MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Enemy Agent Reconnaissance in a Theater of Military Operations in a Modern War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article begins as an historical treatment of US and European agent reconnaissance activities in World War II, based in part on KGB files. The author develops this into what he perceives to be the reconnaissance threat facing the Soviets in a future war in terms of military intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversion by agents and some of the equipment they will use. This article appeared in issue No. 2 (75) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Lieutenant Colonel S. Krylov. This article begins as an historical treatment of US and European agent reconnaissance activities in World War II, based in part on KGB files. The author develops this into what he perceives to be the reconnaissance threat facing the Soviets in a future war in terms of military intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversion by agents and some of the equipment they will use.

End of Summary
One of the most significant features of modern wars is the enormous growth of the role of reconnaissance. Never in the past was its influence on the course and outcome of military operations and war as a whole as decisive and all-embracing as it is now. The military doctrines of the major imperialist armies are based on the assumption that in a future war "victory will attend the one who takes aim more quickly and more accurately", that is, to the one who will be able to collect the most complete and accurate information about the enemy and who will deliver a missile/nuclear strike ahead of the enemy. "Nothing can entail such huge losses in personnel and equipment as incomplete intelligence," it is stressed in the field manual of the British Air Force.

One of the West German Army manuals states that under conditions in which atomic weapons are employed, reconnaissance becomes even more significant. Reconnaissance must continuously and accurately inform the command about the situation so that the latter can warn its troops of the threat of a surprise atomic attack by the enemy and can make effective use of atomic weapons. Under conditions in which atomic weapons are employed, the timely acquisition of reconnaissance information and its use in adopting decisions quickly is of decisive importance.

In the past war, in order to exercise troop control successfully, the command of the operational formations had to receive reconnaissance information on the enemy's situation approximately every one to two hours. The military specialists of the major capitalist armies consider that in a modern war this information should be coming in not less than three times an hour. This fact alone is sufficiently convincing proof of the incredible increase in requirements for reconnaissance.

In view of the growth in importance of reconnaissance in a modern war, the imperialist countries are striving feverishly to
make further improvements in reconnaissance means so that they completely meet the requirements of missile/nuclear war and the aggressive plans of imperialism. In doing this, they are devoting a great deal of attention to agent reconnaissance. In spite of the rapid quantitative and qualitative growth of other types of reconnaissance, agent reconnaissance is still considered the main type of military strategic reconnaissance and one of the principal tactical reconnaissance means of the operational formations.

"The secret collection of information (espionage)," A. DULLES stresses, "must continue to be the main type of intelligence activity." This role of agent reconnaissance under conditions of modern war results primarily from its great penetration capability. In a number of instances, it is the sole means for obtaining reconnaissance information, since, because of their inherent shortcomings, other means cannot ensure the fulfilment of this task. For example, aerial reconnaissance depends to a great extent on the weather. Because of bad weather, the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the fighter-reconnaissance aircraft that carry out reconnaissance at a low altitude were unable for 29 days to take photographs of the territory of revolutionary Cuba in order to confirm agent information about the presence there of Soviet missiles and aircraft.

Aerial reconnaissance cannot always distinguish the false from the real. It can easily be misled by skilful camouflage. Finally, reconnaissance aircraft are in a number of instances unable to overcome the air defense system. Starting in January 1941 and continuing through September 1944, the Germans were unable to carry out a single aircraft sortie for the purpose of photographing London, as English aircraft either shot down the German reconnaissance aircraft or drove them off. Prior to the Allied invasion of France, German aerial reconnaissance was in effect paralyzed by the English and American air defense systems. The Germans succeeded in obtaining only a few aerial photographs of the areas in which the Allied troops were concentrated, and even these were of poor quality.*

The role of agent reconnaissance becomes even more apparent if we take account of the limited capabilities not only of aerial reconnaissance, but of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. Radiotechnical reconnaissance can be neutralized by directional and barrage jamming. To camouflage their actions, the troops are able to employ radio silence, using only the on-alert radio means. This deprives the enemy's radiotechnical reconnaissance of the capability of obtaining reconnaissance information. Another substantial shortcoming of radiotechnical reconnaissance is that it far from always can provide the coordinates of enemy targets with the accuracy required by the missile units to carry out an effective strike. Only agent reconnaissance and aerial reconnaissance provide coordinates with the required accuracy (up to 100 to 200 meters).*

Radiotechnical reconnaissance is unable to detect from the operation of the guidance systems those nuclear attack means which are guided by an onboard inertial guidance system. Currently, radiotechnical reconnaissance is capable of detecting from the operation of the guidance systems the location of only those ballistic missiles and cruise missiles which are guided by a command guidance system, an inertial guidance system with radio correction, and a radio navigation guidance system.

