INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 18 January 1951

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. William H. Jackson
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Lieut. General Clarence R. Huebner, USA(Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. Calvin Hoover, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Thomas J. Betts, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert E. Long, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, Department of the Army
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Mr. Yaro J. Skalnik, Department of the Army
Mr. Harold E. Stearns, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel David Crist, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency
Approval of Minutes (SECRET)

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 4 January (AC-M-13) were approved subject to the deletion of the name of Colonel Marchant and the addition of the name of Mr. Keay in the attendance list.

2. Action: The minutes of 8 January 1951 (IAC-M-14) were approved subject to the following comment by General Megee:

That by virtue of his not being present at the meeting of 8 January 1951 (IAC-M-14) he was not able to present the views of the Director of the Joint Staff with respect to the Special Estimate (SE-1) on the "International Implications of Maintaining a Beachhead in South Korea". These views are to the effect that strong objection is taken to elements in this paper which transcend intelligence, encroaching upon the fields of planning and policy making, and in the future the Joint Staff will take exception to proposed estimates which trespass into the planning jurisdiction.

3. Discussion: Mr. Jackson expressed his sympathy with the foregoing comment of General Megee and emphasized the necessity for the IAC to earn its way by its performance in intelligence. Mr. Howe suggested that this difficult and marginal area between intelligence and policy or planning might be satisfactorily handled if, in our drafting, consideration was focused on appraising the consequences of alternative courses of action.

CIA and the Press

4. Mr. Jackson called attention to recent articles relating to intelligence and particularly the CIA. He pointed to the public interest necessarily aroused by the appointment of a well-known public figure, General Smith, as Director, and on the occasion of a major reorganization of the Agency. He indicated that it is almost imperative to say something to the press else it will make its own deductions and write accordingly. He emphasized that insofar as the press had approached him he had assiduously avoided any comment on intelligence as such but had tried to point up the coordinating...
function of the Agency which was clearly a matter of public record in the law. Mr. Jackson referred to the report of the Dulles Committee which had criticized CIA for its concept of no publicity, the effect of which had been that the press had played up the more sinister aspects of intelligence. Members were invited to make suggestions on this problem.

5. Action: Approved, as revised, this proposed National Intelligence Estimate.

Soviet Course of Action with Respect to Germany (NIE-4) (SECRET)

6. Action: Agreed to postpone for further study and final consideration at 11:00 o'clock on Monday, 22 January. A number of amendments were agreed to and will be presented in a redraft, this redraft to include also a substantive revision of paragraph 8 containing the basic issue of discussion.

7. Discussion: The main issue of the discussion centered around the appreciation of the effect of rearmament of Germany and strengthening of the Western Allies on the basic decision of the Russians to go to war and the timing with respect to the execution of such a decision. While there were none who considered that the situation generally in the world, outside of Germany, could be ignored in this appraisal, there was a difference of view on the question of whether such rearmament would in itself so alter the relative power positions as to force the Russians to decide for war. On the one hand were those who felt strongly that a decision to rearm Germany and the realization of that rearmament would leave the Russians only the alternatives of going to war or foregoing the evolution to its own programs and plans. Admiral Johnson who offered to express his view officially in the form of a dissent considered that German rearmament while of great importance would be weighed by the Russians in the light of the world situation and that its possible courses of action were not restricted to these alternatives. General Cabell associated himself with the Admiral's views in general.
8. There was a consensus on the urgency and importance of this estimate but a belief that further consideration in the light of today's discussion by the members and by the consultants over the weekend would be extremely useful. It was also the consensus that fundamental differences of intelligence opinion such as outlined in the foregoing paragraph were of the order which most justified a dissent and were essential to those responsible for policy decisions.

Target Date for Russian Revision
(Ref. NIE-3/1) (TOP SECRET)

9. Dr. Langer reported that much of ABI 14 is more related to National Intelligence Survey material than estimates. He believed that it was the responsibility of the participating departments to constantly maintain this data up-to-date. The Office of National Estimates was planning to have a redraft of the conclusions available within ten days for consideration at the interagency staff level with three weeks from now as a target for completion.