INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 2 August 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, USA, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhertz, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri, USN (Ret.), Central Intelligence
Agency
Dr. Raymond J. Sontag, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ray Cline, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert E. Long, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
Brigadier General Philip Gallagher, Department of the Army
Colonel M. B. De Pass, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: DATE:
26-Aug-2008
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 30 July 1951 (IAC-M-37) were approved.

Enemy Capabilities for Attack on the United States

2. Action: The secretary of the IAC was instructed to prepare a draft NSC directive providing for the preparation of an evaluation of the net Soviet capabilities to injure the U.S.

3. Discussion: General Smith presented the scope of this evaluation and indicated that ultimately the estimate will consist of 5 parts:
   a. An estimate by the IAC of Soviet capabilities to launch a military attack on the United States;
   b. An evaluation by the JCS of the U.S. capability to repel such an attack;
   c. An estimate by the IIC of Soviet capabilities for clandestine attack and subversive action against the U.S.
   d. An evaluation by the ICIS of the U.S. capability to resist such an attack; and
   e. A final evaluation of the net capabilities of the enemy, to be prepared from the foregoing estimates by the DCI with the collaboration of the Chairmen of the JCS, the IIC and the ICIS.

While General Smith recognized that certain difficulties would be encountered in matching U.S. and USSR capabilities in this context, he emphasized that the President required the prompt completion of this project in connection with the preparation of the Budget for Fiscal 1953 and the President's "State of the Union" message.

Probable Developments in Indochina During the Remainder of 1951 (NIE-35)

4. Action: This paper was approved as modified.
Probable Developments in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea (SE-9)

5 Discussion: It was the consensus that no effort need be made to reconcile differences of opinion which remain in this estimate but simply to represent to the NSC Senior Staff the several points of view where these were at variance.

Coordination of Scientific Intelligence

6. Discussion: General Smith pointed out that any action which may have been taken respecting the continuance of certain sub-committees of the Scientific Intelligence Committee had only the status of recommendation to the IAC and that the Scientific Intelligence Committee could not by its own action dissolve its sub-committees wherein there was basic disagreement. Recognizing that certain special problems are involved in the coordination of scientific intelligence, General Smith said that he proposed to invite President Conant of Harvard to advise him on this question. General Bolling pointed out that of the 9 Scientific Intelligence Sub-Committees, 4 were recommended for dissolution on the ground that their existence involved a waste of the time of the military members. General Smith agreed that any committees which were not performing effectively might well be eliminated after due consideration.

Embargo on Export of U.S. Publications to the Orbit

7. Discussion: General Cabell queried whether there had been sufficient consideration of the various factors affecting the export of unclassified scientific and technical publications to the USSR and its Orbit. It was pointed out that this question has been long and thoroughly considered in the Government. In the discussion the proposal to limit the export of these publications was assessed against its possible effect on our procurement of corresponding Soviet publications. General Smith, supported by Mr. Howe, stated that he was opposed to an embargo on the grounds that it could not be made effective and that it would almost inevitably result in Soviet retaliation seriously affecting our present Soviet publication procurement.