SECRET
IAC-M-46
27 September 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 27 September 1951

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General Charles F. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy
Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. H. M. Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Lotfus Becker, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel W. K. Benson, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ray Cline, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Colonel John F. Schmelzer, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, Department of the Navy
Colonel J. F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

*For part of meeting

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 20 September 1951 (IAC-M-45) were approved subject to deletion of Mr. Dulles' name from among those present.

Psychological Impact of a U.S. Air Offensive Against the USSR. (SE-15)

2. Action: This estimate was approved subject to the deletion of all but the first sentence of the problem and all of the conclusions including Footnote 1. CIA will work into the text the idea that the evidence available to us deals with conventional not atomic bombing and with the reaction of the Germans, Japanese and British rather than the Slavic peoples.

Proposed NIE: Likelihood of the USSR Deliberately Initiating War During 1952. (IAC-D-36)

3. Action: It was agreed to schedule an estimate on this subject, it being understood that it may be difficult or impossible to reach agreement as to the conclusions.

Appendix A to Review of NSC 68 Programs: Probable Developments in the World Situation Through Mid-1953. (SE-13)

4. Action: The proposed revision of Paragraph 2b was approved. It was agreed that the qualifying footnote should not be deleted but that it should begin with some such wording as:

"The following factors must be considered in connection with the above estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities."

Handling of NATO Requests for Combined Estimates on Soviet Economic, Political and Military Capabilities and Intentions.

5. Discussion: As a result of the Ottawa Conference and the desire of the smaller NATO nations to get a more adequate appreciation of the current international dangers, the NATO Standing Group is
required to prepare an estimate on Soviet military and possibly political and economic capabilities and intentions. Thus far the JCS has considered that since responsibility for U. S. support for the NATO Standing Group rests in the Defense Department, its intelligence support should be produced by the JIC securing whatever aid necessary from the State Department and CIA. Admiral Johnson and General Cabell spoke of the burden on their own personnel which this entails and raised the possibility of attaching an estimating staff to the U. S. member of the intelligence committee of the NATO Standing Group in order to relieve their own Departments of this burden.

6. Mr. Dulles raised three questions with regard to this problem:

a. He was greatly concerned regarding the security hazards in providing U. S. contributions to an international estimate. Apart from the importance of the case itself, it might become a dangerous precedent.

b. He was concerned that the JIC procedure for arriving at a U. S. intelligence contribution to the NATO intelligence committee was not in keeping with existing responsibilities of the CIA and would in fact operate to the detriment of the IAC as the accepted and effective body for delivering coordinated U. S. intelligence estimates of national significance.*

c. He was also concerned regarding the advisability of establishing a separate group of estimators to be attached to the U. S. member of the intelligence committee of the Standing Group.

These matters will have to be looked into very carefully he believed. Admiral Johnson and General Partridge undertook to discuss the second point immediately with the Joint Staff in order that the U. S. work* could proceed pending approval of arrangements for international cooperation.

*Since the meeting it has been agreed that the IAC mechanism will be used to produce this estimate.