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COPY NO. 26

C.I.G. 7/1

8 May 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Reference: C.I.G. 7

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The actions on C.I.G. 7 of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board after informal consideration are shown in Enclosure "A" hereto.

2. The comments on C.I.G. 7 of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in Enclosure "B" hereto.

3. The amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in paragraph 2 of Enclosure "B" are submitted herewith for consideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 26-Aug-2008

HR 70-14
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ENCLOSURE "A"

ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON C.I.G. 7

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence:

Approved, subject to the following minor amendment:

Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all Departments of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the agencies agency concerned.

The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable device for clearance of such personnel.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS:

Approved without change.

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper.

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the Enclosure - after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of one representative each of the State Department, Military

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Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence:

Approved without change.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1946

Dear Admiral Souers:

I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

It is believed that there are many persons in government employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER