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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions
of Troops Under Special Conditions



1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article contains two critiques of a textbook of the same title published by the Frunze Academy. Both enumerate shortcomings in the book's treatment of certain questions and offer their views and suggestions for improvement. The first discusses the employment of nuclear weapons in a forest, the employment of amphibious landing forces, and certain features of combat actions in the Far North. The second discusses the nature of combat actions in a city and indicates the role and importance of cities, especially in defense. This article appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

JN
JOHN N. MCMAHON

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
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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 18 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Actions of Troops Under Special Conditions

SOURCE Documentary Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article contains two critiques, the first written by Colonel L. Vinnitskiy and Lieutenant Colonel V. Ofitserov and the second by Colonels I. Lyapunov and N. Smirnov, of a textbook of the same title published by the Frunze Academy in 1961. Both enumerate shortcomings in the book's treatment of certain questions and offer their views and suggestions for improvement. The first discusses the employment of nuclear weapons and the exploitation of their results in combat actions in a forest, the employment of amphibious landing forces, their tasks and support, and certain features of combat actions under conditions of the Far North including an advance on and off roads and the capabilities of moving troops across water. The second discusses the nature of combat actions in a city and indicates the role and importance of cities, especially in defense. End of Summary

Comment:

Colonel L. Vinnitskiy and Lieutenant Colonel V. Ofitserov also collaborated on "Certain Matters of a Front Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of a War" in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962 (). Colonel N. Smirnov also wrote "Meeting Engagements in Modern Operations" in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969



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Combat Actions of Troops Under Special Conditions*

by


Colonel L. VINNITSKIY
Lieutenant Colonel V. OFITSEROV
Colonel I. LYAPUNOV
Colonel N. SMIRNOV

While conforming to the overall system of military art, combat in theaters with special conditions still has a number of special features. An underestimation, and more important a disregard of these features will usually lead to serious oversights and errors. The combat actions of our army in the first stage of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 may serve as an example of this. The simple transferral to the Northwestern Theater of tenets of the theory of a deep operation, which had been worked out mainly with regard for the conditions of the Western Theater, was unsound. In the course of the battle which ensued, considerable corrective changes had to be made in operational-tactical views.

Under present-day conditions, in connection with the great expansion of the spatial boundaries of armed combat, it is all the more impossible to apply the development of tactics and operational art to the Western Theater of Military Operations alone, although in a future war, this theater will undoubtedly retain importance as being the main and decisive theater. This becomes all the more clear if we consider that for almost their entire length the Soviet Union's borders pass through theaters with special conditions.

In light of what has been stated above we would like to make a number of proposals on several questions, which are touched upon in the textbook under review.

* Combat Actions of Troops Under Special Conditions. Textbook, Moscow, Publication of the Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze, 1961, 212 pages and 19 diagram inserts.




Combat actions in a forest. On the whole, the authors of the textbook correctly and logically set forth the basic circumstances for preparing, organizing and conducting an offensive and a defense under these conditions.


However, in our opinion, it would have been more expedient to dwell on the employment of nuclear weapons in a forest, and on what effect this can have on the actions of troops. The success of effectively solving many aspects of organizing and conducting an operation and battle depends on a proper understanding of this matter.

In the textbook, it is stated in very general terms that nuclear weapons are less effective against the enemy in a forest than under ordinary conditions. Actually the forest does limit the spreading of shock waves, thermal radiation, and radioactive contamination of the ground. However, within the limits of their range, the casualty-producing effect of these elements are not decreased, but rather increased in a forest. Thus, the action of a shock wave is increased inasmuch as a large number of tree barriers and debris are produced, which create an additional harmful element. The casualty-producing effect of thermal radiation is also increased due to the incidence of fires over large areas. Finally, as the author points out (page 33) the persistence of radioactive contamination in a forest is higher than in open country.

We feel that the author's conclusion that the forest impedes the rapid exploitation of nuclear strikes by troops is far more accurate when a differentiated examination of the casualty-producing effect of a nuclear burst in a forest is made. In our opinion, this position should have been developed further. After all, in the majority of cases any direct exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes by the immediate passage of troops through areas in a forest close to ground zero usually will be ruled out.

