BACKGROUND TO THE POLISH IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW
(DOI: DECEMBER 1981)

A FORMER POLISH GENERAL STAFF OFFICER WHO MADE THE
FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON HIS PAST EXPERIENCE AND
CONTACTS. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST.

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON THE LATEST POLISH DEVELOPMENTS
BY A FORMER POLISH GENERAL STAFF OFFICER:

A. THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW WAS NOT A LAST MINUTE
DECISION. THE AUTHORITIES HAD PLANNED IT SINCE LATE OCTOBER,
AND ON 30 OCTOBER THEY BEGAN COORDINATION OF THE MARTIAL LAW
PLANS WITH THEIR ALLIES.

B. ACCORDING TO SOVIET DEMANDS, TOTAL POWER WILL BE
CONCENTRATED IN THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SALVATION,
WHICH WILL ASSUME THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY. HEADING THE COUNCIL WILL BE PREMIER WOJCIECH
JARUZELSKI, AND GENERALS TADEUSZ TUCZAPSKI, FLORIAN BICZICKI,
EUGENIUSZ MOCZYK, JOSEF LUZYCKI, HENRYK RAPACEWICZ,
WŁODZIMIERZ OLIIWA, TADEUSZ KREPSKI, LORGIN LOZOWICKI.
CZESLAW KISZCZAK, TADEUSZ HUPALOWSKI, CZESLAW PLOTROWSKI, EDWARD PORADKO AND NAVAL COMMANDER LUDVIK JANCZYSZN. THIS MEANS THAT THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE VICE MINISTERS, THE COMMANDERS OF THE MILITARY DISTRICTS AND SERVICE BRANCHES, THE HEADS OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND THREE KEY CIVILIAN MINISTERS (WHO ARE ALSO GENERALS) WILL COMPRIS THE MILITARY COUNCIL. CIVILIAN MEMBERS WILL BE SECRETARY OF THE WARSZAW PROVINCIAL PARTY STANISLAW KOCIOLEK AND KATOWICE FIRST SECRETARY ANDRZEJ ZABINSKI. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE LATTER TWO INDIVIDUALS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE "MOSCOW'S MEN" AND HAVE EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG ENTERPRISE-LEVEL PERSONNEL IN TWO KEY PROVINCES.

SOURCE COMPILLED THIS LIST PRIOR TO THE 14 DECEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL'S COMPOSITION. MISSING FROM SOURCE'S LIST ARE GENERALS JOZEF BARYLA, MICHAL JANISZEWSKI, JERZY JAROSZ, AND COLONEL MIROSŁAW HERMASZEWSKI. NO CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE YET BEEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES IS COORDINATING THE OPERATION. SOVIET MARSHAL KULIKOV, GENERAL GRIEKOY AND GENERAL SHCHEGLOV ARE ADVISING FOR THE USSR.

C. THE POLISH AIR FORCE WISE TO TAKE OVER ALL COMMERCIAL
AIRPORTS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. THE NAVY WAS TO BLOCK ALL
MAJOR HARBORS AND THE SOVIET BALTIC FLEET WAS TO DEPLOY IN THE
EXTERIOR LIMITS OF THE POLISH BALTIC WATERS.

D. SOVIET FORCES WILL PROBABLY REMAIN IN THE WESTERN
AREA OF THE USSR AND CAN INTERVENE IN THE EVENT POLISH FORCES
ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARTIAL LAW.

E. SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS NOT EXPECTED UNLESS
CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT AND AUTHORITIES ASK FOR SOVIET HELP IN
WHICH THE WARSAW PACT TROOPS, 15 DIVISIONS IN ALL, WILL
INTERVENE (INCLUDING 12 SOVIET DIVISIONS).

F. UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS, THE SITUATION IN POLAND
UNDER MARTIAL LAW WILL UNFOLD AS FOLLOWS:

1) A GENERAL Amnesty WILL BE OFFERED TO INDIVIDUALS
FORMERLY LINKED WITH ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES. THESE INDIVIDUALS,
NOW UNDER ARREST, WILL BE INTENSIVELY PRESSURED TO COOPERATE
WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND, TO SOME EXTENT,
WITH THE SECURITY SERVICE. A SMALL GROUP OF SOLIDARITY RADICALS
SUCH AS JAN RULEWSKI, ZBIGNIEW BULJAK, MARIAN JURCZYK, AND
ANDRZEJ GUIAZDA, WHO ARE UNLIKELY TO COOPERATE, WILL BE
BROUGHT TO TRIAL.
2) "FORMER PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES WILL ALSO BE INTERNED, BUT THIS MOVE WILL BE MEANT ONLY FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THESE FORMER LEADERS WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

3) TELEVISION, RADIO AND PRESS CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE INTERVIEWED. ONCE IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL COOPERATE WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL, RESTRICTIONS ON THE DOMESTIC PRESS WILL BE Eased.

