information as blueprints on facilities (for example, a submarine base or a naval arsenal that might assemble nuclear weapons), reports that identify an activity as to proper strength of personnel, control structure and disposition of personnel and equipment. It would also be useful to have records of strategic materials used at a facility or base, especially where these are indispensable to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or launchers or carriers such as rockets.

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The greatest value would be derived from a combination of a review of periodic reports and on-the-spot, day-to-day inspections in such locations as training stations, munition depots, operating bases and fleet operations control rooms.

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APPENDIX A
TABLE A

USSR NAVAL INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO REPORTING

In many situations one naval installation or complex will include several of the listed facilities and activities.

1. Naval operating bases for forces afloat
2. Shipbuilding yards
3. Ship repair yards
4. Ship equipment factories (electronic and fire-control gear, generators, propulsion machinery, etc.)
5. Ship equipment repair shops
6. Naval air stations
7. Naval aircraft factories
8. Naval aircraft overhaul facilities
9. Naval gun factories
10. Naval guided missile factories
11. Naval munitions and weapons plants (shells, rockets, bombs, depth charges, chemical and biological weapons, etc.)
12. Naval supply depots
13. Naval arms and ammunition depots

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14. Naval fueling stations
15. Naval communications stations
16. Personnel training centers and technical schools
17. Personnel receiving stations
18. Naval test centers (model basins, equipment, etc.)
19. Naval proving grounds (guns, ammunition, guided missiles, etc.)
20. Inland canal system

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APPENDIX A

List 1

SHORE INSTALLATIONS

INFORMATION CONCERNING CATEGORIES TO BE REPORTED

Designation

Location

Principal functions(s)

Secondary function(s)

General Description (area layout of installation, showing all associated facilities and their location; installation blueprints, construction and production charts, management organizational chart, etc. should be requested in the "blueprint" exchange phase.)

1. Number and annual construction capacity of building ways (note more significant characteristics such as crane capacity, type power available, etc). Note number of vessels that can be accommodated by type and class.

2. Number, annual repair and fitting out capacity of drydocks (note more significant characteristics such as crane capacity, type power available, time to

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flood dock, etc.). Include floating drydocks.

3. Number and length of piers and docks (also note the depth of water and facilities available)

4. Number, arrangement and depth of anchorages

5. Ship repair and overhaul facilities (in addition to drydocks and wharves listed above)

6. Equipment repair and overhaul facilities - ships

7. Ship construction and repairs underway

8. Number and length of plane runways

9. Number and capacity of aircraft hangars

10. Aircraft overhaul facilities - capacity - class and type of planes

11. Equipment repair and overhaul facilities - planes

12. Aircraft construction or repairs underway

13. Major input materials and amount - manufacturing and production facilities

14. Source and amount used of scarce strategic raw materials

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15. Source of critical spare parts and component parts used in facilities or in equipment

16. Output capacity - manufacturing and production facilities

17. Type personnel training and processing provided (schools for Officer and Enlisted Personnel; describe specialty of each school: submarines, gunnery, communications, etc.)

18. Capacity of personnel training and processing facilities (length of courses, number of student trainees in each school)

19. Warehouse capacity

20. Hardstanding area

21. Refineries and storage capacity - aviation gasoline, fuel oil

22. Power source and supply capacity - steam, electricity

23. Sewage and waste disposal facilities

24. Communications facilities

25. Fueling facilities

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26. Charging (submarine) facilities

27. Barracks and housing accommodations

28. Hospitals and other medical facilities

29. Recreation facilities

30. Current level of production, construction, repair, training, etc. activity. (Compare current level with estimated normal level).

31. Current stocks: Critical materials
    general stores
    ammunition
    torpedoes
    bombs
    depth charges
    rockets
    missiles
    fuel oil
    av. gasoline
    replacement equipment - heavy
    spare part stores

    (Compare current level with estimated normal level)

32. Type management control organization

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33. Personnel employed - civilian. Number of workmen required to operate facility on a full capacity, three shift basis

34. Personnel: Types of skills represented. Critical shortages, if any

35. Military personnel on station performing military duties or standing by for military operations. Designate types.

36. Harbor/base/port defense: torpedo nets
    mined areas
    gun emplacements
    rocket launchers
    ground to air missile launchers
    ground to sea missile launchers
    special devices: accoustic, etc.

37. Layout of surrounding mined coastal areas

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38. Layout of surrounding coastal defense installations (armament, location of fortifications, personnel assigned, etc.)

39. Layout of Inland Canal System - size of vessels that can be accommodated in the various sections of the canal system

40. Test centers - type of testing: ship model basin, equipment testing, etc.

41. Proving grounds - type guns, rocket and missile launchers, missiles, projectiles and explosives.

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TABLE B

USSR NAVAL COMMANDS SUBJECT TO REPORTING

1. Combatant - Surface Forces - Large
2. Combatant - Surface Forces - Small:
   (patrol craft, motor torpedo boats, mine layers/sweepers, etc.)
3. Submarine Forces
4. Amphibious Forces
5. Service Forces (tankers, cargo, transports, etc.)
6. Training Forces
7. Miscellaneous Auxiliary Forces: (Icebreakers, etc.)
8. State Operated Merchant Marine
9. Naval Air Groups

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APPENDIX A

LIST 2

INFORMATION CONCERNING CATEGORIES

TO BE REPORTED

Designation of command

Normal Base

Normal operating area

Mission (indicate functions such as security patrol, training squadrons, etc.)

General description - Composition and capabilities

/Request Command Organizational Chart/

1. Organization - administrative
2. Organization - tactical by task forces and groups
3. Ships attached by number and type
4. Characteristics of ships attached by types (Armament, speed, cruising range, draft, complement, special equipment, etc.)
5. Ships under construction and expected to join command - types and characteristics
6. Ships, if any, in reduced or inactive status
7. Normal operating procedures: Forces, groups, and units.

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8. Air groups attached to command
9. Number of planes by types
10. Characteristics of planes by types (range, speed, etc.)
11. Normal operating procedures - Air groups
12. Notice of scheduled movements of task forces, groups, units or naval air groups
13. Purpose of movement; security patrol, convoy escort, routine training, special training exercises, etc.
14. Significant deviations from normal operating procedures
15. Indications of impending significant deviations from normal operating procedures

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TABLE C

NAVAL PERSONNEL CLASS AND ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT TO REPORTING

1. Personnel in active duty status currently assigned to all naval establishment activity-units (fleet units, naval air, and shore installations) (This information will be obtained in completing List 1 and List 2)
2. Units of the naval infantry (marines).
3. Units of the constituted reserve .
4. National forces required primarily for internal security to include regularly active organizations and militia type organizations operating under the authority of the state or nation, but not to include municipal police or other forces not susceptible to national mobilization
5. Naval academies and naval units of schools, the primary purpose of which is to furnish officer personnel to the regular establishment or of reserve components. (This information will be obtained in completing List 1)

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6. Reservoir of available trained but unassigned personnel including the unorganized reserve
7. National political organizations which can be activated or naval personnel

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APPENDIX A

LIST 3

INFORMATION CONCERNING CATEGORIES

TO BE REPORTED

Name

Location

Function(s)

General description of organization and status

(level of activity)

1. Size-numbers/organizational units
2. Annual increase or decrease/rate
3. Aptitudes-general qualifications of personnel
4. Specialized training of members (ranks and rates)
5. Physical condition/health level/medical preparation
6. Morale
7. Equipment assigned to organizational units
8. Time to mobilize-process into regular duty assignments

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APPENDIX B

STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

Mr. Stassen, in his memorandum, subject: "U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments", dated 1 November 1955, stated that the comprehensive inspection organization "would be installed by stages".

We are convinced that the USSR would enter into any agreement of disclosure and verification in bad faith and would carry it out in bad faith.

Since the USSR has far more information on the U.S. than vice versa, it is probable that a disclosure and verification system could be so devised that in the initial phases the U. S. would secure more valuable information than would the Soviet Union. This would require that the USSR be prevented from securing in those initial phases information intended to be withheld until a later phase, or not to be disclosed at all.

Beyond the initial stages, phasing of such a disclosure and verification system will become increasingly difficult and there will be a correspondingly greater likelihood that the USSR will secure information of commensurate value to that obtained by the United States.

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Any satisfactory disclosure and verification procedure should meet four criteria. It should provide for: (a) comprehensive and detailed specifications for disclosure within agreed phases, thus reducing the possible scope of Soviet bad faith; (b) clear documentation of Soviet bad faith at any stage, thus providing the best possible case for termination; (c) prompt termination, self-executing if possible, at any stage in event of such bad faith; and (d) protection of the U. S. insofar as it is possible, from disclosure of highly sensitive information, including premature disclosure in earlier phases of information reserved for later phases.

Formulation of such a program involves the following considerations:

a. Disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

b. Disclosure and verification must be carried out stage by stage with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next stage when and only when the current stage has been completed satisfactorily by the signatory nations. A definite time limit should be established for the completion of each stage.

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c. Disclosure and verification should proceed from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in the early stages to the more secret areas. Sensitive aspects of research and development in all fields, manufacturing processes and details of new weapons (the measure of U. S. technological superiority) should be excluded altogether. The freedom of movement and access of inspection teams should in general be carefully limited to quantitative verification of numbers, types, sizes, etc., although within these limits inspection should be as full and free as possible. Detailed inspection of technical specifications, performance data, etc., should be avoided. Although this limitation on the freedom of inspection would reduce the amount of intelligence the U. S. would acquire, it would be necessary in order to guard against premature disclosure of information which we would like reserved until substantial co-operation and good faith has been demonstrated. A phasing of this nature, in addition to furnishing the best indication of a lack of Soviet good faith, would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information.

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Aside from phasing, the types of disclosure and verification procedures employed in each phase would be of vital importance in minimizing the risks to the U. S. and compelling maximum disclosure by the USSR. It is apparent that these two objectives are largely contradictory. The more frequent, thorough, and unrestricted the inspection the less would be the possibility of Soviet concealment, but the greater would be the risks of sensitive disclosures by the U. S. This contradiction is further apparent when we examine two basic problems implicit in any verification system. While it is probably feasible to verify such quantitative data as had previously been disclosed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether all relevant data had actually been disclosed. It would be impossible to determine whether there had been full disclosure unless the inspectors were allowed to travel anywhere to look for anything included in the particular phase. On the other hand, only by careful restrictions on the movement of inspectors could the USSR be prevented from acquiring in the earlier phases information reserved for later phases, or not to be disclosed in any phase.

Although full Soviet disclosure could only be assured by completely free and unrestricted inspection in each phase,

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such a procedure would entail serious risks for the U. S. of prematurely revealing at earlier phases information which the U. S. planned to disclose only in later phases or not at all. Consequently it is doubtful whether in any phase the U. S. should allow Soviet inspectors freedom to travel anywhere and inspect everything. The problem, therefore, is to devise an inspection system which, while less than complete, would still increase the relative gains to the U. S. while minimizing the risks of premature U. S. disclosure.

In considering the appropriate number of stages, consideration was given to the objective that full implementation of the program of disclosure and verification should proceed as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage would unduly delay the program. With this in mind, it is concluded that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should be five -- a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the preceding considerations. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the

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successful completion of the program.

Proposals for disclosures are divided into those for (a) armed forces and non-nuclear armaments and (b) nuclear armaments solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. The problems involved with the appropriate terminology with respect to nuclear weapons differ so greatly from the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single proposal comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons; in other words the first stage and verification in that stage, and the same in all succeeding stages. The stages are:

STAGE 1

Disclose:

a. Overall manpower strength; composition; disposition of regular and reserve military forces to include para-military, security and police forces.

b. Employment schedules sufficient to cover the period of time necessary to complete the first five stages of verification. Inasmuch as the time necessary to complete the first five stages cannot be anticipated at this time, it is proposed

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that each side present in advance employment schedules covering a six months period.

c. Location of military installations and mobilization centers, with a general description of the facilities at each installation except proving grounds and research and development activities (posts, camps, stations, naval bases, training establishments, depots, ports, airdromes, guided missile launching sites, rail and road centers).

d. Details of those parts of the budget which pertain to armed forces less allocations for Research and Development and for nuclear purposes.

Verify by:

a. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data supplemented by aerial reconnaissance and by actual physical checks of tactical units and installations by ground inspection teams. To complete the check and at the same time ascertain the basic military pattern -- but primarily to give early warning of pending attack -- observers will be in place at critical points, i.e. mobilization centers, military depots, road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, airdromes,

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naval bases, ports, guided missile launching sites, training areas, on the date the agreement becomes effective.

b. Inspection of the various installations (type of activity, physical layout, description of facilities) by ground inspection teams.

c. Examination and comparison of previous, present and proposed national budget and reconciliation of authorization with actual expenditures.

NOTE: a., b., and c. -- Inspectors and observers to have access to the entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations of type listed have been declared. They will be provided with facilities for uninterrupted communications. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

STAGE 2

Disclose:

a. Detailed organization and composition of units comprising the over-all strength disclosed in Stage 1 including

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mobilization procedures.

b. Details of each of the military installations, posts, centers, stations, naval bases, etc., listed in Stage 1.

c. Equipment armament and facilities for overhaul and repair thereto (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strength disclosed in Stage 1, except units equipped with novel weapons).

NOTE: Novel weapons include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and nuclear weapons.

d. Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

Verify by:

a. Quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units, supplemented by access to and inspection of units and installations.

b. Inspection by ground inspection teams.

c. Analysis of disclosed data in comparison with tables of

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organization and equipment supplemented by physical checks of units and installations. Also compare with aerial photos.

d. Cross-checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to output of plants, and analysis of operations with respect to materials used.

NOTE: a. and b. to include aerial survey.

STAGE 3

Disclose:

a. Production facilities (military arsenals, civilian plants) for the manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage 1 (excluding novel weapons) including location, type and quantity of armament produced, and maximum annual capacity.

Verify by:

a. Physical inspection of exterior of plant to include observation of plant's physical dimensions, raw material on hand, end product, and labor force employed. Analyze these observations against available production records, input of

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raw material, power consumption, employment statistics and finalcial reports.

NOTE: Utilize aerial survey as feasible.

STAGE 4

Disclose:

a. Research and Development program (except nuclear).

b. Equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, and radiological warfare weapons (except nuclear).

c. Location of installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons including production rates (except nuclear).

Verify by:

a. Analysis of the present and past production records.

b. Examination of pertinent plans and records.

c. Cross-checks of information contained in present disclosures with units denied access to in Stage 1. Supplement these checks by physical checks of these units as well as those in reserve at other locations.

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d. Inspection of exterior physical dimension of plants, and conformation of records pertaining to input of raw materials, type and disposition of finished product, rate of production, labor employed, power consumption, and financial records. (Internal inspection of industrial production plants would in general not be included, but material intake, power use and product output would be reported and be subject to external check).

NOTE: Utilize by aerial survey as feasible.

STAGE 5

Disclose:

a. Quantities and types of novel weapons and delivery systems on hand (less nuclear)

b. Testing programs (less nuclear)

Verify by:

a. Examination and analysis of quantitative reports (showing quantity, type, date of manufacture, location and physical condition) of novel weapons supplemented by (1) actual

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physical count of stockpiles and examination of delivery systems and (2) constant observation to disclose withdrawals from or additions to the stockpile, displacement of delivery systems.

b. Check testing program.

NOTE: Aerial survey to disclose additional stockpiles and delivery sites.

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APPENDIX C

ADVANCE REPORTING - PROJECTED MOVEMENTS,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CARRIERS

Governor Stassen's memorandum, "The Follow-up on the Quantico Session," dated October 31, 1955, at paragraph L, directs the Task Force on Navy Inspection to "make a special study of the requirement for reporting in advance on projected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability in connection with an inspection plan."

The types of nuclear weapons which the USSR possesses, or has the capability of developing, are bombs, torpedoes, mines, torpedo mines ("creepers") and guided missiles.

There are two classes of nuclear weapons carriers which must be considered in such a study by the TFNI; namely, naval vessels and naval aircraft (medium range). In addition, it must be recognized that merchant ships can be used as carriers. For the purposes of this study, i.e., advance reporting of projected movements, merchant ships need not be dealt with, for their movements are subject to report in accordance with world-wide shipping practices. A note of warning in this connection should be recorded, however, that

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the distinction between a naval vessel and a merchant ship is very fine in Russia where all ships are state-owned. For example, during the last war an incident occurred in which a naval tanker was temporarily denied entrance to a United States port, under the rule of clearance through diplomatic channels, to furnish us with a quid pro quo in negotiations on a visa problem and a Murmansk ship repair request. The next visit of the same tanker to the West Coast found it registered as a merchant ship.

The capabilities of naval vessels as nuclear weapons carriers stems from the guided missile with an atomic warhead, in addition to the traditional torpedoes and mines. It must be assumed that Russia has developed the missile, the launcher, and the control system for ship-board firing. That we are able to fire such missiles, both from surface ships and submarines, is well-known to all the world. It is now eight years since our submarine capability was publicized.

It is customary among naval powers to plan the movements of ships well in advance. For example, we develop yearly operating plans which define the general employment and location of ships for that year. This is necessary in order to

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plan adequately for upkeep and maintenance periods, shipyard overhauls, and for the extensive supply system needed to support operations. These yearly schedules are then broken down into shorter periods, quarterly for example, in more detail, and finally into weekly or bi-weekly operating schedules.

The inspection plan should provide, therefore, for exchange of operating plans and schedules of the several fleets and subdivisions thereof, down to the individual ship. This information will serve, not as a complete safeguard of course, but rather to establish contemplated operating patterns. Professional judgment applied thereto can establish, to a degree, the changes in the patterns, if any, which would be required to initiate war through a surprise attack. It will also furnish a basis for judging indications to be derived from the activities of naval shore establishments which support the ships, naval bases, naval shipyards, ammunition and supply depots, training facilities and the like.

As will be readily recognized, the interchange of such information will not in and of itself justify reliance at any given time upon the employment of Russian naval vessels

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as being that which they have declared. And furthermore, while verification of the announced movements can be had to a degree through aerial search and observation, it cannot be relied upon as adequate for an effective inspection plan. In the case of submarine operations, if they are cleverly operated, they will not be observed at all, while low visibility will at times protect surface ships from observation.

It is because of these and other considerations that the TFNI again concludes that ground inspection of naval activities is a necessary part of the plan. In order to complete this study, therefore, there has been prepared a supplementary study, "Detection of Movements of Nuclear Weapons Carriers," Appendix D.

Turning next to advance reporting of naval aircraft, the TFNI recommends, as part of the inspection plan, interchange of operating plans and schedules, which, although not necessarily projected as far into the future as in the case of naval vessels, nonetheless do have to provide periods for routine checks, major overhauls, and supply. To that extent this information will be helpful in furnishing indications of strategic, if not tactical, intentions.

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Verification of adherence to advance plans and schedules for aircraft would seem to require, to an appreciable degree, ground inspection of naval air bases, stations, overhaul and supply activities.

In addition to operating plans and schedules, there should be an interchange of detailed flight plans. Verification of such information is more questionable, although departures and arrivals predicted in flight plans can be checked on the ground. In addition, radar check points can follow within limits the flight route itself.

For the reasons heretofore stated, in the case of ships, however, the TFNI concludes that advance reporting of nuclear weapons carriers must be supplemented by a thoroughly realistic detection system -- hence Appendix D.

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APPENDIX D

INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

1. The primary purpose of the inspection system is to provide adequate early warning by which the United States can be reasonably confident that the Soviets will not be able to launch surprise massive nuclear attack. As stated in the basic directive, the inspection system must be "practical, effective, and comprehensive."

2. Before we put our faith in an inspection system, we must be reasonably certain of what kind of surprise attack we prepare against, of what type of warning indicators we can depend on, and what data we need to provide such indicators. We must avoid accepting a bare minimal or a single type of inspection, because of the certainty that human fallability and Soviet guile will defeat a plan based on this narrow foundation. It is better to have no plan than to be enmeshed in one that lulls the West into a sense of false security -- which is a fundamental danger in the inspection concept.

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3. In developing inspection plans, we must consider both of the following general possibilities of Soviet initiation of war:

   1) supporting massive nuclear attack with large scale conventional attack

   2) to increase possibility of surprise and resulting disastrous damage to the Western powers, making the initial attack principally with nuclear weapons and employing conventional forces to follow up as soon as possible.

4. Because of the overwhelming advantage to be gained from surprise, the Soviet leaders will do everything possible to cover up preparations for initiating war. They will realize that inspection cannot eliminate surprise, so that even with an apparently adequate system of mutual reporting, verification and inspection, it might nevertheless be possible to start World War III with sudden and unexpected nuclear attack. This might, in fact, be delivered with only a portion of their forces because of the great destructiveness that can be achieved with nuclear weapons. For example, the Soviets might launch

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widespread and damaging attacks with submarines and aircraft normally absent from their bases in day to day operations.

5. However, since the damage they could inflict on us in these circumstances might be less than sufficient to break our power to retaliate and ultimately win the war, the Soviets may go beyond these more easily hidden preparations. They may well get ready for operations of sufficient magnitude that changes in their day to day activities will become apparent to inspection teams that have unrestricted freedom of movement and alertly carry out their duties.

PROBABLE NATURE OF THE SURPRISE ATTACK

6. What kind of surprise attack must we prepare against? We must, of course, expect attack by long-range aircraft including those capable of only one-way flight to the United States. In addition, we must also expect the following simultaneous operations designed to destroy as much U.S. and allied strength as possible. Together they could have devastating effect on our capacity to fight a war.

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a) Nuclear attack against the United States from the sea including:

1. Delay action mines laid long in advance of D-Day in our principal ports and waterways, and set to actuate on D-Day. These can be laid on certain areas by submarines -- in others by merchant ships.
2. "Creeper" torpedo-mines fired into harbors from submarines on or before D-Day.
3. Guided missiles fired on D-Day from offshore by submarines and possibly merchant ships.

b) Nuclear attack against United States land and sea bases overseas to reduce our potentiality for nuclear retaliation. This attack would be made by sea forces, including those in a) above, by medium range aircraft and by shore based guided missiles.

c) Sabotage, subversion and biological warfare within the United States and allied nations.

d) Operations against our vital sea lines of communications.

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e) Immediate follow-up of massive nuclear attack by the employment of at least part of the USSR's conventional forces in all types of operations, including short-range amphibious landings, as in Turkey and Iran.

f) Heightened preparations in the USSR and its strategic sea areas to protect against our massive retaliation from land and sea bases.

7. We may furthermore expect, if we emphasize inspection of only part of the USSR's potentiality that the Soviets will devise means both to reduce the effectiveness of that particular inspection, and to increase the relative ratio of other means of surprise attack. They seek "peace" and will accept an inspection system simply as a "truce" during which they will hope to steadily gain advantage over the United States in comparative strength.

WARNING INDICATIONS

8. In looking for warning indications, we must take into account

a) the generally accepted conclusion that nuclear weapons themselves are readily concealed - hence, for an inspection system to be effective it must be directed

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at means of delivery; and

b) the certainty that, should the Soviets start World War III, they will go "all out" to damage us as much as possible on D-Day. Although for purposes of surprise they might accept essential reduction in numbers of attacking forces, including long-range aircraft, they will undoubtedly employ every means of attack possible within the limitations of the desired degree of concealment.

We must therefore look for indications, not only in operation of long-range aircraft, but in the several other critical areas, a number of which also involve delivery of nuclear weapons.

9. Aerial photography and periodic ground inspection will of themselves contribute to detection of Soviet preparations, especially if the Soviets intend to combine massive nuclear attack with a large scale conventional attack on D-Day. However, these methods alone may be grossly inadequate to detect, in timely fashion, changes in the tempo of Soviet activity should the Soviets decide to initiate war with only nuclear attack delivered by normal operating forces.

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10. Likewise ineffective would be inspection limited to movements of long-range aircraft from normal operating fields. To outwit this limited inspection system, the Soviets may be expected to use many stratagems, such as ruses to confuse rada, lulling alertness of inspectors through warlike training missions, including long, unexplained absences of units from their home fields, and through operation from smaller fields made possible by rocket assisted take-offs.

11. To have a reasonable chance of obtaining warning indications of impending "surprise" nuclear attack, we must direct our inspection system at all means of nuclear delivery. It must thus include long- and medium-range aircraft, long- and medium-range guided missiles, surface ships, submarines, and key anti-aircraft and ground tactical guided missile units.

12. In all of these areas, our inspection will have to be geared to detect variations that in and of themselves might in many cases not seem significant; but together would have ominous meaning.

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13. We can be sure that in all inspected locations the Soviets will prepare for war under the disguise of normal operations. This disguise will not be easy to penetrate. For example, consider a submarine base. Submarines come and go all the time. We may expect that the Soviets will keep approximately 1/3 of their submarines at sea, training with training munitions that closely resemble the nuclear ones they will use in war. Aerial photography, periodical ground inspection, or even daily count of submarines will be of limited value in detecting preparations to use nuclear weapons. After the inspection team has departed or the photography plane has gone on its way, it should be an easy matter to equip submarines for war and to send them on what is apparently a normal training operation, especially if the Soviets have operated far in advance under a routine schedule of extended cruises.

14. A similar situation exists in most of the other critical areas. In nuclear war a limited quantity of munitions and a limited number of ships, planes and missiles may be able to deliver almost a crippling blow. Significant

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changes in pattern of preparation and in movement of forces can be detected only by day-to-day inspection on the spot by experienced men who know what they are doing.

15. In order to have a reasonable chance of detecting preparations by the Soviet Navy for surprise nuclear war, therefore, we must have trained naval inspectors continuously on hand in the more important locations. They should be supplemented by aerial photography and traveling inspection teams in the less critical localities.

16. Indications of preparations for surprise attack with nuclear weapons may appear through increased activity in such locations as the following:

a) nuclear munition depots and assembly plants and other key arsenals where nuclear munitions might be concealed.

b) submarine bases and other naval bases to a lesser degree

c) long- and medium-range aircraft bases -- especially those within a reasonable range of the coast and frontiers.

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d) long- and medium range guided missile bases near frontiers and the coast; and tactical guided missile units at key frontier locations.

e) air defense activities including AA guided missile units equipped with nuclear weapons.

f) major training stations and technical schools that train teams for nuclear operations.

17. To have adequate protection against surprise nuclear attack we should therefore have inspection teams at all these critical locations. It is not easy to determine what are the detailed indications they may be able to note in each type of critical location. The following paragraphs will attempt to estimate some of these.

18. The Soviets can no doubt disguise many preparations. Thus the best means to develop a useful syllabus of indicators for inspection teams will be by actual test and war gaming them at similar locations in the U.S. The general indicators that follow are offered as only a tentative guide from which test and experience will develop more valid ones, and in more detail.

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19. Warning Indications at Nuclear Munition Depots and Assembly Plants, and at Other Key Arsenals Where Nuclear Munitions can be Concealed.

a) These locations are among the first places we would hope to find indication of nuclear attack. If we could adequately police these, much of our problem would be solved. That we cannot is obvious; but our plan should provide for as complete inspection as possible, which would be certain to give some warning indications that could be among the most important any of our inspecting teams would obtain.

b) One of the last places we will be able to put inspection teams will be at nuclear manufacturing centers and to a lesser degree at nuclear munition depots. We can probably have them stationed somewhat earlier at naval arsenals; and in some respects this will be more beneficial, since nuclear weapon assembly for naval use will be carried out at least in part at these arsenals. Furthermore, experience at these will soon indicate other arsenals where naval inspectors should be stationed.

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c) Some of the possible warning indications the inspectors may note, Soviet efforts to disguise them, and what incidents may give the Soviets away are covered in the following tabulation:

1. Indicator: Increase in issue rate of nuclear weapons

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors That Should Aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Issue of dummy and test munitions over long periods from the same depot that issues live ammunition	U.S. personnel specially trained in nuclear weapons who visit issue points daily and check on location of explosives may be able to note significant increases in handling of live ammunition

2. Indicator: Restationing of teams trained in assembly and operational use of nuclear weapons

Periodical and frequent alerts of all teams as part of normal training	Familiarity of inspection teams with the personnel and Soviet system may permit them to pick up changes certain to occur when the Soviets prepare for the real thing

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3. Indicator: Increased precautions necessary when live ammunition is being handled in quantity

These precautions will be simulated in routine drills	Whatever system of training is adopted, large issues of live ammunition will so affect Soviet personnel reactions that the change should become apparent to alert inspectors on the spot

4. Indicator: Increased efforts at security and to block information from the inspecting team

The Soviets will make strong efforts to simulate this activity, but they will not be able to match the real thing.	Inspectors on the spot should become quickly conscious that something momentous is developing.

20. Warning Indications in Surface Ship and Submarine Operations

a) One of the critical factors in nuclear surprise attack against the United States will be the submarine and to a lesser degree the surface ship. Probably more than any other major carrier, the submarine will be able to

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conduct its operations with a high probability of achieving complete surprise. This applies both to the secret laying of static and creeper nuclear mines over a period of months prior to the war, and to the attack with guided missiles and other nuclear weapons on D-Day.

b) Furthermore, if warning indications can be gained from submarine operations, some of these at least will have the advantage of giving greater advanced notice. Since the Soviets cannot afford to sacrifice the clear advantage of utilizing their vast number of submarines in surprise nuclear attack, we may hope to find in their submarine preparations some of the best early warning indications.

c) The laying of static and "creeper" mines over a period of months preliminary to the Soviet planned date for war will be a difficult operation to detect. It is quite possible that merchant ships and submarines can conduct this laying without our having any knowledge of what is going on. On the other hand, if we have inspection teams at each main submarine base and at other naval bases where submarines may take aboard

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munitions, there is a chance that we might gain some knowledge of developments. This might be in variation in load; it might be in repeated long absences from base of certain submarines; it might be in the fact that the same submarines would on each voyage call at a certain munitions depot for special loading.

d) There will be better opportunity for inspection teams to note warning indications during the final preparations for D-Day. The attitude and activity on a submarine base during these final weeks may reveal tell-tale indications.

e) These indications will be of vital value whether or not we can obtain agreement that will effectively limit the number of Soviet submarines at sea at any one time and therefore reduce the nuclear attack hazard. It is not certain that this desirable measure can be achieved; even if the Soviets agreed to it they would develop means to negate it. For example, should they agree to having no more than 1/4 of their long range submarines at sea for prolonged training

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exercises, they might well equip this 1/4 (more than 50 vessels) with nuclear weapons for attacking the continental United States. Then in ample time for concerted operations they could send another large portion of their submarine force to sea for "short-range" operations. These could also be armed with nuclear weapons for use against our carrier task forces and overseas bases and ports, as well as the sea lines of communication.

f) Only by having trained inspection teams in adequate numbers could we have any hope of getting worthwhile warning indications from these operations. Some of the indications our inspectors might note are given below:

1. Indicator: Change in type of munitions loaded

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors That Should Aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
Not only will the Soviets make training munitions similar in appearance to war munitions, but they may load	The Soviets will naturally limit to a very small number those who will be informed of plans for the initiation of war. However,

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submarines for training missions at night or holidays -- as they may be expected to load them when preparing for war.

a considerably larger number will of necessity know when live nuclear muntions are being handled. There will thus be greater concern and seriousness among officers and technicians and greater attempts to conceal handling of the nuclear weapon. This change in attitude may become apparent to inspection teams.

2. Indicator: Accelerated installation of guided missile launchers on additional submarines; or large scale replacements with late model launchers.

The Soviets will attempt to make installations appear routine

As the date for D-Day approaches and as the usual delays put them behind schedule, we may expect that a note of urgency will appear in the preparations.

3. Indicator: Capacity fueling

Long in advance of war, capacity fueling will probably be made routine for training

If the Soviets make capacity fueling routine, there will be little indication from fueling operations as to their intentions

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However, it is possible that fuel shortages and inertia may cause them to slack off in capacity fueling. Therefore, if they seem to revert to this at a number of bases it will be a warning.

4. Indicator: Increasing readiness of submarines - repairs, drydocking, spare parts and so forth

The Soviets will endeavor to maintain a constant pattern of keeping their submarines fully ready	Routine peacetime operations will inevitably cause neglect in various fields of readiness. Imminence of war will bring with it increased effort to eliminate deficiencies. This increase in effort will be of such a widespread character that inspection teams reporting from widely scattered bases may develop a significant pattern of change in attitude and action by the Soviets.