Thus, the actions of troops in a forest are very distinctive from the standpoint of exploiting the results of nuclear strikes which have been delivered. In view of the formation of fires and barriers in the zones of the nuclear strikes, which is especially probable during the summer dry season, the advancing troops should bypass these areas. While moving to bypass nuclear






bursts, the troops may find it necessary to deliver immediate fire destruction against the enemy with conventional means. Consequently, the skilful combination of nuclear and conventional means of destruction during actions in a forest acquires exceptional importance, while the role of conventional means increases immeasurably.

Let us mention incidentally that this circumstance greatly influences the employment of tactical airborne landing forces in a wooded area. The outbreak of fires in areas of nuclear bursts rules out setting down landing forces in these areas. Therefore, landing forces will usually be landed in open sectors of terrain, and in winter, as the experience of exercises conducted in the Leningrad Military District shows, they will be landed on the ice on lakes.

Stemming from the special features of the effect of nuclear strikes in a forest, the author should have drawn another important conclusion of a practical nature, that it is advisable to employ nuclear weapons of low yield in a forest. Incidentally, the very disposition of a defense in a forest which customarily has a more centralized nature than in open country, supports this recommendation.

In addition to this, independently operating company and, in a number of cases, even platoon strongpoints predominate during a defense in a wooded area. It is unquestionably inexpedient to expend nuclear weapons of high yield for neutralizing these targets. And we cannot agree with the author's opinion that in a forest "... nuclear weapons of high yield must be employed or the number of nuclear strikes must be increased in order to achieve the necessary results" (page 30).

In examining the peculiar features of organizing reconnaissance in a forest, we feel that it should have been emphasized that the concealed nature of the terrain and the favorable conditions for the enemy's camouflaging himself oblige us to send out a greater number of separate reconnaissance patrols and groups in the offensive zone of a motorized rifle division than is needed in open country. This situation does not require special explanation since it is clear that the capabilities for visual observation of the terrain are sharply reduced in a forest.




In the section "Conduct of an Offensive Battle" (pages 41-44) greater attention should have been devoted to the question of repulsing counterattacks. The concealed nature of the terrain in a forest, as we know, and as it is aptly emphasized by the authors, promotes the conduct of counterattacks and creates favorable conditions for delivering surprise strikes against the flank and rear of the troops on the offensive.

As we know, a characteristic feature of actions of the enemy on the defense in a forest is striving to counterattack the troops on the offensive even with a small number of forces. As a result of this, repulsing counterattacks represents one of the most important forms of combat activity of the troops. The overall momentum and final success of an offensive in a forest quite often depend on this. In connection with this, during actions in a forest it is necessary to take a number of additional measures, in particular, to allocate powerful reserves in large units, units, and subunits even where there are second echelons.

The basic positions on defense in a forest seem correct to us. We would like to make only one comment. As has already been mentioned above, a forest promotes the conduct of counterattacks, the success of which quite often can be achieved even with a small number of forces. Therefore, in a forest more than anywhere else under other conditions, mobile methods of conducting combat actions are more effective than positional.

In the textbook it should have been emphasized that in a forest it is more expedient to have a defensive disposition where the greater part of the forces is located in the depth rather than on the forward edge since this creates better conditions for employing counterattacks.

Combined actions of ground forces large units and units with ships of the navy. In setting forth the tasks fulfilled by amphibious landing forces, the authors, in our opinion, unjustly excluded from the list of possible combat tasks the landing of forces for the purpose of penetrating the enemy's rear in order to destroy his nuclear means. Meanwhile, the employment of amphibious landing forces for this purpose can be an extremely effective method of combating the enemy's means of nuclear attack in theaters with special conditions. By being landed in a



concealed area, detachments which are rather small in strength can relatively easily penetrate the necessary regions, reconnoiter the enemy's nuclear means and destroy them with a surprise attack.

We object to the recommendation that an amphibious landing force should usually be allocated in strengths from a motorized rifle regiment (sometimes even a battalion) up to a motorized rifle division (page 142). This can hardly be considered appropriate for theaters with special conditions. The landing of large landing forces in the strength of a division presents great difficulties, notwithstanding the fact that it also requires prolonged preparation and an amount of landing means which even a front cannot obtain, especially during the initial period of a war.