The appearance of reconnaissance satellites, as the foreign military press admits, does not diminish the role of agent reconnaissance. In their reconnaissance capabilities the satellites do not replace and are unable to replace the agent. Moreover, satellites become a really effective reconnaissance means only when they are employed in conjunction with the good work of agents and of other types of reconnaissance.

* An agent can determine target coordinates with the indicated accuracy if he has a topographic map with a scale of 1:25,000 (1:50,000) and is operating on terrain which has good reference points. If the agent has access to combat documents, he can communicate to the enemy target coordinates with an accuracy down to several meters.
The following facts tell of the exceptional role of agent reconnaissance in future operations. Currently, in the armies possessing nuclear weapons, the number of delivery vehicles for the nuclear means of destruction (missiles, aircraft, artillery) is 2.3 to 2.5 times greater than the amount of nuclear warheads allocated to the operational formations for an offensive operation. This means that out of two to three missile launchers, heavy caliber artillery batteries, and bomber aircraft, nuclear means will be located only on one missile launcher, one aircraft, and one battery. In order to carry out successful combat actions, it is necessary first of all to destroy these particular launchers, artillery batteries, and aircraft. However, neither aerial reconnaissance nor radiotechnical reconnaissance can determine which of these means will be employing nuclear warheads and which will be employing conventional ammunition. Only agent reconnaissance is able to carry out this task. Such very important targets in the theater of military operations, as nuclear warheads depots as well as nuclear weapons assembly bases, can be reconnoitered again only by agent reconnaissance.

In discussing the role of agent reconnaissance in a theater of military operations, our probable enemies stress its special importance when a state of emergency has been declared. It is recognized that in the special period the use of agents will be one of the most important, if not the only, reconnaissance means capable of revealing the preparation for the initial operations of a missile/nuclear war. During this period events will be developing at a rapid pace. The troop grouping located in the theater of military operations will secretly occupy the starting areas for combat actions. The missile/nuclear means of the operational formations will move out to the launch site areas. The staffs will change their permanent disposition areas. Aviation will be dispersed among the field airfields. Rear services elements will move into shelters. In fact, the entire troop grouping located in the departure position and designated to conduct the operation will in a brief period of time radically change its disposition. This will be done under the strictest secrecy, with the use of intensive measures of camouflage and active disinformation. Field reconnaissance will not go into operation until the start of combat actions. Aerial reconnaissance will be spasmodic in nature. The opportunities for radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance will decrease as a
consequence of the wide use by the enemy of secure troop control, camouflage, and disinformation.

Thus, under these conditions the most complete and reliable information on changes in the enemy grouping, on the actual disposition of his troops, and on his plans can be obtained mainly through agent reconnaissance. Reconnaissance will in all likelihood make every effort to establish in the probable theaters of military operations a wartime agent net capable of carrying out fully the tasks of providing reconnaissance support for the first operations in the initial period of war.

All this means that there will be numerous enemy agents active in the theaters of military operations.

Organizing and carrying out agent reconnaissance in the theaters of military operations will be the various intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. These can be divided into three groups: the military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies; the national intelligence agencies; and the national counterintelligence agencies.

The military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies are the main agent agencies in the theaters of military operations. They are the ones that will be carrying out agent reconnaissance directly in support of the planning and carrying out of the combat operations of all the branches of the armed forces and of the branch arms. The following military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies will operate in the theaters of military operations:

-- the intelligence directorate of the staff of the commander of the armed forces in the theater of military operations;
-- the intelligence directorate (department) of the ground forces;
-- the intelligence directorate (department) of the air forces;
-- the intelligence directorate (department) of the navy;
-- the intelligence directorate (department) of the staff of the commander of the army group;
-- the intelligence department of the staff of the field army.
The intelligence directorate of the staff of the commander of the armed forces in the theater of military operations does not itself conduct agent reconnaissance. It plans and coordinates the activity of the military intelligence and counterintelligence organs in the theater of military operations, works out reconnaissance missions, and collates, evaluates, and disseminates to the concerned elements the information obtained by all the types of reconnaissance.

