INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 14 June 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. George G. Carey, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Joseph LaRocque, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
Vice Admiral B. H. Bieri, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Jack Smith, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Raymond J. Sontag, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Department of the Army
Colonel B. B. Talley, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel John P. Merrill, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Frederick P. Munson, The Joint Staff

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

*Present for part of meeting only.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008
Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meetings of 17 May 1951 (IAC-M-31) and 18 May 1951 (IAC-M-32) were approved.

Probable Soviet Reaction to the Inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Western Defense Agreements (SE-7)

2. Action: This estimate was approved subject to the redrafting of paragraph 4 by CIA.

Proposed Estimate on Spitzbergen (NIE-39) (IAC-D-5/3)

3. Action: It was agreed that the material on hand did not now warrant a formal estimate on this subject. Mr. Reber was directed to bring the matter to the attention of the collection offices in order to get more information on the points raised in General Bolling's memorandum.

U.K. Comments on NIE's

7. Action: Dr. Langer distributed copies of a summary of comments on certain NIE's. It was agreed that such comments would be distributed to the IAC agencies as they are received but it was suggested that distribution be limited to the IAC members and their staffs.
Progress Report (IAC-PR-14)

8. The priority for NIE 39 "Psychological Impact of a Strategic Air Offensive Against the USSR" was changed to "Urgent." It was pointed out that it would be helpful to indicate where the suggestion for each estimate had originated.

10. Discussion: Mr. Millikan pointed out that CIA is concerned from the economic point of view in the Soviet rate of production of a considerable number of key articles. In looking for information on this subject CIA has become interested in the exploitation of a source of intelligence that has not heretofore been used for such a broad purpose - the markings on actual pieces of Soviet or Satellite equipment that have fallen into our hands. CIA has been convinced that these markings can be of great value but it has not yet satisfied itself on such questions as whether our efforts should be concentrated on particular types of markings, what methods of analysis should be used, whether our photographic techniques are satisfactory, etc. In order to carry its experimentations further CIA feels it necessary to photograph enemy equipment available in various military installations in the U. S. General Bolling proposed that CIA levy its requirements on G-2 for this work but Mr. Millikan did not feel this would be practicable at the present stage of experimentation. It is expected that in a few months CIA will have developed its thinking far enough to be able to write meaningful collection requirements for levying on the military services. At that time the collection function for exploitation of captured materiel could, by agreement, be transferred to the appropriate collection agency.