As the experience of exercises shows, in particular those in the troops of the Leningrad Military District, the most typical strength for a tactical amphibious landing force should be a battalion and less frequently a regiment. In many cases a reinforced company will act as a landing force. With the proper selection of landing areas, the landing forces at this strength are capable of developing aggressive combat actions and of substantially influencing the success of our troops' offensive.

We feel that the authors somewhat overstated the depth of the possible landing of an amphibious landing force. It is specified as approximately 150 kilometers and more from the front line with due regard for the daily advance of troops at a rate of 100 kilometers. This rate hardly seems realistic in theaters with special conditions where difficult sectors of terrain predominate and the railroad network in a majority of regions is poorly developed.

We suggest that the rate of advance of troops under conditions where there are either no roads or insufficient ones should be estimated at 40 to 50 kilometers per day. Stemming from this, the parameters of the depth of the landing of tactical amphibious landing forces must be correspondingly decreased from 150 to 75 to 100 kilometers.

In examining questions of preparatory fire and support of the landing and combat actions of the amphibious landing forces





on pages 145 and 148, the authors, in our opinion, did not sufficiently emphasize the role of nuclear strikes. And, meanwhile, this circumstance has decisive importance for the employment of amphibious landing forces under present-day conditions.

As we know, during World War II preparatory fire and support of amphibious landing forces involved great difficulties. The fulfilment of these tasks was limited by the range of artillery fire, since there were often not enough aircraft for this purpose. As a result, the landing of amphibious landing forces and their subsequent combat actions on the shore in the immediate depth had to be supported mainly by naval artillery fire.

Amphibious landing forces under present-day conditions have acquired completely different capabilities in connection with the employment of missile/nuclear weapons. Fire support of them can now be carried out by the missile means of the ground forces, the navy, and the air forces. Due to the great power and range of these means, the destruction of the enemy by fire is not only more effective, but also considerably more flexible. Creating this destruction is also simpler on the whole. All this increases the combat capabilities of amphibious landing forces.

In examining the special features of the defense of a coastal area, the authors take only one of the possible variants for air defense. As we see from the text (and especially from Diagram 16), the defensive disposition of motorized rifle divisions in a coastal area is based on holding previously prepared positions.

Without denying this defense disposition, we feel that under present-day conditions it can be based on somewhat different principles. When the front of the defense is especially wide and the terrain along almost its entire length is suitable for an assault landing, then it is advisable to base the defense on the conduct of counterattacks from the depth in conjunction with the preparatory delivery of nuclear strikes. With this variant the troops will not occupy a defense in advance in areas where a landing of enemy landing forces is possible, but rather they will mainly be deployed in the depth. In our opinion, this method of actions should be used, perhaps even more often than positional and classical forms of defense, especially in the initial period



of a war in view of the limited forces.

Combat actions in regions of the Far North. The authors rather fully related the main features which affect the combat actions of troops. These are the geographical and climatic conditions of the North which are characterized by uninhabited regions with almost inaccessible terrain and a severe climate with great fluctuations in the average daily temperature during all seasons.

The special features of the combat employment of all branch arms were set forth concisely and in detail. The positive side is that the positions set forth are supported by specific combat training experience.

While we agree in principle with the recommendations set forth, we would nevertheless like to make some additions.

The authors examine two basic methods of attack: from the march and from a position of direct contact with the enemy. The experience of exercises, however, shows that under conditions of the North, there is reason to include still a third method. The fact is that during an advance from the depth to areas where roads are lacking or in poor condition and there are inaccessible sectors, it is hardly ever possible to carry out the deployment of troops from the march in front of the forward edge of the enemy's defense. For this reason, troops must in fact occupy departure areas for some time. In these areas the deployment of troops from march columns into battle formation is implemented, and also the necessary measures for organizing an attack are carried out. At the same time, they hit the opposing enemy with conventional means -- artillery, mortars, and aviation. Regarding nuclear strikes, these will be delivered with due regard for the safety of our own troops somewhat earlier during the movement of the latter on the march. Thus, when selecting methods of actions under conditions of the North, elements of an attack from the march and from a position of direct contact with the enemy will quite often have to be combined.