The intelligence directorates (departments) of the ground forces, air forces, and navy are actually branches of the central military intelligence agencies in a particular theater of military operations. They conduct agent reconnaissance to the entire depth of the theater of military operations in support of the campaign and of the war as a whole. The US Army Field Manual states, "...The intelligence agencies of the staff of the ground forces in the theater of military operations do not specifically engage in acquiring data of tactical intelligence interest and can acquire it only in the process of obtaining data of strategic importance."

From this it follows that the intelligence directorate of the staff of the ground forces in a theater of military operations is engaged chiefly in strategic intelligence. The intelligence directorate of the staff of the commander of an army group and the intelligence department of the staff of a field army conduct "close" agent reconnaissance directly in support of specific combat actions. Moreover, the intelligence directorate of an army group acquires information of strategic importance, "which is necessary for the long-range planning of large-scale operations."** The depth of agent reconnaissance also depends on the scale of the operation.

National intelligence agencies. In all the major capitalist countries, in addition to the military intelligence agencies there exist national intelligence agencies. In the United States this agency is the not unknown Central Intelligence Agency; in England, the Secret Intelligence Service; in West Germany, the Federal Intelligence Service. These intelligence agencies, as the foreign press indicates, will be represented in the theaters of military operations by the corresponding subdivisions:

operations groups -- liaison groups or main residencies, whose task will most likely be to conduct long-range agent reconnaissance to assist in the waging of the war as a whole. If the military intelligence agencies devote attention principally to the collection of military information, then the national intelligence agencies primarily conduct political and economic intelligence.

The national intelligence operations group (the liaison group or main residency) is considered the senior operations agency in the theater of military operations. It has the task of coordinating the entire reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive activity in the theater of military operations. However, as the experience of the past war shows, in practice this senior position is nominal. The constant rivalry among the intelligence agencies results in each of them actually operating independently.

Coordination is limited to the exchange of information and, in rare instances, to the shared use of operational capabilities.

The national counterintelligence agencies.* These include: in the US, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); in England, the Security Service (SS); in West Germany, the Federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution. In the theaters of military operations their representative agencies will take the form of field departments whose assignment is to conduct counterintelligence activity in the territory occupied by the enemy troops and in our rear area. Thus, there can be three types of counterintelligence agencies operating in the zone of combat actions: military counterintelligence agencies (army, air force, and navy); counterintelligence subdivisions of the national intelligence agencies; and national counterintelligence agencies. Their main task, as can be seen from their activity during the past war and at present, is to combat the revolutionary actions of the workers in the theater of military actions.

* When combat actions are being conducted on the enemy's own territory, the agents of the enemy's national counterintelligence agencies, in addition to carrying out their purely counterintelligence tasks, will also collect data for military intelligence. In a number of instances, counterintelligence agents will be turned over to the jurisdiction of intelligence agencies. In one form or another, the troops will encounter the active subversive activity of the counterintelligence agencies.
operations, to "shield" the troop personnel against the penetration of Communist ideas, and to carry out a number of counterintelligence measures in the theater of military operations designed to counter the intelligence efforts of the socialist countries. It must be kept in mind that the subdivisions of the national counterintelligence agencies are working not so much for the purpose of "counterintelligence defense" of the troops in the theater of military operations as for the purpose of "guaranteeing the security" of the state as a whole. These are the agent intelligence and counterintelligence agencies that the enemy most probably will have in a theater of military operations.*

In the operations of a future war, the massive reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive activity conducted by the enemy may assume an all-encompassing character. He will attempt to carry it out unceasingly in time and in space. The entire effort of the agents will be aimed directly against the troops and the military installations of the Soviet Army in the theater of military operations and may cover all aspects of its combat activity. However, this does not mean that the enemy will distribute his efforts evenly against all the front installations and troops. He will concentrate his main efforts primarily on missile/nuclear weapons, since they are the principal means employed in armed combat. In addition, reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive activity may be concentrated on the axes of the enemy's main attacks, against the main groupings of the Soviet troops. This mode of operations is in accord with one of the basic principles of military art, the essence of which is: "it is impossible to be strong everywhere,"

