1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article propose designating waiting areas at a distance of 70 to 100 kilometers from the forward edge of defense of the enemy as opposed to the 20- to 50-kilometer distance then practiced, as it ensures greater preservation of forces and means from losses and still enables troops to cover this distance and successfully go over to the offensive from the march with little complication of troop control and slight complication in providing rear services support. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned...
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Distance of Departure Areas from the Enemy's Forward Edge of Defense When Troops Go Over to an Offensive from the March
The Distance of Departure Areas from the Enemy's Forward Edge of Defense When Troops Go Over to an Offensive from the March

by

General-Major V. DYATLENKO
Colonel N. PANOV
Lieutenant Colonel A. PRIKHODKO

The going over of troops to the offensive, especially for conducting the first operations, is contemplated, as we know, in the wake of nuclear strikes, from the march after the movement of the formations and large units from the interior, with their deployment from the march. Accordingly, as the experience of exercises has shown, there is an endeavor to shorten as much as possible the last leg of the march in order to preserve the capability of the troops to advance after this to a great depth at high rates.

However, we believe that for the troops to occupy waiting areas at a distance of 20 to 50 kilometers from the forward edge of defense of the enemy, as is usually recommended, is not the best solution to the problem. It is more advisable to go over to the offensive after moving troops up from areas at a somewhat greater distance away from the forward edge of the enemy -- 70 to 100 kilometers.

In advancing this position, we are proceeding on the basis that, with the enemy's highly developed system of reconnaissance, it is extremely difficult to conceal a concentration or even a brief stay of troops in waiting areas located comparatively nearby without the risk of subjecting them to nuclear strikes. And, although the difference between the distance of these areas now practiced and that proposed by us, equalling 40 or 50 kilometers, does not seem so significant, calculations show that it ensures greater preservation of forces and means from losses.

For instance, if in the offensive zone of an army there is an enemy army corps made up of three infantry divisions and one armored division, then it will have at its disposal 16 Honest John launchers and 25 to 29 reinforcement launchers of nuclear means (two or three Lacrosse battalions, three Honest John battalions, one Corporal battalion, and one Redstone...
group). Altogether in this case in the offensive zone of the army the enemy will have 41 to 45 launchers of nuclear means of attack, not counting the 203.2-mm howitzers; of these, only five (the three launchers of the Corporal battalion and the two launchers of the Redstone group) have a range of more than 100 kilometers. The remaining means, as we know, have a range within the limits of 30 kilometers. It is necessary, of course, to take into account also the constant endeavor of the enemy to increase this range.

Nevertheless, in designating the waiting areas at a distance of 70 to 100 kilometers from the forward edge of defense of the enemy, we deprive him of the possibility of using tactical means of nuclear attack on our troops, which reduces to a considerable extent their probability of casualties.

At the same time, upon making a march for 70 to 100 kilometers, the troops will be fully capable of going over to the offensive from the march and, in the wake of the nuclear strikes, of advancing at the required rates -- up to 100 kilometers per day. Troop control is hardly complicated with an increase of the march by 40 or 50 kilometers, nor will this have any effect on the employment of rocket troops. A good number of army and division exercises fully confirm this.

For instance, in one exercise conducted under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade V. I. CHUYKOV, several motorized rifle divisions were positioned by the command at a distance of 80 to 90 kilometers from the front line. After making this march, they successfully went over to the offensive from the march and fulfilled their tasks.

We are naturally opposed to excessively increasing the last leg of the march of troops immediately before the offensive. A march of greater length is, of course, undesirable. After it, almost a complete fueling up of all equipment will be required, which necessitates a long stop; and it will be very difficult for troops after moving up, say, 200 to 250 kilometers to conduct combat actions from the march to a great depth. This applies especially to the driver personnel of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and motor vehicles.

