MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director, National Security Agency
FROM: Max Hugel
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: 1. Attitudes of the Polish Ministry of Defense and Soviet Military Positions in Connection with the Current Political Situation in Poland
2. Results of the Meeting of the Polish National Defense Committee on 19 June

1. Comment: The following information is from an extremely sensitive source and, therefore, recipients should hold this report very closely.

2. A reliable source who has excellent access in the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that as of mid-June the leadership of the Polish General Staff believed that the Soviets would want to avoid military intervention in Poland at all costs. However, Soviet military documents indicate that the USSR is making very intensive and concrete preparations for military intervention. Source cited the fact that at the time of the "SOYUZ-81" CPX exercise as well as after the exercise, the Soviets deployed new military installations, primarily communications, in Poland without the knowledge or prior agreement of the Polish Government. After the well-known announcement [early April] of Solidarnosc concerning...
the deployment of a Soviet military group in the Jaroslaw area, the Polish General Staff began to investigate the matter of the deployment of Soviet forces in Poland. Their discreet investigation turned up the following facts: For example, the commander of the Polish 3rd Mechanized Division reported that there is a group of Soviet soldiers with communications equipment under the command of a major in the area of Radawiec Airfield near Lublin. According to the Soviet major, his communications group was transferred from the Soviet Union and was stationed near Lublin for the purpose of receiving within three days an unidentified Soviet army echelon. Because the Soviet group's food supply was depleted, the major turned to the Polish garrison commander in Lublin for help. Simultaneously with the Polish General Staff discovering the above-mentioned group, they learned that in the southern part of Poland similar Soviet groups with radio-relay equipment were deployed. About 10 or 20 days later, the Soviet Chief of Staff of the Northern Group of Forces informed the Chief of the Polish General Staff in a special coded message that at the time of the "SOYUL-81" exercise Soviet communications sites were deployed on Polish territory. He further informed the Polish General Staff that eight Soviet soldiers are deployed at each one of these sites and that an additional 60 soldiers of the Soviet army are located in Szczurowa. The coded message indicated that the Soviet groups were located in the following locations:

-- Sobotka
-- Niemodlin (30 kilometers west of Opole)
-- Lesnica
-- Cholcnow
-- 5 kilometers north of Bielsko Biala
-- Ligota (25 kilometers northeast of Krakow)
-- Bochnia
-- Szczurowa (25 kilometers northwest of Tarnow)
-- WZG-248 (10 kilometers northeast of Tarnow)
-- In a forest 12 kilometers north of Dedica
-- Czarna Sedziszowska (17 kilometers northwest of Rzeszow)
-- Rokszawa (12 kilometers northeast of Rzeszow)
-- In a forest 5 kilometers southwest of Jaroslaw
-- Roboszow (15 kilometers north of Jelenia Gora)
-- Lesna (30 kilometers west of Jelenia Gora)
-- Nowosolna (8 kilometers west of Lodz)
In addition to the above-mentioned group in Lublin, the Polish General Staff has information that other unidentified groups are located at Skaryszew and Ilza.

3. As of mid-June the Polish General Staff does not have information about new groups of Soviet Armed Forces in Poland.

4. The Polish General Staff is unaware of any large Warsaw Pact exercises which are to take place in Poland in the near future. Such exercises have been mentioned in the Western press. In September, however, large military maneuvers are to take place in the western part of the Soviet Union to which as yet unidentified units of the Polish Armed Forces have been invited.

5. Marshal Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, together with about 100 Soviet army generals and officers, spent almost two uninterrupted months in Poland. Both Marshal Kulikov and his deputies and assistants made continuous visits to Polish army units at divisional, brigade and regimental level. They also conducted talks in the Polish General Staff, with the leadership of the military districts, and with branches of the Polish Armed Forces. During one of Marshal Kulikov's discussions with General of Arms Florian Siwicki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Kulikov proposed an intensification of exchanges of military training areas among the Warsaw Pact member states. It was agreed at that time that various elements of the Soviet army as well as the East German, Czechoslovak and even the Hungarian and Bulgarian armed forces would train in Polish training areas while units of the Polish Armed Forces would be sent to some training areas in other Warsaw Pact countries. General of Arms Molczyk, Vice Minister of Defense, was to work out the plan. However, the formalization of such a plan has not taken place and as of mid-June had not been implemented.

6. On the morning of the beginning of the 11th Plenum [10-11 June] of the Central Committee of the Polish Party, Marshal Kulikov conversed with General Siwicki. Marshal Kulikov was in high spirits, bullied Siwicki and was obviously
counting on the victory of the hard-liners to support a new Polish political leadership more favorable to Moscow. Military transport aircraft from Legnica and Borne Sulinowa were planned to arrive in Warsaw to support the activities of the "new team". However, on the 11th these transport flights were canceled.

7. Marshal Kulikov in his discussions with Siwicki asked him, among other things, why a plan for declaring Martial Law had not been implemented. General Siwicki in defending himself stated that the main reason for the delay in the declaration of Martial Law was the realization that they lacked the forces to implement the plan. General Siwicki indicated that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had already "fallen apart" and was not in a position to carry out the expected tasks required under Martial Law. To this Kulikov retorted that the Polish Government has fallen apart and not the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Marshal Kulikov indicated that the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs was capable of taking decisive action but that the problem lay with the lack of decision on the part of Premier Jaruzelski.