We feel that here the features of an advance combining the movement of troops on and off roads through adverse sectors of terrain should have been given in greater detail. Nowhere but in

northern regions does this affect the actions of the troops so strongly.

An advance on and off roads is organized and conducted entirely differently from the standpoint of the nature of the tasks to be fulfilled, the strength of the advancing troops, and the methods of conducting the battle. Troops, advancing along a road, as a rule, fulfil the task of breaking through the defensive line of the enemy which covers one or another road axis. It is characteristic for troops advancing off roads to penetrate through gaps which are not occupied by the enemy. We should mention, moreover, that although subunits of all branches and branch arms can carry out an advance on roads in the presently existing organization, in regions of the extreme North only subunits in cross-country vehicles can advance off roads, or where there are no roads or insufficient ones.

A frontal attack with all of its main features is characteristic for actions of troops advancing on road axes, and a surprise flank attack against enemy groupings which cover the road axis is characteristic for troops advancing where roads are lacking or insufficient. The rates of these advances will also differ.

Thus, an advance on and off roads represents an extremely complex form of combat activity. It requires that troops have a high level of field training and that commanders and staffs in addition are able to coordinate the combat efforts of troops which are employing various methods of combat actions and which have very inconsistent rates of advance.

Finally, the authors did not discuss the question of the possibility of moving subunits across water at all. One can hardly overestimate the importance of this for northern regions, for we know no other part of our country has such an abundance of different types of rivers and bodies of water. During the Great Patriotic War deep bodies of water were justifiably considered serious obstacles on the route of the advancing troops. And, it could not have been otherwise since motorized rifle troops had a limited number of crossing means at their disposal. Moreover, these were unwieldy and not very mobile. This ruled out the possibility of the wide-scale movement of infantry subunits across water.



Now this situation has been radically changed. Motorized rifle divisions have received self-propelled crossing means in considerable numbers which has substantially increased their capabilities for crossing water. In the summer of 1961 an attempt was made in the Leningrad Military District to investigate the capability for moving motorized rifle subunits across water in the organic crossing means of a division-regiment. In this exercise the regiment crossed a strait up to 1,300 kilometers. After the assault crossing of the strait the main forces of the regiment advanced overland, while one reinforced motorized rifle battalion completed a maneuver on a lake.

The main forces of the regiment crossed the specified distance in six hours. Hence, only the forward subunits went to the appointed area, whereas the detachment bypassing over water, crossed this distance in an hour and a half. In so doing, the detachment moved at full strength, delivered a surprise attack against the rear of the enemy, and secured the capture of an advantageous line.

The capability of moving subunits over water was also tested in other exercises in the troops of the district. The results obtained attest to the fact that in lake regions, the movement of subunits over water can be carried out almost twice as fast as over land (when there are no roads or insufficient ones). Movement of subunits over water, therefore, is an effective prospective method for conducting combat actions in northern regions.

We feel that when the textbook under review is reissued, this situation should be reflected in it.

* * *

In the book under review the authors attempted to summarize the nature of combat actions in a city under present-day conditions and to formulate appropriate theoretical and practical recommendations. In our opinion, the content and structure of this chapter have a wide variety of substantial deficiencies.

We cannot help but mention also that the material of this chapter lacks a specific designation, and, as can be concluded





from the introduction (page 2), it is intended for all levels from the commander of a subunit to the commander of an army. Therefore, the material set forth was extremely general, unspecific and vague. And, it could not have been otherwise, since it is impossible at one and the same time to give specific recommendations to the commander of a platoon and to the commander of a division, not to even mention to the commander of an army.


Combat actions in a city are examined without any connection or dependence on the overall operational-tactical background, although as we know, cities are strongpoints, and as such are included in the overall system of defense.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that cities taking part in a defense considerably raised the strength and stability of that defense, while the fight for cities became an integral element in the plan of an operation, and was a part of the operation itself.

The practice of troop training and especially the experience of operational exercises conducted in 1961 in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany showed conclusively that under present-day conditions combat for major cities is regarded as a part of the unified process of an operation.