As for the second-echelon army of the front, it is undesirable for it to make the last stop during the operation before commitment to the engagement more than 150 kilometers from the front line. So it was in the exercise BURYA (STORM), conducted under the direction of the Minister of
Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade R. Ya. MALINOVSKIIY, where the 82nd Army, located in the second echelon of the 2nd Western Front, was 120 to 150 kilometers away from the front line. Even such a distance permitted the troops to go over to the offensive from the march and keep up its great momentum. To position the second-echelon armies of a front any closer is undesirable, for within the limits of up to 100 kilometers there will be located and moving up second-echelon divisions of the armies already in action, missile units, as well as a number of rear services facilities of the armies and front.

And if an army, for some reason or another, before commitment to the engagement has been stopped at a distance greater than 150 kilometers, then it should be relocated to waiting areas at distances of 70 to 100 kilometers, from where it will be committed to the engagement.

A march of 70 to 100 and even 150 kilometers before an offensive (commitment to an engagement) does slightly complicate the solution of problems of rear services support, especially with fuel and ammunition. In the table are cited estimates of the availability and expenditure of fuel in a division in constant readiness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weight of a fueling (tons)</th>
<th>Availability of fuel at the start of the march</th>
<th>Consumption of fuel during the march</th>
<th>Remainder of fuel after march</th>
<th>Presumable consumption per 100 km. of combat actions (fuelings)</th>
<th>On remaining POL discounting the emergency reserve (0.2 fuelings) the troops can go without supplementary fueling (km.)</th>
<th>With supplementary fueling from the reserve of the division (km.)</th>
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<td>2nd variant -- with increased reserves</td>
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**Note:**
- The table presents data for two variants of fueling during marches.
- The first variant includes normal reserves, while the second includes increased reserves.
- Consumption and remaining fuelings are calculated per 100 kilometers of the march.
- The emergency reserve is accounted for in the remaining POL calculations.
From the table it can be seen that every division with increased reserves of fuel is fully able after a march of 70 to 150 kilometers to conduct combat actions to the full depth of an army operation without any additional replenishment of fuel. And with normal reserves of fuel and the use of the emergency reserve in the division, an offensive of troops to a depth over 100 kilometers will require an insignificant replenishment of aviation gasoline -- within the limits of 10 to 20 tons.

The proposed distance of the waiting (departure) areas for the offensive of troops from the march will not hinder the use of nuclear weapons or the provision of the missile launchers with nuclear warheads and of artillery and tanks with conventional ammunition. The latter (for artillery and tanks allocated for the conduct of fire from indirect fire positions) can be distributed beforehand to the fire positions in quantities of about 0.8 unit of fire in order to ensure dependable support of the offensive. Calculations show that, for two motorized rifle divisions and one tank division attacking in the first echelon of the army, as well as for their means of reinforcement (army or gun artillery brigade, 122-mm howitzer and 130-mm gun artillery regiments) it is necessary to distribute altogether 1,232 tons, which will require 411 three-ton trucks. The organic transportation units of the divisions and army fully ensure the delivery of such a load, as is confirmed by the experience of a number of operational-rear services exercises.

But if it is impossible beforehand to distribute ammunition to the fire positions, then it is advisable for each artillery and tank unit to form motor transport columns with ammunition and relocate them immediately behind the units. Nor do we rule out the designation of several mobile branches of army ammunition depots in the offensive zone of the army, from which the divisions will also obtain ammunition during the offensive.

The success of the going over of troops to the offensive from the march after a 70- to 100-kilometer march will be largely determined by the condition of personnel, especially the mechanic-drivers. To preserve their strength, it makes sense that, for the first half of the last leg of the march, vehicles and tanks should be driven by backup drivers. This matter is not, in fact, new, but insufficient attention is devoted to it in exercises.
In conclusion, let us point out that the problems set forth in this article have been discussed at an army military science conference. Several comrades expressed doubt as to the advisability of putting the waiting (departure) areas for an offensive at 70 to 100 kilometers. They justified this by the great difficulties connected with the control of troops and their materiel support. But we have attempted as far as possible to show that such difficulties should not be feared. It is a question of increasing the last leg of the march of the troops before the offensive by 40 to 50 kilometers altogether, which, given the sharply increased mobility of our troops, will not have a strong negative effect on their actions. At the same time, it fully justifies itself in view of the constant endeavor of our probable enemies to increase the range of fire of the tactical means of nuclear attack.