5. Indicator: Provisioning

Same as in 4. above	Same as in 4. above

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6. Indicator: Building up war complements

Same as in 4. above	Same as in 4. above. There will be such tell-tale indications as cancellation of leave and arrival of trained nuclear teams

7. Indicator: Additional security measures

Measures will be tightened from time to time as a drill	Inevitably on the approach of war the Soviets will increase efforts to block access to important information teams have been getting

21. Warning Indications at Medium-Range Aircraft Bases -- Especially Those Within a Reasonable Range of the Coast and Frontiers Such as the Balkans and Western Europe

1. Indicator: Increased attention to readiness of

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors That Should Aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
The Soviets will endeavor to make a high degree of readiness routine	It will be difficult to maintain a constant high degree of readiness. Hence, we may expect that the Soviets will slack off in

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many bases until they begin to prepare for sudden attack. Then the tenseness and urgency of preparations should become apparent to inspection teams

2. Indicator: Arming planes with live nuclear munitions

In their training operations the Soviets will simulate carrying live ammo and will occasionally load it in the planes

Each time that live ammo is carried, the facts should be reported immediately by the inspection team. Increase in number of planes so armed and reports from a number of fields simultaneously may give adequate early warning.

3. Indicator: Capacity fueling of planes on the same date in many fields and planes for air refueling

Such operations will be made routine periodically

In training operations the Soviets will probably not be able to carry out simultaneous capacity fueling and air refueling in all important bases.

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Therefore, reports of widespread accomplishment of this preparation should likewise be significant

4. Indicator: Increased attention to navigational equipment

The standard operating procedure will undoubtedly be to maintain in the planes charts and equipment ready for distant operations against specific targets

Since the standard operation procedure will undoubtedly be neglected in a number of localities, increased attention to navigational preparations may be observed by an alert team

5. Indicator: Personnel changes and reaction

The Soviets will endeavor by continuous training missions to closely simulate the war mission and therefore to prepare personnel for the real thing

Arrangements for distant attacks with nuclear weapons will not only require additions of skilled technicians in some localities, but the movement of live ammo will become known. Some of the Soviet personnel will give away the seriousness of the situation by their action and emotions.

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6. Indicator: Large number of planes on training flights

Periodically the Soviets will dispatch large numbers of planes from bases on prolonged training flights	These training flights will be difficult to coordinate. The urgency attending imminent attack will be apparent in many bases.

22. Air Defense Activities including AA Guided Missile Units Equipped with Nuclear Weapons

Indicators to be obtained from Task Force on Army Inspection

23. Major Training Stations and Technical Schools that Train Teams for Nuclear Operations

1. Indicator: Slow but steady increase in nuclear and and allied technical training over a period of many months

Probable Efforts to Disguise	Factors That Should Aid in Detecting Soviet Preparations
This increase will be gradually superimposed on normal	As naval training experts become conversant with Soviet needs

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technical training to appear to be merely the usual progressive development to be expected in this scientific age

and methods they may be able to put their finger on critical increases that denote preparation for certain activity

2. Indicator: A sudden jump in the rate of increase as the planned date for war approaches

Dry runs in training variation will be made from time to time to disguise the real thing when it comes

Both the urgency and quantity of change would probably become apparent to trained observers in the situation

3. Indicator: Greater emphasis not only in nuclear weapon training, but also submarines, guided missiles and air defense (radar fence, AA guided missiles, jet interceptors).

This activity would be disguised under normal technical advances and periodic special training

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APPENDIX E

NAVY'S COMMUNICATION PLAN

1. Reports from Naval Verification and Inspection Teams should flow from the field to Naval Sector Headquarters, then to the National Armament Inspection Headquarters in Moscow, and from there to the JCS or specific inspection command in Washington.

2. The plan must provide adequate safeguards for "flash warnings", for rapid movement of other than routine messages, for interchange of information in Russia, for separate channels in case of jamming, and for transmission over an entirely separate system to information addresees in Washington.

3. A typical plan might function as follows:

   a. The field team, equipped with powerful mobile radios, reports to its Naval Sector Headquarters. Important messages will also be sent information to the nearest U. S. communication station on the periphery of the USSR (this should preferably be a naval communication unit. For the most part these units already exist at

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Yokosuka, Dhahrein, and so forth. Naval vessels can fill in gaps).

b) The Naval Sector Headquarters will consolidate and analyze all reports and transmit the summary to the National Armaments Inspection Headquarters in Moscow, and information to adjacent Army Area Headquarters. Important reports appropriately designated by the field team will be transmitted immediately without delay for decoding and evaluation; this will follow later. Likewise the peripheral communication station will immediately retransmit important messages to Washington.

NOTE: It is desirable that equipment at Naval Sector Headquarters be powerful enough to permit communication with Area Headquarters of the United States Army and Air Force, and other Navy sectors, and if possible with the United States direct. This will help reduce the possibility of jamming, will provide several means for sending flash warnings direct to the United States, and be a psychological deterrent to the Soviets against initiating World War III.

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c) Aircraft reconnaissance reports of targets within the USSR will follow the same channel of communications as above, the aircraft in a sense operating like a field team. Patrol aircraft conducting reconnaissance to seaward of naval operating bases will transmit to the peripheral communication station, thence to Moscow. Important messages will be sent information through the usual naval chain of command to the Navy Department. If there are indications of immediate surprise attack, the messages will be sent with an Urgent Priority.

d) Reports from Naval Sectors will be sent action to Department of Defense (Western Powers Inspection HQ, Washington), information to National Armament Inspection Headquarters, Moscow. The latter will not delay the transmission of these reports but can accompany or follow up such reports with additional information or interpretation available to the Moscow Headquarters which will aid evaluation at the Department of Defense.

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e) The Navy Department will make a separate digest and evaluation from the important information messages it receives, and will give this to the JCS. If the other services adopt a similar plan for their communications, this would provide a separate, rapid check of developments in the USSR. This multiple report procedure would be especially valuable in the event of concerted jamming or other action against our teams in Russia.

f) When observer or inspection teams of the three services are in the same location, their communications should be consolidated under the service having primary responsibility.

g) The communication plan should provide for the usual procedures such as change of code, transmission of dummy messages at random varied times, and similar precautions.

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APPENDIX E

NAVY COMMUNICATIONS PLAN



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TOP SECRET

SENIOR NAVAL INSPECTOR

PACIFIC FLEET SECTOR

Location: Vladivostok

INSPECTION

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Senior Officer	1100/0
1	Chief of Staff	1310/1
1	Flag Secretary (sub)	1100/2
1	Flag Lieutenant	1100/4
1	Operations Officer	1100/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	EDO	1400/2
1	AEDO	1510/2
1	Nuclear Tech.	
1	Petroleum Spec.	
1	Marine Officer	Colonel
12	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
4	Enlisted	
16	Total Inspection Personnel	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	Officer	
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
2	Marines	
10	Enlisted	
11	Total Support Personnel	

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VLADIVOSTOK NAVAL BASE

Vladivostok (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Two major shipyards and three small yards; all types of major repairs and drydocking of vessels up to cruiser size (635 ft.); Principal naval fitting out and repair and supply base in the Far East.

Secondary Function(s):

Headquarters Pacific Fleet and Headquarters CinC 5th Fleet; Marine Headquarters; Submarine base; Motor Torpedo Boat Base

General Description:

Icebreakers required from December to Mid-April but open all year.

The Dalstroi Naval Shipyard effects repairs to both merchant and naval vessels, and fits out those built in the Amur Shipyard in Komsomolsk. This yard is actually three yards, all yards under the same administration; the number 202 Naval Yard, the Number 202 Repair Yard, and the EMT Submarine Plant. Facilities available in the Yard in addition to shop facilities, are three graving docks, each approximately 635 feet long, that can drydock vessels up to and including cruisers in size. Largest, most important Soviet repair yard for cruisers and other ships in the Far East; no shipbuilding facilities; primarily afitting out and repair yard for cruisers, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, and merchant ships; fits out naval vessels constructed at Amur.

No. 2 Ship-Repair Yard; engaged in above and below waterline repairs to merchant vessels and is equipped with a floating drydock of approximately 6,000 tons lifting capacity. No national ranking as producer of new construction; important as repair yard and ranks third most important yard in this area. Production consists almost entirely of hull, engine, and electrical repairs to merchant vessels and passenger ships. Underwater repairs are carried out in the floating drydock and floating repairs are done at the Quay.

Additional facilities located in or in the vicinity of the aforementioned shipyards:

Munition, torpedo and mine shops; torpedo assembly plant. Munition, torpedo, mine depot.

Major storage and supply base.

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VLADIVOSTOK, CON'D

General Description:

Machine shops; steel mills

Numerous naval airfields in vicinity (approximately 20).

Schools: naval academy; radio; submarine school; anti-sub school; engineering school; gunnery; Red Banner Coastal Patrol School; communications; naval preparatory school.

Amphibious training base.
1000 bed hospital

Receiving station.

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Regular Line With Amphibious Qualifications	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	Medical Officer	2100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/3
1	Training & Adm. Officer	1720/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col.
14	Officers	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	Marine Officer	
5	Officers	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
18	Photographers or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
18	Enlisted	
34	Total Inspection Personnel	

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VLADIVOSTOK, CONT'D

4	Interpreters	
4	Yeomen	YN
4	Photographers or Aviation Rates	
1	Fire Control Tech.	FT
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
18	Enlisted	
32	Total Verification Personnel	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
3	Officers	
12	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
2	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
2	Machinist Mates	MM
2	Av. Mach Mates	AD
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SC
6	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
52	Enlisted	
55	Total Support Personnel	
70	Total Men	
17	Total Officers	
87	Total Team Personnel	

Transportation Equipment

2 Planes
4 Motor Vehicles

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
2	Naval Aviators	1310/3
5	Naval Aviators	1310/4
8	Officers	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
2	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic Tech	AT
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen(Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
5	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
46	Enlisted	
54	Total Support Personnel	
13	Total Officers	
75	Total Men	
88	Total Inspection & Support	

Transportation Equipment

2 Planes
4 Vehicles

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NAKHODKA NAVAL BASE

NAKHODKA (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Winter Base for Pacific Fleet: Operating Base for Submarines

Secondary Function(s):

Major repairs and drydocking of vessels up to destroyer size. Motor torpedo boat base: Minelayer and Minesweeper base and anchorage. Seaplane base. Supply base.

General Description:

Ice breakers required but less severe conditions than at Valdivostok; frozen over from January to March but navigable with aid of icebreakers all year.

Seaplane hangars and shops.

Machine shops; torpedo repair facilities.

Ammo-torpedo-mine depot.

Fueling docks; oil storage above and below ground.

Submarine school enlisted; communications school enlisted.

Auto plant; locomotive plant; road and railway to Vladivostok.

1000 base personnel.

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	EOD	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	(Major)
7	OFFICERS	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	(Major)
5	OFFICERS	

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VERIFICATION:

2 Interpreters	
2 Yeomen	YN
1 Photographer	PH
1 Torpedoman	TM
1 Gunner's Mate	GM
1 Mineman	MN
1 Quartermaster	QM
1 Radarman	RD
10 ENLISTED	

17 TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL

Support Personnel

1 Naval Aviator	1310/3
1 Naval Aviator	1310/4
2 OFFICERS	
8 Radiomen	RM
2 Communications Tech.	CT
1 Storekeeper	SK
1 Hospital Corpsman	HM
1 Machinist Mate	MM
1 Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1 Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1 Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1 Airman	AN
3 Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6 Mess Cooks	SN
2 Commissarymen	CS
3 Stewardsmates	TN
6 Marines	
37 ENLISTED	

39 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

47 TOTAL MEN
9 TOTAL OFFICERS
56 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

2 Planes
4 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

2 Interpreters	
2 Yeomen	YN
6 Photographers or 2cl Rates	PH
1 Torpedoman	TM
1 Mineman	MN
1 Quartermaster	QM
1 Radarman	RD
14 ENLISTED	

19 TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL

Support Personnel

1 Naval Aviator	1310/3
1 OFFICER	
8 Radiomen	RM
2 Communications Tech.	CT
1 Storekeeper	SK
1 Hospital Corpsman	HM
1 Machinist Mate	MM
1 Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1 Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1 Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1 Airman	AN
3 Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6 Mess Cooks	SN
2 Commissarymen	CS
3 Stewardsmates	TN
6 Marines	
37 ENLISTED	

38 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

51 TOTAL MEN
6 TOTAL OFFICERS
57 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

2 Planes
4 Vehicles

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KOMSOMOLSK NAVAL BASE

KOMSOMOLSK (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Primarily concerned with ship construction: principal Soviet Naval shipbuilding and ship repair center in Far East.

Secondary Function(s):

Supply, repair and operating base for Amur River Flotilla

General Description:

Open June to November.

Shipbuilding and repair: 6 enclosed graving docks and building ways; also shops for building and repair of ships up to cruiser size; marine engine and boiler repairs; 2 fitting-out wharves. Annual construction capacity: 2 cruisers, 3 DDs (or 3 large subs), 2 SS medium and 4 coastal subs. Heavy machinery repair shops.

Naval airfields in the vicinity. 2 aircraft factories. Large petroleum storage base and oil refinery.

Base employs 15,000 workers on three shifts.
Some small craft construction: MTBs, gun boats, sub chasers.

Much manufacturing in the area: Steel works, auto construction and assembly; locomotive plant and railroad shops; Chemical plant; various other manufacturing facilities. RR line to Khabarovsk; dirt road to Khabarovsk; RR and motor road to Sovetskaya Gavan.

Manufacture submarine batteries.

Naval air school; train torpedo bomber pilots and comm. Pers.

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KOMSOMOLSK CONT'D

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
1	Intelligence Off.	1630/
1	Supply Officer	3100/
1	EDO	1400/2
1	AEDO	1400/2
1	Petroleum Spec.	1510/3
8	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Radarman	RD
8	Enlisted	
16	Total Verification Personnel	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Officer	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
37	Enlisted	
38	Total Support Personnel	
9	Total Officers	
45	Total Men	
54	Total Verification & Support	

Transportation Equipment

1 PLANE

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	AEDO	1510/3
5	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
6	Photographer or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Radarman	RD
11	Enlisted	
16	Total Inspection Personnel	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Officer	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
36	Enlisted	
37	Total Support Personnel	
6	Total Officers	
47	Total Men	
53	Total Inspection & Support	

Transportation Equipment

1 PLANE

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SOVETSKAYA GAVAN
NAVAL BASE

SOVETSKAYA GAVAN (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Important repair base: facilities for drydocking submarines and destroyers: operating base for submarines and destroyers and patrol craft.

Secondary Function(s):

Major storage area. Administrative Headquarters for Soviet North Pacific 7th Flt.

General Description:

Open all year; icebreakers required November to May:

Facilities include: shipyard for DDs and cruisers up to 5000 tons; submarine shipyard; 2 floating drydocks; two seaplane bases; one naval airfield; one torpedo warehouse; railroad yard; submarine base; destroyer base, motor torpedo boat base; amphibious craft base.

Other facilities: headquarters building; naval hospital; large ammunition and torpedo depot; underground oil storage. Also submarine officers school.

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Operations Officer	1100/4
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Regular Line with Amphibious Qualifications	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	EDO	1400/2

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major

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SOVETSKAYA GAVAN CONT'D

1	Ordnance Technician	7230
1	Machinist	7430
1	Marine Officer	Major

11	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
2	Photographers or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
10	Enlisted	
21	Total Verification Personnel	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
8	Raidomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
3	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
41	Enlisted	
43	Total Support Personnel	
13	Total Officers	
51	Total men	
64	Total Verification & Support	

Transportation Equipment
1 Plane - Vehicles

7	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Photographers or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
18	Enlisted	
25	Total Inspection Personnel	

Support Personnel

0 Officers

8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
38	Enlisted	
38	Total Support Personnel	
7	Total Officers	
56	Total Men	
63	Total Inspection & Support	

Transportation Equipment
1 Plane - 3 Vehicles

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OTOMARI (SAKHALIN)
(New Name KORSAKOV)
PACIFIC SECTOR

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Supply and fuel depot. Advanced operating base for patrol craft

Naval Hospital

Torpedo boat basin

Warehouses

Berth ships as large as DDs

Naval observatory

POL storage

3 Sec Ports

2 Minor Ports and Naval Bases

41 Minor ports and landings

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1310/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1310/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/3
1	Ordnance Technician	7130
1	Marine Officer	Major
9	OFFICERS	

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INSPECTION:

1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
18	ENLISTED	
22	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	OFFICER	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic T.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
38	ENLISTED	
39	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

NOTE: Personnel included for one plane crew and 3 vehicles.

56	TOTAL MEN
5	TOTAL OFFICERS
61	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

2	Interpreters	YN
2	Yeomen	YN
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
9	ENLISTED	
18	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	AV. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
40	ENLISTED	
42	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

NOTE: Personnel provided for one plane crew and 3 vehicles.

49	TOTAL MEN
11	TOTAL OFFICERS
60	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

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NIKOLAEVSK NAVAL BASE

NIKOLAEVSK (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Naval base for Pacific 7th Fleet during summer months. Minor ship repairs and training activities.

Secondary Function(s):

Base for Ammur River Flotilla and Soviet North Pacific 7th Fleet during summer. Motor torpedo boat and gun boat base. Wharves and anchorage.

General Description:

Harbor 16 ft. depth; frozen over November to May. Steamer service to Petropavlovsk, Valadivostok, etc. Petroleum storage.

Three small shipyards; floating drydock; graving dock 500' X 200'.

Communications School with 500 student capacity; Petty Officers school with 60 capacity.

No rail transportation to other major points.

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	Communications Tec.	7640
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
1	Yeoman	YN
1	Photographer	PH
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
6	Enlisted	
11	Total Verification Personnel	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
1	Yeoman	YN
1	Photographer	PH
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
6	Enlisted	
9	Total Inspection Personnel	

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NIKOLAEVSK CONT'D

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Plt.	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech	AT
2	Commissarymen	
3	Stewardsmates	TN
4	Marines	
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
4	Mess Cooks	SN
29	Enlisted	
31	Total Support Personnel	
7	Total Officers	
35	Total Men	
42	Total Verification & Support	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

Support Personnel

0	Officers	
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
3	Mess Cooks	SN
1	Commissaryman	CS
2	Stewardsmates	TN
4	Marines	
23	Enlisted	
23	Total Support Personnel	
3	Total Officers	
29	Total Men	
32	Total Inspection & Support	

Transportation Equipment

Plane and crew not included in Inspection team. Verification team will decide whether plane will be needed for Nikolaevsk for Inspection Team.

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PETROPAVLOVSK NAVAL BASE

Petropavlovsk (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Base for Soviet North Pacific 7th Fleet (Scouting Force North Pacific); Important repair base; Facilities for making major repairs to vessels up to DD size; Operating base submarines, patrol craft and motor torpedo boats.

Secondary Functions:

Moderate stockpiling area; information on drydocking facilities not available.

General Description:

Open all year - icebreakers usually required

Repairs to ships up to 10,000 tons
Floating drydock; marine railway; anchorage for BBs and CAs

Several airfields and seaplane bases

Ammunition, mine and torpedo depot

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer(sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	Medical Officer	2100/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO	1400/4
1	Ordnance Technician	7230
1	Marine Officer	(Major)
9	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Photographers or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's mate	GM

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer(sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Photographers or Aviation Rates	PH
1	Gunner's mate	GM
1	Radarman	RD
16	Enlisted	
20	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3

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1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
18	Enlisted	
27	Total Verification Personnel	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL:

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmen	TN
6	Marines	
38	Enlisted	
40	Total Support Personnel	
11	Total Officers	
56	Total Men	
67	Total Verification and Support	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Motor Vehicles

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
37	Enlisted	
39	Total Support Personnel	
6	Total Officers	
53	Total Men	
59	Total Inspection and Support	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Motor Vehicles

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PROVIDENTIA NAVAL BASE

PROVIDENTIA (Pacific Sector)

Principal Function(s):

Provision and fueling base for northern passage. Summer operating base for submarines and light surface craft.

Secondary Function(s):

Communications station. MVD patrol base.

General Description:

Navigable June to October. Have seaplane base; ammunition warehouses

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/3(Sub)
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
1	Yeomen	YN
3	Enlisted	
5	TOTAL VERIFICATION	

Support Personnel

0	Officers	
4	Radiomen	RM
1	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Seaman (Driver)	SN
2	Mess Cooks	SN
1	Stewardsmate	TN
1	Radarman	RD
10	Enlisted	
10	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
13	TOTAL MEN	
2	TOTAL OFFICERS	
15	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

Note: If an inspection team is necessary - the verification team will become the inspection team integrated with the Army and (or) Air Force. No plane provided - two vehicles.

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SENIOR NAVAL INSPECTOR

NORTHERN FLEET SECTOR

LOCATION:

Severo Morsk - 69-04-30 N, 33-28-15 E
Near Murmansk

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Senior Officer	1100/0
1	Chief of Staff	1310/1
1	Operations Officer	1100/2
1	Flag Secretary	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Nuclear Technician	
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Colonel
12	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
3	Photographers	PH
1	Quartermaster	QM
10	ENLISTED	
22	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Medical Officer	2100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/3
3	OFFICERS	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
2	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
5	Stewardsmates	TN
2	Marines	
37	ENLISTED	
40	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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Senior Naval Inspector (Cont'd)

15	TOTAL OFFICERS
47	TOTAL MEN
62	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1	helicopter
3	vehicles

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MURMANSK NAVAL BASE

MURMANSK (White Sea Sector)

LOCATION:

68 58' N, 33 03' E (SW Barents Sea) - Kola Peninsula

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Combines with Rosta to form major naval repair and supply base for Soviet Northern Fleet - principal supply depot

SECONDARY FUNCTION(S):

Fleet Headquarters - Northern Fleet Adm. HQ
Naval Base for Small craft

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Commercial center of Kola Peninsula

Ranks second to Arkhangelsk as most important port of Northern USSR
Ice free year round
Extensive naval and commercial berthing facilities (could be utilized by submarines)

Extensive repair & fitting out facilities

Extensive shops
Zaliv
Principal supply depot
Extensive surface & underground storage: fuel depot; ammo, mines, & torpedo station

War College - Naval schools, etc.
Post Grad. Officers' School
Enlisted training school
Sub. training school
Navay Diving school

20 - Piers - 41 storage warehouses
Numerous underground shelters
Extensive surface and underground storage
Secondary naval base 13 mi. NE at Kolshiy Zaliv
Shipyard MYS Hkadeyev
2 Floating drydocks 400' & 747'
At Rosta - 2 graving docks 360' - 600'

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Receiving Station

Hospital (Naval)

Sheet metal)
Foundry)
Machine) At yards
Forge)
Carpenter)

Seaplane Base

About 5 airfields

NOTE: Believe Murmansk team can also cover Polyarny, Vayenga, Guba Tyuva, Port Vladimir and Pechenga.

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
8	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
30	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
5	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RN
2	Communications Tech	CT
36	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
60	ENLISTED	
65	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

1 Naval Aviator	1310/3
1 Naval Aviator	1310/4
1 Naval Aviator	1310/5
3 OFFICERS	
1 Storekeeper	SK
1 Hospital Corpsman	HM
1 Machinist Mate	MM
2 Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2 Chief Av. Pilots	CAP
2 Aviation Elec Tech	AT
2 Airmen	AN
4 Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8 Mess Cooks	SN
2 Commissarymen	CS
1 Steward	SD
3 Stewardsmates	TN
6 Marines	
35 ENLISTED	
38 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
64 TOTAL MEN	
11 TOTAL OFFICERS	
75 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
3 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1 Naval Aviator	1310/3
1 Naval Aviator	1310/4
1 Naval Aviator	1310/5
3 OFFICERS	
1 Storekeeper	SK
1 Hospital Corpsman	HM
1 Machinist Mate	MM
2 Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2 Chief Av. Pilots	CAP
2 Aviation Elec Tech	AT
2 Airmen	AN
4 Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8 Mess Cooks	SN
2 Commissarymen	CS
1 Steward	SD
3 Stewardsmates	TN
6 Marines	
35 ENLISTED	
38 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
95 TOTAL MEN	
8 TOTAL OFFICERS	
103 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
3 Vehicles

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GUBA TYUVA NAVAL BASE

GUBA TYUVA (White Sea Sector)

(To be serviced by Murmansk Inspection Teams)

Location:

2 1/2 miles East of Polyarny
69*12'N, 33*35'E

General Description:

Functions as an auxiliary base to Polyarny. Was used by subs during war. 4 small piers and an offshore wharf. Chief value of Guba Tyuva is to provide berths for small craft and sheltered anchorage for subs.

PECHENGA NAVAL BASE
(formerly Petsamo)

PECHENGA (White Sea Sector)

(To be serviced by Murmansk Inspection Teams)

Location:

60 miles West of Murmansk (Barents sea shore, bordering Finland and Norway)

General Description:

Formerly Finland's only port on Barents Sea. No naval installations. Minor repairs - fishing boats. Armament school - officers, Communications.

PORT VLADIMIR

(White Sea Sector)

(To be serviced by Murmansk Inspection Teams)

Location:

There is a Vladimir on the highway between Moscow and Gorkiy, but it is not referred to as "Port" Vladimir.

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POLYARNY NAVAL BASE
(formerly Aleksandrovsk)

(White Sea Sector)

(To be Serviced by Murmansk
Inspection Teams)

Location:

20 miles NE of Murmansk 69*12'N, 33*28'E

Principal Function(s):

Operating base for subs, destroyers, minesweepers, minelayers, and patrol craft.

Secondary Function(s):

Motor Torpedo Boat and Seaplane Base (and hangars)

General Description:

Guba Tyuva auxiliary to Polyarny as sub base. Could support a squadron of subs or DDs. Underground fuel and ammo storage. School for petty officers. Anti-sub school - officers and men. Air raid shelter cut into rocks. Small hospital.

Comments:

Base has:

Battery-charging cables
distilled battery water in rubber jars
high-pressure air for charging air banks or torpedoes
a marginal wharf
a finger pier
a torpedo repair shop
a torpedo storage shop
a battery shop
a supply warehouse

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VAYENGA NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

(To be Serviced by Murmansk Inspection Teams)

Location:

12 miles East of Murmansk - 69*05'N, 33*27'E

Principal Function(s):

One of the principal operating bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet Administrative headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet.

General Description:

Accommodates flotilla of DDs. Minesweepers - largest vessels handled by crane and other equipment. Major repairs at Murmansk. Mine assembly and storage. Naval school. Communications School - officers and enlisted. Airfield - Air Force quarters. 2 Naval hospitals.

ROSTA NAVAL SHIPYARD

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

Near Murmansk - 69*03'N, 33*05'E

Principal Function(s):

Second most important yard and the major repair yard of Soviet Northern fleet. Preparation of vessels for the trip over the Northern Sea route.

General Description:

2 graving docks (656 feet long and 328 feet long)a floating drydock reportedly of 3,000 tons lifting capacity. No shipbuilding ways. Yard does not engage in ship construction.

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GORKIY

INLAND EUROPEAN SECTOR

NOTE: If Army has a team here -- the below numbers could be materially reduced.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Principal building yard for subs.

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
20	ENLISTED	
24	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/2
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
20	ENLISTED	
24	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT

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INSPECTION

1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
48	TOTAL MEN	
6	TOTAL OFFICERS	
54	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

VERIFICATION

1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
48	TOTAL MEN	
7	TOTAL OFFICERS	
55	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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TOP SECRET

PETROPAVLOVSK

INLAND EUROPEAN SECTOR

INSPECTION:
NOTE: Same size as verification providing Army does not have a team here.

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer (Mine & Torp)	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
19	ENLISTED	
23	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel:

0	Officers	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
6	Marines	
19	ENLISTED	
19	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
38	TOTAL MEN	
4	TOTAL OFFICERS	
42	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

VERIFICATION:
NOTE: No doubt the Army will have a team here - if so we can cut below this number.

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer (Mine & Torp)	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
19	ENLISTED	
23	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel:

0	Officers	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
6	Marines	
19	ENLISTED	
19	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
38	TOTAL MEN	
4	TOTAL OFFICERS	
42	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

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YOKANGA NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

South of Barents Sea near W. entrance to the White Sea
68*04'N, 39*30'E

Principal Function:

Anti-sub and minesweeping base

General Description:

No commercial significance - now a naval anchorage area and advanced patrol base. Operating base for vessels up to destroyer size.
Administrative headquarters, barracks, warehouses, quays
Accommodations for about 5,000 military and naval personnel and families
Repair facilities
Floating drydock
Underground fuel storage facilities (small)
Seaplane ramp

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2 (Sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
2	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
19	Enlisted	
21	Total Verification Personnel	

27 Total Support Personnel

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
	(Same as Verification team - provided Verification feels there is a need for Inspection team here.)	

Support Personnel:

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commiss rymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
25	Enlisted	
27	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

44 TOTAL MEN
4 TOTAL OFFICERS
48 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

TOTAL MEN
TOTAL OFFICERS
TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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MOLOTOVSK NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

17 miles NW of Arkhangel'sk (Coast of White Sea)
64*35'N, 39*47'E

Principal Function:

Important naval ship construction and repair base.

Secondary Functions:

Potential sub operating base (can be kept ice-free). Activities include shipment of lumber and manufacture of munitions. Capable of constructing cruisers. (only yard in area capable of building large ocean-going vessels.)

General Description:

6 wharves; 2 covered graving-building docks, each about 1,000 ft. long and 150 ft. wide (capable of building the largest of vessels); 2 transverse building ways; 1 large transverse shipbuilding site capable of simultaneous construction to 10 destroyers.
Repairs and fitting out berths; numerous machine shops, underground fuel storage, supply depot and coal.
Aviation engineering school; naval hospital.

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2(Sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine officer	Major
5	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
21	Enlisted	
26	Total Verification Personnel	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2 (sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
21	Enlisted	
25	Total Inspection Personnel	

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INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
48	TOTAL MEN	
6	TOTAL OFFICERS	
54	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Helicopter
2	Vehicles

VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
48	TOTAL MEN	
7	TOTAL OFFICERS	
55	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Helicopter
2	Vehicles

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ARKHANGELSK NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

E. Coast of White Sea 64*34'N, 40*32'E

Principal Function:

An important naval supply and repair base and is the principal Soviet Commercial port in the Arctic

General Description:

Construction of small craft
Patrol craft headquarters - not an operating base for DDs and SSs
Only one important shipyard (10 in the area, 9 of which are of secondary importance and believed ancillary to Krasnoya Kezrutza)
2 graving drydocks (280' and 370')
2 floating drydocks (590' and 370')
4 Marine RR
Fitting out and repair for DDs and SSs and commercial wessels-12 wharves
Naval - underwater welding, cutting & repair
Heavy lift equipment
Gpod shops - repair & fitting out
Fuel oil storage
Ammo, mine, torpedo and naval stores

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION: *

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
4	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	Enlisted	
26	Total Verification Personnel	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
12	Photographers or 2 cl. aviation rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
32	Enlisted	
35	Total Inspection Personnel	

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ARKHANGELSK (Cont'd)

VERIFICATION

Support Personnel

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	" "	1310/4
2	Officers	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
29	Enlisted	
31	Total Support Personnel	

INSPECTION

Support Personnel

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	" "	1310/4
2	Officers	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
29	Enlisted	
31	Total Support Personnel	

* The verification team may find that naval facilities do not warrant an inspection team. Perhaps Molotovsk could handle both.

51	TOTAL MEN
6	TOTAL OFFICERS
57	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

61	TOTAL MEN
5	TOTAL OFFICERS
66	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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BELOMORSK NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

SW Coast White Sea (directly west of Arkhangel'sk)

General Description:

Seaplane base. Is northern terminal of Stalin Canal 2 small boatyards. Minor repairs to machinery. No naval facilities. Large airfield here.

Comments:

Check with Army and AF; if they put team here we should put a couple of officers and a few men to watch canal traffic.

VERIFICATION: (Note: This team will also cover KEM)

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
20	Enlisted	
23	Total Verification Personnel	

Support Personnel:

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Officer	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
12	Photographers	PH
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
30	Enlisted	
33	Total Inspection Personnel	

Support Personnel:

1	Naval Aviator	
1	Officer	
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN

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VERIFICATION: (CONT'D.)

Support Personnel:

No.	Enlisted	Designator
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	Enlisted	
28	Total Support Personnel	

46 TOTAL MEN
4 TOTAL OFFICERS
50 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION: (CONT'D.)

Support Personnel:

No.	Enlisted	Designator
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	Enlisted	
27	Total Support Personnel	

56 TOTAL MEN
4 TOTAL OFFICERS
60 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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DIKSON NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

Location:

SE Coast of Kara Sea, Taimyr Peninsula

Principal Function(s):

Repair base.

General Description:

Sub base - 3 shelter pens - 6 sub capacity
Repair for 4 ships at a time
drydocking for up to 2300 tons
1 wharf 5,000 ft.
oil depot
storage
landing field; seaplane anchorage - also sheltered mooring
radar station
observatory (weather conditions) communication
no rail or road connections - dog sleds

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2(sub)
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner'smate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
19	Enlisted	
22	Total Verification Personnel	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
(Same as Verification if inspection team is warranted)		

Note: If the Army or AF should put a team at Dikson we could cut our personnel considerably.

Support Personnel: (Verification and Inspection)

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	

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DIKSON - CONT'D.

Support Personnel (Cont'd.)

No.	Enlisted	Designator
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
25	Enlisted	

27 Total Support Personnel

46 TOTAL MEN
5 TOTAL OFFICERS
51 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
1 Vehicle

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IGARKA NAVAL BASE

(White Sea Sector)

(Verification and Inspection Teams from Dikson will handle this base also)

Location:

SW Taimyr national district (850 mi. N of Krasnoyarsk)

Principal Function(s):

Of trifling importance.

General Description:

2 wharves - no cranes
minor repairs - river craft
oil storage - 36,000 lbs.
seaplane base
no rail or road connections
radio station
meteorological station

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LENINGRAD
(Including KANONERSKIY, BALTIC, MARTI AND ZHDANOV SHIPYARDS)

(BALTIC SECTOR)
59 55' N., 30 16' E

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Baltic Shipyard (Ranks first in Baltic as producer of new construction - is most important shipbuilding installation in USSR.)

SECONDARY FUNCTION(S):

Adm. offices Baltic Sea Fleet - C.-in-C.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

5 shipbuilding ways (largest 1,100 ft. long)
3 covered shipbuilding sites, each 400 ft. long
no drydocks and no ship repair
currently engaged in const. of cruisers and subs
(maximum annual construction capacity est. 235,000 gross register tons of passenger vessels, or 165,000 standard displacement tons of naval vessels)

Marti Shipyard (Ranks second in Baltic as producer of new construction)
2 large shipbuilding ways (cruisers, tankers, and possibly MTB's
Minor above water repairs
(maximum annual const. capacity est. 112,750 gross register tons of passenger vessels, 89,000 gross register tons of tanker or 89,750 standard displacement tons of naval vessels)

Zhdanov Shipyard (Ranks third in Baltic as producer of new construction)
4 shipbuilding ways 500 ft. long
18 shipbuilding sites, largest of which is 400 ft. long
possibly 2 floating drydocks are located in yard, enabling it to repair vessels up to 250 ft. in length.
(maximum ann. const. capacity est. 237,000 gross register tons of mercht. vessels or 170,000 standard displacement tons naval vessels)
Zhdanov engaged chiefly in construction of destroyers.

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Zhdanov considered to be capable of accomplishing all major above-water repairs and some underwater repairs to destroyer-sized vessels; two floating drydocks and transverse launching ways capable of being used as marine railways are available. Details of only one floating drydock are known.

Torpedo manufacturing plant
Mine manufacturing plant
Periscope manufacturing plant
Turbine manufacturing plant
Naval gun manufacturing plant
Sub battery manufacturing plant
Gyroscope manufacturing plant

Kanonerskiy Shipyard (No construction - engages in fitting out and repair of vessels)
fitting-out wharfage for vessels up to 650 ft. long with drafts up to 31 ft.
2 floating drydocks, (larger can lift 6,000 tons)
past production has included manufacture of crankshafts for steam engines, propellers, and propeller shafts.

GENERAL INFORMATION ON LENINGRAD YARDS

Ordnance plants
Large communications

Frunze Naval Academy
Naval War College (Order of Lenin)
Naval Medical School
Supreme naval hydrographic school
Engineering Institute
Red Banner Naval Political School

NOTE: Viborg - 100 miles NW of Leningrad - large port but no known naval facilities

Sudomekh Shipyard (Ranks first in Baltic Area as producer of new sub construction)
6 covered shipbuilding ways (builds long-range ocean-type subs.) (maximum ann. const. capacity est. 51,000 naval standard displacement tons of submarines, or 32,000 gross register tons of merchant vessels)
3 building sites (each site will accommodate 2 small subs abreast)

Yard capable of effecting minor repairs to all classes of subs and to patrol craft, alongside its wharves; it has no underwater repair facilities.

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LENINGRAD
SENIOR NAVAL INSPECTOR
BALTIC AREA

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Senior Officer	1100/0
1	Chief of Staff	1100/1
1	Operations Officer	1100/2
1	Flag Secretary	1100/3
1	Flag Lieutenant	1100/4
1	Submarine Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/2
1	AEDO	1510/2
1	Nuclear Technician	
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Colonel
16	OFFICERS	
4	Interpreters	
6	Yeomen	YN
12	Radiomen	RM
4	Photographers	PH
4	Communications Tech.	CT
30	ENLISTED	
46	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Naval Aviator	1310/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/3
3	OFFICERS	
2	Storekeepers	SK
4	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
2	Stewards	SD
6	Stewardsmates	TN
4	Marines	
23	ENLISTED	
26	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

53	TOTAL MEN
19	TOTAL OFFICERS
72	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

NOTE: Plane and plane crew provided in Inspection Team personnel
4 vehicles

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LENINGRAD
(BALTIC SECTOR)

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	EDO Engineer	5100/2
1	Communications Tech	7640
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
11	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech	ET
2	Radarmen	RD
25	ENLISTED	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
3	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Av. Pilots	CAP
1	Av. Elec. Tech	AT
2	Airmen	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
3	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
5	Stewardsmates	TN
8	Marines	
41	ENLISTED	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Communications Tech.	7640
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
7	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
6	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech	ET
2	Radarmen	RD
29	ENLISTED	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
3	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Av. Pilots	CAP
2	Av. Elec. Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
5	Stewardsmates	TN
8	Marines	
42	ENLISTED	

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VERIFICATION:

44 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

66 TOTAL MEN
14 TOTAL OFFICERS
80 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

2 Planes
4 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

45 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

71 TOTAL MEN
10 TOTAL OFFICERS
81 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

2 Planes
4 Vehicles

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URAS, MAKSLAKHDEN - SATAMA, KOYVISTO, LOMONOSOV, PALDISKI, AND PARNU

BALTIC SECTOR

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

URAS - Secondary Port	LENINGRAD	TEAM	WILL	COVER
MAKSLAKHDEN - SATAMA - No naval facilities	"	"	"	"
KOYVISTO - No naval facilities	"	"	"	"
LOMONOSOV - Patrol boat base large seaplane base Auxiliary base for Kronshtadt No repair facilities	"	"	"	"
PALDISKI - intend to make large fortress for Leningrad	TALLINN	TEAM	WILL	COVER
PARNU - Minor repairs - small craft MTB base	RIGA	TEAM	WILL	COVER

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RIGA

(BALTIC SECTOR)

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

MTB base - subs and DDs could operate

Naval repair including drydocking

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Wharf area and cranes

5 Shipyards - all secondary

Floating drydocks and marine RR available

Repair up to Destroyer size

Storage - ammunition, food, clothing
underground oil storage

Naval school (enlisted & officers); language, nav., comm, diving

Naval aviation school

Several airfields

Seaplane base

Industrial - comm., radar, navigation, electrical equipment for naval use

385,000 population

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VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2(sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
7	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
3	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
21	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer(sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
18	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
35	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seaman (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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49 TOTAL MEN
9 TOTAL OFFICERS
58 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

63 TOTAL MEN
5 TOTAL OFFICERS
68 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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BALTIISK

(BALTIC SECTOR)

SW Coast of Baltic Sea - Outer Port For Kaliningrad

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Headquarters and principal operating base of Soviet 4th (S. Baltic) fleet; about 25 subs based there; Note - One of the main Soviet submarine bases in the Baltic Sea.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

6 Harbors, 5 of which are commercial; radio station

3 shipyards, small craft bldg & repair

14 small slipways

300 ft/45' floating drydock; 1500 tons lifting capacity
(can berth cruisers)
(up to 50 subs can be accommodated)
Minor sub repair
battery recharging stations

Torpedo shops (assembly and repair)

Torpedo warhead storage

Underground oil storage & fuel supply

Underground ammunition depot - underground capacity for whole 4th flt.

Mine depot

Submarine training center

Navy artillery barracks

big airport

large seaplane base, hangars

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VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1(sub)
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3(sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
7	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
2	Torpedomen	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
21	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(Sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer (Sub)	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
8	Photographers	PH
2	Torpedomen	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
27	ENLISTED	
31	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
1	Aviation Mach. Mate	AD
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

48 TOTAL MEN
9 TOTAL OFFICERS
57 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

54 TOTAL MEN
6 TOTAL OFFICERS
60 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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KRONSHTADT NAVAL SHIPYARD

(BALTIC SECTOR)

Near Leningrad, 59 59' N., 29 47' E

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION:

Great Strategic Importance
Largest ship-repair installation in the USSR

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Radio Station, (believed to be a base for about 25 submarines) (cruisers, minesweepers, subs)

4 floating drydocks (1 of 50,000 tons lifting capacity)

7 graving docks - one will take a 30,000 ton vessel

1 marine railway (Railroad center - much industrial activity) small craft can be constructed on 6 shipbuilding sites (each about 160 ft.)

Ind. activity: grain, timber, alcohol, cellulose

Large iron foundry & shops
Large underground gas depot, also coal bunkering

Radar Installations

Mine depot

Torpedo depot

Naval hospital

Communications school - diving school

Ordnance stores

Large airfield

Superfortress - guarding leningrad mine fields

Harbor entirely artifical, broken into 4 small harbors: Coastal Trade Harbor, Commercial harbor, Central Harbor and Naval harbor.

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VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2(sub)
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3(sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/&
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/3
1	Ship Repair Tech.	7740
9	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
6	Photographers or Av. 2cl Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	
34	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	Ship Repair Tech.	7740
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers or Av. 2cl Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

52 TOTAL MEN
11 TOTAL OFFICERS
63 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

52 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
59 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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KLAIPEDA (MEMEL)
(BALTIL SEA SECTOR)

SE COAST OF BALTIC SEA

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Secondary Naval Base - program of development underway

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

New Shipyard

Quay 500' long

DD & SS base for Germans

Marine R.R.

Small floating drydock

Repair & outfit up to 2,000 tons

Small shops

8 Radar stations

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3(sub)
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Communications Tech	7640
4	OFFICERS	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/3
1	Ship Repair Tech	7740
3	OFFICERS	

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VERIFICATION:

2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
6	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Radarmen	RD
19	ENLISTED	
23	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator OFFICER	1310/3
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	TOTAL ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

45	TOTAL MEN
5	TOTAL OFFICERS
50	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

INSPECTION:

2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
6	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Radarmen	RD
19	ENLISTED	
22	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator OFFICER	1310/3
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

45	TOTAL MEN
4	TOTAL OFFICERS
49	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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TALLINN
(BALTIC SECTOR)

59 26' N., 24 45 E - Estonia

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Main Operating base of the Soviet North Baltic Fleet (headquarters) (8th Fleet Naval Headquarters).
One of main operating bases for submarines on the Baltic, probably 9 subs - (moderate activity at best, however) (minor repair base)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor repairs to hull and machinery - shops and cranes
3 drydocks (largest 330 ft.)
floating drydock up to 1800 tons
2 marine railways
large graving dock under construction
3 repair yards
tremendous oil storage - 260,000 barrels
mine depot
naval academy
several coast defense air fields - navy large seaplane base
Rail & transportation good around port
Some DDs and MTBs operate from base

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	EDO	1400/3
5	OFFICERS	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Ship repair Tech.	7740
4	OFFICERS	

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VERIFICATION:

2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
4	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
48	TOTAL MEN	
7	TOTAL OFFICERS	
55	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

INSPECTION:

2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
24	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
42	ENLISTED	
46	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Av. Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
68	TOTAL MEN	
6	TOTAL OFFICERS	
74	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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STATE SHIPYARD 820 - KALININGRAD
(BALTIC SECTOR)

Konigsberg - 54 45' N, 20 30' E

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION:

Ship repair center

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Capable of repairing naval vessels up to cruisers in size. Also important water and rail center with fairly extensive commercial facilities; Soviet 4th fleet maintains fleet air base with adm. functions, radio station.

1 200-ft. graving dock and 4 floating drydocks
3 shipbuilding ways (largest 430 ft.)
1 220-ft. shipbuilding site

some sub repair

140,000 barrels underground storage of fuel

(possible that this yard is engaged in construction of minesweepers)

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
4	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
21	ENLISTED	
26	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
24	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
41	ENLISTED	
44	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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LIEPAJA NAVAL YARD (BALTIC SECTOR)

LATVIA - 56° 31' N., 21° 01' E (E. COAST OF BALTIC)

PRINCIPAL FUNCTION(S):

Submarine berthing; MTB Base; Large ship repairs

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Submarine berthing - 30-40 subs, 500 - many patrol craft operate from base; finger piers
Motor and torpedo boat base
Underwater repairs for naval vessels up to 700 ft. long
2 graving docks (larger 700 ft.)
2 floating drydocks (larger 300 ft.)
(Second in repair capability in Baltic area)
Sub repair
2 graving docks
1 floating dock
Shops for complete submarine overhaul
All types of hull, engine, boiler, and electrical repairs on ships
Large railroad yard to repair docks
33 large cranes

Manufacture of land and marine boilers
Torpedo plant

Sub storage - adequate space for material, ordnance and fuel

Large oil storage - 165,000 bbls.

Large warehouse storage

large hardstanding area.

2 lg training craft-probably naval school

2 seaplane bases - probably airfield

Misc. powerful radio station
more than one radar station

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VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1(sub)
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/4(sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/2
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
4	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Radarman	RD
21	ENLISTED	
26	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer (sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
12	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Radarman	RD
29	ENLISTED	
32	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

47 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
55 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

55 TOTAL MEN
5 TOTAL OFFICERS
60 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1
0

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TOP SECRET

STATE SHIPYARD 820 - KALININGRAD

KONIGSBERG (Baltic Sector)

Principal Function (s):

Ship repair center.

General Description:

Capable of repairing naval vessels up to cruisers in size. Also important water and rail center with fairly extensive commercial facilities; Soviet 4th fleet maintains fleet air base with administrative functions, radio station.

1 200-ft. graving dock and 4 floating drydocks.
3 shipbuilding ways (largest 430 ft.).
1 220-ft. shipbuilding site.

Some sub repair.

140,000 barrels underground storage of fuel.

PERSONNEL

VERIFICATION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
4	Photographers or 2 cl Aviation Ratings	PH
1	Torpedomen	TM
1	Minemen	MN
1	Radarmen	RD
21	Enlisted	
26	Total Verification Personnel	

INSPECTION:

No.	Officer	Designator
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	Officers	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yoemen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
24	Photographers or 2 cl Aviation Ratings	PH
1	Torpedomen	TM
1	Minemen	MN
1	Radarmen	RD
41	Enlisted	
44	Total Inspection Personnel	

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KALININGRAD CONT'D

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
1	Storekeepers	SK
1	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinist Mates	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airmen	AN
2	Seamen Drivers	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Stewards	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	Enlisted	
28	Total Support Personnel	
7	Total Officers	
47	Total Men	
54	Total Verification & Support	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	Officers	
1	Storekeepers	SK
1	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinist Mates	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airmen	AN
2	Seamen Drivers	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Stewards	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	Enlisted	
28	Total Support Personnel	
5	Total Officers	
67	Total Men	
72	Total Inspection & Support	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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VENTSPILS
(Baltic SEA SECTOR)

LATVIA - N. OF LIEPAJA - E COAST OF BALTIC

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor base
Principal port
Trivial naval facilities
Small craft base
German MTB base
Submarine bunker

Minor repairs hull & machinery

Large mine depot

Military Airfield

Shore heavily fortified - shore defense guns

Radar network stations

NOTE: After the Verification Team has inspected Ventspils it is doubted that we will need an Inspection Team there. If so the inspection team can be dispersed elsewhere as needed.

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1(sub)
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Communications Tech.	7640
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
18	ENLISTED	
24	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
6	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
25	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
46	TOTAL MEN	
8	TOTAL OFFICERS	
54	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
		SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
25	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
47	TOTAL MEN	
5	TOTAL OFFICERS	
52	TOTAL PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1	Plane
2	Vehicles

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SENIOR NAVAL INSPECTOR

BLACK & CASPIAN SEAS

NOTE: Also acts as Senior Inspector for Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Senior Officer	1310/0
1	Chief of Staff Off.	1100/1
1	Operations Officer	1100/2
1	Flag Secretary	1100/3
1	Flag Lt.	1310/4
1	Submarine Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/2
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/2
1	AEDO	1510/2
1	Nuclear Technician	
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Colonel
15	TOTAL OFFICERS	
4	Interpreters	
6	Yeomen	YN
12	Radiomen	RM
4	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
28	ENLISTED	
43	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Supply Officer	3100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/3
3	OFFICERS	
2	Storekeepers	SK
2	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinists Mate	MM
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
2	Stewards	SD
9	Stewardsmates	TN
4	Marines	
25	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

53	TOTAL MEN
18	TOTAL OFFICERS
71	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

4 Vehicles

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SEVASTOPOL' NAVAL SHIPYARD
(Yalta & Balaklava, Feodosiya & Kerch)
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA SECTOR
N. Black Sea on Peninsula - 44-35' N, 33-34' E.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Largest naval base in Black Sea area, chiefly repair activities
HQ Black Sea Flt. (Adm. HQ) (important base)
Well defended; 2 airfields; coastal defense guns, submarine nets, etc., antiaircraft batteries
2 large, 2 small yards - other small repair yards
Motor torpedo boat base
20 bays & coves in port area
Small subs, barges, and power boats reported being built (1949)
Est. ann. shipbuilding cap. - 37,000 gross reg. tons or 24,000 tons naval standard displacement
Can build up to DDs
5 graving docks, length of largest 745 ft.
2 floating drydocks, 330 ft.
5 marine rrs, hauling capacity of largest 1,000 tons
4 shipbuilding ways, length of largest 330 ft.
Portal jib crane, 3 locomotive cranes; 2 floating cranes
Can handle any ships for repair in Black Sea Fleet
40 wharves
18 shops, including workshops, forges, machine shops, foundries, smithy gunshop, mechanical workshop, carpenter shop, plate shop and mold loft, pattern shop
Torpedoes - manufactured
Naval academy
Seaplane operating bases - 4 (and 4 airfields)
Large hydro-electric plant
Important communications center
No. of employees - approx. 2,200 (1949)

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BALAKLAVA

LOCATION:

Adjacent to Sevastopol' Northern Black Sea - 44-30' N, 33-36' E

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor port and secondary naval operating base.

Training, operational and repair base for sub force of Black Sea Fleet

Motor torpedo boat base

Sub operating base (probably serves as base for 20-30 subs divided into 3 flotillas

4,500 linear feet of wharfage

Rail, naval housing, storage and warehouse facilities

Extensively equipped repair yards

Underground storage facilities for torpedoes and munitions W side of harbor

Submarine school

Diving school

Sub charging facilities

YALTA

LOCATION:

Southern Crimea (N coast of Black Sea)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Small marine railway

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FEODOSIYA

LOCATION:

SW of Kerch, NE Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor naval base for minesweepers & sub chasers

Radio station

Technical school - 300

KERCH

LOCATION:

NE Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Const. minesweepers

7 large wharves

Marine RR

Repair MTB, minesweeper & coastal craft

Oil tank storage

Industrial center - mining, quarrying, smelting, steelworks, chemical plant, processing fruit & tobacco.

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SEVASTOPOL (BLACK SEA)

NOTE: This team will also cover Balaklava and Yalta, Feodosiya and Kerch

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER.	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1 (sub)
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/2 (sub)
1	Regular Line with Amphibious Qualifications	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/4
1	Ship Repair Tech	7740
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col
10	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
31	ENLISTED	
41	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinists Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic	AT
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
36	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

67	TOTAL MEN
12	TOTAL OFFICERS
79	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane; 1 Helicopter; 4 vehicles.

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SEVASTOPOL CONT'D

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1 (sub)
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/2 (sub)
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Ship Repair Tech.	7740
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col
6	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
48	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
73	ENLISTED	
79	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
36	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1(sub
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col.
8	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
28	ENLISTED	
36	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
3	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
3	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
3	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
38	ENLISTED	
40	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TOP SECRET

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SEVASTOPOL CONT'D

INSPECTION:

109 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
117 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
4 Vehicles

VERIFICATION:

66 TOTAL MEN
10 TOTAL OFFICERS
76 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
4 Vehicles

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MARTI SHIPYARD
(BLACK SEA SECTOR)

Nikolayev N. of Black Sea on Yuzhnyy (Southern) Bug River

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Largest shipyard in Black Sea Area
Not an operating base
Types of vessels produced: cruisers, submarines
Est. ann. shipbuilding cap.: 163,000 gross reg. tons or 136,000 tons naval standard displacement
Drydocking facilities: 2 floating drydocks, length of largest 175-250 ft.
Shipbuilding ways: 7 shipbuilding ways, length of largest 985' fitting out
8 tower cantilever cranes, 15-20 locomotive jib cranes, 2 floating cranes, probably bridge cranes and traveling jib cranes
49 shops including machine shops, forges, woodworking shops, joiner shop, sawmills, electrical shops, heat-treatment plant, fitting shop, bolt and screw shop, stamping shop, turbine plant, foundries, furnace shop, pattern shop, plate shops, boiler and sub-assembly shop, automotive repair shops, fabrication shops
Underground barracks & storage
Oil storage
Naval oil station
War ship institute - 1200 const.
Naval Reserve Off Training center 500-1,000
Enlisted Training center
Naval Aviation School - 1500 trainees

Steel mill - 60,000 tons ann. production

No. of employees: 35,000 - 45,000 (two 8-hour shifts - 5-day week.

KHERSON

E. of Odessa on N. Coast of Black Sea (Mouth of Dnieper River)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

No naval installations - but yard could repair small naval craft
Const. & Repair torpedo & gun boats

3 shipyards
graving dock - 500'
Marine railways

Grain, coal and iron ore

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NOTE: This team will also cover Kherson (50 mi.)

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2(sub)
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
7	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
12	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
32	ENLISTED	
37	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:	INSPECTION:
50 TOTAL MEN	60 TOTAL MEN
9 TOTAL OFFICERS	5 TOTAL OFFICERS
59 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	65 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT	TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
1 Plane	0
2 Vehicles	

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POTI & BATUMI
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA SECTOR

LOCATION:

Near Border of Turkey on W coast of Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Adm. HQ base
Repair base for subs, destroyers, and smaller naval vessels
may also be an operating base for such vessels.
Can repair up to destroyer size (repair men-of-war, particularly subs)
apparently can repair even cruisers - minor repairs
Can berth cruisers and all smaller craft
Tender & supply ships
Mine & torpedo depot
Radio Station
Hospital
2 floating drydocks - small Marine RR - small work up to 150 ft.

BATUMI

LOCATION:

Near Turkish Border on SE coast of Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor Naval base - can accomodate 8 SSs or DDs
MGB - Naval Police - Naval Border Guards
Minor naval repairs installations
(Secondary base for larger bases at Eastern portion of Black Sea)
Ann. delivery of 11,000,000 bbls. oil thru pipelines
10 wharves
8 warehouses
Oil refinery - Petroleum shipping
Local utilities

NOTE: Poti team will also cover Batumi (60 mi.) unless Verification justifies separate team for Batumi.

INSPECTION			VERIFICATION		
NO.	OFFICERS	DESIGNATOR	NO.	OFFICERS	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2(sub)	1	Commanding Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3	1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3	1	Submarine Officer	1100/3

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POTI CONT'D

INSPECTION

1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rate	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
30	ENLISTED	
36	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
31	ENLISTED	
33	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

VERIFICATION

1	EDO	1400/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Major
7	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
26	ENLISTED	
33	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
31	ENLISTED	
33	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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INSPECTION

61 Total Men
8 Total Officers
69 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
2 Vehicles

VERIFICATION

57 Total Men
9 Total Officers
66 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
1 Helicopter
2 Vehicles

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TUAPSE, NOVOROSSIYSK (OR YEISK)
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA SECTOR

LOCATION:

S of Novorossiysk on E coast of Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Principal port
SS and patrol craft can be berthed, minor repairs MTB

Drydock 330 ft.
2,000,000 bbls. oil storage

Only naval interest - fueling depot

Coastal defense school

Refining & shipping oil & petroleum products
Hydro-electric plant

NOVOROSSIYSK

LOCATION:

E. Coast of Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Patrol vessel base
Cruisers & DDs visit
Only SS and MTB & Subchasers & minesweepers based here

2 floating drydocks (2 shipyards)
10 Marine rrs and related shops (limited to lighter size)

700,000 bbls. oil storage
large coal, oil and grain storage

Naval Infantry school

Radio station

Hospital

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INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2 (sub)
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Photographer	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
26	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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INSPECTION

48 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
55 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

VERIFICATION

48 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
56 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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MARTI SHIPYARD
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA SECTOR

LOCATION:

Odessa (NE Section) NW Coast of Black Sea - 46-30' N., 30_44' E

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

40-ton Steel river barges
Chiefly repair yard for merchant vessels. River barges built in assembly shops
Minesweepers, layers, and patrol boats based here
Will accommodate DDs & SSs, but not based there
Repairs vessels up to 5,000 tons
Estimated annual shipbuilding capacity; 40,000 gross register tons or 25,000 tons naval standard displacement
Drydocking facilities - 3 floating drydocks, length of largest 400 ft.; Marine railway complex, 240 x 150 ft.
4 old shipbuilding ways, length 300 ft. each, possibly in use
3 tower jib cranes (portal type), locomotive cranes, automotive cranes, floating cranes

Shops: 21 shops, including plate shops, forges, foundries, machine shops, assembly shops, blacksmith shop, sheet metal shop, electrical shops, carpenter shops, sawmills, locksmith shop, automotive repair shop.

Oil storage, 290,000 bbls, fuel oil, gasoline & kerosene

Coastal Defense School
Naval Intelligence School
Submarine School
School for Naval Medical Assistants

Machine tool plant

Approx 1,200 employees (1949)

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VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/2
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (Sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
22	ENLISTED	
25	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION

49 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
56 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION

49 TOTAL MEN
5 TOTAL OFFICERS
54 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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MAKHACHKALA
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEA SECTOR
Also, Baku, Krasnovodsh, and Astrakhan

LOCATION:

W coast of Caspian Sea - S. of Astrakhan

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

3rd largest Caspian port - fishing & textiles

Mine testing Dept.

Torpedo range-test

Naval torpedo factory - large generating plant (1200 torpedoes complete except for gyro)

Small shipbuilding & repair yard

Also contact mines & trench mortar bombs

Magnesium plant
3 Airfields
Oil refinery
Tanks works
Huge petroleum storage - 59 tanks,1,312,000 bbls. oil

Elaborate shop works - provision - Heat treatment, etc. Forge
RR repair shops
Numerous machine shops

Radio school

ASTRAKHAN

LOCATION:

NW Caspian Sea - mouths of the Volga River

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Const. of small craft (oil barges) - 10 small shipyards

Petroleum center - transportation to interior

Oil storage depot - large

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BAKU

LOCATION:

West Coast of Caspian Sea - near Iranian border

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

HQ Caspian Sea Fleet

Secondary Naval Base

3 graving docks

2 small shipyards

Tremendous storage facilities - oil

Oil refinery & oil shipping center

Oil line to Batumi - also gasoline & kerosene line
11,000,000 bbls. annual each line

Soviet Naval Academy

Caspian Higher Naval School (Center for Reserve Officer Training)

Training Detachment - Enlisted - All Ratings for the Red Banner Flt.

Chemical plants

KRASNOVODSH

LOCATION:

East coast of Caspian Sea - directly across from Baku

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Minor naval base for Caspian Sea Fleet

Minor repairs - shops

12 piers

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MAKHACHKALA, BAKU & KRASNOVODSK

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col
5	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
18	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
2	Torpedomen	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
44	ENLISTED	
49	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
36	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Supply Officer	3100/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/2
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Marine Officer	Lt. Col.
8	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
2	Torpedomen	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
28	ENLISTED	
36	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av. Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
2	Airmen	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
36	ENLISTED	
38	SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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80 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
87 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

2 Planes
3 Vehicles

64 TOTAL MEN
10 TOTAL OFFICERS
74 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

Transportation Equipment

2 Planes
3 Vehicles

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TAGANROG
BLACK AND CASPIAN SEAS AREAS
(Also covers Rostov, Zhdanov (Mariupol), Osipenko)
and Yeisk (or Eisk)

LOCATION:

NW Sea of Azov

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

2 Shipyards - small
Aircraft plant
Steel mill
Naval School
Naval Aviation School
Anti-aircraft Artillery School
Seaplane base (also 3 airfields)
Large Airfield
Metallurgical works

ROSTOV

LOCATION:
Sea of Azov (N. of Black Sea)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Examine 2 small shipyards - unification

Zhdanov (Mariupol)

LOCATION:

N. coast of Sea of Azov (N. of Black Sea)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

No naval facilities
Has much heavy industry
Port second to Odessa
Merchant vessel construction & repair
820 ft. building ways and drydocks
Several floating drydocks up to 390 ft. in length
RR yard - large

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TAGANROG CONT'D

OSIPENKO

LOCATION:

Sea of Azov - 45 m. SW of Shdanov

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Naval seaplane base

Minor repairs (marine rr) for small craft

4 wharves

YEISK (or EISK)

LOCATION:

Gulf of Taganrog NE Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Small ship repair yard equipped to handle minor repairs to small craft

Several building ways

Naval seaplane base is located here also

Naval aviation school & Intelligence school

TAGANROG
(Also Covers Rostov, Mariupol, Osipenko and Yeisk)

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	

VERIFICATION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1310/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	

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INSPECTION

3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
36	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
61	ENLISTED	
65	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
6	Seamen	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
33	ENLISTED	
35	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
94	TOTAL MEN	
6	TOTAL OFFICERS	
100	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
4	Vehicles

VERIFICATION

3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
31	ENLISTED	
37	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	MM
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
33	ENLISTED	
35	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
64	TOTAL MEN	
8	TOTAL OFFICERS	
72	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
4	Vehicles

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STRALSUND

Opposite Rugen, Germany on SE Coast of Black Sea

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

4 shipyards

10 cranes

Small covered storage

Small petroleum storage

Sea Police Training School

Central Radio Station of Sea Police

Soviet Navy Aircraft

STRALSUND - Also covers Wolgast, Sasnitz, Peenemunde, Ruegen Island

NOTE: The Stralsund team also acts as Senior Naval Inspector for East Germany and Poland.

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Nuclear Technician	
1	Commanding Officer (MTB Officer)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
8	OFFICERS	
4	Interpreters	
4	Yeomen	YN
4	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech	ET
1	Radarman	RD
19	ENLISTED	
27	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer (MTB Officer)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Submarine Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col
5	OFFICERS	
4	Interpreters	
4	Yeomen	YN
24	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronic Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
39	ENLISTED	
44	TOTAL INSPECTION TEAM	

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STRALSUND (GERMANY) CONT'D

VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

; 1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
46	ENLISTED	
48	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
65	TOTAL MEN	
10	TOTAL OFFICERS	
75	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
4	Vehicles

INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
4	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
46	ENLISTED	
48	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
85	TOTAL MEN	
7	TOTAL OFFICERS	
92	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

Transportation Equipment

1	Plane
4	Vehicles

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KIEL

N. Germany Near Border of Denmark

NOTE: Team at Kiel also covers Lubeck

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Repair facilities:

2 graving docks - 735 ft.

