INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency, on 21 December 1950

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor F. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. James M. Andrews, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel Archer E. Lackey, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Acting Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency
Approval of Minutes (TOP SECRET)

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 7 December 1950 (IAC-M-10) were approved.

2. Action: Agreed that the Watch Committee (formerly called the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee) terms of reference as submitted by General Weckerling would be studied and discussed at the next meeting. Agreed further that if the Watch Committee is to perform the most useful service to the Government it should, short of estimates, make some evaluations of the indications that it detects. It is understood that General Weckerling plans to expand the Watch Committee's publication to include domestic and Near Eastern Sections.

Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea (NIE-12) (SECRET)

3. Action: Agreed that this draft as amended by the deletion of paragraph 4 should be issued as a national estimate with the dissent of the Air Force and with the following note attached:

This estimate considers only the consequences of the immediate employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the present situation and does not deal with the consequences of eventual employment of Chinese Nationalist troops either in Korea, in later and changed circumstances, or on the Chinese Mainland as part of a larger undertaking. An Estimate (NIE-10) is in preparation on the more general question.

4. Discussion: There was an extended discussion over the differences between the subject draft estimate and the suggestions for amendment by the Air Force. General Smith emphasized that in the preparation of national estimates timeliness was of great importance. Policy officers in the Government must have the intelligence they need when they are faced with their decisions rather than after the decisions are taken. In the event that any member or members feel that they cannot agree with a proposed estimate or
if they feel that the scope of the problem being dealt with is not
the most useful it would be more appropriate and entirely proper for
them to dissent rather than to delay the issuance of the estimates.
General Smith did not feel that a watering down of the national
estimates for the sake of unanimity was proper. In general the
members concurred in these views.

Probable Soviet Reactions to a Demilitarization of Western Germany (NIE-17) (SECRET)

5. **Action:** This paper was referred back to the staff for
informal clearance or a future IAC meeting if necessary.

Progress Report (IAC-PR-4) (SECRET)

6. **Action:** Noted the Progress Report and agreed that:

   a. The National Estimate on Indochina should, if possible,
      be cleared without a meeting.

   b. The proposed National Estimate on Communist China
      embraces many of the questions which came up in the discussion
      on NIE-12 above with reference to the effects of the utiliza-
      tion of Chinese Nationalist Forces.

7. **Action:** With respect to NIE-6 on Iran, General Weckerling
reported that the Watch Committee saw no international reasons for
the alert in Iran and requested State Department to check this
view.

Russian Reaction to Japanese Treaty
(No document)

8. **Action:** General Megee transmitted to the IAC orally a
request of the Joint Strategic Survey for informal guidance on the
following question:

   What would be the reaction of the USSR if the United
   States negotiated a unilateral peace treaty with Japan at
   the time that we are considering the rearmament of Germany?
It was the consensus that General Megee should transmit the view of the IAC that the USSR has probably already taken into account the possibility of our unilateral negotiation, even recognizing that it might be a prelude to the rearmament of Japan, and that basic decisions of the USSR on actions vis-a-vis the U.S. would not thereby be materially affected.