INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 30 November 1950

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Captain Ward C. Gilbert, USN, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Mr. Melville J. Ruggles, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Acting Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008

HR 70-14
(U)
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: Minutes of the meeting of 21 November (IAC-M-7) were approved subject to the following corrections:

   a. Paragraph 2a should be revised to read as follows: "The shift of the Communist armies from South China and the building up of forces along the Yalu River, especially in that the build-up started prior to the North Korean invasion of June 25."

   b. In paragraph 2d delete "and the USSR."

Revision of NSC 68/1, Annex No. 6

2. Action: Agreed that the two paragraphs set forth below should be transmitted to the NSC as fulfilling the requirement for the Annex dealing with intelligence and related programs:

   "1. It is axiomatic that the situation appreciated in NSC 68 and the policy proposed to meet it require the improvement and intensification of US foreign intelligence and related activities, as a safeguard against political or military surprise, and as essential to the conduct of the affirmative program envisaged.

   "2. The Director of Central Intelligence and Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken and are taking action directed toward the improvement and intensification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For reasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and contemplated, and their budgetary requirements, are not set forth here. It has been determined, however, that even the substantially increased budgets now projected would be inconsiderable in relation to the grand total of the other programs projected in this report."

Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation (State draft of an Estimate)

3. Action: Agreed that there should be prepared for consideration Saturday morning a redraft and expansion of the proposed estimate to include both the view set forth in this paper and the
view set forth in paragraph below with necessary changes in the discussion. This estimate should then be sent to the NSC and the President with the explanation that there is a sincere difference of view in respect of the appreciation of the firmness of the Soviet position, and that it is thought desirable to make these views available to the policy makers, in as much as a determination of which one is correct is not possible on the basis of available intelligence. The DCI stated that he was personally inclined toward the view as referred to in paragraph 4 below.

4. Discussion: The estimate proposed as an alternative to State's conclusions in paragraphs 5 and 6 (of the draft) centered on the thesis that the USSR has not decided for global war at this time, although pursuing its present course in Korea might lead to war for which it is probably prepared. By its present course in Korea, it is probably the view of the USSR, it stands to gain by disrupting the UN and the U.S. in its relations with its allies, hampering UNM if Communist intervention should lead to it. Furthermore, the Chinese clearly are aware of the damage which may result for their cities to which they look not only for political support but also industrialization. This thought leads to the conclusion that by and large the Communists are tools of the Soviet Union and that the fruits of Chinese victory in Korea could be taken away from the Chinese by the Soviet at any time. In opposition it was argued that it is entirely to the Soviet interest to make a deal with the Chinese Communists for them to nominally control Korea after expulsion of the UN, it being clear that the Soviets feel themselves entirely capable of controlling both China and Korea.

5. In support of the State view it was pointed out that the friction in the Chinese Communist Government between the Nationalists and the International Communists had been settled in favor of the latter, resulting in the removal of troops from Southern China where domestic political control was weakest. This it was asserted could not have been done without the fullest USSR assurances of support in the Korean adventure and war with the U.S. if Communist intervention should lead to it. Furthermore, the Chinese clearly are aware of the damage which may result for their cities to which they look not only for political support but also industrialization. This thought leads to the conclusion that by and large the Communists are tools of the Soviet Union and that the fruits of Chinese victory in Korea could be taken away from the Chinese by the Soviet at any time. In opposition it was argued that it is entirely to the Soviet interest to make a deal with the Chinese Communists for them to nominally control Korea after expulsion of the UN, it being clear that the Soviets feel themselves entirely capable of controlling both China and Korea.
6. The question was raised regarding the assumption that the U.S. would be able to defeat the Chinese through war in Asia. It was the consensus that an intelligence evaluation of factors bearing on this assumption would be useful.

Terms of Reference: Communist China (IAC-D-7)

7. Action: Agreed with the recommendation of this paper that the IAC adopt the view that national intelligence estimates should endeavor to answer specific questions related to policy determination rather than be generalized country studies. There was no determination on the acceptability of the terms of reference for China as set forth in TAB A of IAC-D-7.

8. Discussion: There was no disagreement with the views expressed by General Smith that in order to meet the requirements of the policy makers national estimates would have to deal with the problems before the policy makers (whether they be specific or general, regional or functional), that they would have to be brief, that the argument attached thereto should be a summary of the deductions drawn from the data supporting the estimate and, finally, that all readers would have to understand that for an examination of the voluminous detail reference would have to be made to the experts.

9. Specific approval of the terms of reference in TAB A was not given.