INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 23 August 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Brigadier General Ernest B. Moore, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
*Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, USA (Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency
Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bier, USN (Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
*Colonel M. B. De Pass, Department of the Army
Colonel Benjamin B. Talley, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel James F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

*Robert E. Long
Acting Secretary

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 26-Aug-2008

meeting only
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 16 August 1951 (IAC-M-41) were approved.

Breakdown of Cease-Fire Negotiations in Korea

2. Action: Although it was generally agreed that there were insufficient facts available at this time to justify an opinion on the significance of the Communist statement, it was decided that the IAC representatives should work on an estimate of the probable consequences of the breakdown based on the assumption that it was permanent.

3. Discussion: It was accepted on the basis of available evidence that the alleged bombing of the neutral zone was undoubtedly staged by the Communists. While there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the resultant breakdown could be considered definitive, General Smith noted that positive Communist action in breaking off negotiations was contrary to the usual Russian tactic of putting the onus on the other side. Various possible motives were suggested:

   a. that the Soviets might prefer a tenser situation in Korea in order to justify a more belligerent attitude at the San Francisco Conference;

   b. that the Soviets might be trying to bring about a session of the UN General Assembly in order to bring pressure on the U.S. position with respect to the 38th Parallel;

   c. that in a limited offensive, the Communists might force the UN troops back to the 38th Parallel before resuming truce talks;

   d. that the Communists now felt strong enough to resume a general "6th phase."

Intelligence Coordination in Germany (IAC-D-30/1)

4. Action: In executive session the draft informal memorandum was approved with the understanding that State will revise it to take account of certain suggested changes, after which it will be recirculated to the interested agencies. It was decided that the formal letter was unnecessary and should be dropped.
Proposal for an Estimate on a Holy War in the Middle East (IAC-D-31)

5. Action: It was decided not to write such an estimate at this time.

Proposal for an Estimate on the Strategic Importance of the Far East (IAC-D-32)

6. Action: It was agreed to undertake an estimate of the strategic importance of the Far East to the USSR, omitting reference to its importance to the U.S. The estimate was to proceed de novo and not to be a revision of ORE 17-49.