The authors examine only combat within a city, as a result of which such important questions as the role and importance of cities as the targets of armed combat, modern methods of capturing cities, methods of overcoming the opposition of defending troops on the close approaches to a city, the special features of employing nuclear weapons, aviation and other means of neutralization during a battle for a city, the employment of maneuvering, and a wide variety of other questions were omitted.

The need to examine these questions in such volume is occasioned by the fact that under conditions where nuclear weapons are employed, the fate of cities, in all probability, will be decided away from their borders, even on the distant approaches, and will reach a much more expansive scale than previously.



Due to the special importance which the problem of the combat for a city holds for present-day conditions, in our opinion, the current point of view on the role and importance of cities as the targets of armed combat should have been set forth in the book and their influence on the combat actions of troops should have been examined from this position. At the same time, to a certain extent a unity of views on this problem should have been worked out. After all, it is a secret to noone that, concerning matters of the combat for cities and assessing them as combat targets in a present-day war, quite often some officers and generals firmly deny their role and influence on the course and outcome of the combat. By way of reasoning, the authors of such opinions allege that, owing to the unlimited capabilities of missile/nuclear weapons, cities now are completely doomed and have lost their former importance. That this viewpoint is untenable is completely obvious.

Regardless of the fact that they can be destroyed by nuclear weapons, the role of major cities in the overall system of defense is, as before, great. Even when destroyed they will create considerable obstacles and present difficulties on the routes of the advancing troops. In destroyed cities in which there are a considerable number of brick buildings and basements remaining, and also a developed network of various underground structures, the troops can carry out persistent defensive battles for a prolonged period of time.

We cannot help but take into account the fact that it will not be expedient to destroy all cities with nuclear weapons, although they are a considerable obstacle in the path of the advancing troops. We must also keep in mind the role of one or another city from the standpoint of its economic and political importance, density of population, and its historical place in the government.

Finally, we feel that the combat against the garrisons of cities will not be conducted exclusively with the aid of nuclear weapons, all the more since the nuclear capabilities of the combatants have certain limitations. For example, calculations made in the course of exercises in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany showed that to destroy only the major cities with a population exceeding 100,000 people, assuming that a single nuclear strike will be delivered against them, it would be

necessary to expend 64 front missiles in the zone of a single front.

Cities are usually located on important axes forming transportation centers. At the same time, modern armies need good roads for maneuvering and transporting all the necessary materiel for the combat activity of the troops. Therefore, to a great extent, combat for cities is a fight for roads and for freedom of movement.

Industry, whose centers are usually cities, also influences their technical and economic importance as targets of armed combat. Only the capture or total destruction of major cities ensures a reduction in the enemy's capabilities in the area of production and supplying the army with all types of armament and equipment. Moreover, capturing cities increases the supplies of one's own troops. Therefore, combat for cities is a fight to reduce the industrial and economic potential of the enemy and to increase one's own capabilities.

The morale and political effect on the army and country made by the successful defense or the loss of cities and also by the capture of the enemy's cities plays a very important role.

Taking into account the great density of cities in the Western Theater of Military Operations and the highly developed network of ground transportation lines, the centers of which, as a rule, coincide with the territory of the cities, as well as their importance in the political and economic life of the nations of Western Europe and the place which they occupy in the overall system of measures of a military nature, we can with certainty say that, in a future war, if the imperialists are successful in unleashing one, combat for cities will acquire an even stronger and more violent nature than it had in past wars.

Consequently, questions of organizing and conducting combat actions for cities must be given serious attention even under peaceful conditions. But, in spite of the great importance of this problem, the study of it is proceeding slowly. In view of the absence in the troops of appropriate training resources, no special exercises in capturing cities are being conducted. In the course of the general exercises which are conducted, this question is not given much attention, although we should mention

that our probable enemy is persistently preparing himself in this area. It suffices to say that even West Berlin is being used for this purpose.

