CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AS SOURCES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Reference: C.I.G. 12/1

Memorandum by the Secretary, N.I.A.

1. At the 7th meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the enclosed revision of Appendix "A" to C.I.G. 12/1 was concurred in by all members of the Board except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who undertook to present the Enclosure to the Director of the F.B.I. for further consideration.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed that:

   a. If the Director of the F.B.I. concurred in the Enclosure, it would be issued forthwith as a directive.

   b. If the Director of the F.B.I. did not concur in the Enclosure, the Intelligence Advisory Board would meet again to discuss submitting this matter to the National Intelligence Authority for decision.

3. The Enclosure is therefore circulated for further consideration by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and for the information of the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
INTERIM PROVISION FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE COLLECTION
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THROUGH
EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS,
NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD

1. Under the provisions of N.I.A. Directive No. 5, the
Director of Central Intelligence is charged with acting for the
National Intelligence Authority in coordinating all Federal
foreign intelligence activities related to the national security
to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established
by that Authority are properly implemented and executed. Under
this responsibility the Director is charged with the coordi-
nation of the exploitation of all sources of foreign intelligence
information required for the national security.

2. Pending a complete solution of the over-all problem of
exploitation of sources, current circumstances require that an
interim action be taken with regard to the particular source
represented by American business concerns, other non-governmental
groups and individuals with connections abroad.

3. The following policies and procedures relating to the
collection of foreign intelligence information required for the
national security, through exploitation only in the United
States of American business concerns, other non-governmental
groups and individuals with connections abroad, are announced:

a. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish
uniform procedures for:

(1) Securing the cooperation of American business con-
cerns, other non-governmental groups and individuals with
connections abroad in supplying such foreign intelligence
information required for the national security as they possess, acquire, or assist in obtaining.

(2) Insuring the security of the information procured and that the interests of those cooperating are not jeopardized.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish and maintain, on a current basis, as a part of the Central Register*, a contact register* of all existing and future business, group and individual contacts, from which clearance must be obtained by participating agencies before new contacts are approached.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish standards for security clearance of contacts by participating agencies, which shall include consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the advisability of contacts of other than American business concerns. Results of security checks will be furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence for incorporation in the central contact register to avoid duplication of effort.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence will coordinate the exploitation of this field on a nation-wide basis. Coordination will be effected by the Director of Central Intelligence through the heads of the intelligence agencies concerned. O.I.G. field representatives will establish and maintain liaison with the Intelligence Officers of local headquarters of Army areas, Naval Districts and Air Forces, if present, through the medium of local inter-agency offices.

e. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish procedures for the dissemination of information collected by participating agencies.

* To be defined by footnote.
f. The Director of Central Intelligence will establish procedures for the procurement of information by one agency for another.

g. Any briefing of private individuals going abroad temporarily, as to foreign intelligence information required for the national security, shall be performed by the agency making the contact. If agreeable to the contact, a representative of the Central Intelligence Group will participate. Departmental intelligence agencies will submit their requests for such information to the Central Intelligence Group. When required and available or upon request by a participating agency, technical specialists furnished by the participating agency will take part in the briefing.

4. It is not the intent of this directive to affect in any way the authorized relationships of Federal departments and agencies with American business concerns, other non-governmental groups and individuals for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelligence information required for the national security. The National Intelligence Authority recognizes the primary responsibility of the Department of State to protect and promote American foreign trade and also recognizes that the Department of State must, to that end, maintain contacts with American business concerns and other non-governmental groups and individuals engaged in foreign trade. The National Intelligence Authority recognizes the primary interest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Foreign Nationalities Groups in the United States in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities for the internal security of the country. In order to preclude disturbance of these Federal Bureau of Investigation sources, the Central Intelligence Group will be the only agency authorized to exploit Foreign Nationalities Groups for foreign positive intelligence and this only after consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in each case.