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18 October 1957

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Department review completed

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
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
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
ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee



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2. USSR ANNOUNCES ATOMIC ICEBREAKER WILL BE LAUNCHED SOON

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Launching of the Soviet atomic icebreaker Lenin, to be proclaimed as the first atomic-powered surface vessel in the world, will evidently be treated as part of the 40th anniversary program culminating on 7 November. The Soviet news agency TASS announced that the Lenin, which was begun in the spring of 1956, would be launched "soon" from the Leningrad yards. Judging from the extent of the construction as shown in a June photograph of the vessel, the hull could probably be launched at any time. It probably would be some time--perhaps as long as 18 months--before the vessel could be fitted out with the reactor installation.

Soviet propaganda, in addition to claiming another "first," will contrast the peaceful purposes of the Lenin with alleged US emphasis on building atomic submarines.

The 16,000-ton, 400-foot vessel, which will probably be added to the icebreaker fleet operating on the Northern Sea Route, will need refueling only about once a year and will be able to travel at speeds of up to 18 knots in open water.

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6. BURMESE DEPUTY PREMIER REPORTEDLY TO DISCUSS
ARMS PURCHASES WITH CZECHS DURING BLOC TOUR

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Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein will negotiate for the purchase of arms during his forthcoming visit to Czechoslovakia,

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During a two-month tour scheduled to begin on 21 October, Kyaw Nyein will also visit the USSR, Poland, and Communist China. This trip will be essentially a good-will tour highlighted by attendance at Moscow's 7 November celebration.

Burma seeks substantial quantities of arms to re-equip its army, now in the initial phases of a reorganization, to enable the Burmese to patrol their borders. New arms are also needed for the police, who are being prepared to assume primary responsibility for suppressing the Communist and Karen insurrections. In answering a reporter's question stimulated by earlier rumors of Czech arms offers, Prime Minister U Nu stated on 30 July that it was the policy of his government to purchase arms from any source without regard to "ideological consideration," provided it is within Burma's means to do so.

The Burmese have been promised \$10,000,000 worth of American military equipment at favorable prices and an American survey team is being sent to Burma in the near future to study the requirements of the police.

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7. SITUATION IN LAOS

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Expansion of Laos' six-man "emergency" cabinet is expected shortly and there are indications that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and other proponents of an early settlement with the Pathet Lao will seize this opportunity to press for a coalition cabinet which would include Pathet Lao

representatives.

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Souvanna told an American embassy official on 16 October that his brother, Pathet chief Souphanouvong, is prepared to sign a joint communique embodying all guarantees and concessions demanded by the royal government. He said this communique would guide the mixed negotiating commissions in working out the final details of a settlement, which would then be submitted to the national assembly. Acceptance would clear the way for formation of a coalition government.

Conflict of interest involved in the jockeying for cabinet portfolios is seriously straining the alliance between the conservative leaders, Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone and Interior Minister Katay Sasorith, who have previously served to check Souvanna's drift toward a relatively unguarded settlement with the Pathets. There are indications that Souvanna is exploiting the rift.

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8. NEW GOVERNMENT COALITION IN PAKISTAN

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The new government coalition in Pakistan, expected to take office on 18 October with Moslem League leader I. I. Chundrigar as prime minister, may bring only a limited period of stability. The exclusion of former prime minister Suhrawardy's Awami League and the domination of the coalition by West Pakistani elements probably will

result in a considerable increase of opposition sentiment in East Pakistan.

Chundrigar told the press that the coalition would include his own party and the Republican party, two of Pakistan's major groups, as well as two smaller East Pakistani political factions. He was to have been sworn in on 17 October, but the ceremony has been postponed for one day, possibly indicating a hitch in the naming of his cabinet.

Sixty-year-old Chundrigar has served in several high government positions, but has little political following and lacks the qualities of a dynamic and popular leader. The Moslem League recently called for an "independent" foreign policy, but Chundrigar indicated to the press on 17 October that his government would not make any significant changes in Pakistan's present pro-Western policies.


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9. BRITISH MARKING TIME ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

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


The British government has evidently concluded that no new moves to negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus problem would be profitable at the present time. The Foreign Office is discouraged about the prospects of persuading Greece even to discuss the British plan for a British-Turkish-Greek condominium. It believes the Greek and Cypriot assessment of the British Labor party's recent endorsement of self-determination for Cyprus will cause Athens to stall in the expectation that a future Labor government would grant its aspirations. Greek opinion assumes that Labor will win the next general election, which must be held by May 1960 at the latest.

In the meantime, the British intend to weaken the EOKA underground by such tactics as their recent announcement that they possess an EOKA list of 200 Greek Cypriots scheduled for extermination. EOKA is nevertheless likely to resume violence if it believes the UN General Assembly debate, expected in November, does not advance the cause of union with Greece. A resumption of terrorism might impel London to resume efforts to negotiate a settlement.

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ANNEX

No. 376

Watch Report 376, 17 October 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from developments concerning Syria continue to create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East. The continued deployment of major Turkish forces on the Syrian frontier, the publicized presence of Egyptian forces in Syria, and Soviet pressure moves combine to make this situation particularly tense. On balance, the initiation of hostilities by Turkey against Syria is considered unlikely in the immediate future.

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