5 floating drydocks

2 floating cranes

22 shore cranes

Large covered storage

LUBECK

N. Germany - SW of Rostock

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Large shipyard 1 mile downstream from Lubeck

1 shipyard

1 floating drydock - est. cap. 1300 tons

505,000 sq/ft. covered storage

27,000 bbls. oil storage

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KIEL (also covers Lubeck) TOP SECRET

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
29	ENLISTED	
31	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
12	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
35	ENLISTED	
39	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
29	ENLISTED	
31	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TOP SECRET

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VERIFICATION:

54 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
61 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

64 TOTAL MEN
6 TOTAL OFFICERS
71 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

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WARNEMUNDE

Germany - S. of Kiel near Danish Border

NOTE: Team here can cover Rostok and Wismar

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Soviet Naval Station

Large shipyard - major repairs to auxiliary naval vessels

2 graving docks - under construction

Small warehouse storage
50,000 bbls. petroleum storage

Visual, radio & radar station

Technical Bureau for Naval design

Patrol Craft - manned by USSR & Sea Police

WISMAR

Germany - S. of Warnemunde - near Danish Border

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

USSR Navy Command Post

Sea Police Recruit Camp

2 shipyards - major above water repairs to naval vessels

No drydocking facilities

343,000 sq/ft. covered warehouse space

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ROSTOCK

N. Germany - SE Coast of Baltic Sea
(Warnemunde team will cover)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Soviet Navy Shipyard for Repair up to destroyer size

2 shipyards - one for major repairs

2 graving docks

2 floating drydocks - 8,000 ton capacity

1 Marine RR

118,000 sq/ft. covered warehouse space

50,000 bbls. oil storage

Naval hospital

WARNEMUNDE (GERMANY)
(Also covers Rostock and Wismar)

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer(sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Elec. Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
15	ENLISTED	
22	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer (sub)	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
12	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Elec. Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	

10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
44	ENLISTED	

46 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

59 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
67 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	

10	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
8	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
44	ENLISTED	

46 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

69 TOTAL MEN
6 TOTAL OFFICERS
75 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

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GDYNIA
(Also covers DANZIG)

Oksywie - 54 32'N, 18' 33E (Poland)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Major operating base of Polish Navy as well as HQ of Polish Navy High Command - educational center for Polish Navy and Merchant Marine

Furnishes logistic support for subs and other vessels for the Polish Navy (*Of great strategic importance as sub operating base for USSR)

2 artificial basins

(Hel, 54 37'N, 18 47'E, major operating base of Polish Navy - also of great strategic value to USSR)

Naval shipyard
Ordnance component
Supply component
Training component
Medical component
submarine component
Meteorological station

54 piers
6 floating drydocks
(lifts 1700-8000 tons)
Base for 17 patrol vessels and 17 minesweepers - POL Storage

At Babi Dol (54*18'N, 18*19'E) is a very large dump of German and Soviet ammunition, mines & torpedoes. Armament and equipment are believed to be stored in a 2 story building 200 yards worth of Military Basin No. 1. Also 1 mile north of Mil. Basin No. 1 reported a large underground ammunition depot.

Communications - radio station at Gorkiy

Naval Hospital

Torpedo firing range

Coastal Defense

Radar Station

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VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
21	ENLISTED	
26	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
2	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
29	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
3	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rates	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
28	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION:

48 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
55 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

53 TOTAL MEN
5 TOTAL OFFICERS
58 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

0

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STETTIN (POLAND)

(Also covers SWIENEMUNDE)

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
13	ENLISTED	
18	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel:

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
1	Electronics Tech	ET
6	Marines	
39	ENLISTED	
41	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer(sub)	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/4
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
13	ENLISTED	
17	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel:

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Av. Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
4	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
1	Electronics Tech	ET
6	Marines	
39	ENLISTED	
41	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TOP SECRET

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52 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
59 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

52 TOTAL MEN
6 TOTAL OFFICERS
58 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

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CONSTANTA (ROMANIA)

ROMANIA - W. COAST OF BLACK SEA

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Sea Forces Command
3rd Sea Sector Command

Floating drydock - 7800 tons lifting cap.
Marine R.R. 1,000 ton displacement

Large fuel oil storage 3,500,000 bbls.
400,000 sq/ft. covered storage

Ammunition depot

Naval schools

Radio Station
Soviet Naval Detachment

BRAILA

ROMANIA - 25 miles S of GALATI (across Danube)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

River Sector Command HQ

Floating drydock 262 ft. long
4 small Marine RRs and 15 small floating docks

Covered storage - 1,053,445 sq/ft.
Oil storage - 63,000 bbls.

Communication school

Communications battalion

Naval Infantry battalion

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GALATI

Inland from the Baltic Sea on the Danube (Romania)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Romanian Navy Danube River Command
Soviet Navy Danube Flotilla Command

Floating drydock - 350 ton capacity
3 shipyards
2 floating repair units

750,000 sq/ft. covered storage

Ammunition depot

Naval Infantry School

Recruit training center

Radio station

CONSTANTA (ROMANIA) ALSO COVERS BRAILA AND GALATI

NOTE: If the Army or Air Force have teams here our Teams can be reduced.

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/3
1	EDO Communications	1420/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
6	OFFICERS	

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CONSTANTA (ROMANIA) CONT'D

VERIFICATION

3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	

31 TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Plt	CAP
1	Av. Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
30	ENLISTED	

32 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

55 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
65 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

INSPECTION:

3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
2	Electronics Tech	ET
1	Radarman	RD
25	ENLISTED	

31 TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Plt	CAP
1	Av. Elec. Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
30	ENLISTED	

32 TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL

55 TOTAL MEN
8 TOTAL OFFICERS
65 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

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DURRES

W ALBANIA

NOTE: If Army or Air Force have teams here we can reduce size of our teams

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Operating base

Command HQ Albanian Navy

Principal Albanian Naval base

Only 30 craft - total displacement 500 tons

No important Albanian Naval base.

VOLNES

Most important port

Soviet subs operate in area

Place two small Inspection teams - one on Volnes and one in Durres

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1310/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
19	ENLISTED	
23	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/2
1	Executive Officer	1100/3
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
2	Interpreters	
2	Yeomen	YN
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Radarman	RD
9	ENLISTED	
13	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

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VERIFICATION

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	OFFICER	
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
6	Marines	
27	ENLISTED	
28	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
46	TOTAL MEN	
5	TOTAL OFFICERS	
51	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

INSPECTION

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	OFFICER	
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
3	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
2	Stewardsmates	TN
1	Electronics Tech.	ET
6	Marines	
37	ENLISTED	
38	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	
46	TOTAL MEN	
5	TOTAL OFFICERS	
51	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL	

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
2 Vehicles

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STALIN
(Also covers Burgas 50 mi.)
N. BULGARIA - W. coast of BLACK SEA

NOTE: One team at Burgas can take care of Burgas and Stalin since only 50 miles apart.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Principal operating, repair and supply base
Naval and Fleet HQ

3 shipyards
2 graving docks
1 Marine RR - 1,000 tons capacity
7 Marine RR - small craft
1 floating drydock - 2,200 ton capacity

Petroleum storage

Navy academy

School for interested personnel

Seaplane base

BURGAS

S. BULGARIA - on W. coast of BLACK SEA

Minor operating base - small patrol & coastal vessels

3 building ways - vessels 150'

Minor repairs to large vessels

No drydocks

220,000 bbls petroleum storage

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STALIN (BULGARIA)

TOP SECRET

VERIFICATION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	EDO	1400/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
5	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
2	Electronics Tech.	ET
25	ENLISTED	
30	TOTAL VERIFICATION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tec.	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
30	ENLISTED	
32	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

INSPECTION:

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Commanding Officer	1100/1
1	Executive Officer	1310/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/3
1	Marine Officer	Major
4	OFFICERS	
3	Interpreters	
3	Yeomen	YN
8	Radiomen	RM
2	Communications Tech.	CT
6	Photographers or 2cl Av. Rate	PH
1	Torpedoman	TM
1	Gunner's Mate	GM
1	Mineman	MN
1	Quartermaster	QM
1	Radarman	RD
2	Electronic Tech.	ET
29	ENLISTED	
33	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/5
2	OFFICERS	
1	Storekeeper	SK
1	Hospital Corpsman	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
1	Av. Mach. Mate	AD
1	Chief Aviation Pilot	CAP
1	Aviation Electronic Tech.	AT
1	Airman	AN
5	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
6	Mess Cooks	SN
2	Commissarymen	CS
1	Steward	SD
3	Stewardsmates	TN
6	Marines	
30	ENLISTED	
32	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

TOP SECRET

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55 TOTAL MEN
7 TOTAL OFFICERS
62 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

59 TOTAL MEN
)6 TOTAL OFFICERS
65 TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

1 Plane
3 Vehicles

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CHIEF OF NAVAL INSPECTION

MOSCOW

INSPECTION

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Senior Officer Vice. Adm.	1100/0
1	Chief of Staff Off. Rear Adm.	1310/0
1	Operations Officer	1100/2
1	Flag Secretary	1100/1
1	Flag Secretary	1310/1
1	Flag Lt.	1100/4
1	Flag Lt.	1310/4
1	Submarine Officer	1100/2
1	Regular Line with Amphibious Qualifications	1100/2
1	Intelligence Officer	1630/2
1	EDO	1400/1
1	EDO Civil Engineer	5100/2
1	EDO Communications	1420/2
1	EDO Ordnance	1450/2
1	AEDO	1510/2
1	Nuclear Technician	
1	Petroleum Specialist	
1	Colonel USA	
1	Marine Officer	Colonel
1	Marine Officer	Lt.Col.
20	OFFICERS	
6	Interpreters	
7	Yeomen	YN
16	Radiomen	RM
5	Communications Tech.	CT
2	Photographers	PH
3	Electronics Tech.	ET
1	Radarman	RD
40	Enlisted	
60	TOTAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL	

Support Personnel

NO.	OFFICER	DESIGNATOR
1	Naval Aviator	1310/3
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Naval Aviator	1310/4
1	Supply Officer	3100/2
1	Supply Officer	3100/4
1	Medical Officer	2100/2
1	Medical Officer	2100/3
7	OFFICERS	
2	Storekeepers	SK
3	Hospital Corpsmen	HM
1	Machinist Mate	MM
2	Av.Mach. Mates	AD
2	Chief Aviation Pilots	CAP
2	Aviation Electronic	AT
2	Airmen	AN
6	Seamen (Drivers)	SN
10	Mess Cooks	SN
3	Commissarymen	CS
2	Stewards	SD
14	Stewardsmates	TN
8	Marines	
57		
64	TOTAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL	

97	TOTAL MEN
27	TOTAL OFFICERS
124	TOTAL TEAM PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT:

2 Planes & crews; 4 vehicles

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APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS - NAVY

The Task Force for Navy Inspection finds that the Army's plan as originally submitted is suitable to the Navy's needs provided that the following modifications could be made:

Under II. Assumptions (c) Change to read as follows - "Initially, installations and services may be acquired on a rental basis through USSR authorities such rentals to be paid by the host (USSR) government. In the event that rental facilities are inadequate, construction program which would provide installations and facilities of American standards should be initiated as soon as practicable.

Reciprocal provisions for housing would be provided for USSR inspection personnel located in the U.S. In addition to the host government paying for the housing of inspection team personnel, it is strongly recommended that the host government pay for the transportation of inspection personnel." We have learned through bitter experience with the housing and transportation of our Embassy and military attaches in Moscow that the USSR has two price standards -- one for Russians and one for the

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Americans -- the latter price is exorbitant.

Under IV. Major Support Responsibilities, 10. Installations - office B billeting space - "Rental basis until ... Add one sentence to read - Cost of rentals and adequate construction to be borne by the host government." 14. Add one sentende - "Such cost of rental of Russian vehicles and maintenance to be borne by the host government."

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Air

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FINAL REPORT

TASK FORCE ON AIR INSPECTION

23 NOVEMBER 1955

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TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

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SUMMARY

We view the aim of inspection and control of armaments to be increased national security, perhaps eventually at reduced cost.

In our opinion, the over-riding goal of inspection is to reduce the likelihood of full-scale surprise nuclear attack. Important supplementary goals are detection of massive buildup of conventional weapons, an increase in the target intelligence available to allied retaliatory forces, warning of technological surprise, and increased East-West contacts. Nevertheless, the key purpose -- warning -- is so critically important to security that we should be prepared to sacrifice lesser aims for progress toward this goal. To achieve this purpose we believe that the most critical factor is knowledge of the whereabouts of intercontinental weapons carriers.

We are led by these premises to reject a massive ground inspection operation so far as air weapon systems are concerned. In the first place, we do not consider that such an operation is required to obtain the information we need respecting these carriers. Furthermore, we believe that pressing for such an operation would substantially reduce the likelihood of achieving a lesser, but vital, amount of ground inspection. Lastly, we have grave doubts as to the desirability of allowing large numbers of Soviet "inspectors" ready access to our military bases. For these reasons, we recommend as an initial goal for negotiation the minimum ground inspection operation adequate to monitor intercontinental weapons systems. We visualize this inspection as occurring in two phases: a trial phase limited to a few typical installations followed by a second phase including all installations of a few critical types: airfields, missile test and launching facilities, major aircraft maintenance bases, and aircraft and missile manufacturing plants.

Extensive experience with the minimal ground system would provide the best indication of the feasibility and desirability of more extensive ground inspection for the purpose of comprehensive arms control and limitation. Negotiation of a massive ground effort should, we believe, await this experience.

In contrast to ground inspection, we see no reason to limit air inspection to any specified types of installations or areas. Subject only to air traffic monitoring and to determination that the inspecting aircraft are not carrying weapons, we feel that full and

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free aerial inspection, without phasing or trial, should be sought from the outset. Very important in this connection is that we now have, or can soon have, the capability of obtaining aerial inspection on Soviet areas without their concent, a possibility which does not exist with ground inspection.

We see these ground and air tools combined to provide a substantial deterrent to surprise, minimal ground inspection providing the continuous surveillance required for weapons posing an immediate intercontinental threat, and full aerial inspection providing general surveillance to detect massive build-up of conventional weapons and to show where the continuous surveillance should be concentrated.

As a means of achieving further warning of massive surprise attack, we propose consideration of an international agreement to limit the number of intercontinental aircraft and cruise missiles permitted outside the purview of the ground inspection system. Such numbers, would be large enough to permit maintenance of combat readiness, yet smaller than the number required to destroy retaliatory forces. They would depend primarily on the proficiency of U.S. and USSR long-range aircraft and the effectiveness of U.S. and USSR air defenses. The critical numbers of aircraft are more likely to be in the hundreds than in the tens. They could be established, of course, only in conjunction with similar agreements respecting surface and sub-surface carriers.

Separation of nuclear weapons and long-range carriers is not recommended as part of any inspection agreement. We have been unable to find a method of policing such an agreement which we would permit the Soviets to use for inspection of our carriers.

The intercontinental ballistic missile, probably but a few years from operational status, represents a special problem. Once tested, produced, and operationally deployed, the probability of detection by air or ground inspection is very small. More important, flight time is about 30 minutes so that control of surprise attack is virtually impossible. Due to the extreme criticality and imminence of the ICBM threat, we strongly recommend thorough exploration of any proposal which offers promise of alleviating the situation.

We believe that the critical inspection objectives can be achieved by:

1. Free but monitored aerial inspection by four existing wings of available strategic reconnaissance forces, operating from

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existing peripheral bases with about 9,500 personnel, including 2100 to process and interpret the results of reconnaissance. Full-scale aerial reconnaissance should be the first step in implementing inspection. It would take 4 to 5 months to accomplish the bulk of the initial aerial task. Thereafter, the aerial effort might be reduced.

2. Approximately 900 resident ground inspectors, principally near Soviet air and missile facilities.

3. About 360 mobile air-ground inspectors based exterior to the Soviet sphere.

4. Approximately 3600 analysts to man a proposed Data Analysis and Synthesis Center at Inspection Headquarters, exterior to Soviet dominated territory.

5. Communications and air logistics support for the resident and mobile ground inspectors.

In addition to examining the inspection problem in its broad aspects, we have investigated a number of related points. Our views on the more important of these follow:

1. Whereas existing reconnaissance technical squadrons can quickly process and interpret the photography for warning indicators, a considerable augmentation of information digestion capabilities will be necessary to make maximum use of the information.

2. Although aerial inspection could commence immediately, many improvements would result from properly directed research and development. Especially important are operations research, including gaming, on the whole inspection problem, and additional research and development on high resolution radar, the reconnaissance satellite, photo interpretation techniques, data handling, and intelligence systems and indicators.

3. Any inspection agreement with the Soviets must allow unilateral abrogation in the event they fail to meet prescribed timetables and attempt negation through delaying tactics. Furthermore, in view of changing circumstances, including the possibility of technical surprise, the agreement must provide for re-negotiation of any of its major features within certain time limits, and for their partial or total abrogation if desired by either party.

4. If it is desirable to put aerial inspection on a multinational basis, a small U.S. reconnaissance force could be placed under United Nations operational direction. Furthermore, we could offer to make photographic results from the mutual aerial inspection available to a United Nations control organ or an international arms commission of participating nations.

5. Finally, to be entirely satisfactory, any inspection system must ultimately be world-wide in scope.

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REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AIR INSPECTION

I. THE ASSIGNMENT

The basic assignment of the Task Force on Air Inspection is, so far as aircraft and missiles are concerned, to meet the statement of assignment made in Memorandum: Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419, dated July 5, 1955, Revised August 4, 1955. This statement is:

> "Design in specific terms a practical, effective, and comprehensive armament and armed force inspection system within the USSR, which does not depend on good faith for effective operation, the reciprocal pattern of which would be feasible and acceptable within the United States. Its purpose is: to improve the prospects of a durable peace through identifying violations of agreements; limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attack; and providing an effective early warning system."

The Memorandum appears in full at Appendix A, together with a letter which comments on some parts of it.

In accordance with the discussions at the Quantico meeting of 20-22 October 1955, and with the instructions in the resulting Memorandum: The Follow-up on the Quantico Session, dated October 31, 1955, which appears in full at Appendix B, the Task Force on Air Inspection has taken as its primary task the planning of inspection from the air. Our requirements for ground inspection are being passed on to the Special Working Group via the Task Force on Army Inspection, to be integrated with other requirements for inspection on the ground. See Appendix C. Similarly, the communications requirements arising from the air inspection system are being passed to the Special Working Group via the Task Force on Communications, for integration into the over-all communications plan. See Appendix D.

The Memorandum appearing at Appendix B requested of the Task Force on Air Inspection certain special studies, as follows:

> "K. A sub-working group of the Air Force Task Group and the Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the problem and feasibility of the separation of nuclear weapons from their carriers in relation to an inspection system.

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"L. The Air Force and Navy Task Groups each to make a special study of the requirement for reporting in advance on projected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability in connection with an inspection system."

The resulting special reports are presented at Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively.

II. COMMENTS ON THE INSPECTION PROBLEM

A. The Goals of Inspection.

The broad over-all goal of an inspection system is that of providing enhanced national security, perhaps ultimately at reduced total cost. The initial tasks of an inspection system would be:

1. To verify the correctness of the "blueprint" describing the USSR military establishment. The items of information comprising the blueprint should be chosen on the basis of studies of the inspection problem intended to determine what information is really necessary to serve the goals of inspection and is obtainable through reciprocally acceptable inspection means.

2. To diminish the likelihood of massive surprise attack, and to give timely warning of the imminence of prospective attack.

3. To maintain on a continuing basis a knowledge of the strength and positioning of armed forces and armaments.

The aerial inspection system should be designed to make a maximum contribution to reaching these goals, always consistent with the limitations which arise primarily from the reciprocal character of the proposed inspection terms. The nature and extent of these limitations will not be discussed.

B. Factors Affecting Inspection System Design.

1. Intelligence Considerations. One of the major immediate benefits of the United States that would result from the inauguration of a partial or complete system of aerial inspection is the improvement this would make in our strategic intelligence relating to the USSR war machine and its supporting economy. The corresponding improvement in USSR intelligence relating to the United States would be much smaller, since it can be presumed that USSR intelligence is already quite good. This suggests that

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the United States might be prepared to consider reasonable compromises elsewhere in order to secure agreement on aerial inspection, which is so valuable to us.

It must be assumed that the USSR inspection effort, in addition to its mission of inspection, will be carefully designed and organized as a major instrument for intelligence, subversion, and even potential sabotage. This consideration yields two major conclusions affecting the inspection plan:

a. The design of the inspection system must be such as to give to the Soviets minimum leverage for infiltration, covert intelligence, subversion, and sabotage, perhaps even at the cost of reducing the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence benefits from ground inspection activities. This suggests maximum utilization of aerial inspection means.

b. The United States must be prepared to contain and render as harmless as possible any efforts of the USSR inspection organization to exceed its agreed role in the inspection process.

2. Inspection and Military Capability. During the early period of operation of an inspection system, before confidence in its effectiveness has been established, the costs of the inspection system will represent an addition to the defense budget, so that total expenditures for national security will be greater than they had been before the introduction of the inspection system. While successful and reliable operation of an inspection system over a period of time may permit eventual reductions in arms budgets, it would be unrealistic and dangerous in the extreme to reduce our defense capability or slacken our buildup in armaments before an inspection system is in place, has operated for some time, and has conclusively demonstrated its effectiveness. It would be unfortunate if premature reliance on an untried system of inspection were to have the result of diminishing popular support of current defense budgets. In any event, the fact that the costs of an inspection system represent an addition to defense budgets which cannot initially be reduced suggests very strongly that the simplest and cheapest inspection system capable of doing an adequate job is the one to be preferred.

In the detailed design of the inspection system, attention must be given to the effects on the military capability of the United States of reciprocal application by the USSR of the measures proposed. Since we must not relax our military posture in any way while inspection is being discussed, agreed upon, installed, and tested, a suitable inspection system must be so designed that, while it yields the information actually required to achieve the goals already enumerated, it does not restrict the military capability which is today our main reliance for maintaining peace. For example, the combat readiness of our Strategic Air Command is of major importance as an

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existing deterrent to large-scale aggression; therefore, we must insure that the reciprocal application of an inspection system leaves SAC's capability and combat readiness unimpaired.

As has already been noted, one of the possible consequences of an inspection system which gives USSR nationals access to important installations in the United States is the potentiality for sabotage. While this must be guarded against everywhere and on all occasions, it is perhaps especially important in connection with SAC and with our Air Defense Command. Although it has sometimes been suggested that the flight control centers in the USSR might be monitored by United States inspectors, it is doubtful that any important information contributing to the goals of inspection would thereby be collected, and the reciprocal inspection of our Air Defense Command flight control centers by Russian inspectors might make it possible for our warning and defense system to be crippled at the very time a surprise attack was on the way. In our discussions with the Continental Air Defense Command, we found them most reluctant to consider admitting foreign inspectors to their control centers. We share this reluctance, and further feel that the value of the information gained would be more than offset by the dangers inherent in the reciprocal arrangements.

A special problem is posed by the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This weapon is under development in the United States, and appears to be under development in the USSR. It is a missile of intercontinental range, having the ability to deliver a thermonuclear warhead with accuracy. While there are formidable difficulties to be surmounted in the development of this weapon, there seems to be little doubt that they can be met, and that the ICBM will become an operational reality sometime within the next decade.

If such a weapon were to come into existence in fully developed and operational form prior to the installation of a suitable armament inspection system, the task of providing warning of surprise attack would become many times more difficult, if not altogether impossible. Launching sites for such missiles could be prepared in secret and camouflaged or hidden quite effectively, the time required to ready a missile for launching could be quite short, and the total intercontinental time of flight of such a missile would be only some 30 minutes. Under these circumstances, adequate warning of surprise attack appears so difficult as to be impossible. We are not able to conceive any system of inspection which could be relied upon to control the numbers of these weapons in existence or to give a reasonable warning of their unexpected use in a surprise attack, once the ICBM is fully developed.

3. Civilian Considerations. It is plain that the interchange of personnel and of information between the United States and the USSR attendant on the introduction of an inspection system would begin to nullify the

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effects of the "Iron Curtain". This would have the effect both of improving our strategic intelligence and of improving East-West contacts so vital to our Cold-War strategy. Mr. Molotov has already called most East-West contacts "subversive", and it is exactly for these reasons that we must expect the Soviet to be reluctant to agree to the establishment of any but a minimal ground inspection system, even though they themselves have proposed the exchange of ground inspectors at key control centers.

Just as our desire to maintain the combat readiness of the Strategic Air Command gives rise to limitations on the detailed design of the inspection system, so also there are limitations which arise from purely civilian considerations. The most prominent of these is the requirement to safeguard the commercial secrets of American business and industry. Our labor cost is the highest in the world, and we can compete in world markets only becausw we have machinery, methods, and processes which are superior to those in use elsewhere. Any inspection system that we propose must be capable of protecting the proprietary developments on which our industry relies for continued success.

4. Legal Considerations. Certain statutory and executive restrictions to overflight of the United States by foreign and domestic aircraft are presently in effect.

First of these is the Air Commerce Act, Section 6, which specifies that no foreign aircraft shall enter the U.S. without consent of the Secretary of State.

Certain Air Defense Zones are established by Executive regulation under statutory authority of Title 12, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, enacted in 1950. This enabling legislation authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Administration to set up air defense identification zones, in which all air traffic is rigidly controlled for air defense purposes. The procedures for accomplishing this are set up by Code 14 of Federal Regulations, Part 620.

Certain other air-space reservations involve "Prohibited", "Danger" and "Caution" Areas. These are established by Executive Order and involve flight restrictions over such areas as atomic energy installations, anti-aircraft gunnery ranges, military flight training areas and research, development and test centers.

In each of the above areas suitable arrangements and coordination of overflights can, where desirable, probably be achieved through Executive rather than major legislative action. We believe this to be necessary in order that certain areas in Russia not be rendered off limits to us.

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5. The problem of Geographic Asymmetry. While it is stipulated that any inspection system to be proposed must be reciprocally acceptable to the United States, there are problems arising from the differences in the georgraphical situation of the United States and the USSR. During recent years we have built up a ring of peripheral air bases around the USSR and her satellites. We have air bases, for example, in Alaska, in Japan, in Okinawa, in the Philippines, in Turkey, in North Africa, in England, in Spain, and in Greenland. These air bases are used by the Air Force for routine rotational training exercises and are capable of sustaining air operations on a continuing basis. They are also available for use in the event that it is necessary to launch a full-scale strategic attack on the USSR.

Russia has no such air-base complex. Any strike on the United States would have to be launched from the Eurasian continent. Similarly, any aerial inspection of the United States conducted by the USSR would require extreme effort if the aircraft concerned were to be based in Russia. True reciprocity of inspection suggests that the United States might well offer to provide a base in the Pacific Northwest and another in the extreme Northeast for the use of inspection aircraft of the USSR. Russian aircraft could either be permanently based at these airbases or could use them for staging. Some such arrangement would appear to be required if we are to achieve a truly reciprocal system of mutual overflight and inspection, and if we wish to maximize the likelihood of Soviet acceptance of our proposal.

6. Phasing. The Soviets are now well known for their tactic of accepting an agreement "in principle" and then abrogating it in effect through endless arguments over technicalities and definitions, or through delays and harassments during implementation. Accordingly, the ground inspection system must provide for the time phasing of small trial inspection operations -- to test Soviet intentions -- prior to full-scale implementation. The various phases must be tied to a firm timetable, and the inspection agreement must be self-abrogating if the timetable is not adhered to. Therefore, we are in full agreement with the provisions of JCS Draft Plan dated 19 October 1955, as they relate to ground inspection.

Regarding aerial inspection we prefer full immediate implementation. The Russians may insist in negotiations on gradual geographic phasing of aerial inspection but this should be resisted if possible. If a trial phase is necessary, it should cover representative areas with comparable weather and targets, rather than specific targets.

C. Recommended Objects of Inspection.

1. General Criteria. In designing the inspection system intended to control air weapons, our task force has been guided by two main principles. First, nothing should be done in the name of inspection if it does not

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contribute to one or more of the goals of inspection that have been named above. Second, nothing must be done -- even though it contributes to these goals -- if its reciprocal application to the United States by the USSR would impede or reduce our military capability relative to the Soviet Union. The application of these principles will become clear in the discussion below of the ground inspection organization planned by the Air Inspection Task Force.

2. Aerial Inspection. The objects of aerial inspection are all of the militarily and industrially important facilities of the Soviet Bloc. Some of the military objects are subject to rapid redeployment. Since these facilities and movements can occur at any place or time within the USSR and its satellites, there should be neither geographical nor time restrictions on the proposed aerial inspection operations. The major effect of an altitude restriction would be to limit the time during which aerial photography could successfully be conducted; thus, this restriction is also unacceptable. See the later discussion of weather limitations on photographic reconnaissance (Paragraph III.A.1).

There are also technical difficulties to imposing a limitation on the area which can be overflown. The photographic equipment carried on routine reconnaissance flights is capable of giving good coverage out to [redacted] 25X1 USAF However, if there are restrictions on the area which may be overflown, special equipment will provide good coverage out to [redacted] or more from the flight line. 25X1 USAF

Aerial inspection can make very important contributions to four principal goals of inspection -- warning, periodic verification of military force levels, periodic verification of industrial and military installations, and accounting for industrial production. The second and third can be accomplished largely by aerial inspection alone. As regards warning indicators and production, although aerial photography can be used to determine where ground inspectors should be located, it cannot provide by itself the continuity of observation which is important for these two inspection purposes.

3. Ground Inspection. As has already been indicated, our Task Force believes that for many reasons -- including the cost of the system, the desirability of early success in negotiations, the reciprocal acceptability of the inspection plan, the ease with which inspection personnel can be recruited and trained, and the efficacy of aerial inspection for many vital purposes -- the simplest ground inspection system capable of doing the critically important aspects of the job will be the best one to propose. We have, therefore, examined the list of objects of ground inspection listed in the Air Force part of the JCS Draft Plan, dated 19 October 1955, in order to determine which of these must be subject to ground inspection as a part of the initial minimal inspection plan we are recommending. There follows a discussion of the ground inspection which we feel to be the essential minimum.

a. Airfields. In order to guard against and give timely warning of massive surprise attack, an inspection system should have

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resident inspection teams on the bases used by the long-range air regiments of the USSR. While the massing of ground troops or the readying of naval units for combat are operations that take days to achieve and offer numerous observable indications of their progress, considerably less time and observable preparation is required for long-range aircraft. Furthermore, the combat readiness of a strategic air force can be maintained only by frequent training exercises. If these are realistic, any one of them can be distinguished from an offensive strike only as the force approaches the borders of the country which it may intend to attack. As a matter of routine, our Strategic Air Command continuously runs exercises which terminate near the borders of the USSR; at the last moment, the bomber stream turns aside to land at one of our numerous overseas bases.

How is a training exercise such as this to be distinguished from an actual attack? If warning is the object, this distinction must be drawn long before the bomber fleets are at the borders of the country which may be attacked. On the other hand, the maintenance of full combat readiness in our Strategic Air Command or in that of the Russians requires that realistic exercises such as those described above be carried out repeatedly.

When one thinks unilaterally about the problem of diminishing the probability of surprise attack, it is easy to imagine many ways in which a ground inspection team could help to lessen it. We might house observers on the airbase and give them unlimited freedom of movement; we might permit them to observe and to supervise the bombing-up of Soviet aircraft, so that they can be sure no nuclear weapons are loaded on the occasion of what is claimed to be a training mission. We can even have a United States observer ride in each bomber aircraft to make sure that the ostensible flight plan of the mission is indeed followed.

All these measures are directed at the end of reducing the likelihood that a surprise attack will be launched under the guise of a training maneuver, which is a constant possibility when each side has a combat-ready strategic air force. But the trouble with these measures is that when their reciprocal application is considered, they are entirely unacceptable. They would vastly increase the risk of sabotage at SAC bases, they would severely reduce the combat-ready capability of our Strategic Air Command, and it is not sure that they would accomplish their objective, in any case.

We feel that it is not necessary to have our observers inside of Russian bases in order to erect a system which has an excellent possibility of distinguishing maneuver from attack.

Let us first of all define an effective surprise attack as being one which is carried out in sufficient force to cripple the United States and to reduce to ineffective levels our own capability to mount a retaliatory attack. This definition implies that the ground effort of the proposed air inspection system will concern itself only with long-range air weapons

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systems capable of attacking the United States. It will not have ground observers maintaining continuous watch on short-range aircraft, even though such aircraft are capable of delivering a nuclear attack on our allies in Western Europe or against our peripheral bases. At first sight, this makes it appear that there is no mechanism for giving timely warning of such an attack. We are mindful of this, and we feel that there are two safeguards against such a possibility:

1. Any limited attack on Western Europe, or against our peripheral bases, while it might be highly effective locally, would leave substantially intact the retaliatory capability of the U. S. Strategic Air Command. It would thus be an invitation to Russian disaster, and is therefore not likely to be undertaken.

