MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director, National Security Agency

FROM: John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Current Political/Military Situation in Poland

1. [Comment: The following information is from an extremely sensitive source and, therefore, recipients should hold this report very closely.]

2. A reliable source who has excellent access in the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that the Soviet leadership is maintaining contact with Jaruzelski and that Brezhnev has had many telephone conversations with Jaruzelski. These talks were reportedly very unpleasant. Kania has been completely left out of these discussions.

3. The new military representative of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland stated during a confidential talk in the Polish Ministry of Defense that Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov told him that the USSR has decided that under certain circumstances [not further described] that they would intervene militarily in Poland.

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4. Source reported that there is a complete split between Kania and Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski, on the basis of the opinions of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as the arguments of the Soviet leadership, favors the introduction of Martial Law. However, Kania has rejected the possibility of introducing Martial Law as a means of eliminating Solidarnosc in its present form. Jaruzelski realizes that he has lost out; however, on his order the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared a general plan for the introduction of Martial Law. After studying the plan Jaruzelski approved it as the basic variant of action—i.e., in case there should be a surprise introduction of Martial Law. Jaruzelski ordered the preparation of the following additional variants to the basic plan for the introduction of Martial Law:

a. In the event of the threat of sit-in strikes;
b. In the course of sit-in strikes;
c. In the event of the so-called "creeping into" Martial Law.

The plans for all four of the above-mentioned variants of Martial Law have been completed.

5. The plans for the implementation of Martial Law were upset by the moderate course of the second half of the Solidarnosc congress as well as the wave of protests which swept the factories throughout Poland.

6. Since the 5th of October there have been intensive deliberations by the Party and military leadership concerning solutions to various variants of the political crisis. In connection with these deliberations members of the Polish Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been advised to stand by to work on plans for solutions calling for the use of force. Mention was also made of the possibility of changes in the highest levels of the leadership and the emergence of a new Party-Government team. However, no names were mentioned.

7. General of Arms Siwicki, Chief of the Polish General Staff, is currently drafting his speech to be delivered at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party which will take place during the latter part of the week of 11 October.

Comment: The meeting is scheduled for the 14th and 15th of October. The thrust of Siwicki's speech will be a very hard line directed against Kania and in defense of Jaruzelski.
The speech will criticize the Party for doing nothing while at the same time pointing out that the Government has a program which is consistently being carried out. The speech will conclude by calling for the implementation of the "creeping state" of Martial Law. The Minister of Internal Affairs will also deliver a speech with a similar theme.

8. Source believes that at the coming Fourth Plenum for the first time leading personalities will change their positions and attack Kania while defending Jaruzelski. Olszowski is being mentioned as a possible replacement for Kania. However, because of their antagonistic attitude toward each other Source doesn't know whether it is possible for Jaruzelski and Olszowski to work together. Source feels that such a union, if it took place, would be a short-term affair and would only serve as a means for also getting rid of Jaruzelski. Most of the military leadership is openly against Jaruzelski. At present he can count primarily on Siwicki, Lt. General Jozef Baryla, General of Arms Tadeusz Tuczapski, and possibly General of Arms Jozef Urbanowicz. Source believes that Jaruzelski cannot survive the Fourth Plenum by relying only on the principle of the "lesser evil".

9. Contrary to the official propaganda, the election of Walesa and the other moderates to the National Consultative Committee is considered to be the worst possible turn of events.
Distribution:

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