MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Subject: Transfer of German Military Document Section and Special Document Section to CIG as requested by G-2, Intelligence Division, WDGS.


1. In the reference memorandum, General Chamberlin proposed that both the German Military Document Section, located in the Pentagon, and the Special Document Section at Camp Holabird, Baltimore, be transferred to CIG as of 1 April 1947. This transfer would include the library and document exploitation responsibilities of captured German documents now held by the War Department.

2. Representatives of ICAPS have made a study of these two document sections and a brief thereof follows:

a. Special Document Section, Camp Holabird, Maryland.

(1) The Special Document Section is a part of the Exploitation Branch, Intelligence Group, Intelligence Division, WDGS. The mission of this section has been the exploitation of captured German documents, and to a lesser extent of Russian documents captured by the Germans, dealing with economic intelligence. The main effort of the Section has been the preparation of an industrial card file on industrial installations, including power plants, factories, shipbuilding yards, railway repair shops, etc. This project will include some 35,000 cards when completed. IBM card files are also being established based on this correlated information.

(2) The Special Document Section is at a present strength of five officers, five enlisted personnel and forty-four civilians. It is located in adequate quarters with excellent working facilities at Camp Holabird.

(3) A visit to the Special Document Section evidenced the fact that this small exploitation group of linguists and analysts is without doubt efficient and well organized and have been performing excellent service for the Defense Project. It should be pointed out that this section scans all available documents in the many repositories in Washington and abroad and selects therefrom the material necessary for any given project. They have maintained liaison with JIB in England and with other repositories in the Occupational Zones. The SDS is not itself a repository for documents and within the War Department draws documents as needed from the WDGS.

(4) The SDS, as mentioned above, has been engaged exclu-
sively in economic intelligence, and to date there has been no exploitation of the considerable material existing on political-psychological or other types of intelligence nor on exploitation of economic information on many European countries not covered to date.

(5) The SDS will complete its present project about the latter part of May 1947.


(1) The GMDS is likewise a part of the Exploitation Branch, Intelligence Group, Intelligence Division, WDGS. This section is the library, reception, and indexing facility for captured German documents in possession of the Intelligence Division and has been engaged in indexing captured German documents in possession of the War Department now on hand and as they are received from the Theatres. The indexing that is performed is from purely an intelligence viewpoint and not a conventional library cataloguing. The resultant of this operation is called the GMDS Intelligence Catalogue, which consists of card files of intelligence by subject classification and by geographic location. Copies of the cards comprising the file are circulated to interested agencies.

(2) The GMDS is at a present strength of four officers, twelve enlisted men, and four civilians. The officers are regarded as highly competent in their field, the enlisted men are linguists but are very young, now on the job, and other than simple translation have no exceptional qualifications. The civilians are regarded as well qualified.

(3) The GMDS occupies 11,000 square feet in the basement of the Pentagon. They have also unlimited leased storage in Alexandria where they now have approximately 1,000 tons of captured German documents which are regarded as of negative intelligence value.

(4) The GMDS will complete the compilation of the GMDS Intelligence Catalogue about 1 August 1947, excluding additional documents shipped from the Theatres after that date.

(5) The ICAF S and CO representatives visiting the GMDS estimated that a large part of the documents on hand are either now of only historical value or are fast approaching that status. It should be stressed that these documents are military documents; in the main, records, diaries and files of German military units. It seems that their principal value has been to determine the intelligence available to the German Armies up to approximately late 1944. Of course, that part of this intelligence relating to transportation and eco-
nomic facilities included in this estimation does have considerable current value.

(6) All captured German documents are jointly owned by the United States and the British.

3. The decisions incident to reply by the Director of Central Intelligence to General Chamberlin's memorandum should be based upon the following considerations:

a. Exploitation of Foreign Documents as a Centralized Responsibility.

It appears that the IAB agencies are highly desirous that this exploitation be done centrally by CIG. As a result, the Documents Branch, OO, was organized and is now exploiting all captured Japanese documents of current intelligence value. By its assigned mission, the Documents Branch, OO, must be prepared to exploit German and Russian documents. If the CIG accepted the transfer of SDS from the Intelligence Division, WDGs, it would be adequately prepared to undertake the latter exploitation.


Captured German documents have to date been principally exploited on only one project of importance, i.e., economic and industrial intelligence on certain areas. However, the following projects are either already requested or may soon appear worthwhile:

(1) Exploitation for political-psychological-social intelligence incident to psychological warfare.

(2) Exploitation for economic, industrial, or other types of intelligence on certain areas not yet covered.

(3) Scanning many hundreds of tons of German documents which may yet be shipped to the United States from Theatres or which are in possession of former Allied nations in Europe.

(4) Continuing need for translation facilities inherent in the current research for an intelligence group comprising the scope of CIG.

(5) A possible future role of CIG in scanning of current foreign publications for intelligence information.

(6) As a service to all government agencies, the recording and indexing of such intelligence information of continuing value and the turning over to other agencies of material no longer of intelligence value, but yet of great historical, commercial or private research value.
c. Space and Personnel Considerations.

Sufficient space can be provided for SDS at the present location of Documents Branch, OOR. CIG does not now have and probably will not have for some time sufficient space for the GMDS. In this regard, it is emphasized that after filtering newly received documents, the actual material which is regarded as of permanent intelligence value should go to the Central Reference File, ORE. Thereafter, space for filing is a matter of space allotted ORE for its Central Reference File.

CIG should have the funds and should be in a position to take over the forty-four civilians at SDS. The number of military personnel (five) at SDS is being reduced by attrition and any taken over would have to be on either loan from the Intelligence Division or charged against personnel allotment of the War Department. It appears that if CIG takes over SDS, all military personnel except two officers should be dropped. It appears advantageous to seek loan from G-2 of two officers for a period of three months after date of transfer until suitable civilians can be selected to replace them as section chief and deputy.

d. Disposition of files now at GMDS.

CIG has been informed that if it does not accept transfer of the library maintained by the GMDS, these files will be turned over to the Adjutant General. G-2 has tentatively discussed maintaining thereafter approximately three individuals with the files for scanning and filtering incoming documents which are received subsequent to the turn-over to the Adjutant General. It appears that CIG should have no objection to the procedure and that this library would be almost as available to us in the hands of the Adjutant General as it would be in our own possession. Concerning the reception and filtering of future shipments of documents, it would perhaps be more clearly a function of CIG to receive and filter same and effect the distribution to the appropriate repository. This latter matter should receive careful study by the Office of Operations, particularly concerning personnel and other facilities which would be required, but should not now be undertaken.

e. Date of any Proposed Transfers of Personnel or Responsibilities.

The SDS is expected to complete its work on the present project sometime in May. It appears that transfer of the SDS should not be made until this present War Department project is completed. In setting the date of transfer as of 1 April, the Intelligence Division was then of the opinion that the project would be completed by 1 April.
On the other hand, budgetary and personnel reductions will probably force the War Department to dissolve both SDS and GMDS by 1 July. In order to effect the smooth transfer of personnel facilities and functions, at least a month should be allowed, or date of transfer to CIG should be set as of 1 June 1947.

4. Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

a. The Director of Central Intelligence inform General Chamberlin that the CIG is willing to accept the transfer of SDS, including its document exploitation responsibilities on 1 June 1947, subject to the conditions shown on the attached draft memorandum.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence further inform General Chamberlin that CIG is not in a position to accept transfer of the GMDS, for the reasons shown in attached draft memorandum, but agrees to take over the document screening and intelligence functions, if desired by the Intelligence Division and as mutually arranged between CIG and the Intelligence Division.