2. It seems scarcely likely that any USSR attack on Western Europe would be carried out by air alone. We feel that such an attack would be followed up at once by movements of ground troops into the areas attacked, and very likely by coordinated naval operations, as well. Preparations for these ground and sea operations should be detected by the ground inspection teams watching the USSR Army and Navy units, thus giving timely warning of the danger. It should also be borne in mind that the air inspection plan set forth below involves repeated aerial reconnaissance of the bases used by short-range aircraft of the USSR, so that some indications of a prospective air attack on Western Europe are likely to be detected by these means alone.

Another implication of the above definition of effective surprise attack is that such an attack cannot be carried out by a small number of aircraft. It is this circumstance that gives an inspection system some chance of being effective in helping to guard against surprise attack. To keep track constantly of every long-range aircraft belonging to the USSR would take a vast organization of ground inspectors and a complicated communications system of unprecedented reliability and speed. We feel that this need not be done.

There is some level of size of a long-range attacking force below which the force cannot make an effective surprise attack on the United States, and above which it can. We note that long-range aircraft and missiles are not the only delivery means capable of making a long-range attack. Submarines equipped with short-range missiles can contribute to such an attack; so can merchant ships able to deposit nuclear weapons in U. S. harbors, and so can saboteurs present in the United States. The question of delivery by sea is being considered by the Task Force on Navy Inspection; we here address ourselves only to the question of aerial delivery of an attack on the United States launched from the USSR or its satellites.

Even though long-range aircraft and missiles are not the only delivery means capable of making an effective surprise attack, there is little reason to doubt that they are, at the present time, the most effective means. And our Task Force feels that there is some number,

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roughly determinable between reasonable limits, of long-range aircraft and missiles required to be successful in launching an effective surprise attack. This number is affected by many factors, notably including weapons capabilities, the competence of the air defenses of the country attacked, the state of readiness of the attacking force, etc. Because these factors change with time, the number will change with time; for example, any drastic change in air defense effectiveness on one side or the other will alter the number of attacking aircraft and missiles needed to make an effective surprise attack.

Our Task Force feels that the USAF should be requested to make periodic studies directed at determining the approximate size of a force of USSR long-range aircraft capable, under conditions obtaining at the time of each study, or making an effective surprise attack on the United States, according to the above definition.

Whatever the detailed results of such a study, we believe that the number of attacking aircraft required at present is probably in the order of hundreds, rather than in the order of tens. The ground inspection system must then be so designed that it can keep track of USSR long-range aircraft and missiles with sufficient definiteness and reliability so that somewhat fewer than this critical number of aircraft and missiles are out of sight of the inspection system -- and therefore possibly on their way to deliver a raid on the United States -- at any given time.

This approach to the ground inspection problem will be most effective if the U.S. and the USSR agree that they will not conduct air operations which will result in more than the critical number of long-range aircraft and missiles being out of sight of the ground inspection system at any given time. However, we do not anticipate that any such agreement would be or should be made prior to the time when an inspection system is in place and some confidence in its effectiveness has been generated by its successful operation. Even without any such agreed limitation, the type of ground inspection suggested here -- based on a responsible USAF estimate of the number of aircraft the Soviets might need for a surprise attack against the U. S. -- has substantial value; its most important property is that it enables us to alert our Air Defense Command and SAC - should more than the critical number of Soviet long-range aircraft be out of sight of the system at any time.

We are of the opinion that the USAF can so select the critical number that any limitation on the training operations, maintenance, combat readiness, etc. of our Strategic Air Command which might be produced by agreeing on a maximum number of long-range aircraft to be airborne at any given time would be more than outweighed by the warning against surprise attack which would be provided. In this connection it is important to bear in mind that we recommend no agreed limitation on numbers whatsoever, until after the matter has been thoroughly studied by the USAF, and until after an inspection system is in place and working.

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b. Air Logistics Installations. In JCS Draft Plan dated 19 October 1955, it is proposed to inspect 53 supporting installations belonging to the Red Air Force. In accordance with the discussion of the preceding section, we are of the opinion that only those bases devoted to overhaul, repair, and modification of long-range aircraft need have resident inspection teams. The ground inspection can be limited to an initial tour of the base to verify the blueprint followed by infrequent periodic recheck. Between these tours the maintenance of a continuous knowledge of which planes have entered and which left the base can be accomplished by inspection activities conducted from an inspection center located outside the military installation concerned.

c. Aircraft, Missile, and Engine Manufacturing Plants. The Air Force portion of the JCS Plan proposes to have resident ground inspection teams at the plant of each manufacturer of aircraft, missiles, and engines. It is implied that such inspection teams will have free and complete access to the plants in question, as well as the ability to inspect all pertinent records of the operation of the plants.

Our Task Force feels that continued close inspection of this kind is neither necessary nor desirable. It is unnecessary because one tour of the plant to be inspected, followed by a careful check on incoming shipments of airframe materials and on outgoing aircraft or missiles and scrap, could reliably keep tabs on the production of the plant in question with only infrequent recheck inside. This is all that the goals of inspection require, and there is no need for more thorough-going measures of inspection. The simple inspection means which we here propose would safeguard the commercial secrets of U.S. manufacturers and, therefore, should be acceptable in their reciprocal application to the United States by the USSR.

We do not believe that it is necessary to perform ground inspection at the manufacturing plants devoted to making engines for aircraft or missiles. Since only the complete vehicle, with engine, airframe, guidance, and warhead, represents an immediate threat in terms of surprise attack, we feel that it would be sufficient to keep careful track of the output of aircraft and missile manufacturing plants.

d. Missile Test Ranges. In the Air Force portion of the JCS Plan, it is proposed to have a substantial force of resident inspectors based at the experimental range which is used for development test, and proof firing of long-range guided missiles in the USSR. Our Task Force feels that the reciprocal application of any such inspection provision would be unacceptable to the United States. Far too much information on the status and progress of military research and development programs would be given away if this were to be permitted, quite apart from the very real danger of sabotage that the presence of such inspectors would represent.

Recognizing that the purpose of having ground inspectors near missile test ranges is to serve the goals of inspection that have been set forth it would appear that an adequate means of inspecting guided-missile test ranges

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would be to have an inspection team equipped with a long-range radar system located somewhere within perhaps 25 miles of the launching site at the head of the range. With the help of the radar system, such an inspection team could monitor the test activity at the range, and could form reasonably good opinions of the state of development of long-range guided missiles, without being permitted to see the configurations of the missiles used and without having opportunity for subversion and sabotage.

e. Air Defense and Air Traffic Control Installations. As pointed out, we are of the opinion that the objections to having Russian inspectors at air traffic and air defense control centers presently outweigh the value of the information likely to be gained by United States inspectors at Russian centers. We therefore recommend that no ground inspection of air traffic control centers or air defense installations be recommended or agreed to at the present time. However, as has already been pointed out, the level of Soviet air defense effectiveness could modify, in an important way, the critical number of Soviet aircraft and missiles required for an effective surprise raid on the United States. If Soviet air defenses suddenly became much more effective as a result of a technological "break-through", only a smaller surprise raid would be needed by them to cripple SAC's retaliatory ability - the improved Soviet air defenses being left to cope with the brunt of SAC's intended retaliatory attack. Therefore, if we obtain indications of such a development as a result of aerial reconnaissance and normal intelligence activities, we should redetermine the critical number of aircraft permitted to be outside the inspection system and take suitable action.

f. Air Research and Development Facilities. It is attractive to suppose that the inspection plan might include resident inspection teams located at the major research and development facilities of the USSR. However, no substantial contribution to the goals of inspection would be made by such a measure, while the military research and development program of the United States might be substantially compromised by the inauguration of any such inspection means. It is the recommendation of our Task Force that no inspection of research and development facilities, apart from the general overflight which we are recommending, be requested or agreed to. However, this recommendation should in no way be construed to minimize the importance of guarding against Soviet technological surprise using techniques which are not part of the proposed inspection system.

g. Major Air Command Headquarters. The JCS Plan proposes resident inspection teams at each of the major Air Command headquarters of the USSR. We doubt that this would make any substantial contribution to the goals of inspection, and we feel sure that the reciprocal

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application of such inspection would be unacceptable to the U.S. Air Force. We recommend against installing ground inspection teams at air command headquarters.

III. THE AIR INSPECTION PLAN

A. Aerial Inspection.

1. Concept. It is proposed that, upon the simultaneous exchange of military information ("blueprint") between the governments concerned, complete aerial reconnaissance will be initiated by each inspecting government of the other's territory. Negotiation of the aerial inspection agreement should take account of the following stipulations and procedures.

a. Inspecting aircraft will be unarmed.

b. Inspecting aircraft will land at designated ports of entry near the border of each country for inspection by the host government prior to continuing on their tasks. Inspection will be limited to the examination of aircraft for weapons, and will not be the cause of undue delay of reconnaissance missions.

c. Liaison personnel of the host government may, as it elects, be taken aboard reconnaissance aircraft. Space for one observer per aircraft shall be all the inspecting government should be obliged to provide.

d. There will be no restrictions upon the areas to be covered, altitude of flights, time of flight, or the frequency of flights over any given area. However, the host government may monitor all flights. To "monitor" means to maintain continuous knowledge of the position of inspecting aircraft by means of electronic devices, and/or through visual observation from aircraft which may accompany the inspecting aircraft at the election of the host government.

e. Providing that inspection aircraft land for inspection by the host government prior to conducting their reconnaissance missions, there will be no compulsion for inspecting aircraft to operate from bases in the host country, nor restriction on operations from any bases that may be specified.

f. Flight plans covering the planned operation of inspecting aircraft will be filed with appropriate air traffic control authorities

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in the host country. Other than in matters of air traffic safety as regards airspace separation, these control authorities will not have supervision over the route, hours of operation, or altitudes to be flown by inspecting aircraft.

g. No unreasonable restrictions will be placed on the numbers or types of inspecting aircraft, nor on the ground facilities and personnel required to support these aircraft.

h. Countries participating in the inspection plan will agree on the allocation of communications frequencies for use by airborne inspection crews and ground inspection teams.

i. All photographic coverage and other information resulting from the inspection of each host country will become and remain the property of the inspecting country, with further distribution to be at the discretion of the inspecting country, prior to multilateral agreements governing distribution among participating countries.

j. In the aerial inspection system, aircraft for rescue, for courier service, for logistic support, and for evacuation will be permitted to enter the boundaries of the host country in addition to and in accordance with the terms agreed for inspecting aircraft.

k. Other than to discharge observers from the host country, departing inspection aircraft will not be required to land at bases in the host country. When such landings take place, the inspecting aircraft will not be detained or subjected to additional inspection; furthermore, the results of reconnaissance need not be revealed.

l. Aircraft proceeding from or to host countries may be monitored by the host country concerned under the meaning of the term "monitor" as defined in sub-paragraph d. above.

2. Operational Plan. Aerial inspection of the USSR and its satellites will be conducted from selected peripheral air bases that the United States maintains around the borders of the USSR. Given agreement on an inspection plan, the aircraft, crews, support facilities, and overseas bases that are required to implement a plan of aerial inspection are immediately available.

The aerial inspection plan involved the deployment of reconnaissance aircraft and units from the United States to overseas bases around the USSR. They would be directly supported by the normal rotation of similar units based in the United States. If a landing at a Russian staging base is required before the commencement of each inspection mission,

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the operational concept calls for rapid refueling and immediate continuation of the mission. Examples of bases that could be used in the aerial inspection plan are England, North Africa, Turkey, Japan, Thule (Greenland), and Alaska.

The aircraft now available to implement the aerial inspection plan are the reconnaissance wings of the Strategic Air Command. The force presently available in SAC consists of five wings of RB-47s (45 aircraft per wing) and 4 wings of RB-36s (30 aircraft per wing). It is suggested that two wings of RB-47s and two wings of RB-36s would be kept on overseas stations at any given time. The remaining reconnaissance aircraft would be used in the United States for training, for backing up the operational units and for maintenance of emergency war plan capability.

A major limitation on the aerial inspection plan arises from the weather over Russia, which is notoriously poor. In Appendix I, for example, is shown by quarters the number of days per month when it is possible to accomplish high-altitude (20,000 feet and above) photographic reconnaissance over the USSR. The criterion used to define days suitable for high-altitude photography is that there should be less than 2/10 cloud cover and at least 6 miles visibility. Conditions meeting these requirements exist over the USSR less than twenty percent of the time. Yearly averages are as follows:

8% Kola Peninsula area
30% Caspian Sea area
15% Middle of the USSR
12% Chukotsk Peninsula area

Taking these weather factors into account, it is estimated that the four reconnaissance wings mentioned above could provide photographic coverage suitable for verifying the bluepring and for charting, covering ninety percent of the USSR and its satellites, in some four or five months. Radar coverage, not being subject to the same weather limitations, should be substantially complete in one or two months.

For the purpose of inspection, high-altitude reconnaissance will not always be the best way of providing the desired information. Coverage from lower altitudes will often be preferable, and at lower altitudes the visibility limitations on photography due to weather are also less severe. The capabilities and limitations of various types of sensing equipment are discussed in Appendix H and illustrated in Appendix G.

When aerial inspection of the USSR first becomes possible, there are three phases of the work to be carried out. Some of them may, and probably will, be performed simultaneously. These phases are as follows:

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a. The pioneer reconnaissance phase. This refers to the provision of basic photographic, radar coverage, and much electronic intercept over the area to be inspected. Its output will be a complete radar coverage of Russia and high altitude photographic coverage which will be perhaps ninety percent complete. The more critical areas within the remaining 10% will presumably be covered with small scale low altitude photography and high resolution radar.

b. Detailed analysis phase. From existing intelligence, pioneer reconnaissance, and ground inspection, areas of special interest will have been pinpointed. Missions will be dispatched to perform specific reconnaissance over such areas. The observations made in the course of such reconnaissance can involve high or low altitude photography, radar mapping, thermal radiation detection, electronic intercept, and other special methods. The intent of these detailed observations will be to provide more specific information than becomes available from the pioneer coverage.

c. Surveillance. Areas which have been confirmed to be of interest in earlier phases of the inspection operation will be investigated by repeated aerial surveillance. This will be especially important in the case of bases from which a surprise attack might be mounted.

3. Personnel Requirements. One RB-36 wing on rotational duty overseas requires 500 officers and 1500 airmen for a total of approximately 2,000 personnel per wing. This figure assumes that the base from which the wing is operated is fully manned and prepared. An additional 600 personnel are required if the base is not equipped and manned. One RB-47 wing requires 1700 personnel, less base complement.

The force which is proposed for the aerial inspection effort, consisting of 2 RB-36 wings and 2 RB-47 wings, thus involves a total of 7400 personnel plus the base complement necessary for their support.

B. Ground Inspection.

1. Concept and Plan. It is supposed that, upon the simultaneous exchange of military blueprints between the Governments concerned, aerial reconnaissance will be undertaken to verify the correctness of the information submitted and to reveal the existence of any undisclosed installations, facilities, or units. This aerial reconnaissance will be supplemented by ground inspection carried out by verification teams.

Verification of the blueprint will make known the airfields at which are based aircraft capable of making an attack on the United States. The same is true of missile launching sites. (Verification will not be considered complete until virtually all "pioneer" reconnaissance has been carried out.) An inventory of the aircraft and missiles present at these

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locations can be made by the ground verification teams on the occasion of the complete tour of the airfield that is required in the verification procedure. Thereafter, except for infrequent periodic inspection tours of the base itself, the ground inspection team assigned to each field will occupy an inspection post outside the field. By maintaining continuous aural and visual observation of takeoffs and landings to verify the flight plans submitted to them, each inspection team will be able to know at all times how many aircraft of what types are away from the base that it is watching, and how many aircraft of what type remain on the field.

It would be desirable to have the location of each ground inspection team, though outside the airfield, be such that visual monitoring of activities on the field is possible. Indications of preparations for a maximum effort operation could be picked up visually, in most cases, long before takeoff. In the case of operational guided-missile bases, the additional warning time gained in this way would be especially important, since the time of flight of missiles is less than that of aircraft, and pre-takeoff warning correspondingly more valuable.

Bases occupied by short-range aircraft but on which such aircraft are not now based permanently, will also be inspected through a visit by a verification team, and will be kept under surveillance on a random basis through aerial reconnaissance and inspection by mobile ground inspection units. However, it is not proposed to station resident observation teams at such airfields, at least not initially. Experience with the system of ground inspection we are proposing will be required to determine its proper scope. The system should have two major goals. First it should be extensive enough to keep at an acceptably low level the fraction of the time during which more than the agreed number of long-range aircraft (see subparagraph II C.3.a., above) are out of sight of the ground inspection system. Secondly, it should not be so extensive as to make its reciprocal unacceptable to the United States or to make achieving agreement with the Soviets most unlikely. Since these are to a degree conflicting goals, a judicious balance must be sought. If redeployment of long-range aircraft requires the coverage of new bases not originally provided with ground observation teams, these bases can be covered by the mobile inspection teams mentioned below. If a new capability for long-range operation appears to have been attained by the USSR -- such as would occur, for example, if aerial refueling gave fighter-bomber aircraft a long-range capability -- then ground observer teams would have to be stationed at the fields basing aircraft of this type.

The thing to be emphasized is that the ground-observer coverage needed at any given time is a function of the conditions obtaining at that time. In this paper, we are recommending that such coverage be limited to the fields at which the long-range aircraft of the USSR are

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currently based; however, it must be re-emphasized that this permanently based ground-observer coverage will be supplemented by random inspection of other bases by mobile units, and the provisions must be made to insure that the ground inspection plan may at any time be extended or altered, as current conditions demand.

It should also be recognized that the aerial reconnaissance which is planned will be able to supplement the ground inspection by revealing airfields at which the level of activity suggests the installation of a ground observer team. Roving teams of ground inspectors will be available for prompt installation at fields whose inspection from the ground seems desirable on the basis of the results of aerial reconnaissance.

The measures we are suggesting for inspection of the fields used by long-range aircraft of the USSR are also applicable to launching sites capable of launching air-breathing missiles of the general type of the U.S. Navaho. Such a missile flies at a speed higher than but comparable with that of contemporary manned aircraft, and can therefore be dealt with by an inspection system of the type we are here recommending for manned aircraft.

The minimal ground-inspection plan that we are advocating here cannot be guaranteed to give certain warning of surprise attack. It does not relieve the United States of the Requirement for being prepared to mount the most effective air defense possible. It does not provide a fully reliable guarantee against very heavy and damaging -- though not decisive -- surprise attack. In our opinion, no inspection scheme, even the most elaborate, can justifiably make such claims.

There is, however, a relationship between the extent and intensity of ground inspection and the worth of the security that it can provide. This relationship is such that, as the extent of ground inspection increases, the ability to warn against surprise attack increases also, but at a slower and ever slower rate. The ground inspection organization we are describing here is far less elaborate than the one visualized in the Air Force part of the JCS Draft Plan, dated 19 October 1955, and yet we consider its capability of warning of surprise attack (though not its intelligence yield) to be not significantly different from that of the full JCS Plan.

In order to guard against the clandestine creation of new long-range air units which could operate outside our ground inspection system, it is desirable to keep track of factory outputs, as well as of military units in the field. As already indicated in subparagraph II.C.3.c., our Task Force believes that this can be done by means of the external inspection of the input and output of aircraft and missile manufacturing plants, or the plants of other component manufacturers. This plant inspection would be carried on by resident teams of ground inspectors of about the same size as the teams stationed near airbases.

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In addition to using the mobile teams described above for random inspection and as a source of resident teams at newly activated or newly discovered facilities, we envision using them also to replace resident teams on a regular rotation basis.

It is not our plan that the ground inspection teams covering airfields, overhaul bases, and aircraft and missile manufacturing plants in the Soviet bloc should be self-sufficient military units. To the maximum extent possible, they should subsist on the facilities, and supply available locally, their other needs being met by airborne resupply provided by the supporting airlift which is part of this plan. This will minimize the number of U.S. nationals stationed in the USSR, in conformity with our minimal inspection principle. The airlift required to carry out this ground inspection operation is described in Section III.D., below. Because of the importance of the time factor in making use of movements reports submitted by the ground teams observing the USSR air operations, reports from them must be processed through the communications net to the air inspection headquarters in the minimum possible time. These reports will be collected and interpreted at the Air Inspection Headquarters.

2. Personnel Requirements. The number of ground observers recommended under this plan depends in an important way on the number of USSR airfields at which long-range aircraft are based; this latter number cannot be known exactly prior to the exchange and verification of military blueprints. The estimates below must be taken simply as illustrative of the expected order of magnitude of the minimal ground inspection task. The number of men required to maintain surveillance of an airfield should be the minimum number capable of doing the job; we have somewhat arbitrarily chosen this number to be ten. With these reservations, the following personnel summary is offered:

Object of Inspection	Personnel per site	Total Personnel
50 airfields basing long-range aircraft	10	500
5 overhaul bases for long-range aircraft	10	50
1 long-range missile testing range	50	50
30 aircraft and missile manufacturing sites	10	300
TOTAL RESIDENT PERSONNEL		900

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36 reserve inspection teams	10	360
TOTAL GROUND INSPECTION PERSONNEL		1260

It is exceedingly important that the ground inspection personnel manning the system proposed here be familiar with the general nature and requirements of the operation under their surveillance. The teams watching airfields, for example, should include officers with actual experience in our own heavy bombardment squadrons. The ability to read and speak the language of the host nation is also vital. The teams attached to aircraft and missile factories should include personnel with aircraft manufacturing experience. Only if this is done will it be possible for the observing teams to originate prompt and meaningful reports which reliably describe and interpret their observations.

In addition to the basic training and experience which observers must have in order to make their required contribution to the inspection system, further specialized training in intelligence collection will enable such observers to make important contributions to available intelligence concerning the USSR and its armed forces. We regard such additional intelligence as desirable, but not basic to the minimal inspection plan designed to help guard against surprise attack. At a heavy-bomber field, for example, we must have knowledge of aircraft movements into and out of the field; other information about the base and the units stationed on it is desirable, but not essential. At an aircraft factory, we must have knowledge of the factory output, if we are attempting to keep track of arms levels; any other information gathered by the observers is likely to be useful, but is not vital to the main goals of inspection.

3. The Requirements of Full Inspection. The minimal ground inspection plan just described ignores all short-range air units of the USSR, on the basis of the logic and facts presented above in this report. This minimal inspection scheme will not provide a continuing knowledge of the strength and positioning of all USSR air force units and air armaments. If it is desired to achieve this more ambitious goal, the size of the ground inspection organization rises sharply.

For example, an estimate of requirements made by the Director of Intelligence, USAF, calls for a total of 11,130 field inspection personnel or about ten times as many as the minimal plan would require. The detailed statement of requirements is given in Appendix K.

Our Task Force is of the opinion that the additional contribution to the goals of inspection that would be made by implementing the complete plan rather than the minimal one is for the present, far from proportional to the ten-fold increase in the size of the field inspection organization.

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C. Requirement for Communications.

The concept for communications to support the aerial inspection plan is based upon the following qualitative requirements:

1. Aircraft communications. Provisions should be made for the reconnaissance aircraft to communicate directly with a peripheral communications network. This may be done by air to air relay of messages or by direct communications from the reconnaissance aircraft. This requirement is based upon the necessity for transmittal of information relative to inspection obtained during flight (such as airborne processing and analysis of photographs) and for following the position of the reconnaissance aircraft at scheduled intervals.

2. Ground-observer communications. Ground observers must be able to send messages from their posts to the peripheral network with a minimum of delay. Since time is critical for many messages from ground observer posts, these messages must be given priority in the over-all communications system.

3. Freedom from interference. To the maximum degree possible, the communications system must be free from interference, and further have the property that, if the system is jammed or if equipment or personnel are interfered with we will be able to recognize this interference.

Attached as Appendix J is the Air Force communications plan which forms part of JCS Draft Plan, dated 19 October 1955. We have used this material for broad guidance and have submitted it to the Task Force on Communications for their use in designing the comprehensive inspection plan. It should be noted that the minimal ground inspection plan presented in this report envisions only some 86 sites within the Soviet bloc at which ground observers are permanently stationed, as contrasted with as many as 781 sites contemplated in the full ground inspection plan presented at Appendix K. There can be little doubt that the equipment, personnel, and costs required to provide communications for the minimal ground inspection plan will be substantially below those required by the full plan.

D. Requirements for Supporting Airlift.

The need for rescue, courier airlift, logistic support, and evacuation has already been referred to. These activities are in support of both the resident and mobile ground inspection teams described in III.B. Each cargo aircraft bearing a team could carry a helicopter or a small liaison plane equipped with photographic gear to permit detailed aerial reconnaissance of the area of interest.

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In terms of existing equipment, we believe that the task just described might be carried out by C-124's or similar aircraft. We propose that four flights of six each C-124's be stationed on the periphery of Russia. Since the requirements for supporting airlift are still largely unknown, it may be that the force is either more than is needed or else inadequate. Only experience can decide whether it should be augmented or reduced. The recommended force of 24 C-124's, tentatively suggested, would require an equal number of helicopters of the H-19 type, and a total of 1200 personnel.

E. Using the Information.

1. General. On many occasions in the past, the basic purpose of aerial reconnaissance has tended to be obscured by the complicated machinery for carrying it out. Staggering numbers of negatives have been exposed without commensurate returns as indicated by the only meaningful standard, the amount of useful information delivered to decision makers. As basic and difficult as is the task of exposing negatives, or recording the information received by other sensors, it is essential to note that this is just the beginning so far as aerial inspection is concerned. Unless effective and timely attention is devoted to the organization of a system for handling and utilizing the raw data obtained by the reconnaissance aircraft, much of the potential value of aerial inspection will be lost.

The major steps in handling and utilizing the raw data are processing, analysis, and synthesis. The first step is essentially a mechanical one, for which we are fairly well prepared. The remaining steps, on the other hand, represent processes which have never been entirely satisfactorily developed. Each is discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

2. Processing. From the standpoint of time as well as of quality of recorded data and scheduling of repeated coverage, it is essential that the original chemical and mechanical processing of photography and other records be carried out at the earliest possible moment. In some cases, processing aboard the aircraft will be indicated. For the greater part of the task, however, processing should occur near the base from which the reconnaissance aircraft operates. Air Force Reconnaissance Technical squadrons are well equipped to handle these tasks, and a sufficient number is presently available to process all material obtained during the aerial reconnaissance operation outlined earlier in this report. Processing facilities will also be required at other data-handling centers, to duplicate material for distribution to other parts of the inspection organization.

3. Analysis. The information received by the airborne sensors will serve several purposes: it will contribute to the early-warning potential of the inspection system; it will play an important role in blueprint verification; it will assist in policing any arms limitation agreement; and

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it will provide navigational and target data much needed by the U.S. but presumably already available to the USSR. Because these contributions differ with respect both to the time available for analysis and to the amount of synthesis required, more than one stage of handling is strongly indicated.

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USAF 25X1 The [redacted] are set up to carry out just this sort of analysis. A sufficient number of [redacted] is available for this preliminary analysis to match the procurement capability of the aerial reconnaissance wings described above. 25X1 USAF

For the other purposes of aerial inspection, time is not as critical as is thorough analysis of the raw data and synthesis of the results of aerial reconnaissance with information obtained from other sources. At this stage, the method of handling the information is no longer purely a matter of aerial reconnaissance. The detailed analysis should be carried out in an organizational framework which insures that the various sources of information mix at the working level. The requirement for this mixing arises out of the "convergence of evidence" principle, so useful in the earth sciences and in intelligence. The rationale for this principle is that frequently, although no single indicator is sufficient to confirm or to suggest strongly the existence of a situation, several indicators taken together may do so. The same general notion can be expressed in probability terms: even though the probability that each of five separate indicators will fail to reveal a dangerous situation is .5, the probability that all five will simultaneously fail to do so is only .03. These considerations serve to emphasize the immense importance of the method of data utilization to the success of the inspection assignment.

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Although it is perhaps premature to propose any specific means of accomplishing the data utilization task beyond the stage of initial analysis, it may be appropriate to discuss some general concepts. Two major approaches may be distinguished; the geographic area approach, and the subject area approach. In the former the area to be inspected is divided into sub-areas sufficiently small so that a small team can become intimately acquainted with the military, industrial, and transportation features, as well as other features of interest, within each sub-area. These teams might well include a military intelligence specialist, an industrial engineer, a photo-interpreter, and a person familiar with the language and life of the area. Each team should receive all information available on its area, and should be responsible for continuous reporting on critical developments within the area. From a purely data gathering standpoint, the best location for such a team would be within the sub-area assigned to it. However, to conform with the concept of minimal personnel within Soviet dominated territory concentrations of these teams at one or a few locations exterior to the Soviet sphere is indicated. In this case, in fact, it would be natural and desirable to locate the sub-area teams physically as well as organizationally within regional or central inspection headquarters. In this way part of the disadvantage of geographic separation of each team from its assigned sub-area would be compensated for by the greater case of exchange of information between teams, and between each team and the key users of its information.

Also essential to an adequate exploitation of the information gathered by inspection is analysis and synthesis, by subject. Such a requirement arises from two considerations. First, not every sub-area teams can be expected to include persons qualified to render final judgment on all military, industrial, technical, and scientific matters of importance within its area. Secondly, much will be gained by a centralized study of the changes in each important subject area throughout the entire inspection area. An example of the first might be that a geographic area team would recognize it as an installation for the static test of missile engines. The significance of the second point may be emphasized by noting that a change in weapon deployment which may be insignificant in any one area may be highly significant if observed in many areas.

A natural and effective means of accomplishing the subject area analysis and synthesis is to organize small teams of military and technical experts which will receive all information gathered by inspection and generated by geographic area teams as well as the latest technical information related to their specialties. Reporting responsibilities would parallel those of the geographic area teams. Among the subject areas which certainly should be treated in this manner are; guided missiles, aircraft, submarines, nuclear weapons manufacture and storage, chemical and biological warfare facilities, and ground forces. The appropriate location for such teams would, of course, be in the central headquarters of the inspection organization.

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4. Final Synthesis. The processof putting the vast amount of information which would be developed by an inspection system into a form suitable for use by those responsible for inspection and control does not stop with the reports of the geographic and subject area teams. Although any one of these reports, as well as any initial report from a reconnaissance plane or base, or from a ground inspection team, may be the basis for immediate warning or control action, more likely is the case where the development of a dangerous situation would be revealed only by considering the entire inspection area. Thus, although the geographic and subject reports would be the result of a degree of synthesis, still more would be required to reduce the information to manageable proportions for the use of the command.

Carrying out this final synthesis is not a large task in terms of numbers of people, but it is an exceedingly difficult one. The resulting estimates of the situation within the inspected areas would be the basis for far-reaching decisions, decisions which could even bring immediate hostilities. Upon the experience, intelligence, and courage of the relatively few men performing this task would depend to a considerable extent the success of an inspection and control plan.

A number of different backgrounds and talents should be represented in the "final synthesis" group. Certainly there should be men widely experienced in all critical phases of military operations and intelligence, using "military" in the exclusive sense. There should also be top-flight representation from the physical sciences and engineering. Essential too, would be people well acquainted with the life and mode of thinking in the areas of concern.

Among the responsibilities of this "final synthesis" group should be study of the importance and reliability of each of the many indicators which singly or jointly may foretell of attack.

We have concerned ourselves so far with the development and flow of information entirely within the inspection organization which we presume would be, at least in the early stages of inspection, either entirely a U.S. operation, or largely so. It is assumed, therefore, that at appropriate points in the analysis of reconnaissance results, both raw data and finished reports from the inspection organization would be fed into our National Intelligence system for synthesis there with other sources of information.

Other requirements for external distribution may also arise, one being a requirement arising from UN or other multinational inspection or armaments control activity. We believe that such distribution should be limited to copies of the basic records of unclassified types of aerial sensors (photography, for example) without the results of interpretation. Soviet knowledge of the success of our analytical efforts would be an inducement to inspection counter-measures on their part.

