INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 9 August 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Brigadier General Ernest B. Moore, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Key, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert E. Long, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Colonel Benjamin B. Talley, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel U. G. Carlan, Department of the Army
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel James F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff

*For part of meeting only.

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008
Report by Mr. Dulles

1. Discussion: Mr. Dulles, Deputy Director for Plans, CIA reported on his recent trip to Germany. He noted that intelligence coordination in that area in general was satisfactory and that he had had the occasion to discuss with authorities in Germany a number of problems of collateral concern to the members of the IAC. He made specific mention of the Zipper Operation and said that there would shortly be available from this source copies of a report on Soviet preparations for attack which should be of considerable interest and value in the study of indications.

Approval of Minutes

2. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 9 August 1951, IAC-M-39, and of the meeting of 13 August 1951, IAC-M-40, were approved after amendment. Revisions will be circulated.

Draft Memorandum to be Transmitted by IAC Members to their Respective Intelligence Chiefs in Germany (IAC-D-30)

3. Action: The preparation of agreed memoranda to be sent by the IAC members to their principal representatives in Germany was referred back to committee for reconsideration in the light of the discussion. The committee was to submit by the meeting of 30 August drafts of two memoranda, the one, along the lines of the G-2 draft, being in the nature of an instruction to be passed to the field through command channels, the other to be a memorandum of information designed to convey more fully the thinking of the IAC on this subject.

4. Discussion: General Smith stated that although the changes incident to the replacement of the High Commissioner by an Ambassador might fundamentally affect the coordination of intelligence in Germany, the contemplated memoranda should not specifically provide for re-examination of the proposed arrangements because they were being made for the longer term and should be presumed to survive transition. He also indicated that reference to such details as channels of communication should be omitted, it being understood that the most expeditious channels would naturally be used for the benefit of the IAC as a whole. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the absolute deadline for instructions to have reached the field was mid-September and enjoined upon the committee speed in handling its assignment. General Smith urged the committee, in preparing the memoranda, to take advantage of General Partridge's experience in coordination work in Germany.
5. Action: It was agreed that NIE 40 should be pushed to completion even though certain sections of NIS would thereby be retarded.

6. Discussion: The competition of work on NIE 40 with the certain sections of the NIS schedule was recognized to be more critical as a result of a five percent personnel reduction across the board in the service intelligence agencies. Some relief in this problem was afforded by cutting to a minimum the terms of reference of NIE 40 and by the understanding that the Service Agencies might, where necessary, produce rough estimates of Satellite capabilities on the basis of existing research. This competition for limited resources in the economic field may be expected to continue and even to increase.

7. General Smith suggested, with respect to the five percent personnel reduction in the Service Agencies, that every effort should be made to retain within the intelligence community qualified personnel who might be released under the cut. This might be done either by CIA and the Department of State hiring them or perhaps by somehow assisting the service intelligence agencies to continue to have the benefit of the services of such personnel.