NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214, Department of State Building, on Wednesday, 12 February 1941, at 11:00 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT
Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Peterson
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARY
Mr. J. S. Lerman, Acting Secretary

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE:
26-Aug-2008
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS AND POSSIBILITIES

SECRETARY PATTERSON gave a brief report on the present status of U.I.A. 6. He stated that the Atomic Energy Commission desired to retain three people to go over information contained in the files to be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group. He said that these three people were to search these files for information pertaining to uranium deposits and such information was to be retained by the Commission. Secretary Patterson suggested that O.I.G. take up the matter of the transfer of the personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.

After some discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Agreed to the transfer of the personnel mentioned in N.I.A. 6 and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with Mr. Lilienthal.

(Transfer subsequently completed on 18 February 1947)

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that his last report was rather comprehensive in pointing out the accomplishments of O.I.G. since its inception. However, this time he wished to report some of the difficulties encountered by O.I.G. He said that before taking up these difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments recently effected by O.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that when it was first agreed that the O.I.G. take over the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the South American field, there was some doubt as to whether O.I.G. could ably accomplish this assignment. He mentioned that he had received a letter from Ambassador Peary which commended the smooth transfer of these activities accomplished by the O.I.G. representative attached to his staff. General Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr. Dawson of the State Department had also stated that the
C.I.G.'s representatives who had replaced the F.B.I. personnel were of a particularly high type. General Vandenberg brought out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check these newly assigned personnel in South America and their reports indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an exemplary manner.

GENNELL VANDENBERG then gave a brief report on C.I.G.'s monitoring of foreign broadcasts and stated C.I.G. was now preparing to negotiate a new agreement with the British Broadcasting Corporation for better exchange of material and the future transfer of C.I.G.'s Cairo Monitoring Station covering the Middle East from Cairo to Cyprus.

GENNELL VANDENBERG stated there also had been established a central contact register to coordinate the exploitation of U.S. business concerns and other U.S. individuals and groups having connections abroad. He pointed out C.I.G. had received unusually excellent cooperation from business firms, and those firms so far contacted were making every effort to make available to C.I.G. selected personnel for briefing purposes prior to trips abroad. Further, some firms had agreed to allow a representative of C.I.G. to search any files they were maintaining of a foreign intelligence nature.

GENNELL VANDENBERG said that Mr. Winthrop W. Aldrich, Chairman of the Board of the Chase National Bank, prior to a trip to South America, had consented to being briefed and seemed enthusiastic regarding the method of collaboration proposed by C.I.G. General Vandenberg went on to state that Mr. Aldrich had said he would be more than pleased to be briefed by C.I.G. before any future trips that he might make and also that he would make available any of his employees whom C.I.G. might desire to brief prior to trips they might make.

GENNELL VANDENBERG pointed out that C.I.G. was coordinating the exploitation of documents collected in the Far East and that plans are now being completed for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would now like to mention some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G. in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG further stated that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "Recommendations approved by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NIA Directive No. 1, par. 4)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed," (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that it was the feeling of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that the current interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement." This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the position of an executive secretary to the I.A.B. and that he did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A. General Vandenberg then pointed out that in some instances it
had taken six to eight months to get agreement on a paper. He stated that in order to rectify this he recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be considered as having authority similar to that given to the Joint Research and Development Board. "The Joint Research and Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as an agency of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Board so that its decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such." (JREDB 1/1, 6 June 1946, as amended 3 July 1946)

GENERAL VAUDENBERG suggested that as an alternative to the above recommendation that C.I.G. forward its implementing directives to the N.I.... members for subsequent issuance from their offices. However, such a practice would be cumbersome and involve a great loss of time on the part of all concerned.

GENERAL VAUDENBERG stated that the production of strategic and national policy intelligence had been hindered further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its definition. In order to clarify this situation, C.I.G. had developed the following definition, which he requested the N.I.... approve:- "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."