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IV. Improving Our Aerial Inspection Capability

A. Introduction

Whereas the combat reconnaissance forces of the United States now have the competence to conduct aerial inspection of the entire USSR from existing bases, our aerial inspection abilities can be considerably improved by five types of action:

1. Operational testing and use of available equipments offering promise for inspection purposes, which are not used at present by reconnaissance units because unsuitable for combat operations.

2. Immediate formation of an aerial inspection force, initially composed of assigned combat reconnaissance units as described earlier in this report. This force could conduct "manoeuvres" against U. S. and Allied Forces, which would provide experience useful both for negotiation and subsequently during inspection operations. This force would also be the focus for the development of aerial inspection capabilities not now available because they are not suitable for combat reconnaissance operations.

3. Operations research, including gaming, on inspection operations, using a team of well-qualified Soviet experts. See IV. B., below and Appendix L for an expansion of this suggestion.

4. Expanded study of the indicators of essential elements of arms information, with particular emphasis on various aerial inspection means.

5. Acceleration of certain equipment development programs, particularly those for bad-weather aerial reconnaissance, the reconnaissance satellite, and for rapid processing of intelligence information.

B. System Design and Test

No amount of effort prior to the implementation of an inspection and control system can purchase complete assurance that the system will accomplish what was intended. There are, however, many things which can be done in advance to increase the chances of selecting a workable system. Perhaps more important, there are means of estimating the reliability of various proposed systems, none of which can possibly be perfect.

Two general categories of methods may be distinguished: those employing only pencil and paper, figuratively speaking; and those employing the proposed tools of inspection. Paper and pencil methods have long been employed to attack problems of warfare. The usual procedure, one

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which has been effective in a wide variety of circumstances, is examplified by the work of this Task Force. It involves a common-sense evaluation of what constitutes the problem, a qualitative comparison of the solutions being considered, and a determination of the conclusions and recommendations based on the comparisons. This approach has the great advantages of being straightforward, easy to grasp, and flexible with respect to the time required to arrive at answers which are at least superficially reasonable. It has serious shortcomings, also. It does not lend itself to the formulation or detailed analysis of problems of great complexity and it does not ordinarily provide a quantitative basis for decision.

These shortcomings came to light most forcibly early in World War II, and resulted in a call for scientists not only to develop weapons, but also to assist the military in determining how these weapons could best be used. Since then, under such headings as "Operations Research," "Systems Analysis," and "Operations Evaluation," a wide variety of real and potential military (and civil) operations have been subject to searching scientific scrutiny with a success which has often been spectacular. These matters are extensively documented.* There appears no reason to doubt that these same techniques can be of immense value in seeking a safe, or the least dangerous, path to inspection and disarmament.

What distinguishes the operations research approach from its more conventional predecessors is the attempt to discover the basic, underlying structure of the operation under study, and to describe it in such a way, mathematically if possible, that the effect of changing various parameters can be conveniently assessed in quantitative terms.

We believe that the inspection and disarmament question is urgently in need of precisely such an examination. Realizing that the march of world events cannot be halted pending completion of large research projects, we propose that two operations research projects be established, one to study the basic structure of inspection and disarmament on a relatively long-term basis, and the other to provide a degree of scientific approach to decisions which must be reached in the immediate future. This is discussed more fully in Appendix L.

*See, for example, "Methods of Operations Research," by Morse and Kimball, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1951.

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The design and analysis of an inspection system implies the need for experimentation with the tools of inspection. Such questions as the following need answers: How much can the Soviets learn of our atomic weapons capabilities through aerial inspection? What is the

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In addition to providing estimates of critical parameters, operation of the tools of inspection over our own territory prior to the implementation of inspection can be of great assistance in the design of a system. It can provide a nearly "real life" test of parts of the system, much like a conventional military "manoeuvre".

One of the most critical aspects of inspection and control to which both paper-and-pencil and experimental attention should be devoted is that concerning critical indications of hostile intent. There must be a never ending study of the importance and reliability of the various indications as a function of the changing technological, military, and political scene. There is an important requirement for extensive research along these lines, and we urge immediate expansion of existing efforts.

C. Aerial Collection

High-performance combat reconnaissance aircraft are adequate but not ideal for inspection purposes. Conventional logistics carriers and turbo-prop carriers now under development offer major advantages:

1. Low altitude performance is much better, and weather considerations make this important.

2. Space is greater, permitting better reconnaissance and communication equipment installations, readier modification, greater crew and observer comfort and better accommodation for monitoring personnel.

3. Endurance is better.

4. Small airfield operations are possible.

The reconnaissance satellite vehicle will also be a useful device for the inspection force. Very recent technical advances with

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certain sensing and transmission equipments give promise of returning to earch remarkable detail (possibly [redacted]; this capability might be realized within three years. Not only can the satellite be a direct source of useful data, but it can also serve as an operational control instrument for the inspection command, regularly surveying the entire area for weather and for major indicators, as a means better to control the dispatch of inspection aircraft and ground observers. 25X1 USAF

With adequate development emphasis, a reconnaissance satellite capability could become available shortly after the I.G.Y. satellites now scheduled for 1958. Such emphasis is recommended.

Vertical take-off aircraft (helicopters, convertiplanes, and V.T.O. planes) incorporating range extension features (air refueling and particularly parasiting) may prove very useful for airborne ground inspection parties, if their use can be negotiated for quick spot checks. It would appear that the early exploration of these techniques might soon provide an additional and useful inspection capability not only for airborne ground inspectors, but also an aerial transportation system linking ground inspection teams with their bases.

Turning to the question of reconnaissance equipment, the area where increased effort would provide the greatest pay-off is that of high-resolution radar. To help provide timely warning of impending attack as well as to search for military installations over much of Russia, an all-weather capability is essential.

Recently developed high-resolution radar employing large antennas and short wavelengths can detect major installations at high altitudes and promise to give fairly reliable aircraft counts from low altitudes. The minor redesign of these units for low-altitude operation and greater dynamic range in their output and recording units is recommended, along with their accelerated production and installation.

Experimental work with certain new techniques, such as the [redacted] system, may lead to even higher resolution. These efforts are not supported financially in relation to their extreme importance and promise, both for combat reconnaissance and inspection. We recommend accelerated attention to this entire program. 25X1 USAF

A range of other equipment is "on the shelf" or in advanced stages of development. Although "available" for aerial inspection operations, they require operational evaluation and in some cases procurement. Appropriate studies and tests over U. S. targets should be undertaken immediately to evaluate the usefulness of these devices as supplemental aerial inspection means.

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The value of inspection as a warning mechanism depends, of course, on how quickly critical information from each post can be collated with that from other posts and presented as a basis for action. This is particularly important with respect to the reporting of aircraft movement. One means which offers promise is the use of a presentation board in major inspection headquarters which could receive "push button" messages from field transmitters and automatically present air order of battle and other warning indicators to its viewers.

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It appears certain that if rapid distribution, analysis, and synthesis of inspection information are to be achieved, some basic change must be made in the physical means of handling the documents.

This is certainly not the place to propose any specific method. It is appropriate, however, to mention here some of the more important properties which an adequate method would seem to require. Perhaps foremost is speed of indexing, storing, and retrieving documents. Of almost equal importance is that the probability of complete recovery be high, e.g. that one can be reasonably certain that what is delivered as "all the large-scale vertical photographs of area X" is in fact just that. From the standpoint of photography and other "continuous-image" documents, it seems essential to preserve a very large part or all of the information which was in the original document, and to insure at least equal ease in viewing and comparing the stored images as is possible with the original on a high-quality full-size reproduction. Other important features are ease of duplication and distribution, cost, and space required.

It is clear, then, that the problem of storage and retrieval of information is one which should be the subject of an early, intensive study. (It should be noted that this problem is still far from solution even for normal intelligence operations.) It is no trivial point that an inspection organization would start without the handicap of a past. With no commitment to any system,

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with no library to be reclassified or recast, the organization would be in an exceptionally good position to establish the modern system it would need to do its job.

E. Ground Inspection.

As discussed in Subparagraph II.C.3.a., ground inspection of air armaments is needed at first only "outside the fence" of bases. The purpose is to keep track of incoming and outgoing traffic between periods of "disclosure and verification" on the base and aerial verifications.

To supplement visual observation, small sonic and seismic detection units exist which can readily record and identify the individual signatures of the types of aircraft and missiles taking off. Their development and procurement for this purpose should be undertaken immediately.

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TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

July 5, 1955

Revised August 4, 1955

MEMORANDUM: Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419

FROM: The Special Assistant to the President

I. Assignment: Design in specific terms a practical, effective, and comprehensive armament and armed force inspection system within the USSR, which does not depend on good faith for effective operation, the reciprocal pattern of which would be feasible and acceptable within the United States. Its purpose is: to improve the prospects of a durable peace through identifying violations of agreements; limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attack; and providing an effective early warning system.

II. Assumptions:

The USSR and the U. S. (and other major nations) have agreed:

1. To a limitation of armament at a level at which neither has the capability to annihilate the other, each has a substantial strength ample to deter the other from attempted aggression, each has a substantial nuclear weapon stockpile and means of delivery, similar in total to present levels of armament.

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ENCLOSURE 1
APPENDIX A

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2. To disclose in parallel stages a blueprint inventory of the status and location of armament and armed forces in accordance with the limitation agreement.

3. To report in advance to an international Armaments Commission movements of their standing armament in international air or water, or on foreign land, water, or air.

4. To place certain specific quantities of nuclear material in a supervised stockpile for peaceful civilian purposes, to add all future nuclear material production to such supervised stockpile, and to use material drawn from such stockpile exclusively for peaceful civilian purposes, this stockpile to be in addition to the international atomic stockpile initiated in the United Nations.

   a. To stop fabrication of additional nuclear weapons and to stop nuclear weapons testing.

5. To permit the establishment within their national borders of an effective inspection service, including land, sea, and air survey, and the use of scientific instruments such as radar, sonic, photographic, and radiation detection devices, for the following purposes:

   a. To assure that standing armament would not be used for a surprise attack, or otherwise used

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without warning, or in violation of the United Nations Charter.

b. To verify the levels and positioning of standing armaments as disclosed in the national reports.

c. To detect promptly any significant violation of agreed levels of standing armaments; or of armament production, export, or import; or of armament production capacity.

d. To verify the completeness and accuracy of reports of international armament movements under paragraph 3 above.

e. To currently communicate with headquarters beyond national borders without interference.

f. To otherwise ascertain the good faith compliance or bad faith evasion of the terms of the armament agreement.

6. That each nation is to make such reports to the inspection service as may be necessary to the efficient fulfillment of the inspection task.

7. That the available relevant intelligence data on USSR facilities is reasonably accurate in magnitude and geographic location.

III. Solution Required:

1. Give specific detailed preliminary estimates of the

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personnel (including technical competence by types), facilities, installation, reporting and inspection systems within the USSR, and the rights, powers, and privileges of the control mechanism which would be required to implement such an agreement:

a. With particular reference to the necessary rapid continuous reliable communications arrangements without interference.

b. To verify the disclosed and agreed status of air forces, aircraft and missile armament, and bases incident thereto, and to promptly detect any significant violation of the agreement in this respect.

c. To verify the disclosed and agreed status of the Navy, including particularly submarines, and to promptly detect any significant violation of the agreement in this respect.

d. To verify the disclosure of the strength of the army forces, including armored units and artillery, and paramilitary and police, and to detect any major violation of the agreement or any significant re-positioning of the forces.

e. To establish a supervised stockpile of nuclear material for peaceful civilian purposes to be owned nationally, and to assure that there is

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complete knowledge of the location and end use of such stockpile material, and to minimize the potentiality of rapid and clandestine conversion of the stockpile material to weapons purposes.

f. To verify the cessation of nuclear material production in any plant in which cessation has been agreed upon; to verify observance of prohibition against the clandestine production of nuclear material; to assure the placement of nuclear material within the supervised stockpile from agreed production; and to assure the placement of nuclear material produced incident to other peaceful uses, such as power plants, in the supervised stockpile.

g. To observe and verify the volume of steel produced, to verify the agreed percentage used for armament purposes, and to detect any important diversions for expanded armament in violation of the agreement.

h. To verify the production and use of strategic materials and the fabrication of armament, and to detect any important diversions for expanded armament in violation of the agreement.

i. To assure that new armament production facilities directly constructed for clandestine use, or as a stand-by for future use, in violation of the agree-

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ment, or the significant expansion of armament production beyond agreed levels, is detected.

j. To verify the national budget for armament purposes, and to detect any significant violation in the agreed levels of such bduget.

k. To maintain continuous knowledge of the positioning of substantially all of the long range weapons delivery aircraft and missiles, and to assure to the maximum degree feasible against a surprise attack being launched through such delivery systems.

2. To asemble the inspection, reporting, and communications requirements of the portions of the total problem into one comprehensive inspection system with interrelated contribution to the total effectiveness.

IV. Supplementary Information Requested.

1. What portion of the personnel should be U. S. nationals as compared to nationals of other free countries?

2. What would be the range of magnitude of approximate cost of the installations?

3. What would be the range of magnitude of the approximate cost of the annual operation of the inspection system?

4. What special problems of recruitment of the necessary skills or of maintenance of the required installations is anticipated?

5. Would a variation in the precise agreed level of

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armaments cause any major alteration of the recommended inspection system? If affirmative, describe the effect in general terms.

V. Would the reciprocal facilities, installations, privileges, personnel, and reports within the United States be feasible?

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August 19, 1955

Honorable Harold Stassen
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Governor Stassen:

During our discussion Friday, August 12, we queried three points and you indicated you would be pleased to receive suggested modifications in the memorandum "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419", dated July 5, 1955, and revised August 4. These suggested modifications follow:

Query No. 1 - There is some question as to the relevance and validity of Assumption 1 of Section II, page 1: "The U. S. and the U.S.S.R. (and other major nations) have agreed to a limitation of armament at a level at which neither has the capability to annihilate the other."

It is possible that the U.S. has the ability today to annihilate the U.S.S.R., in the sense of being able to destroy most of its retaliatory military strength and a major portion of its productive capacity. The U.S.S.R. also may have this capability vis-a-vis the U. S., if she is willing to sacrifice the obsolescent part of her long-range air force (in one-way missions) to this end.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that adequate inspection of arms levels can be achieved soon, and thus before nuclear-air capabilities increase substantially on both sides. Therefore, we fear that the basic assumption, if officially adopted, would encourage a relaxation of the arms build-up before adequate inspection is achieved.

Suggested Modification:

In place of this assumption, we suggest the following:

"It is assumed that Communism's pursuit of its 'World-State' objective, using all feasible methods, remains unaltered, that deceit and even armed force will continue to be used when advantageous, that a major Soviet attempt politically to disarm the West may now be under way and, therefore, that the U. S. must continue its own arms build-up until an agreement is reached and an inspection system adequate to check and permit control of arms levels has been installed and is in successful operation."

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Honorable Harold Stassen

Query No. 2 - We raise a question as to the validity of Assumption 7, page 3, "that the available relevant Intelligence data on U.S.S.R. facilities is reasonably accurate in magnitude and geographic location."

Based on our C.I.C. and Air Force Intelligence briefings, and on previous work by members of our group in the Intelligence field, we doubt that this assumption can be defended.

Suggested Modification:

"It is assumed that neither present Intelligence nor a Soviet disclosure of the magnitude and location of U.S.S.R. facilities will be an adequate initial basis for an armament inspection system, until verified by a complete aerial survey of the U.S.S.R."

Query No. 3 - In Section III, "Solution Required", should not item k, the inspection system designed to warn of impending surprise attack, be given more emphasis or even priority status?

Inspection complete enough to control arms levels will be extremely difficult to bring about, and will require much time. Therefore, it seems to us that it would be better to concentrate on the crucial question of limiting use of armed force through inspection sufficient to warn of impending surprise attack.

Suggested Modification:

A recasting of Section III to call for a "Phase I" or limited inspection system, adequate to warn of impending surprise attack, and a "Phase II" or total inspection system, adequate to verify arms levels.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ J. H. Doolittle

J. H. DOOLITTLE

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APPENDIX B

October 31, 1955

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairmen, All Special Task Groups
Special Study Staff

Subject: The Follow-up on the Quantico Session

The excellent session at Quantico and the significant accomplishment of the Special Task Groups lead to the conclusion that the following procedure would be most fruitful for the continued carrying out of the President's directive:

A. A special working group be established consisting of one representative from each of the Special Task Groups under the chairmanship of the working group member from General Smith's Task Group.

1. This working group to proceed to fit together in one comprehensive inspection plan to apply to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe the inspection proposals of the various groups.

2. The regions to be established for the ground inspection service in a manner similar to the Smith Report, with such adjustments as may be needed to fit more readily the Navy requirements for regionalization and the communications flow, having in mind also the external

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communications net, and the relation to the external bases of the air inspection.

3. Anticipate that all ground inspection shall be under one command, that this will be established through the United States Department of Defense, that the United States would be the effective agent of the International Armaments Commission for the purpose of inspection in this territory, and that the United States would incorporate inspection personnel from states associated in collective defense agreements with the United States, and would also be required to associate some observers from the so-called neutral states.

4. Arrange the external and internal communications net to best fit with the potential of communications facilities, the external bases, and internal flight patterns of the air inspection and the regional and local ground inspection organization.

B. The Nuclear Task Group to proceed with the spelling out of the method of conducting a supervised stockpile of nuclear material in four countries, and within the USSR, United Kingdom, and United States, to be used if and when agreements are reached to place materials in such supervised stockpile.

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C. The Industry Task Group to consider further the numbers and types of personnel needed for its inspection role and to consider other industries which would need special attention beyond the power industry supervision.

D. All Task Groups to prepare a statement of requirements for aerial inspection service and submit these to the Air Task Group for their consideration and accommodation.

E. The Air Force Task Group to specify their requirements for ground inspection and sea approach inspection and submit these to the Army and Navy Task Groups respectively.

F. All Task Groups to present to the Communications Task Group their requirements for communications facilities for appropriate accommodation.

G. The Communications Task Group to be assisted through cryptographic specialists in working out safeguarding arrangements for internal communications.

H. Special sub-working groups of any two or three or four of the Task Groups to be established when suitable to prepare segments of the total work.

I. The comprehensive inspection plan, after preparation by the working group, to be reviewed by the Task Group Chairmen under the chairmanship of General Walter B. Smith, and following this review, to be presented to the Special Assistant to the President, and subsequently to the President and the NSC.

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J. The Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the development of a bomb "Sniffer" and to advise whether a specific request of the Atomic Energy Commission should be made by the Special Assistant to the President in this regard.

K. A sub-working group of the Air Force Task Group and the Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the problem and feasibility of the separation of nuclear weapons from their carriers in relation to an inspection system.

L. The Air Force and Navy Task Groups to each make a special study of the requirement for reporting in advance on projected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability in connection with an inspection system.

M. Each Task Group Chairman to advise on the anticipated time schedule involved in the rigid implementation of this follow-through assignment.

/s/ Harold E. Stassen

Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President

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THE WHITE HOUSE

APPENDIX C

Washington

21 November 1955

MEMORANDUM to General Walter Bedell Smith, Chairman
Task Force on Army Inspection

SUBJECT Requirements for Ground Inspection in the Air Inspection Plan

1. Under the date of 28 October 1955, General Truscott, of your Task Force, solicited our requirements for ground inspection teams which, in accordance with the understandings reached at Quantico, you would coordinate with the ground-inspection requirements of other Task Forces. This memorandum will confirm the verbal understanding we had with General Truscott relative to the ground inspection requirements envisioned by the Task Force on Air Inspection.

2. Attached are pertinent extracts from the final report of the Task Force on Air Inspection, making clear our view of our requirements and the considerations which have led us to this plan.

3. Our Task Force has been concerned with keeping to a minimum the number of U.S. nationals needed within Russia and her satellites to implement an inspection plan. Accordingly, we propose the establishment of ground inspection teams only at some 86 locations, as compared with the more than 200 places contemplated in the JCS Draft Plan, 19 October 1955.

4. We also feel that the complexity, cost and acceptability of the proposed ground inspection organization will be enhanced if the erection of an elaborate support structure can be avoided. We thus propose that our ground inspection teams will not be self-sustaining military units, but rather will obtain as much of their support as possible from local indigenous sources. To the extent required, those of their needs which cannot be met satisfactorily in this way will be looked after by airborne resupply conducted by the cargo aircraft, based outside of Russia, which we propose as a part of the air inspection plan. Thus the ground teams used for air inspection should not add to the support responsibilities of the Army inspection organization inside Russia.

J. H. Doolittle, Chairman
Task Force on Air Inspection

Encs: S II.C.3, S III.B., S III.D.

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THE WHITE HOUSE APPENDIX D

Washington 21 November 1955

MEMORANDUM to Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman
Task Force on Communications Inspection

SUBJECT Communications Requirements of the Air Inspection Plan

1. In accordance with the understandings reached at Quantico, and the conversation which Dr. Ridenour, of our group, had with you soon afterward, we handed to your Mr. Affel, a copy of the Air Force communications plan forming part of the JCS Draft Plan, 19 October 55.

2. Since that time, our thinking on the ground-inspection problem has advanced considerably, and we are now recommending a plan which envisions the establishment of ground inspector teams only at some 86 locations in the Soviet bloc, as opposed to the more than 200 locations on which the JCS plan was based. We feel that, although our basic requirement for air/ground communications is not changed in any way, this more frugal requirement for point-to-point ground communications may simplify the over-all communications plan.

3. Bearing in mind the fact that your Task Force is to integrate communications requirements arising from all the other groups, we have not tried to work out a communications plan. Instead, we have specified the general requirements for the type of communications that we shall need. The pertinent part of our final report, stating these requirements, is attached.

4. One point which is implicit in our report should perhaps be stated explicitly. We have striven to keep at a minimum the number of ground observers needed within the USSR. This has as a corollary the conclusion that the communications equipment supplied these ground observer teams should be simple to operate, easy to maintain, and highly reliable. The telephones with which your Company provides subscribers offer an excellent model of what is needed.

J. H. Doolittle, Chairman
Task Force on Air Inspection

Enc: S
s III.C.

APPENDIX D

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APPENDIX E

SPECIAL STUDY: SEPARATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM CARRIERS

In the post-Quantico memorandum which appears in full as Appendix D, the Task Force on Air Inspection was instructed as follows:

> "K. A sub-working group of the Air Force Task Group and the Nuclear Task Group to make a special study of the problem and feasibility of the separation of nuclear weapons from their carriers in relation to an inspection system."

Representatives of the Task Force on Nuclear Inspection and of the Task Force on Air Inspection met to discuss this problem, and their conclusions are summarized in what follows.

It is possible by extreme measures of detailed inspection to make sure that no nuclear weapon is loaded aboard an aircraft when it takes off. However, the fact that no fully reliable device for detecting the presence of a bomb from a distance is now available or appears likely of achievement (according to the Task Force on Nuclear Inspection) implies that only the closest and most detailed inspection can be relied upon to police such a restriction.

It is the view of the Task Force on Air Inspection that the combat-ready capability of the U.S. Strategic Air Command would be unduly endangered if foreign nationals were permitted unlimited access to the air bases from which SAC operates. Thus, measures designed to keep nuclear weapons separate from their carriers is unacceptable.

We feel that a far more promising approach is to keep tract of the movements of carriers capable of an intercontinental delivery of nuclear weapons, as set out more fully in the foregoing report and in Appendix F.

This conclusion would be modified if it becomes possible to build a device capable of detecting the presence of nuclear weapons at a distance of some tens of feet. While this does not now appear to be possible, the Task Force on Nuclear Inspection has some development suggestions directed to this end. The Task Force on Nuclear Inspection feels that these proposals should be implemented.

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APPENDIX F

MOVEMENTS CONTROL

Governor Stassen's letter of October 31, 1955 (Par. L) requests the Task Force on Air Inspection to "make a special study of the requirement for reporting in advance on projected movements of carriers with a nuclear weapons capability in connection with an inspection system."

We have concluded in the body of the report that accounting should be attempted respecting the number and location of manned aircraft and cruise missiles with intercontinental range. This suggests the exchange of detailed flight plans for such services. Unfortunately we cannot conceive of any mutually acceptable means of monitoring the positions of aircraft in flight. Since we see no need for accumulating information which cannot be verified, we propose that flight plans for carriers with intercontinental range be exchanged, but that these plans include only time and place of take-off-and estimated time and place of landing.

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), on the other hand, does not, so far as we can foresee, lend itself to the movements control concept. Once the ICBM is tested, produced, and operationally deployed (by clandestine means or in the absence of an inspection system) detecting it, the most fundamental prerequisite to any control system, becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, by any mutually acceptable inspection system. More important, however, flight time is so short (about 30 minutes) that violations of flight plans would become apparent too late to be of any practical value.

We are deeply disturbed by the prospect of the USSR achieving an ICBM operational capability, particularly since the difficulties in the way of successful interception and destruction of such missiles are, if not insurmountable, at least extremely great. Our concern is not lessened by the belief that the ICBM can become operational, or nearly so, by 1959. As a consequence, we have devoted some study to means of forestalling the arrival of the ICBM age. Although our thinking on the point is decidedly preliminary, we offer for discussion and for exhaustive further study on a very high priority basis, the notion of limiting development of the ICBM. We do this without for a moment suggesting that we should in any way relax the high priority we are currently putting on our ICBM research and development program.

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Consider first the feasibility of policing such a limitation. There is no way of developing an operationally-reliable ICBM without test-firing several hundreds of missiles, each of which can be heard for 30 miles when it takes off, can be seen for hundreds of miles by radar and perhaps thousands of miles by suitable infra-red means, and in general makes a substantial fuss. Furthermore, ground facilities for testing large missiles are very difficult to conceal. Consequently, we think that reliable means of detecting a test-firing anywhere are both technically feasible and not unduly costly.

Two major considerations remain. The first relates to the nature of a limitation agreement. We cannot conceive of the United States entering any control agreement which does not include all nations with an ICBM potential and all areas in which testing and launching could be carried out. Neither could we subscribe to a plan which did not allow continuous adjustment of the means of inspection to the changing technology. Lastly, means of punishing violation, including but not limited to the right of abrogation, would be essential.

The other problem to be considered is whether limiting ICBM development would also limit some phases of scientific advancement, and whether this would be acceptable. The idea of such a limitation is repugnant to us. We believe such a limitation is unavoidable, however, if only national programs are considered. A possible way to get around this difficulty would be to create an international organization to develop, test and operate earth satellite vehicles and other missiles of a type closely related to the ICBM which might be desirable from a purely scientific or other non-military standpoint.

The big risk in a proposal to ban national test firing, of course, is that mere knowledge that it is being seriously considered might slacken the pace of our own efforts. But this need not and must not be so. After all, for years the Soviets have been reaping a bonanza in propaganda advantage by calling for the banning of nuclear weapons, while themselves developing a nuclear stockpile at a pace that always exceeds our estimates. Pending establishment of a reliable control system (if technically feasible and negotiable) could we not reap a similar advantage in the ICBM field, while simultaneously being realistic and sophisticated enough to keep our own program going at full pace?

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APPENDIX N
TAB I
Capital Costs of the JCS Air/Ground Inspection Plan
(Costs in Millions)

TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS		$743.4
		542.0
Equipment		
Communications and Electronics	$275.0	
Inspection Control Centers	25.5	
Intermediate Stations	36.0	
Inspection Teams	210.0	
Augmentation to GLOBECOM Stations	3.5	
Aircraft	224.7	
175 C-131 aircraft including initial spares	185.0	
100 L-26 aircraft including initial spares	10.0	
25 H-19 aircraft including initial spares	7.0	
30 Air Rsq Gp aircraft (SA-16, SC-123, H-19, SB-29) including initial spares	22.7	
Other	42.3	
Unit Mission Equipment	6.0	
Personnel Equipment	36.3	
Facilities		102.0
Inspection Centers	47.5	
Centers are assumed to be built adjacent to USSR flying fields. Estimates are based on ZI costs for flying organizations of comparative size and numbers of aircraft.		
Aircraft maintenance and operations, POL storage, troop housing and messing, utilities, bulk storage, medical, personnel facilities, administration, shops and five portable GCA's. Costs exclude airfield pavement and family housing.	40.0	
Communication and Electronic Facilities	7.5	
Other Locations (C&E facilities only)	54.5	
Intermediate Stations	42.0	
Inspection Teams	12.5	
Initial Transportation		99.4
Personnel	9.4	
Equipment and Supplies	90.0	

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APPENDIX N
TAB II

Capital Costs of the Minimal Air/Ground Inspection Plan
(In Millions of Dollars)

TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS		301.7 206.7
Equipment		
Communications & Electronics	129.0	
Inspection Centers	25.5	
Intermediate Stations	30.0	
Inspection Teams	70.0	
Augmentation to GLOBECOM Stations	3.5	
Aircraft	59.7	
24 C-124 aircraft including initial spares	30.0	
24 H-19 aircraft including initial spares	7.0	
30 Air Rescue Group aircraft (SA-16, SC-123, H-19, SB-29) including initial spares	22.7	
Other	18.0	
Unit Mission Equipment	6.0	
Personnel Equipment	12.0	
Facilities		49.0
Inspection Centers	15.0	
Centers are assumed to be built adjacent to USSR air fields. Estimates are based on ZI costs for flying organisations of comparative size and numbers of aircraft.		
Aircraft maintenance and operations, POL storage, troop housing and messing, utilities, etc. Costs excluse airfield pavement and family housing	10.0	
Communications & Electronic Facilities	5.0	
Other Locations (C&E facilities only)	34.0	
Intermediate Stations	30.0	
Inspection Teams	4.0	
Initial Transportation		46.0
Personnel	6.0	
Equipment and Supplies	40.0	

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APPENDIX N
TAB III

Recurring Annual Cost of the JCS Air/Ground Inspection Plan
(Costs in Millions of Dollars)

TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS		$385.4
Aerial Reconnaissance		202.2
2 RB-36 Wings	98.5	
2 RB-47 Wings w/2 KC-97 Squadrons	97.8	
1 Air Rescue Group of 30 aircraft		
Support Aircraft		27.3
175 C-131 aircraft	24.5	
100 L-26 aircraft	2.0	
25 H-19 aircraft	0.8	
Personnel pay, allowances, overseas pay, medical and miscellaneous support costs (17,677 men)		98.1
Maintenance of C&E Equipment		38.5
Recurring transportation of personnel and equipment		19.3

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APPENDIX N

TAB IV

Recurring Annual Costs of the Minimal Air/Ground Inspection Paln
(Costs in Millions of Dollars)

TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS		319.0
Aerial Reconnaissance		202.2
2 RB-36 Wings	98.5	
2 RB-47 Wings w/2 KC-97 Squadrons	97.8	
1 Air Rescue Group of 30 aircraft	5.9	
Support Aircraft		4.8
2 Squadrons of C-124 aircraft (24 acft)	4.0	
24 H-19 aircraft	0.8	
Personnel pay, allowances, overseas pay, medical and miscellaneous support costs		90.0
Maintenance of C&E Equipment		12.0
Recurring transportation of personnel and equipment		10.0

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REPORT

TASK FORCE
on
GENERAL INDUSTRIAL AND POWER

23 December 1955

General Industry and Electric Power are primarily economic factors but are importantly related to a country's military strength. This is because the resources, facilities, and services involved are essential, directly or indirectly, to the production of modern military materiels, as well as to the support of any military action.

The objective of this task force is to present a general plan for the mutual exchange and verification of information relative to electric power and selected general industries that can be integrated into an overall inspection system to provide appropriate knowledge as outlined below. It should be noted that the information proposed for exchange is of a simple nature, most of which, as it pertains to the United States, is available through trade organizations and governmental bureaus.

1. Electric Power

   a. The existing power resources at the time of the exchange of information

   b. Plans for the expansion of electric power systems

   c. Power production statistics

   d. Power utilization statistics classified for certain key industries

2. Fuels

   a. Solid -

      (1) Mining facilities and resources

      (2) Production statistics

      (3) Utilization statistics classified for certain key industries

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b. Liquid (Petroleum and Synthetic) -

(1) Production facilities and resources

(2) Production statistics

(3) Utilization statistics classified for certain key industries

c. Gaseous (Natural and Manufactured) -

(1) Production facilities and resources

(2) Production statistics

(3) Utilization statistics classified for certain key industries

3. Non-Ferrous Metals

a. Aluminum, Copper, Magnesium -

(1) Production facilities and resources

(2) Production statistics

(3) Utilization statistics classified for certain key industries

b. Other Strategic Metals as Necessary

4. Chemicals

5. Machine Tools

Details concerning the specific information to be exchanged can be determined readily after there is a better understanding of the sincerity of the countries that might be included in the program.

