INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 25 January 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, Acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Magee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Key, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. Calvin Hoover, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Deforest VanSlyck, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Mr. Yaro J. Skalnik, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Mr. L. P. H. Healey, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 26-Aug-2008
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 22 January 1951 (IAC-M-17) were approved subject to deleting in Paragraph 2 the statement that CIA would forward a letter to the JCS regarding coordination of planning and intelligence on NIE-13. It was understood that General Smith had already discussed the matter with General Bradley and would try to work out with him a standard operating procedure for coordination with the JCS planners in future similar cases. It was also understood that General Megee would undertake on an ad hoc basis to get the cooperation of the military planning officers on the draft NIE-13.

2. Discussion: General Smith mentioned the marginal area between policy and intelligence and explained that the questions asked by the President and others do not always fall clearly on one side or the other. He pointed out that there are many factors involved in assessing the adequacy of European defense which are beyond intelligence and emphasized the need for a combined intelligence-operation estimate.

Prospects for Communist Attack on Taiwan

3. Action: It was agreed that an estimate should be written on this subject even though we have no indications that such an attack is likely before April or May. It was understood that the subject should be expanded to cover the vulnerability of Taiwan and the advantages the Chinese Communists would derive from such an attack.

Soviet Course of Action with Respect to Germany (NIE-4)

4. Action: It was agreed that CIA would redraft paragraph 8 using the Air Force proposal as a guide, make such other changes as are necessary, and send the new draft to the various members for approval.

5. Discussion: The principal discussion centered around the statement in paragraph 8, that the Kremlin would be "more likely" to resort to military action than to accept the rearmament of Western Germany. Some of the members felt that although resort to military action was a possibility, it was less, rather than more, likely.
This view rested in part on the appraisal that the Soviet grand strategy lay in expansion of their political power in Asia and in their fundamental assumption of the inevitability of capitalist collapse in time. There was a consensus that if the Soviets considered the rearmament of Western Germany in conjunction with a strong Western European coalition to be a threat to the security of the Soviet orbit, it was virtually certain they would resort to military action at such time and place as appeared most advantageous to them. If, however, the Kremlin considered such a rearmament of Western Germany to be merely a check on their European ambitions, the majority felt they would not resort to military action. There was some difference of opinion as to the likelihood that the Soviets would accept Western rearmament even if they considered it only a check on their European ambitions. There was also some feeling that the Russians would not differentiate (at least in this case) between a threat to their security and a check on their European ambitions, but would consider such a Western resurgence ipso facto a threat to the Soviet orbit. This view rested in part on the appraisal that the Soviets would have as major considerations the memory of past invasions, their own recognition of their imperfect control of the Satellites and their construing of Western resurgence as aggressive in intent.