8. In addition to General Siwicki, General Skalski also believes that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is in disarray. Both believe that the current leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs does not enjoy the confidence of the middle- and lower-level cadre. The most controversial demand of the Militia was their desire to form trade unions.

9. Miroslaw Milewski, Minister of Internal Affairs, is considered to be part of the group of hard-liners who are submissive to Moscow. As evidence of this, Source was informed that a few days before the 11th Plenum one of the ranking members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs recommended that Milewski sign a letter of support for Premier Jaruzelski. Milewski, however, refused and stated that he would not write to a "former Premier". Minister Milewski was to be replaced by General Sawczuk, Undersecretary of State of the Ministry of Defense.

10. According to Source, unofficial talk in the Polish Ministry of Defense indicates that the Polish Armed Forces are as disoriented as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There are serious disagreements between the conservative
element of the Polish Armed Forces (general officers) and the young cadre. The general officers are removed as a matter of principle from the list of candidates to high-level Party conferences as well as to the Party Congress. The army does not believe in the existence of anti-socialist forces. There are some [unidentified] in the Polish MOD who maintain that if Polish military units were asked to go into action against the workers, they would in fact turn against those who issued such commands. At the present time, 50 percent of the conscripts in the Polish Armed Forces have participated in various forms of protest during the period since the beginning of the crisis last year. The Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces indicated that a large percentage of the Polish Armed Forces are members of Solidarnosc. In short, the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense foresees serious internal difficulties in the armed forces. The whole of the armed forces is backing Kania and Jaruzelski because of their stand on solving the current crisis through political means. However, General Sawczuk is being condemned as well as General Molczyk who is getting ready to take over the Ministry of National Defense. The decision to recall Sawczuk after the 11th Party Plenum from his position in the Ministry of National Defense and to assign him to work in the Central Committee of the Party's Correspondence Bureau was greeted with great satisfaction in the General Staff.

Results of the Meeting of the Polish National Defense Committee on 19 June

11. On the 19th of June there was a meeting of the Polish National Defense Committee (KOK) under the chairmanship of Premier Jaruzelski, which devoted itself to a discussion of the possible introduction of Martial Law. [Comment: According to available information, the KOK is essentially a governmental organization which meets on a bi-annual basis to discuss problems in Poland's defense industry. Permanent members of the KOK, in addition to the Premier, are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy, and the Chairman of the Planning Commission.] In the meeting of the KOK, Premier Jaruzelski made the following comments:
a. "We are aware of the fact that American imperialism is conducting a great game in our country. As much as Western Europe would like to disassemble our system in a relatively long period of time, the United States wants to settle the matter very quickly. An indication of this is the attitude of the American banks on the fate of our debts."

b. "Anti-socialist forces are determined to take over power and move Poland in a social democratic direction. The main danger is the Committee for an Independent Poland (KPN). We are alone in our fight with the KPN. The KPN exploits nationalistic and anti-Soviet themes which have taken hold in our society. That organization has a strong base in academic circles, in the independent union of Polish students. There is a possibility of the KPN and the Social Self-Defense Committee (KSS "KOR") moving closer together. If this should take place, there will follow a greater penetration of KPN slogans on Solidarnosc."

c. With reference to Martial Law, Premier Jaruzelski stated that it is necessary to make corrections in the scenario for the introduction of Martial Law. He indicated that there is not now sufficient forces for the execution of operation "WIOSNA" [Spring] which involves the internment of activists. As things stand now, it is very likely that Martial Law will not be introduced until the 6th or 7th day of an escalation of disorder, strikes or unrest. Premier Jaruzelski also indicated that it was necessary to view the possibility of limiting the implementation of Martial Law to specific geographic regions as well as a selective implementation of the plan for the declaration of Martial Law.

d. Premier Jaruzelski also approved various proposals set forth by the Chief of the Polish General Staff. This will include the establishment in the near future of an operational staff in the KOK under the leadership of one of the vice premiers. Operational groups are already functioning in the Central Committee of the Party, in the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, in ministries, and in inspectorates of National Civil Defense.
e. The composition of each voivodship defense committee will be verified. Their chairmen will be in principle the voivods, but because of the situation they could be the chairmen of the voivodship people's councils or secretaries of the PZPR voivodship committees. The composition of the WKO (voivodship defense committees) will contain ex officio the commandants of the voivodship militia (MO) in the position of deputy chairman of the WKO.

f. Premier Jaruzelski also introduced a series of detailed tasks in which he ordered the development of interdepartmental plans for cooperation in the event of the need to introduce Martial Law as well as a plan for seizing the mass media centers.

In conclusion, Premier Jaruzelski stated that: "We must all work for the 9th Party Congress. It is necessary to adjust the requirements of activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs because the Party and the administration are weakened. The Militia must act resolutely and Militia patrol operations must be strengthened and they must be visible on the streets."
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