GENERAL VAUDENBERG stated it was his understanding that those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the C.I.G. would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, so far, had not taken place, nor had any working relationship been achieved;
further, that J.I.O. continues to have responsibilities parallel to those of C.I.O., and until this is resolved, complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission cannot be attained. General Vandenberg recommended that J.I.O. be abolished, and that C.I.O. provide the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, he believed that some members of the J.C.S. had stated that if this were done, it would lower the original concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropriation committees, to defend C.I.O.'s request for funds since he was constantly confronted with the question as to the amount of overlap in intelligence. It was his understanding that one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central Intelligence was the reduction of such overlap to an absolute minimum.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would also like to point out that when C.I.O. went to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments for information, there was constant friction as to whether J.I.O. or C.I.O. should have priority. In short, two agencies were asking for the same type of intelligence but requested in a slightly different manner. This duplication was unnecessary and occupied the time of personnel which should be engaged in more productive intelligence activities.

SECRETARY FORRESTI.L then asked whether the question of dissolution of the J.I.O. and the assignment of its duties to C.I.O. had been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL VANDENBERG answered that he believed it had through the I.A.B. members.

MR. EDDY stated that he thought that it was important now to abolish J.I.O. and to have all interdepartmental intelligence under the C.I.O.
After some discussion,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

a. Agreed that while they believed that the
J.I.C. should be abolished and its functions
assumed by C.I.G., they desired to withhold
decision until such time as it had been dis-
cussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would take up
this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG
then reread his first recommendation.

SECRETARY PATTERTON stated that he saw no alternative
to the N.I.C., approving this recommendation. He added, however,
that a proviso should be inserted in the recommendation to
allow any aggrieved agency to appeal to the N.I.C. through
that agency's respective Secretary.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said it was realized that each
agency has the inherent right to appeal through its respective
Secretary any objection to a specific directive.

ADVISER LEAHY stated that he recommended approval,
but that he was in agreement with Secretary Patterson's proviso.

SECRETARY PATTERTON raised the question as to whether
General Vandenberg's recommendation would involve C.I.G.
entering into the field of operational intelligence of the
agencies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this was not the intent.

MR. EDDY asked, if authority was delegated by the
N.I.C. to the Director of Central Intelligence that his
directives shall be considered as emanating from them, would
such authority be interpreted to allow the Director of Central
Intelligence to draft personnel from other agencies to perform
specific jobs.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. had no intention
of interpreting this authority as indicated by Mr. Eddy.
SECRETARY P. T. PETERSON asked if C.I.G. was contemplating recommending that some of the intelligence manuals now published by the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments be discontinued.

GEN. V. VANDENBERG stated he would like to have an opportunity to look over these publications before answering this question.

SECRETARY FORRESTY stated he believed that the proviso to be added to General Vandenberg's recommendation under discussion should read along the following lines: "Provided in cases of objection to specific actions, any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

MR. EDDY stated he assumed that any directives, before being issued by C.I.G., would normally have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

GEN. V. VANDENBERG concurred.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY: Approved the recommendation that "The Director of Central Intelligence shall operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to the Director of Central Intelligence so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such, provided any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

At Secretary Marshall's request, GEN. V. VANDENBERG then repeated his recommended definition of "strategic and national policy intelligence."

After some discussion, in which General Vandenberg pointed out the reason why an approved definition of this term
was needed.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved the following definition: "Strategic
and national policy intelligence is that com-
posite intelligence, interdepartmental in
character, which is required by the President
and other high officers and staffs to assist
them in determining policies with respect to
national planning and security in peace and
in war and for the advancement of broad
national policy. It is in that politico-
economic-military area of concern to more
than one agency, must be objective, and
must transcend the exclusive competence
of any one department."

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated that in a recent conversa-
tion Congressman Taber was concerned from a security stand-
point with reference to appropriations for intelligence
activities. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr.
Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people
had to be consulted in considering such appropriations.
Secretary Marshall went on to state that he believed the
best way to maintain proper security was for the President
or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that
a request should be made for a flat appropriation.

GENERAL VAUDREURG stated he had appeared recently
before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance
would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival
he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He
went on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he
would continue to be careful of the information presented.
However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations
could best be protected by funds which should be concealed
and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one person.