PROPOSED PROGRAM

Because of the very large area of Russia, and its satellite countries, if they are included, much detailed advanced planning would be required before any verification work is undertaken. Little seems to be known about the exact location of the power plants, transmission lines, and industrial installations which are of importance.

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It is our understanding that the first phase of the overall plan would deal strictly with military installations and concentrations. It likely would include the proposed exchange of military "blueprints" followed by (1) complete aerial mapping and (2) surface inspection by army and navy groups for verification of the blueprints.

This would be expected to reveal information of considerable importance to this task group. The aerial photographs, in particular, should reveal information concerning the location of the major industries. From them and from such other information as might come to light, careful plans for the ground inspection would be made in advance of any actual field work.

Electric Power and Industry Blueprints Information

As noted earlier, most of the United States information proposed for exchange is available through trade organizations and governmental agencies. Except in a few instances, a substantial amount of assembly and coordination would be required to put the information into the form required for the purpose. It is likely that this operation would require up to 50 persons for a six-month period.

Field Operations

Two important functions are required in the field as follows:

1. Initial verification of blueprint information, and

2. Continuing inspection of industries under observation for verification of expansion programs and production and utilization statistics.

Initial Verification of Blueprint Information

As noted previously, detailed plans for verification would be made in advance, taking full advantage of disclosures made by aerial mapping and surface inspection by the military. The field inspectors would have the responsibility of finding and reporting all important electric power and industrial installations.

Field groups would report their observations to the program base for interpretation, corrections to the blueprints and other similar work.

Approximately 10 inspection groups, manned as follows, should be able to complete the initial verification in from three to six months.

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PROPOSED PERSONNEL OF EACH INSPECTION GROUP

1 Group Director - Civilian

4 Technical Specialists, in fields of Electric Power, Aluminum, other Non-Ferrous Metals, Liquid and Gaseous Fuels, Chemicals, etc., - Probably Civilians.

3 Assistant Technicians - Possibly assigned by Military

3 Interpreters

4 Clerks and Typists

6 - 12 Logistic support, including Transportation and Communications - to be assigned by the Military

It is anticipated that the host country would expect to assign appropriate personnel (two or three persons) to work with each inspection group to provide local direction to inspection targets and to make proper contacts with key people in the industries in question.

The technical specialists would all be qualified to deal with several fields of activity rather than any single field. They would operate either as a single unit, where important matters are involved, or as several sub-units in less important areas.

Military forces would be depended upon entirely for locistic suport. Inasmuch as each group would have to cover very wide areas, the logistic support might well include trailers for sleeping quarters and offices, together with appropraite motor vehicles.

With this organization, each group would be assigned the inspection responsibility for definite geographical areas. They would be supplied with the best possible advanced information concerning inspection targets. The group director would assign definite targets to the various technicians.

It is expected that the logistic military support would be assigned to the group, to work under the group director.

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CONTINUING INSPECTION AND EXCHANGE OF PRODUCTION STATISTICS

It is planned that this operation would be reduced to the minimum which would permit spot checks to confirm the accuracy of production statistics submitted on a periodic basis. This operation, however, would require direct contact with the Russians, which likely would have to be arranged through military channels.

It is believed that this function would be accomplished by five groups acting primarily upon instructions from the base headquarters.

Proposed Organization of Continuing Inspection Group

1	Group Director	- Civilian
3	Technical Assistants	- Civilian
3	Clerks and Typists	- Possibly Military
2	Interpreters	
3	Logistic Support	- Military

Communications

Information resulting from the initial verification of blueprints or the continuing inspection of industrial activities cannot be expected to serve as critical indicators of immediate military intentions. Speed of communications therefore is not emphasized. It is anticipated that communication needs can be coordinated with whatever systems may be set up for other inspection activities.

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Steel

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S T E E L

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FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

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OBJECTIVE

Make an inspection of and report to the President's Disarmament Study Group on the present status of the steel industry of the Soviet Union and Satellite Countries. Such investigation is to cover the following specific phases:

Raw Material Availability;

Capacity and Capability to assemble materials at plant sites ready for smelting;

Capacity and capability to make, shape and treat steel to meet the requirements of the economy for war and peace;

Product by Product Requirements of the economy for war and peace.

SCOPE AND CONCEPT

While the capacity of the iron and steel industry of the Soviet Bloc is only about one-half that of the United States, the task of investigating and cataloging Soviet steel mill facilities, the related raw material base and logistic support, is magnified by the wide dispersal of the plants and raw material sources over the geographic vastness of the U.S.S.R. and her satellites.

The Soviet Republic of itself is three times as large as the United States. Its steel mills, numbering over 100, according to available reports, stretch out from the Ukraine in the Soviet West, across the continent down to the Amur River in the Soviet Far East. Roughly, the Soviet steel industry falls into these main divisions:

Dnieper-Donbas Group in the Ukraine;

Central Group around Moscow, chiefly the Tula area;

Northwestern Group around the Leningrad area;

Ural Group with Sverdlovsk and Magnitorsk as the main centers;

Trans-Caucasion Group around Tiflis;

Central Asian Group extending from Tashkent through Kuznetsk to Lake Baikal;

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Far Eastern Group centered around Komsomolsk and Vladisvostok.

Total steel capacity is about equally divided between the industrial regions east and west of the Ural Mountains.

To the Soviet Union proper, there must be added the steel industry of the Soviet Satellite Countries in Eastern Europe--Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Rumania--now undergoing considerable expansion under a coordinated Moscow-directed master plan aimed at building up Eastern Europe's industrial potential to a position of balance with that of the Ruhr.

Collateral interest also attaches to the Manchurian steel industry which must be considered as part and parcel of the Soviet potential.

ORGANIZATION

Giving full consideration to the magnitude of the task outlined under OBJECTIVE and SCOPE and CONCEPT, the maximum direct staff personnel requirements of the Steel Inspection Force are estimated at one hundred, divided between a small Headquarters Group and four Field Teams, organized on a geographic basis, as follows:

Team I - Soviet Union - West of the Urals

Team II - Soviet Union - East of the Urals

Team III - Eastern European Satellites

Team IV - Manchuria

Organizational, functional and manning details are shown in the diagram on the following page.

The Headquarters Group will consist of the Head - Steel Inspection Force and his Staff and will be located at general Headquarters in Moscow. The Head - Steel Inspection Force will be responsible for the direction, coordination and effectiveness of the Steel Inspection Force. He will serve as a member of the U.S. (Western Powers) Headquarters - Moscow.

The Field Inspection Teams will be self-contained mobile units responsible functionally to the Head - Steel Inspection Force. Their duties will be to inspect, identify, catalog and assess the raw material base, logistics, steel facilities and steel distribution in the assigned regions. To insure maximum mobility, each unit will be billeted and found on a railway train comprising the required tractive equipment, two to three sleeping cars complete with adequate bathing and

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Steel Inspection Force

Diagram of Organization and Responsibilities

U. S. (Western Powers)
Inspection Mission
Moscow

Evaluation Team
Washington
(Government — Industry)

Head
Steel Inspection
Force

Direction —
Coordination — Effectiveness

Headquarters Staff

4 Staff Assistants
2 Secretaries

4 Inspection Teams

Inspection, Cataloguing, Assessment of Identified Facilities

Team 1 — Soviet Union West of Urals

Team 2 — Soviet Union East of Urals

Team 3 — Eastern Europe

Team 4 — Manchuria

Access To

Military District Groups

Security and Logistic Support

Each Team Composed of

Chief

1 Transportation Expert
2 Raw Materials Experts
1 Materials Handling Expert
2 Blast Furnace Experts
3 Steelmaking Experts of which 1 Alloy Steel Specialist
4 Rolling Mill Experts
1 Forgings Expert
2 Interpreters
1 Staff Assistant
3 Stenographers
1 Administrative Assistant

To Be Succeeded By

1 Audit Team
To Cover Entire
Soviet Steel Complex

Spot-Check Discrepancies —
Investigate Previously Undisclosed
Facilities and New Facilities
Under Construction

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other sanitary facilities, one fully staffed dining car, one office car with office and conference room facilities, two baggage cars suitable for accommodating four automobiles assigned to each team, plus the necessary railway cars and facilities for crew and provisions. The Army Ground Forces will furnish the required logistic support, including train crews, drivers, communications and other technical personnel and the provision of food, office supplies and equipment and dependable telephone and radio communications to and from the trains and automobiles. The Inspection Teams will have direct access to Military District Groups for supervision, security and logistic support. Normal communication with the Headquarters Group in Moscow will be by courier or any other system established for the overall program.

Upon termination of the primary inspection assignment, estimated as requiring three to four months' work, there will be formed from elements of the Inspection Teams an Audit Team of a continuing nature, the function of which will be to spot-check discrepancies, investiage previously undisclosed facilities and new facilities under construction.

Personnel for the Inspection Force, experienced in making, shaping and treating of steel and corollary operations, will be provided by the Steel Industry of the United States at no expense to the Government, other than as indicated. Secretarial and stenographic staff, as well as the pool of interpreters, will be supplied by the Government, preferably from Military or Naval personnel.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES

The Inspection Teams will verify information submitted by Soviet and Satellite authorities and/or such undisclosed facilities as may be brought to their attention as a result of aerial surveys or other intelligence reports by entering, viewing, identifying and observing raw material, raw material assembly and industrial plant facilities and their operation and output. By being permitted merely to enter plants and observe operations, inspectors experienced in steel mill operations will be able to determine with sufficient accuracy the output potentialities, quantity and quality-wise. Detailed study of manufacturing processes or probing into commercial secrets is not necessary nor is it deemed desirable, from a reciprocal facility standpoint.

The Steel Inspection Force will have access to aerial photographs and their interpretation by experienced technicians. It will also have access to required intelligence reports and to facilities providing for the interchange of information with other Inspection Forces.

Interpretative analysis of developed steel industry data is to be effected in the United States by Government agencies assisted, as required, by steel industry technicians.

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Budget

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January 10, 195

REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON
BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL INSPECTION
HAROLD G. MOULTON, CHAIRMAN

The assignment of the Task Force in the financial realm was "to verify the national budget for armament purposes and to detect any significant violation in the agreed levels of such budget." The procedure followed has been: (1) to study the budgetary and financial accounting system employed by the United States and our principal allies, and, so far as the meager data would permit, by Russia; and (2) to discuss the issues and problems involved with experts in the Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of the Budget, Department of Defense, State Department, and General Accounting Office.

A budgetary and financial system of control is appealing at first thought. Ascertain from the budget appropriations the aggregate, and the types of, expenditures authorized and then examine the financial records to see whether actual outlays are within the authorized total and have gone for the specific purposes designated. This seems like a simple, direct method of ensuring compliance with the agreements that have been reached. However, investigation of budgetary and accounting procedures reveals that such an inspection system is beset with difficulties. Hence the purpose of this memorandum may be stated as being to: (1) reveal the practical difficulties involved in budgetary inspection and verification of accounts, relating to military outlays; (2) and to outline a somewhat restricted inspection system believed to be feasible, and a valuable complement to other forms of inspection.

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Budget Systems

The budgetary and accounting procedures of nations are highly diverse. They reflect historical developments, differing accounting conceptions, and often the practical exigencies with which harassed Finance Ministers have been confronted. National budgets vary widely as to coverage; and many items outside the budget proper commonly have to be brought into the picture. In addition to the Ordinary Budget there may be an Extraordinary Budget, a Special Budget, or Annexes. Sometimes the budget proper excludes all, or important types, of military expenditures. Moreover, the method of classifying expenditures usually does not reveal the military items in which we are interested. A brief description of the official budgets of the United States, Great Britain and Russia will serve to reveal the nature of the difficulties involved.

1. The United States Budget. Even under the very good United States budget system, there is confusion as to aggregate military outlays. The figures commonly quoted as the "budget for defense" refers only to expenditures under the Department of Defense; highly important items are budgeted elsewhere. However, the President in his annual summary presents a comprehensive unified statement of projected receipts and expenditures, with everything included. The summary for fiscal 1956 as presented by the President lists the following:

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Department of Defense	$34,000	billions
Development and Control of Atomic Energy . .	2,000	billions
Strategic and Critical Materials	783	millions
Mutual Security	3,675	billions
Total	$40,458	billions

Atomic Energy outlays are under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Strategic and Critical Materials are budgeted under, and administered by, General Services Administration, in accordance with policies laid down by the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Mutual Security, financed from funds appropriated to the President, is now administered jointly by the International Cooperation Administration, within the Department of State, and the Department of Defense for Military aid. The breakdown of the $3,675 billions is $3,075 for Military Assistance and $600 millions for Direct Forces Support.

These various major categories, it will be seen, are of diverse character. Department of Defense is an administrative agency; Atomic Energy and Strategic and Critical Materials are specific military items; while Mutual Security is an objective.

Even the more detailed budgets for the Army, Navy, and Air Force contain little useful information for the present purpose, since they are geared to very different objectives. The principal subclasses for the three Services are listed on page 4, the figures given being estimates for Fiscal Year 1956.

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A. The Army

Military personnel	$3,500,000,000
Military maintenance and operation	2,987,000,000
Military construction, Army Reserve Forces	30,000,000
Reserve personnel	120,000,000
Army National Guard	270,000,000
Research and Development	380,000,000
Military Construction	350,000,000
Procurement and Production	2,316,000,000

B. The Navy

Military Personnel, Navy	$2,260,000,000
Reserve Personnel, Navy	75,000,000
Navy Personnel, general expenses	79,000,000
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	560,000,000
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	16,000,000
Marine Corps - troops and facilities	160,000,000
Marine Corps - procurement	450,000,000
Aircraft and facilities	750,000,000
Aircraft and related procurement	2,000,000,000
Ships and facilities	680,000,000
Construction of Ships	55,000,000
Shipbuilding and conversion	882,000,000
Naval military procurement	425,000,000
Ordnance and facilities	175,000,000
Medical care	61,000,000
Civil engineering	105,000,000
Military construction, Naval Reserve Forces	25,000,000
Research and Development	434,000,000
Service-wide supply and finance	300,000,000
Service-wide operations	80,000,000
Naval Petroleum Reserve	3,825,000
Public Works	240,000,000

C. Department of the Air Force

Aircraft and related procurement	$6,150,000,000
Major procurement other than aircraft	925,000,000
Research and development	540,000,000
Maintenance and operation	3,450,000,000
Military personnel	3,300,000,000
Reserve personnel	38,000,000
Air National Guard	180,000,000
Acquisition and construction of real property	950,000,000

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The expenditures are broken down into a number of subclasses, but in the main these have no relation to specific types of armament. Rather, they relate to overall personnel, to maintenance, procurement, research, etc.; and they show separately the budgets for subsidiary military agencies such as Reserve Forces and the National Guard. There is no uniformity in the several classifications, each being a reflection of its own historical development and its particular accounting practices. These differences are strikingly illustrated by the fact that the Navy shows no item for Maintenance and Operation, and the Army makes no specific reference to Aircraft and Related Procurement. With one or two exceptions one cannot add up comparable figures drawn from these several budgets to obtain significant aggregates. And without a close scrutiny of the accounting records one cannot know precisely what is meant, or included, in some of the categories.

Most important for our purpose, these budget summaries are not focused on specific types of weapons. What we would require is a detailed breakdown of such broad categories as "Procurement and Production" (Army); "Ships and Facilities"; "Construction of Ships"; and Shipbuilding and Conversion (Navy); and "Major Procurement Other than Aircraft" (Air Force).

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Fortunately, the Department of Defense, for purposes of internal information and control, compiles monthly a report on Status of Funds by Budget Category, in which the material is assembled by specific objects of expenditure and on a combined basis, without reference to the separate services. The data show cumulative totals for the fiscal year, to date; and for purposes of comparison accompanying charts show annual expenditures since 1951. The major classes include: Military Personnel Costs; Operation and Maintenance; Major Procurement and Production; Military Public Works; Reserve Components; Research and Development; DOD Establishment-wide Activity; Working Capital (revolving) Funds; and Undistributed.

The breakdown under Major Procurement and Production, showing expenditures for specific types of armament, greatly clarifies the character of our defense program. The items included are as follows:

a. Aircraft
b. Ships and harborcraft
c. Combat vehicles
d. Support vehicles
e. Artillery
f. Weapons
g. Ammunition
h. Guided missiles
i. Electronics and communications
j. Production equipment and facilities
k. Other

Guided missiles appeared as a separate category for the first time in 1954, but the outlays given are not yet inclusive, because those involved in uncompleted contracts are still included under ammunition. To make the picture complete inventories should be included; and it is my understanding that this problem is now being studied jointly by the General Accounting Office and the Department of

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Defense. Though some of the categories are still very broad, and numerous important specific items are not revealed, it could readily be modified to meet the needs of a budgetary inspection system.

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3. The Russian Budget System. The only published Soviet budget summarizes the numerous types of Revenue and the Expenditures by broad categories. The expenditures classification for fiscal 1954 are as follows:

Soviet Budget Expenditures 1954

Financing the National Economy	Billion Rubles
Industry	90.9
Agriculture	(55.5)
Trade and Procurement	(16.0)
Transport and Communications	21.5
Municipal Economy	(7.5)
Other	25.0
Total	216.4
Social-Cultural Measures	
Education	67.2
Health and Physical Culture	29.3
Aid to Mothers	
Social Security	44.9
Social Insurance	
Total	141.4
Administration	13.9
Internal Security	(14.0)
Defense	100.3

Russian outlays for atomic energy are believed to have been under Financing the National Economy -- Other until 1955; and then shifted to Industry. Expenditures for military components of the internal security police are apparently included under Internal Security rather than Defense.

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In a State where the whole economy is directed by the Government a larger proportion of all economic activities find reflection in the national budget. This means that there are more cases where expenditures serve both military and non-military purposes; and naturally there are more places where outlays serving military ends might be hidden. It is, of course, possible that many items of military significance are included under Industry; Transport and Communications; Trade and Procurement; and even Education.

The fact that the Russian Budget, as currently published, furnishes almost no information relevant to the armament control problem, should not be interpreted adversely; for this is also true of other national budgets. The Soviet authorities might well agree to present data in the form called for by the international inspection agency. Indeed, they stated in their May 10 proposals that "the control organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military purposes, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty)". In the light of this explicit statement a failure to comply would be convincing evidence of bad faith, ab initio.

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Two widely differing methods of inspection are to be considered. in this memorandum. The first would concentrate on analysis of official budgets and the impact of reductions in military outlays in the national economy. The second would depend on an actual audit of accounts pertaining to military outlays. Each method requires consideration.

The Budgetary Analysis Approach

This approach, as suggested by the French Government, proceeds from the assumption that an agreement is reached calling for a quantitative reduction in total military outlays, leaving it to each country to decide for itself just where the cuts would be made. The reduction is assumed to be on a progressive percentage basis -- the higher percentage each year to be computed on the new (reduced) base.

The control, or inspection system, involves the following conceptions and procedures:

(1) The submission of military budgets annually to an international control agency. These should be broken down into significant categories, and be presented on a strictly comparable basis with uniform terminology.

(2) Budgets for the initial year might be padded; hence it would be necessary to compare them with budgets for several preceding years - with appropriate allowance for changes in wage and price levels.

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(3) Each new annual budget as submitted would be carefully compared with preceding budgets. Significant budget differences would have to be explained by citing specific military items that are to be reduced. The international agency would then seek to verify the budget cuts by calculating the savings that would normally be expected from such a type of reduction (taking account, of course, of possible changes in cost levels in each particular nation).

(4) In case patently false or insincere budgets are submitted severe penalties should be levied against the offender.

(5) Finally, the validity of the budgets submitted from year to year should be tested by studying the impact of changes in the military budget upon the national economy.

The great emphasis in the French proposal on aggregate reduction of military expenditures -- in order to release funds for constructive purposes -- creates the impression that the plan is wholly quantitative and thus relatively simple. But the inspection system suggested is, in fact, a highly complex procedure. If, for example, a Russian budget showed a contemplated reduction in outlays for ground forces, of say 1,000,000 men, the international agency would proceed to study the resulting impact of this displacement upon the private economy. Do the released personnel show up in increased employment in transportation, or manufacturing, or

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agriculture, or government? Do production and trade data reveal a contraction of sales of military uniforms, or trucks, or gasoline, or food to government procurement agencies? If expenditures for artillery or ships are curtailed, would not repercussions manifest themselves in the output of steel, copper, and other structural materials? The point was emphasized that any serious dishonesty in the budget would certainly be detected by skillful statistical analysis -- that the telltale evidence would show up somewhere. "Oh the tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive".

The French delegate on the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament expressed the view that the system of budgetary inspection thus outlined would be sufficient by itself to protect the vital interests of the contracting nations -- that no other form of inspection would really be necessary. In the end, however, it was admitted that other forms of inspection might be useful complements.

Would such a system adequately safeguard our national interests? Concretely, could we be sure: (1) that aggregate military expenditures were really being curtailed; (2) that, even with a reduction in total outlays, military power was not still increasing; and (3) that we would be forewarned of an imminent attack? We shall consider each question in turn:

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(1) Aggregate military outlays might still be increasing, with funds obtained from other than budgetary sources. There are in fact, numerous devices by which military outlays might be increased without appreciably affecting the budget. For example: (a) Arrange with a government-sponsored agency (presumably for non-defense purposes) to borrow money from private sources and use the proceeds to buy military equipment. The government could then make annual contributions to the agency sufficient to amortize the loans over a period of years. Even these small amortization costs might be hidden if the borrowing arrangements were made with the Central bank. (b) Have a local government borrow the money to purchase military goods. Annual payments to liquidate the loans could be called grants-in-aid. (c) Arrange with a private contractor to borrow the money to finance the manufacture of military equipment, the government again spreading its payments over a period of years. Such a credit arrangement might also be made with the cooperation of the Central bank. (d) Employ a special trust fund into which the Treasury would divert revenues to meet military expenditures. By spending the money during the current fiscal period, neither the gross income nor the gross expenditure need appear; only the net difference between receipts and expenditures would be shown on the accounts of the special fund.

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(2) Even with a curtailment of total military outlays, military power might still be increasing rapidly. This would result from elimination of outmoded or relatively unimportant weapons or methods of warfare and concentration on more lethal types. Under present conditions this is a vital weakness in any quantitative program.

(3) A budgeting control system which relies upon analysis of the impact of changes in military outlays upon the private economy would be useless as a warning device. This is because a reduction of armed forces, or of special types of military supplies and equipment, or - what is more germane to our present question -- any increase in military personnel or equipment and supplies would not be manifest in the statistics of civilian employment or production and trade for many months. Indeed, most data of this type commonly do not become available for more than a year. Moreover, many countries do not assemble all of the information that would be required. Finally, the complexities of the civilian economy are such that it would be impossible to isolate the effects of military changes from other changes operating within the economy.

Verification of Financial Accounts

We turn now to the alternative method of control -- the inspection of the financial records. Assuming that each country agrees to furnish the international agency the budgetary data in the form and with the breakdown

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prescribed would it be possible, or practical, for the Agency to check the financial records -- to audit the accounts so that we might have assurance that actual expenditures are in line with budgetary data?

It should help in understanding what would be involved in verifying the figures to know how the auditing system employed by the United States Government operates. Appropriations are, of course, made by Congress on the basis of specific budget requests, accompanied by detailed costs data directly related to the objects of expenditure. These data are made available to the General Accounting Office, which under the law is charged with responsibility for seeing that expenditures are made in accordance with legislative authorizations. The General Accounting Office is also empowered to determine and supervise the accounting and auditing systems of the various departments of government.

The contracts let with industrial companies by the military services require satisfactory accounting procedures. The accounts are audited at the companies, chiefly by civilian accountants employed by the Government. The vouchers and other data, on the basis of which checks are drawn, remain in the possession of the producing companies. Eventually, all checks are filed with the General Accounting Office.

To facilitate the handling of the vast assembling and recording of data involved the Government maintains three finance centers -- for the Navy, at Cleveland; for the Army, at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis;

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for the Air Force, at Denver. The records of payments compiled by agents in the field are assembled in these finance centers; and the resulting schedules are in due course transmitted to the Controller in the Department of Defense in Washington.

What now would be involved for a team of International Inspectors seeking to verify the figures? The first step would be to visit the General Accounting Office in order to confirm legislative authorizations budgetary estimates. Next, it would be desirable to confer with the military services with respect to procurement contracts. Then it would be necessary to visit financial headquarters in Cleveland, Indianapolis and Denver to scrutinize the detailed schedules showing payments made to specific contracting companies. Finally, to verify these figures, it would be necessary for the inspectors to go to the producing companies and check the documentary evidence. To make a complete verification of accounts by this method would necessitate visiting scores of plants -- not taking account of the multitude of subcontracting concerns.

Following the checking of documents at the individual companies it would be necessary to assemble the results on a national overall basis in order to check them against the combined budgetary figures compiled by the Department of Defense.

By a sampling process it would be possible for a competent group of inspectors to satisfy themselves that the system of accounting control in use is good, or bad, as the case may be. But any extensive verification

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of accounts would be wholly out of the question. [The magnitude of the operation may be gauged from the fact that the General Accounting Offices for a similar purpose maintains a staff of roughly 500 certified public accountants and 150 field experts; and is still undermanned.]

First, it would necessitate a substantial group of financial experts in Washington, Moscow and other capitols, privileged to scrutinize the financial records of the central government. Russia would be unlikely to agree to this because she would have much more to lose than to gain from the intelligence point of view. Second, it would require that a vast army of accountants be permitted to work inside industrial establishments for considerable periods of time. How could one know that they were not technical production experts rather than accountants? Third, the essential professional personnel -- accountants and language experts - would not be available - at least in the United States.

In any case such audits could not be completed in time to be useful as danger signals. The regular auditing accounts comes late, not early. It is usually quite some time after the expenditures are made before the audits in the field are completed. Then the process of assembling the results through the three finance centers and compiling the combined data at the Controllers office in Washington normally requires approximately two months. To round out the whole picture, it would also be necessary to include military outlays which are not administered by the Department of Defense; such, for example, as Strategic and Critical Material and

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Atomic Energy in the United States, or defense outlays by Civilian departments in Great Britain. Thus, before the International Inspectors could follow up the leads, and complete the task of verification and reporting, well over a year's time presumably would have elapsed. Hence, it would not be useful for alarm purposes.

In the U.S.S.R. the task of verifying expenditures might well present even greater difficulties. In a highly centralized bureaucratic state one might assume that the financial accounts and reports with respect to procurement would all be located in Moscow. But, it has been reported that in the past two years a decentralized system of administration is being developed, which involves transferring details of planning to regional ministries and local plant managers. This said to have resulted in substantial reductions in the reporting to Moscow and hence in personnel requirements. If this be true the accounts and supporting documents would now presumably be widely dispersed.

It should be added that the task of determining precisely just what production activities are military, or semi-military, would present great difficulty to financial inspectors. A given plant may be producing both military and civilian goods; and raw or semi-manufactured materials ostensibly intended for civilian uses might readily be diverted to military production.

The conclusion to which our study of both types of financial control -- that is, budgetary analysis and inspection of accounts,-- leads is that

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neither could be depended upon to ensure that agreements made were being fulfilled.

A Suggested Program

Despite the negative conclusion which the foregoing analysis has reached, we nevertheless believe that a budgetary and financial inspection can be so devised and administered as to constitute a highly important complement to other forms of inspection. Indeed, it might even be a useful means of testing the integrity of purpose of the U.S.S.R.

An effective financial inspection would require: (1) Submission of the budget in the form required by the International Agency. It should be required that all military expenditures be included, regardless of past practices. (2) The budget should be broken down so as to reveal specifically those types of military outlay covered by the agreements. (3) Quarterly or semi-annual reports, similarly classified should be required. These specific classifications would be useful for purposes of comparisons of specified types of armament. Moreover, they would shed light on the general character of a nations military program -- disclosing perhaps the relative emphasis on offense and defense.

In addition to the official budget the following documents should be submitted:

(1) Legislative and executive documents pertaining to military authorizations and appropriations, and executive decisions relating thereto. (Suggested by U.S.S.R. May 10.)

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(2) An official statement relating to unexpended balances from previous authorizations.

(3) Reports of the Ministry of Finance or Treasury.

(4) Reports of the Central Bank.

(5) An official statement of authorized military expenditures, classified in terms of the specific items covered in the agreements.

The general budget and other official documents pertaining to authorizations and appropriations not only provide a valuable overall picture of a nation's operations but in the hands of experienced analysts may afford clues to possible evasion of agreements. Since current budgetary authorizations afford no adequate measure of the financial resources available for the military program, requirement No. 2 is of great importance.

Reports of the Treasury are required because they might possibly disclose: (a) evasions such as those indicated on pp. 12-13; and (b) a speeding up in the rate of military outlays, foreshadowing a surprise attack. The Central Bank is a possible source of funds not connected with ordinary fiscal operations; hence, one might be forewarned if quarterly reports indicated an increase in advances to government agencies or to outside enterprises. The required submission of these various documents and the general budget in the form specified might well provide a quick test of each nation's willingness to cooperate and

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of its integrity. Failure to submit the budget data in the form requested, and the other documents called for, or evasiveness in discussing most questions arising with respect to specific budget items would be evidence of poor faith.

While comprehensive inspection of financial records is impractical, for reasons set forth earlier in this memorandum, a selective system does appear feasible. It is recommended that such inspection be applied to those classes of military production where it could be carried out rapidly and with a minimum of personnel. Fortunately, some of the items of major interest fall in this category. For example, atomic energy production is a government monopoly and is concentrated in a few very large installations; consequently, the number of documents to be checked would be small relatively to the magnitude of the outlays involved. Construction of naval vessels is likewise a giant scale operation, and the inspection of accounts would not present insuperable difficulty. Army and Air Force bases, ports, and railway and highway construction perhaps fall in the same category. While it is difficult to draw the line between the practical and the impractical, it is obvious that inspection difficulties mount in proportion to the dispersion of the productive effort. The items where financial inspection would be authorized would, of course, be specified in the agreements.

The nature of the organization required and a tentative estimate of the cost will be found in the general integrated report.

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PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS

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INCORPORATED
MURRAY HILL LABORATORY
MURRAY HILL, NEW JERSEY
SUMMIT 6-6000

J. B. FISK
VICE PRESIDENT-RESEARCH

28 August 1955

The Honorable Harold E. Stassen
United States Delegation
2 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Governor Stassen:

Attached is a preliminary study of the communications problem. It consists of three parts:

1. A foreword, which discusses the role of observation and inspection in reducing the probability of war. It stresses general observation and inspection as a supplement to or, initially, as an alternative to disarmament and the strict control of nuclear weapons.

2. The report proper, entitled "Preliminary Study of Communications." It calls attention to the intimate relation existing between the communication system and the rest of the inspection operation. Because of this relationship it deals as largely with the inspection operation as it does with the communication system per se.

3. An appendix, which describes the present status of some of the links in a proposed external communication network.

We are persuaded that observation and inspection are themselves important goals, however limited they may be initially. We are further persuaded that an evolutionary approach is necessary;

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that the "pilot" operation including its communications will itself be valuable; that a comprehensive system can grow in time; that its effectiveness and the reliance to be placed upon it will be learned gradually. We do not visualize a system which can be an immediate substitute for any of our existing defenses or military strengths.

Our preliminary report is obviously and necessarily sketchy. We believe we understand the principal problems and will be prepared to elaborate on them as the over-all inspection scheme takes shape.

In its present form the report is the work of Dr. H. W. Bode and myself. The proposed external network was worked out by Mr. W. G. Thompson. We have benefited by earlier discussions with General Doolittle's group and with other properly authorized persons, but have not subjected the report to detailed criticism or coordination.

Sincerely yours,

J. B. Fisk

Attached:
Report

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FOREWORD TO COMMUNICATIONS STUDY

DISARMAMENT AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR: REDUCING THE THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK

New Weapons and the Importance of Surprise

The start of World War II for the United States was a coordinated air attack on the Philippines, Hawaii, and other outposts. Several hundred planes, with high-explosive bombs and torpedoes, destroyed the fleet at Pearl Harbor. Surprise, and the weight of the attack, were the essential factors in the Japanese effort.

