INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 2 December 1950

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Colonel Edward H. Porter, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Bowze, Department of the Army
Dr. Samuel McKee, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel David Crist, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff

Acting Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008
1. Action: Agreed that this draft as modified represented the views of the IAC and will be submitted as a National Intelligence Estimate by the DCI.

2. Discussion: This action revises the course of action agreed to at the last meeting of 30 November 1950 (see IAC-M-8 paragraph 2), in as much as staff discussions among the agencies revealed that they were not as far apart in their views as had been thought.

3. The discussion at the meeting centered primarily on refinement in the language of the paper, the consistency of its paragraphs (primarily paragraph 2 and paragraph 8) and the vital paragraph 12. The final revision of that paragraph reflects a desire on the part of the IAC to be as helpful as possible to the policy makers but to indicate the limitation in estimating Soviet intentions on the basis of available intelligence:

"The possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR may (possibly intend) already have decided to precipitate global war in circumstances most advantageous to itself through the development of general war in Asia. We are unable on the basis of present intelligence to determine the probability of such a decision having in fact been made."