MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Need to Standardize Current Terminology

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report concludes the series which has been based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article addresses the problem of standardizing military terminology so as to reflect specific concepts and avoid ambiguities. The author cites several examples of imprecise terminology in the area of missile/nuclear weapons where different terms refer to the same concept and where identical terms refer to different concepts, and proposes certain initial steps to correct this situation, including setting up a special commission to deal specifically with this problem. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned.

John H. Stein
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Source: Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel I. Dremach. This article addresses the problem of standardizing military terminology so as to reflect specific concepts and avoid ambiguities. The author cites several examples of imprecise terminology in the area of missile/nuclear weapons where different terms refer to the same concept and where identical terms refer to different concepts, and proposes certain initial steps to correct this situation, including setting up a special commission to deal specifically with this problem.

Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. Although portions of it appear to be tongue-in-cheek, the article is an accurate reflection of the difficulties encountered in translating the Military Thought series, and thus a fitting conclusion to it.
The Need to Standardize Current Terminology

(Letter to the Editor)

by

Colonel I. DREMACH

The appearance of a new weapon inevitably requires that an appropriate name be found for it, one that gives a brief but precise description of its basic characteristics and the methods of its employment.

The terminology currently in use, however, does not provide a strict and economical definition of the essence of modern weapons, the methods of preparing them for use, or the principles of their combat employment. As a result it leads to various kinds of misconceptions and misunderstandings.

In the area of missile/nuclear armament this has lead to a situation where in official literature one may encounter different terms referring to identical concepts and, conversely, identical terms referring to different concepts. For example, in the Manual on the Conduct of Operations (Part Two) a missile (reaktivnyy snaryad) guided in flight and designed to strike tanks is called a guided antitank missile (upravlyayemaya protivotankovaya raketa) (page 335), while in the field service regulations and in most other official documents this missile is called an antitank guided missile (protivotankovyy upravlyayemyy reaktiyny snaryad).

The section of the missile containing the warhead and detonating devices is often called both the boyevaya chast and golovnaya chast, while the warhead (boyevoy zaryad) containing a nuclear explosive is defined, even in the same manuals, as a nuclear warhead (yadernyy zaryad), special warhead (spetszaryad), or nuclear warhead (yadernyy boeprapis) (see the Manual on the Operational Rear Services, Part Two).

There appears to be no satisfactory explanation for these facts, nor for the fact that, for example, the launch site of rockets (reaktivnye snaryady) is called a fire position, while one of tactical missiles (taktichesskiye rakety) is called a launch position, even though a rocket and a tactical missile are essentially the same in method of preparation.
and carrying out the launch.

Particularly unfortunate, in our view, is the widespread use of the term raketa (for "missile"). In point of fact, according to the combat regulations of rocket troops, a missile is a means of destroying enemy installations, but at the same time it is a means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. In the field service regulations a missile is referred to as one of the basic means of delivering nuclear warheads to their targets. But in the Manual on the Conduct of Operations (page 49) and the Manual on the Operational Rear Services (pages 18, 125, 179) a missile is merely a delivery vehicle and even lacks missile propellant.

That similar ambiguities could be cited is clear from the following: In Article 147 of the Manual on the Conduct of Operations it states: "The presence in a front (army) of long-range missiles makes it possible to use them extensively to deliver strikes against enemy forces and means." Comparing this definition with Article 49 one might conclude that strikes against the enemy are actually delivered by delivery vehicles. The same situation prevails in analyzing the analogous articles in the combat regulations of rocket troops.

In practice, of course, no one draws this conclusion, since everyone understands that it is impossible for delivery vehicles to deliver strikes, but nevertheless such ambiguities are impermissible.

At one time, for example, a great deal of effort had to be expended to convince certain comrades of the technical impossibility of altering the yield of missile warheads (raketnyye boyevye chastii) by replacing their nuclear charges (yadernyye zaryady). It is quite probable that this misconception was caused by the wording in Article 49 of the Manual on the Conduct of Operations (Part Two), where among other things it states: "The basic types of materiel are missiles, nuclear warheads (yadernyye zaryady), and missile propellant...", whereas in reality the basic types of materiel are missile delivery vehicles, warheads (boyevye chastii) with nuclear, chemical, conventional, and special charges (zaryady), as well as missile propellant.

Similar examples could be cited many times over, but in our opinion these are sufficient to convince us of the need to standardize the terminology pertaining to missile/nuclear weapons, and perhaps not to them alone.
As a first step in work to make current terminology more precise, it seems to us advisable to consider the following proposals.

1. A missile (raketa) is the aggregate of a missile delivery vehicle, the devices of the system of flight guidance, and the warhead, all ready for use after completion of pre-launch checks.

2. A missile delivery vehicle is designed to deliver a warhead to target by using a rocket engine, whose time of operation is automatically limited in accordance with the designated range of flight of the missile.

3. A warhead (boyevaya chast) is a device for destroying targets by using the live charge (boyevoy zaryad) and devices and mechanisms inside it that ensure timely production of a definite yield and type of burst.

4. Inasmuch as a warhead (boyevoy zaryad) may consist of a nuclear or conventional explosive, and toxic, combat, radioactive, or bacteriological substance, and may also be special (for example, illuminating, smoke, propaganda, etc.), warheads (boyevyye chasti) should be subdivided into nuclear, conventional, chemical, etc.

5. In view of the fact that the term pusk (for "launch"), as opposed to start, has come into general use among rocket troops, the following designations should be established: puskovaya ustanovka (for "launcher") in place of startovyy agregat; predpuskovye proverki (for "pre-launch checks") in place of predstartovyye proverki; puskovaya pozitsiya (for "launch site") in place of startovaya pozitsiya; and puskovaya batareya (for "launch battery") in place of startovaya batareya.

6. The term reaktivnyy snaryad should refer to a missile delivery vehicle plus a warhead, taking a missile delivery vehicle to mean a device designed to deliver the warhead to target by means of a rocket engine which functions until its fuel is completely exhausted or until it is destroyed when the missile hits its target or a barrier. And missiles whose range and flight trajectory cannot be altered after launching should be called "free rockets" (neupravlyayemye snaryady).

7. Instead of the term "missile-technical support of troops" it is preferable to use the term "support of troops with missiles and special armament," since otherwise it would be necessary by analogy to speak of "ammunition-artillery support," "electronic-radiotechnical support," and so on.
8. The levels of readiness of missile delivery vehicles, warheads, and missiles in general, should be so arranged that the numbers indicating the levels of readiness run from the highest to the lowest.

9. A non-T/O&E commission should be set up under the Commander of Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Ministry of Defense, composed of representatives of the Staff of the Rocket Troops and Artillery, the Chief Rocket and Artillery Directorate, and military educational institutions, with the task of making the current terms pertaining to missile/nuclear weapons more precise, as well as developing new ones. The results of the commission's work should be published in the military press for consideration and should be taken into account when reissuing our regulations and manuals.