TO: The Director.
FROM: Chief, Legislative Liaison Division.
SUBJECT: Navy Comments, Dated February 1947, On Enabling Legislation for CIG.

1. Enclosed herewith are the comments of the Legislative Liaison Division addressed to the memorandum of the Chief of Naval Intelligence regarding the proposed CIG Enabling Act.

2. It is felt that virtually none of the Navy's suggestions would add anything to the bill as presently written nor should they be incorporated at the present time.

3. It is recommended that these comments not be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Intelligence. If any further acknowledgement is necessary, it might be sufficient to acknowledge receipt of their comments and to state that the bill is under considerable study and revision at the present time, and that when a further draft is available it will be furnished to them.

4. A draft of a letter as proposed in the previous paragraph is attached herewith.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director.
FROM: Chief, Legislative Liaison Division.
DATE: 7 March 1947.

SUBJECT: Navy Comments, Dated 21 February 1947, On Enabling Legislation for CIO.

The following remarks are submitted in connection with the comments submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence regarding enabling legislation for the Central Intelligence Group.

1. (a) To be commented on in detail below.
   (b) "It is suggested that sub-paragraph (4) of Section 1(b) be revised by substituting "effective and expeditious processing" for "evaluating, correlating, and interpretation."

   Comment: No clarification would result from a substitution of the phrase "effective and expeditious processing" for "evaluating, correlating and interpretation." The latter terms are specifically defined in the Act and have a commonly accepted intelligence meaning. The use of the word "expeditious" as suggested is unnecessary.

(c) To be commented on in detail below.
(d) "Section 3(a)(1) deviates materially from the provisions of the Presidential directive pertaining to members of the N.I.A. It is suggested that it be revised to achieve the following:

   (1) N.I.A. membership to consist of four: Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a fourth member appointed by the President.

   (2) The Director of Central Intelligence to sit with the membership but to not have a vote.

   (3) The Director of Central Intelligence, although appointed by the President, to be responsible to the N.I.A.

   "If Congress approves unification on legislation providing for a Council of National Defense, it is considered that that agency could be substituted for the N.I.A."

   Comment: Section 3(a)(1) of the proposed Act does not deviate materially from the Presidential directive. However, any discussion is now academic, in view of the present "merger" bill now before Congress.

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Navy Comment 1 (g): "Section 3 (a) (B) - This section is similarly considered too broad. It is suggested that it be amended by adding the following: 'except for operational (combat) intelligence in time of emergency or war.'

Comment: These Navy comments go to the essence of the very need of our existence. It is felt that these paragraphs, as set forth in our bill, should be maintained as written unless we are specifically ordered to amend them by the NIA.

5. Navy Comment 1 (o): "Section 4 (a) (10) - It is considered essential for the Army and Navy to control security of classified naval/military information. This involves the responsibility of CNO (CNI) pertaining to classified naval information and to the release of such information to foreign governments. It also impinges upon and could adversely affect the authority of the Joint Security Control and the Security Advisory Board. It is believed that such security functions should remain with the Army and Navy Departments, the JCS (JSC) and SWNCC (SAB)."

Comment: It is felt that our draft should stand as written. The Navy comment is unduly apprehensive. No attempt would be made under this Section to upset the control of the Army and Navy over its own security of classified information. The most that might be attempted might be the writing of an over-all AR-380-5 which would be applicable alike to the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces. Their own internal control would not be upset nor would it interfere with their own decisions as to the release of classified information to foreign governments. The problem of Joint Security Control which is raised appears immaterial, as it does not come within our purview. The problems raised in connection with the Security Advisory Board do not appear to be particularly pertinent, especially in view of the fact that we will probably take over the Security Advisory Board at a later date.

WALTER L. PFORZH clutter