4) THE GOVERNMENT WILL ATTEMPT TO REORGANIZE A "WORKERS SOLIDARITY," WHICH WILL COOPERATE WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS BRANCH TRADE UNIONS CURRENTLY COOPERATE WITH THE REGIME.

5) STRIKES IN THE ENTERPRISES, SHOULD THEY ARISE, WILL BE COUNTERED BY MEANS OF DIVERSION (GOVERNMENT AGENTS AT THE WORKPLACE), MEANS OF PERSUASION, PROPAGANDA AND THREATS OF VIOLENCE. PROLONGED STRIKES WILL RESULT IN THE "ISOLATION" OF THE ENTERPRISE. IF NECESSARY, FOOD FOR STRIKES WILL BE CUT OFF, AS WILL ELECTRICITY AND WATER. AUTHORITIES ARE PREPARED FOR THE STRIKES TO LAST FROM A FEW DAYS TO MANY WEEKS; HOWEVER, THE LATEST ESTIMATES DID NOT CONSIDER THE LATTER AS LIKELY. THEY EXPECTED SPORADIC RESISTANCE INSTEAD. THE
A key task will be to throw food reserves, even military food reserves, on the market. This is particularly important over the holiday season. The Warsaw Pact Allies will increase food deliveries during this period. (source comment: This will be the most important task facing the regime.)

Once it becomes apparent that strikes, anti-regime leaflets and other protest activity is markedly decreasing, a gradual easing of curfew restrictions will occur.

Of course, there are different variations of popular reaction to martial law to consider. Should widespread strikes continue, the citizens militia will quell them. Should they fail, the army will move in. Various means— including the use of clubs and riot control agents—will be used to bring the situation under control. Firearms, however, will not be used against the public as the regime fears a repetition of the bloody seacoast riots of 1970. Air and naval troops will not be used to "patrol the streets," as they will have to secure airfields.
AND NAVAL BASES. RATHER, THE 350,000 STRONG GROUND TROOPS WILL BE USED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. ONCE THE PUBLIC BECOMES AWARE AS TO HOW THINLY SUCH TROOPS ARE SPREAD AND THE FACT THAT SUCH TROOPS DO NOT USE DEADLY FORCE, TROUBLE MAY RESULT.

G. FOR BACKGROUND, SOURCE SAID THAT THE CHANGING VIEW AMONG THE POLISH MILITARY PERSONNEL TOWARD SOLIDARITY MAY BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

1. SPRING 1981--THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR SOLIDARITY AND POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION;

2. SUMMER 1981--THE REALIZATION AMONG OFFICERS THAT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IS WORSENING AND THAT SOLIDARITY IS PARTLY TO BLAME. IN ADDITION, MOUNTING CRITICISM BY SOLIDARITY REGARDING MILITARY CORRUPTION AND THE MISUSE OF PRIVILEGES, AS WELL AS THE IDEA THAT THE "MILITARY IS AGAINST" SOLIDARITY STIRRED UP A GOOD DEAL OF RESENTMENT.

3. AUTUMN 1981--MOUNTING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF JARUZELSKI AS BEING INEPT OR INCAPABLE IS EQUATED BY MILITARY OFFICERS AS AN ATTACK ON THE MILITARY;

4. LASTLY, THE REMOVAL OF KAMIÀ AS PARTY LEADER IN OCTOBER 1981 INDICATED TO MOST MILITARY OFFICERS THAT A
"RADICAL SOLUTION" WAS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE DOMESTIC CRISIS.

H. SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE POLISH GENERAL STAFF HAS ASCERTAINED, ON THE BASIS OF SOME FRAGMENTARY REPORTS, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REORGANIZED REGIMENTS OF THEIR TWO "PERMANENT" DIVISIONS LOCATED ON POLISH TERRITORY INTO SIX "TRUNCATED DIVISIONS." EACH OF THESE "TRUNCATED DIVISIONS" IS COMPOSED OF A COMBINATION OF ABOUT 300 TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES AND ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THEM. EXCLUDED FROM THE "TRUNCATED DIVISIONS" ARE ENGINEER, CHEMICAL AND ROCKET TROOPS AND THE LIKE, AS THESE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR ACTIONS IN POLISH CITIES. AS OF THE SUMMER OF 1981, POLISH GENERAL STAFF PERSONNEL BELIEVED THAT THE "TRUNCATED DIVISIONS" WERE LOCATED IN FORESTED AREAS SURROUNDING THE "PERMANENT" SOVIET FACILITIES AT BORNE-SULINOVO AND SIEJETOSZOW.