Pearl Harbor is an isolated episode in United States history. However, most modern wars have begun with a sudden heavy onslaught of some sort, delivered with little or no warning. Aggressor nations generally have found it to their military advantage to do as much damage as possible immediately, before their adversaries were on guard and prepared to resist.

These military calculations held even in an era in which destruction could be accomplished only by high explosives. Since then, however, the destructive power of bombs available for the initial attack has increased a millionfold: from tons to megatons. The cost of equivalent explosive has dropped by a factor greater than 1000; the cost of delivery by a much greater factor.

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The Hiroshima bomb was more than a thousand times as powerful as an HE bomb of equivalent weight. Our fleet concentration at Pearl Harbor could probably have been destroyed by one such atomic bomb carried by one airplane. Since Hiroshima, the destructive power of a single bomb has increased by still another factor of 1000. One airplane today carrying a 20 megaton bomb could destroy an area 100 times as great as a 1945 bomb.

In ordinary discussion of these matters it is natural for us to focus our attention largely on the dramatic power of a single bomb, especially on the great destructive potential of the megaton bomb. But the real danger is not the single bomb, however destructive. As in the HE era, it is the large-scale coordinated surprise attack with many bombs. A single bomb will not win a war. A small number, perhaps 50, megaton bombs delivered on selected targets with practical accuracy could simultaneously destroy a large part of our striking power and so disrupt civil life and the function of government that retaliation and the ability to fight a war would cease.

It is, of course, for just these reasons that disarmament is now more prominent in our thoughts than ever before. Disarmament in the sense of detailed control of nuclear weapons has not been acceptable. It is not likely soon to become acceptable; it may no longer be technically feasible. But "disarmament" is not the only approach to relief from the real danger. If the large-scale, coordinated, surprise attack can be

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observed in the making, thus surprise prevented, large-scale nuclear war becomes improbable: - The consequence to the aggressor of only partial success in a first attack is most likely to be his own total destruction.

How We Are Meeting the Threat of Tactical Surprise

Massive, surprise attack can be conceived as simultaneous detonation of bombs delivered by ship, launched from ship and submarine, emplaced clandestinely, and delivered by airplane from both high and low altitude. Vigilance against each approach is required but principally against the air approach, to which the others would be supplementary.

For the safety of our cities and for the safety of our striking power, warning of impending attack is absolutely essential - both for dispersal and for effective combat and retaliation. Tactical warning and alert is being planned and provided. We are being equipped with electronic means for getting a few hours warning. The DEW line, with its extensions and improvements, will begin to fill this tactical warning need. Closer to the continental United States other warning, alerting and action lines are being planned and installed. Within the United States proper the Air Defense systems serve to warn, and will control an air battle should it come.

These layers of warning and defense are essential. They will be essential for the foreseeable future. They must continually be strengthened and extended. Strategic warning could be of even greater importance -

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both in sharpening response to tactical warning, and, particularly, as a deterrent to war.

Strategic Warning

An alerting and warning system should start with intelligence, which could give us several days notice of impending attack. The weakest part of our system is very likely right here at the start. This is not for lack of effort; the Iron Curtain has been one of the most successful inventions in military history. Any improvement in our intelligence, in our accumulation of hard facts, will improve our entire defense position. For we have little "strategic" intelligence, and no satisfactory ways to obtain the hard facts on which such intelligence must be built.

National capabilities and intentions are the objects of strategic intelligence. Capabilities are learned over long time periods by piecing together quantities of information from many sources: industrial activity, transportation and construction, military installations, numbers, types and performance of military weapons and vehicles and the skills with which operations and maneuvers are carried out. Intentions are learned or surmised over similar long time periods by first piecing together the information that establishes normal patterns of activity, then focussing on the critical elements of the pattern to detect abnormal activity and change.

Strategic intelligence, thus, is characterized by the quantity and variety of its information content and by the relatively long time scale

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over which significant changes take place. These characteristics bear importantly on any observation, inspection and communication system which may be established to reduce or eliminate the probability of surprise attack.

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Conclusions

Observation and inspection which leads in time to comprehensive knowledge of Russia's military capabilities and intentions is an alternative to disarmament in making large-scale nuclear war improbable.

A reciprocal observation and inspection scheme in effective operation could demonstrate to each side the lack of hostile intentions by the other and remove the grounds for uncertainty and suspicion.

Initially, observation and inspection would supplement and strengthen our defenses - not substitute for them.

As a supplement to our defenses, any factual information, however sparse, has real value and should be accepted as a good beginning.

It is important to remember that problems of inspection and control become harder with time and with the evolution of new weapons. There is a time urgency to begin to acquire information now. The methods and techniques of observation, the operating procedures, the communication system, the information itself will grow gradually. We cannot expect

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comprehensive and infallible inspection or control before years of experience.

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Beyond observation and inspection for the prevention of Surprise attack there is a longer term goal of greater meaning. This is the dissolution of the Iron Curtain and the establishment of interchange and understanding between the countries and the people of east and west. As this takes place, the need for armament and special precautions will diminish. The observation and inspection schemes being proposed move us toward this goal.

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THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Introduction

Any realistic approach to the provision of communication facilities for the proposed inspection system must begin with the recognition that the technical problems of providing a suitable communication network are very great. The reasons need not be described in detail here, since the subject will be discussed in more detail later. Briefly, however, they stem primarily from the fact that we are considering very large areas, and consequently very large distances over which communication must take place. In addition to the areas to be inspected, we must give some allowance to peripheral areas containing supporting communication facilities.

Another important factor is the absence of ground facilities on which oommunications can be based. In the United States, of course, large-scale communications are based either on appropriate land lines, or upon elaborate chains of radio relay posts. In the Soviet zone, and most of the surrounding area, these are largely lacking. We would probably not, in any case, wish to base the communication network for the proposed inspection system primarily on facilities under Soviet control.

These considerations do not mean that the communication problem is totally impossible. They do mean, however, that to make

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an effective approach to the communication problem we must pay careful attention to the intimate relation existing between the communication system and the rest of the inspection operation. We must know, in other words, fairly precisely what the objectives of the inspection operation are, and how we plan to reach them. Otherwise the communication system may turn out to be fantastically difficult, if it can be achieved at all.

As a consequence of these considerations, the present report will focus as largely on the inspection operation broadly as it does on the communication problem per se. In addition, a Foreword has been written which gives the understanding of the communication task group of the over-all objectives of the inspection operation. It will serve as a general foundation for the discussion of inspection objectives which follows in the next few sections.

Another conclusion also follows from these general considerations. This is the fact that a suitable approach to the communication problem must be somewhat evolutionary. We must take account, in other words, of the fact that, if an inspection system is instituted, its objectives and plan of operation will probably change gradually over the course of time, and the associated communication system must change correspondingly. Moreover, in providing any sort of communication system we will probably be under very great time pressure. We will need to meet the most urgent requirements first in order to provide even a makeshift system sufficiently early.

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The emphasis in the present report is very strongly on the provision of communication facilities to meet the needs of the near future. The political and psychological climate in which an inspection system might operate in the remote future, and therefore the specification of the job which a supporting communication network might have to do, is rather difficult to foresee now in the absence of any actual experience with the inspection operation. We can better plan this as we go along. On the other hand, the provision of rudimentary communication facilities for the initial stages of inspection is itself so difficult and pressing a problem that it needs all our attention for the time being.

Communications and Day-by-Day Operational Problems

It seems clear on reflection that the communication system will be called upon to serve two distinct functions in the over-all inspection process. The more obvious is the transmission of the product of the inspection process to home base. In other words, the final product of inspection will be simply information about the Soviet zone. A communication system is of course, by definition, a device for the transmission of information. Thus one obvious function of the communication system is the final transportation of inspection results to a place where they can be studied and acted upon as necessary.

When we think of the communication system in these terms we are likely to think of the vital importance of the information, the necessity that it be transmitted in good season, whatever that may mean, and the

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possibility that the inspected party may attempt to substitute fraudulent information for the real message.

These dramatic aspects of the problem should not permit us to lose sight of the fact that the communication system must also serve a more mundane but equally important function. This is the support of the day-by-day inspection operation. The practical inspection process will involve activities which are thinly scattered over a huge area, and are based at many widely separated ports of entry around the area. An adequate communications network will be a necessity to meet immediate operational problems in such an area, and to secure a reasonable coordination among the various activities, without regard to the transmission of the information which the inspection process yields.

A critical examination of the objectives of inspection indicates that this operational function, rather than the first function, is the one which will make the most pressing demands on the communication system, at least during the initial phases of inspection. This subject is discussed in the next section.

Near-Term Inspection Objectives

The Foreword gives a summary of the background assumptions concerning our general military and political situation in so far as it affects the communication problem in the proposed inspection system. Briefly, it is assumed that our military build-up will continue, including the construction of the DEW line and similar remote alerting lines, without

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regard to the initiation of the inspection system. This assumption is obviously a necessary one at this early stage. Even at a later stage we must reckon with the fact that the inspection system can be unilaterally denounced at a moment's notice by either party, while military installations like the DEW line would require months or years to re-establish. The assumption, however, means that we will retain all our powers of retaliation and all our present alerting systems, so that we can look to the proposed inspection system primarily for advantages which our present situation does not offer.

Broadly speaking, our principal disadvantage with respect to Russia is the extreme scarcity of our underlying intelligence material. It is clear, then, that the immediate advantage which we would gain is in the copious flow of strategic intelligence which would be afforded by the inspection mechanism. As one example, a radar map of Russia would be of great value to SAC.

The accompanying report also emphasizes another point. This is the fact that in the nuclear age the chief danger to either side is in the possibility of a massive surprise attack which would attempt to win a war at one stroke. The power of present nuclear weapons makes this a possibility which is easy to envisage, and one which our present alerting system could probably not deal with adequately. If this possibility could be ruled out the probability of war would be much reduced, because it is clear that an aggressor who did not win a war in the first stroke would suffer very severely in turn.

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With delivery systems based on present bombing planes, however, a build-up sufficient to win a war at a stroke would require probably several days and some geographical concentration of planes and tankers. It would thus be amenable to the general sorts of indicators which are comprised under the term Strategic Intelligence.

Without regard to these particular arguments it is clear that any inspection process must at least at the beginning be devoted primarily to gathering strategic intelligence. We must, in other words, gain enough information to know what the country is in fact like and to verify the fact that the "blueprint" is actually an exhaustive list of military installations. Until a backlog of such understanding has been built up, we would not know how to look for unusual signs which might betoken important military activity.

Strategic intelligence of the sorts just described represent large quantities of information such as might be obtained by taking systematic aerial photographs of the country. Such information is far too great to be transmitted by available electrical communication means. On the other hand, none of it requires split-second action. Thus the natural communication means for such intelligence is a fast courier plane which will fly the film out of the inspected area to a center where it can be studied.

This discussion has stressed the advantages to be obtained from military intelligence provided by the inspection system. In a broader sense, however, our fundamental stake is probably that of getting some

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inspection system going, without special emphasis on the amount or type of information which it may yield. The fact that there is an operating system, existing by mutual consent, will be a large factor in permitting further advances toward a genuinely peaceful relationship. Thus our most urgent problem is probably that of providing the communication network which will permit a smooth and frictionless operation of the inspection system.

Early inspection will probably be principally by air. Airplane operations for inspection present all the problems of normal civil operation. In addition, emergency changes in plan because of accidents in flight, etc., must be made and coordinated with the Russians as they would be in ordinary civil operations. The considerations of producing a good political climate make it essential that this be as far as possible a frictionless situation, incapable of causing misunderstandings or unnecessary losses of planes and crew. The unexplained disappearance of an American plane over Russia for a period of days would be inflammatory in the early stages of inspection even though it might be caused by a perfectly normal flight accident. The only alternative appears to be liberal communications, so that it is possible, for example, to maintain continuous contact between the inspection plane and American representatives on the ground. The provision of such a communication link may be in fact the most pressing problem.

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Far-Term Inspection Objectives

In its initial stages it seems likely that the inspection system will consist principally of aerial surveys. One can imagine an orderly evolution in which the primary stage is carried out by planes flying safely outside Soviet borders and later stages provide deeper and deeper aerial penetrations. During this period, however, the primary bases, both of aerial operations and communications, would remain outside Soviet borders.

At later stages a larger number of ground operations within the Soviet zone would be included. This would permit more comprehensive aerial inspection, by providing operational bases for airplanes within Russia. We can also imagine that aerial surveys will be increasingly supplemented by ground observations at critical points.

A further evolution may be in the nature of the intelligence information to be transmitted. If we understand the situation better we can probably rely increasingly on intelligence indicators; e.g., traffic at critical points, rather than on complete records. We may also expect that build-up times required to launch a massive attack will tend to diminish. This may be particularly true if bombing planes are replaced by long-range missiles. On the other hand, if the inspection system begins now we can probably keep track of missile launching sites as they are constructed, and also of large traffic to them, so that the missile threat can be continuously appraised.

These developments suggest that we may eventually be required to provide a skeleton communication system connecting various ground

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points within the Soviet zone to each other and to external bases. They also suggest that as a practical matter a larger proportion of inspection results may be transmitted by such a network rather than by courier plane. In the writers' opinion, however, this does not mean that we should attempt to engineer such a network to transmit alarms of undoubted reliability and authenticity on a split-second basis. We assume that vital information will still be carried to external points by courier plane, with its authenticity vouched for by the presence of the original observer, carrying his own records.

There are several reasons for rejecting the split-second concept. One is that it logically implies almost continuous inspection, since delays between inspections are obviously as serious as delays in the final delivery of the information. Moreover, it implies that something constructive could be done with the small time savings if we had them. This would probably be true only in the case of immediate notice of an enemy attack. Since the probable bases for an enemy attack are in North Russia, such notice could best be given by a border patrol communicating directly with external bases of our own, rather than by facilities in the heart of an enemy country.

The real reasons, however, are more far reaching. It is hard to believe that a determined enemy could not find means, by force or fraud, to defeat a local inspection operation if he caredto. In any case, if we are really on a split-second alarm basis the world will have become so explosive that the inspection will have failed in its ultimate purpose.

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General Characteristics of the Communication System

The communication system can be thought of as consisting broadly of an internal part and an external part. The internal part consists of the communication links inside the Soviet zone, including links from points inside the zone to ports of entry or to bases just outside the zone. It has in effect been described broadly in the preceding sections, and is imagined as existing primarily to assist the practical operations of inspection.

The external network is intended as a supporting communication system just outside Russian borders. It will link the various ports of entry with one another and with the home base in the United States, and provide for the coordination of inspection operations in various parts of the country. It is expected that both the internal and external networks will consist largely of radio links, although the external network may make some use of existing wire facilities.

In detail, of course, the planning of the external network must depend upon the ports of entry which are chosen. If we think of the variety of ends to be accomplished, and the desirability of relying as little as possible upon bases inside the Russian zone, however, it is fairly clear that we may need a very widespread network, almost encircling that country. For example, an inspection concerned with the general industrial and strategic build-up in Russia probably would center on the central and southern parts of European Russia, and on southern Asiastic Russia,

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extending from the Urals perhaps as far east as Stalinsk. Appropriate bases for the inspection operation in this case would be found in western Europe and in the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions.

On the other hand, if we are concerned primarily with the detection of incipient large-scale bombing attacks on the United States, we would naturally give emphasis to the parts of Russia which are closest to this country. It is generally conceded that plausible bases for attacks by bombing planes might be found in the Kola and Taimyr peninsulas, with wings extending as far south perhaps as Poland on one side and Kamchatka on the other. Any part of the immense area of northern Russia from Kola to Taimyr, including the offshore Arctic islands, would furnish a plausible launching site for ballistic missiles. It is clear that, if we were to try to detect launching sites as they are constructed, we should make at least occasional inspection flights over this region. This calls for an operation based primarily on Alaska, Greenland, possibly Scandinavia, and Arctic ice islands.

The principal difficulty in providing both the internal and external circuits will be in the large distances which must be bridged between relay points. This makes it certain that we will be unable to supply "broad band" facilities, of the sort that are customarily used, for example, for television transmission. There will be no possibility of transmitting fine-grained pictures, or equivalent large amounts of information obtained from other sources. Communication facilities

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which can be provided will suffice for voice transmission, at the utmost, and in most cases only telegraph transmission can be obtained.

The external network can probably be made reasonably, but not entirely, free from jamming since some of it will be by wire, and we can make use of very directional antennas in point-to-point radio links. Jamming can be recognized as such and would in itself be evidence of hostile intent. We must, however, assume that the internal network can be jammed at will by the Russians. There is no way out of this, since they can always overpower any receiver we may have within their boundaries with a nearby transmitter.

The problem of making the communication facilities secure is one which should be referred to the official agencies which deal with such matters. No particular questions appear to arise as far as the external system is concerned, and we can probably assume the maximum degree of security obtainable from applicable known devices. However, the degree of security in the internal system may be much lower. The situation in the internal network is obviously one which provides the Soviets with a maximum opportunity to decipher our systems, and to introduce fraudulent messages of their own. Moreover, we might not wish to employ our most advanced devices in such service for fear of compromising them. As indicated earlier, this report takes the view that the authenticity of vital observations is best established by flying our own observers, with their records, to external points.

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The provision of both the internal and external networks is a very difficult technical problem deserving much further study. The next two sections give only brief indications of the possibilities which might be thought of.

Implementation of the Internal Communication Network

The functions of the internal communication network were described earlier. Primarily it is intended to support the actual day-by-day inspection operation. In the initial stages of inspection we can assume that communications will take place between external bases and airplanes making aerial surveys during deep or shallow penetration of the Soviet zone. At a later point there will also be the problem of establishing communications to a chain of ground points which may serve as operational bases for survey planes or as centers for ground observation.

The chain of ground points turns out to be the easier of these two objectives to reach. A straightforward technical approach is furnished by the use of so-called "forward scattering" techniques. Recent experiments indicate that quite reliable transmission of telegraph-width bands can be obtained in a forward scattering system with links 1000 or more miles long. Thus a skeleton chain of such links stretching throughout Russia could be provided with only five or six ground stations within Russian borders.

The provision of suitable communications between survey airplanes and the ground appears to present a far more difficult, as well

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as far more urgent, problem. We note that there are some points of the Soviet Union which are at least 2000 miles from the nearest border, so that if we were to fly survey planes from external bases we would like to have communication ranges of this order of magnitude. Shorter ranges, of course, would still be useful for many externally based surveys and might have to be accepted in early stages.

Conventional air-to-ground communication links are limited essentially to "line of sight" distances, corresponding to ranges of not over 200-300 miles for airplanes flying at representative altitudes. It is clear that this is quite inadequate for the purpose at hand. If we were to attempt to remain in continuous communication with an airplane, using communication ranges of only this size, we would need a minimum of several dozen relay points within Russian borders.

The obvious methods of securing greater ranges in the air-to-ground link appear to be the following:

1. Ordinary "short-wave" radio, such as is used in amateur transmission, can sometimes be heard for great distances. However, it is traditionally very unrealiable,* and is easily subject to accidental as well as intentional jamming. On the other hand, it will

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*e.g., the Bell System requires four separate short-wave bands in Transatlantic service in order to be reasonably sure that at least one band will be operating, in spite of the advantages represented by highly directional antennas and large power.

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support voice transmission, which has many advantages in ease of operation and in providing means for informal but relatively reliable authentication. It is suggested that we should attempt to find spectrum space to provide at least one or two channels of this sort. Transmission on these channels would not need to be coded.

2. In the very long-wave spectrum we may secure great ranges through the use of ground wave propagation. This should give very reliable transmission, but with very narrow bands suited only to telegraph-type signals.

3. "Forward scattering" systems are probably not applicable to air-to-ground systems because the high directivity requirement for the antennas rules out applications with a mobile end point. However, the somewhat related "Janet" system might be applicable for intermittent transmission. It, also, should provide ranges of the order of 1000 miles or more.

4. A final method of extending the range of plane-to-ground systems is by the use of additional airplanes as relay points. The procedures are somewhat complex, but they offer the possibility of extending the range by 400-500 miles for each relay. Since we can well image that the survey planes will fly in spaced formation, covering the territory in definite patterns, in any case, this might afford a valuable interim technique.

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It is understood that advances have been made by the Air Force in the techniques of long haul plane-to-ground transmission, and it is suggested that information be obtained through the proper official channels as to such techniques. With such data it should be possible to formulate a combined plane-to-ground and point-to-point plan.

Implementation of the External Network

It turns out that the external network will also give rise to major problems. In order to show what may be possible, an illustrative system has, however, been worked out in outline. It is presented here and in the attached statement and accompanying map.

It was assumed in preparing the plan that the network would be required within the next two to three years at the outside. This meant that it was necessary to rely upon presently known methods of communication. Further, in order to provide a hemispheric network in such a short period, it was necessary to assume that existing installations and facilities, both civil and military, would be utilized and perhaps requisitioned for the project. In addition to the problems this raises, it should be noted that many of the required communication centers and new facilities will be on foreign soil, so that there may be diplomatic difficulties as well.

The plan has, of course, been developed without any facts as to the nature of the aerial surveys or of the landing points involved. Since the specific information on which the plan is based was assembled in a

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short time, there may be errors with regard to individual items, or the facts may not be up to date. These possible variations, however, would not change the general outline of the plan very much.

The plan is based on the concept that there will be an established ring of communication points, called "forward bases, around the Soviet area, connected with each other as well as with related inspection posts, ports of entry, etc., inside the area. Examination of the Soviet perimeter led to the selection of twenty-five plausible locations for "forward bases" as shown on the attached statement and accompanying map.

It seems desirable that the communications from these "forward bases" should flow immediately to regional filter points called "sector centers." Each "sector center" would, of course, have adequate communication facilities to each of its "forward bases" as well as to its adjacent "sector centers." Seven such centers have been selected as shown in the statement and map.

It is assumed that all data would be assembled finally at "master centers." The map shows two such centers, one on each side of the Atlantic.

The selection of "sector centers" and "master centers" is related to the general problems of operational control and of digestion of the inspection reports. This is discussed in more detail in the next section. It is not very likely that the given choices will turn out to be entirely suitable for these purposes. They have, however, been indicated

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to suggest the desirability of some sort of hierarchical arrangement among the communication centers.

Certain communication links which are relied on here, such as the Transatlantic and Alaska cables, will not be available until 1957. In the interim, temporary use may be made of military facilities contained in the Army, Air Force and Navy existing communication networks. In due course after the primary network is filled in, it would be desirable to develop alternative routes also for greater reliability and convenience of operation.

The Appendix gives a detailed review of the existing facilities which make up the proposed system. We note that the weakest sector in the plan is that stretching from Anakar, Turkey, to Indo China. There is, of course, a great gap also in the north. These gaps would have to be filled by some sort of makeshift arrangements. The following are suggested as possibilities:

1. Point-to-point radar transmission of narrow bands by forward scattering techniques may be available in some of these regions as it is for the internal Russian network.
2. The possibility of using one or more ice islands in the Arctic to provide both operating points for airplanes and communication centers, for the very difficult Arctic patrol, should be studied.

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3. It is possible that ships, which could be outfitted in the United States and sent to duty points, would make very good emergency relay stations for communications. Plausible locations for such ships would be the Sea of Okhotsk, the Persian Gulf, and the Barents Sea. It should be noticed that a ship is almost ideal as a data processing center, from the point of view of security.

Forward Centers for Communications, Command, and Data Processing

It seems certain that in the actual inspection we would need perhaps five or six subordinate centers scattered around the periphery of the Soviet block. The actual inspection operation is sufficiently complex to require a command headquarters at least this often. It is clear that the inspection could not actually be managed by remote control from Washington.

A local center is also required for another purpose. It has been stressed in the report that the volume of data which is obtained on films is far too great to be transmitted by the electrical communications systems which we will have at our disposal. It was therefore proposed that such records be flown out to an external base. It was thought that the time delay in this flight would not be serious, and could be balanced against many considerations of convenience which this method of transmitting information affords.

The additional delay required to fly the film all the way back to the United States (or perhaps to London), on the other hand, is unnecessary

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and might be serious. Since it would still be impossible to transmit any great bulk of such information electrically, this suggests the necessity of providing advanced bases at which preliminary studies of the inspection material might be made. The nature of such a preliminary inspection would, of course, need to be worked out later. However, we ought to think of a center in which large-scale mechanical scanning and data processing techniques could be used, if they turned out to be applicable to the problem.

It is clear that any centers chosen to suit these purposes of command and data inspection will be natural centers also for the communication system. The "sector centers" of the preceding section were chosen with communication requirements only in mind, and thus probably do not always represent suitable sites for command and data inspection operations. However, in other respects they represent the sort of organizational structure which one may imagine.

The Reciprocal Problem

If inspection is conducted on a reciprocal bases, the Russians will have a need for communicating their own inspection results, just as we do. This raises the question whether we might be called upon to offer communication facilities to help them.

Even if the inspected area is taken to include Canada as well as the United States, the Russians' problem of providing an "internal" network is considerably simpler than ours because of the shorter distances

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between probable ports of entry and any interior point. On the other hand, the problem of external communication is far more difficult, because there is no existing Soviet system of transoceanic communications to serve as a basis. The question whether we should volunteer some of our own limited supply of facilities for their use may require consideration.

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APPENDIX

Communications Available

1. Between the two "Master Centers" (Washington and London) and between those centers and four of the seven "Sector Centers" (St. John's, Fairbanks, Oslo and Frankfurt) communications facilities are good, or will be improved by 1957. By that time there will be in service a "broad band" submarine cable system linking New York and London which will be available for voice, facsimile, and teletype transmission. The quality and reliability of transmission will be as good as domestic service within the United States. A section of this cable system can be utilized to provide excellent facilities between St. John's and Washington. A similar cable system will go into service between Seattle and Skagway, Alaska by 1957. Initially, wire lines will carry the circuits northward to Fairbanks; however, it is hoped that by 1958 troposphere radiotelephone circuits will be available to extend the "broad band" cable circuits into Fairbanks. So that communications between Washington and two of its four tributary "Sector Centers" should well serve the purpose of this project.

Between the Manila and Tokyo "Sector Centers" and their "Master Center" at Washington, communications at present are confined to short wave radiotelephone and radioteletype across the

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Pacific. Transmission over such circuits is fair but their reliability is uncertain. The proposed plan for the installation by 1958 of a "broad band" cable between the mainland and Hawaii, together with the suggested plans by the military for providing "forward scatter" radioteletype between Manila, Tokyo and Hawaii, if carried out, will improve the situation both as to transmission and reliability of communications by teletype. "Broad band" facilities beyond Hawaii do not appear practicable in the near future.

2. Between the Oslo and Frankfurt "Sector Centers" and their "Master Center" at London, existing communications facilities are good and "broad band" circuits could be made available with some strengthening of short sections. A cable was laid last fall between Bergen and Scotland under a NATO plan and extension of "broad band" facilities into Oslo would provide excellent circuits from Oslo to London. There are good wire circuits within Germany and there is a military cable carrying a few voice circuits between Cuxhaven and England. This cable could be expanded to a "broad band" cable of large capacity by the addition of more repeaters which is a relatively simple task in these shallow waters. In fact, such a plan is under discussion by the British Post Office and the Germans. When this is done there will be excellent circuits between Frankfurt and London. In the meanwhile there are available excellent routes from Frankfurt via both Amsterdam and Brussels to London.

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3. The weakest sector in the whole communications plan is that stretching from Ankara, Turkey through Iran, India, Burma and French Indo China. This section has nine "forward bases", of which three (Hanoi, Mandalay, and Calcutta) have been assigned to the Manila Sector Center on the basis of distance, and the possibility that some type of radio communication might be established from Manila to these points. Manila to Calcutta is 2,200 statute miles.

The remainder of the "forward bases" in this area, i.e., Ankara, Teheran, Bahrain, Karachi, Kabul, and New Delhi, have no natural control point anywhere in the area from which there are or could be made available good communications toeeither London or Washington. It appeared, therefore, advisable to select Ankara as the "Sector Center" for the reason that its communications back to London might be developed readily and that it was the best type of place for such a center. Ankara is 2,300 statute miles from New Delhi, the farthest "forward base." The British military facilities to Ankara are not known; however, it is likely that from London to Cyprus, which is not far from Ankara, there are communications facilities which could be expanded and extended to Ankara.

4. Excluding the six "forward bases" which also are "sector centers," there are nineteen "forward bases" of which five have available good communications to their "sector center," i.e., Berlin, Munich,

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Taipei, Okinawa, and Seoul. Five others have fair communications, i.e., Hong Kong, Nome, Adak, Thule, and Reykjavik. The existing radio plant at these points could be built up without difficulty, to provide adequate capacity for teletype service for the project. It is doubtful if within the near future "broad band" service could be provided.

Of the nine remaining "forward bases" i.e., Hammerfest, Belgrade, Teheran, Karachi, Karbul, New Delhi, Calcutta, Mandalay and Hanoi, two, Hammerfest and Belgrade, have some sort of wire connections to their respective "Sector Centers" Oslo and Frankfurt. Just how good these connections are is not known at this writing. However, it would appear that good connections at least for teletype could be arranged without undue effort.

To provide communications between Teheran, Karachi, Kabul, New Delhi, and their "Sector Center" at Ankara, and between Calcutta, Mandalay and Hanoi and their "Sector Center" at Manila presents difficult problems. It means obtaining diplomatic entry, and the setting up of new communications posts, and the manning thereof. Probably installations of "forward scatter" radioteletype would be all that could be established readily at these points. With the possible exception of Mandalay and Hanoi, some sort of civilian radio stations exist and unless there are security objections arrangements might be worked out for the use of buildings, power, etc. This would simplify the problem and reduce the time interval for service.

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A POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

Advance Observation Posts	Forward Bases	Communications between Forward Base and Sector Center	Sector Centers	Communications between Sector Center and Master Center	Master Centers
Not known. In most cases communication to such posts would have to be newly established. This might be done by installations of "forward scatter" radio-teletype at Advance Post and at nearest Forward Base. Some cases might require intermediate relay point inside Soviet Area.	1. Hammerfest, Norway	Not known.	Oslo	Excellent-wire, radio, sub.cable-telp., TT-civil.-NATO-ample capacity.	London
	2. Oslo, Norway	-			
	3. Berlin, Germany	Excellent-wire, radiophone, TT-civil.-military	Frankfurt	Excellent-wire, radio, sub.-cable-telp., TT-civil.-military-ample capacity	
	4. Munich, Germany	SAME			
	5. Belgrade, Yugosl.	Poor-wire via Vienna-civil.			
	6. Ankara, Turkey	-	Ankara	Poor-sh.wave, radiophone, TT-ample capacity-civil.-military. This point would have to be built up for communications center. No good center exists for Near East and India.	
	7. Teheran, Iran	Not known			
	*8. Bahrein, Arabia	Sh.wave-TT-military-fair			
	9. Karachi, Pakistan	Probably none			
	10. Kabul, Afghanistan	Probably none			
	11. New Delhi, India	Probably none			
	12. Calcutta, India	Probably none	Manila	Fair-sh.wave radiophone, TT-civil.-military. Expect F.S. radio to Hawaii and sub.cable from there by 1958. Capacity readily increased.	
	13. Mandalay, Burma	None			
	14. Hanoi, Fr. Indo China	None			
	15. Hong Kong, Br. Terr.	Fair-civil.-military-radio, TT			
	*16. Manila, Philipp.	-			
	17. Taipei, Formosa	Good-Military-radio, TT	Tokyo	Same as above.	
	*18. Kadena, Okinawa	Good- " " "			
	19. Seoul, Korea	Good-Military-radiophone-TT			
	*20. Tokyo, Japan	-			
	21. Nome, Alaska	Fair-Military TT	Fairbanks	Fair-sh.wave radiophone, TT-slender open wire line phone, TT-civil.-military. Expect sub.cable to Skagway by 1957. F.S. radio to Fairbanks by 1958. Capacity and transmission excellent after 1957.	Washington
	*22. Adak, Alaska	Fair- " "			
	*23. Fairbanks, Alaska	-			
	*24. Thule, Greenland	Fair-Military TT via Goose Bay and Harmon Base	St.John's, N.F.	Poor-sh.wave, radiophone, TT-civil.-military. Expect sub.cable and microwave by end of 1956, after which capacity and transmission will be excellent.	
	25. Reykjavik, Iceland	Fair- " " via Goose Bay, Greenland and Harmon Base			

* Main Air/Ground Station

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