Taking into consideration the nature of a modern war, we cannot imagine that the enemy will concentrate large masses of troops inside cities for defense. Obviously, he will take all measures, using the latest means of combat, to rout the advancing troops while they are still on the distant approaches to the city. Because of this, the recommendation that "a very great number of forces may be needed to capture a major city with a population of many millions of people" (page 4) appears rather questionable.

Inasmuch as the fight for a city is examined without any regard for the overall situation, even questions of cooperation among troops operating outside of the city and between subunits and units conducting combat within the city, are not examined, although under actual conditions very serious attention will, of necessity, be given to them. Unfortunately, questions of combating the approaching reserves were also ignored, and consequently, measures for repulsing possible counterthrusts and counterattacks of the enemy were omitted.

In our opinion, the authors should have discussed the form and special features of capturing a city from the march, and also they should have given the modern concept of the form of an attack on a city after its preparation in short time limits. This should have been done for the simple reason that the latter method of capturing a city has not yet been specified in our regulations. It also should have been emphasized that under present-day conditions capturing a city from the march is the main method of combat actions of troops for capturing cities.

During the last war storming was regarded as one of the main methods of capturing cities. This same opinion existed in the recent past; however, lately, new views have surfaced which maintain that this method is not appropriate to the nature of a present-day battle and operation. We feel that the authors of the textbook should have expressed the latest opinion either for or against storming a city.

In our opinion, too little space in the book was devoted to questions of the wide envelopment of a city. We feel that in a modern war wide envelopment of cities will be one of the most prevalent methods of combat, and therefore, it should have been dealt with in greater detail. The conditions and nature of present-day armed combat (the great width of offensive zones, the conduct of combat actions on separate axes, the presence of great breaches and gaps in the battle dispositions of troops) will most advantageously promote the wide-scale employment of this form of maneuvering.

However, we must keep in mind that all cities cannot be enveloped, for as a result of wide envelopment the troops of the enemy will be built up in the rear of the advancing troops, while the enveloped city will still not be captured. Obviously, the allocation of specific forces and a certain amount of time are needed for fighting for and capturing these cities.

In our opinion, the most substantial shortcoming in discussing combat actions in a city is that the authors barely touched on the fundamental changes in military affairs which occurred with the introduction of missile/nuclear weapons. The events surrounding combat actions in a city are related in the same form and sequence as they occurred in the last war.

Accordingly, recommendations for employing conventional means of combat are given independently from the results of employing missile/nuclear weapons, and in particular, the organization and conduct of a defense were not discussed. Questions of employing these weapons were omitted from the elements underlying the specification of the content of the combat tasks and the commander's decision. The nature of conducting combat actions under conditions of radioactive contamination of a city, as well as the most suitable means for crossing "nuclear barriers" created by the enemy on the troops' routes to the city, were not examined at all.

In several places sentences are too general and specify nothing. What specific recommendation for determining the nature of employing forward detachments during a battle for a city can be extracted from the theory, for example, that missile/nuclear weapons "open up new and broader capabilities for successful actions of forward detachments" (page 14). Doesn't this

statement apply to any situational conditions?

The authors also offer no recommendations for employing missile battalions, and in particular, for selecting a place for locating siting areas and launch sites, nor do they discuss the degree and necessity of their participation during an attack on a city from the march and after its preparation in short time limits. In making plans for employing missile/nuclear weapons in a battle for a city, they should have pointed out the need for the cautious and economic expenditure of these expensive weapons, and the exceptionally great responsibility of the commander for expending each nuclear weapon.

Questions connected with the organization, procedure, and sequence for withdrawing troops from a city after its capture are not examined in the textbook.

In conclusion, we must mention that the material on combat actions in a city is based almost entirely on detailed explanations of the field service regulations. However, in a number of cases, a certain amount of free interpretation has been permitted, which has resulted in contradictions and the exclusion of certain important provisions of the regulations. There are also many careless wordings of ideas, inaccuracies, and questionable recommendations. Such shortcomings are inexcusable in a textbook.

Considering the large number of serious shortcomings in the chapter under review, we feel that it can hardly orient students completely enough in questions of studying the special features of organizing and conducting combat actions of troops in a city under conditions where missile/nuclear weapons are employed. The author collective had every opportunity to work out these questions on a higher theoretical level and with the necessary substantiation.