* The intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the various countries making up the aggressive imperialist blocs may be working simultaneously in the theater of military operations. As a rule, their efforts will be coordinated by the intelligence agencies of the country whose troops are playing the major role in the particular theater of military operations. However, the existence of sharp contradictions among the "partners" of the aggressive blocs does not exclude independent activity of their intelligence agencies and an unhealthy rivalry among them.
In organizing reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive activity against our troops, the enemy intelligence agencies will assign their agents and sabotage-reconnaissance groups very broad tasks, whose content may change depending on the situation and, primarily, on the nature of the combat actions. These numerous and well-known tasks can be divided into four groups: the collection of reconnaissance information on the disposition, composition, armament, and combat tasks of the troops, on their morale and political status, combat losses, and on the results of atomic strikes; the carrying out of sabotage actions; attacks against missile/nuclear installations, control organs, rear installations, transportation lines, etc.; the conducting of "psychological warfare" among the troops and local population; the carrying out of terrorist acts; and the inflicting of heavy losses on personnel by spreading bacteriological means and contaminating the food and water. Particular attention may be given to inciting enmity among the servicemen of the armies of the socialist countries and to propagating panic-inspiring and provocative rumors. One of the important tasks of enemy agents and sabotage-reconnaissance groups will be the collection of information on the radiation and chemical situation.

The most important of the enumerated tasks is the determination of targets for missile/nuclear strikes. The regulations state, "Foremost among the principal targets marked for destruction are the following: areas in which nuclear weapons delivery means are located; nuclear weapons guidance systems; nuclear weapons depots; and command posts and communications centers. Therefore, the main efforts of reconnaissance must be concentrated on identifying these targets."

The reconnaissance and subversive activity conducted by the enemy may have a combined character. Agent reconnaissance will be combined with aerial and radiotechnical reconnaissance. Successful counteraction by our air defense system against the enemy's reconnaissance aircraft will inevitably result in an increased effort to drop agents into our rear area. The same thing may occur when weather conditions limit the flights of reconnaissance aircraft. Radio silence by our troops will also cause activity by enemy agent reconnaissance. In order to

* US Army Field Service Regulations (FM 100-5), published by the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, 1964, Page 192.
deceive our troops, the enemy may step up aerial reconnaissance on secondary axes, while on the axis where the main efforts are being exerted he may devote his main attention to agent reconnaissance, using highly skilled agents for this. This method of enemy deception was used widely in the Second World War (on the eve of the Allied landing on Sicily, in preparing and carrying out Operation Overload, during the Allied air offensive against Germany). At the time of Operation Overload military reconnaissance and the reconnaissance of the terrain were organized in such a manner as to demonstrate extreme interest in those areas where military actions were not planned. Reconnaissance aircraft made fewer sorties into the Normandy coastal area (where the landing was planned -- S.K.) than into Le Havre and other areas. The combined character of the reconnaissance and subversive activity will also be expressed in the combining of the reconnaissance and sabotage actions of agent reconnaissance with the carrying out of "psychological warfare".

Making use of one of the most important attributes of agents, which is their ability to penetrate deeply into an area of interest -- this is beyond the scope of any other form of reconnaissance -- enemy intelligence agencies will make the maximum effort to dispatch their agents directly into the troops. Main attention will be given to those targets which are of reconnaissance interest. The reconnaissance capabilities of an agent who has penetrated, for example, a large staff cannot be compared with the capabilities of an agent who is working in the surrounding area or with the capabilities of other non-agent reconnaissance means. By working in a large staff and having access to secret documents, one agent can give the enemy the kind of information that an extensive agent net operating under other, less favorable, conditions could not provide. This information can be acquired in a shorter period of time, which is particularly important in modern war.

In view of this, enemy intelligence agencies will count on infiltrating their agents primarily into the staffs of the fronts, armies, corps, and divisions and into the communications centers and other key reconnaissance targets. The most highly skilled agents, trained in peacetime, will be used for this purpose. The enemy will try to dispatch some of them to these targets long before the start of military actions.
Targets offering excellent potential for sabotage may also attract the attention of enemy intelligence agencies. These include: missile/nuclear sites; air defense installations, primarily radio navigation systems; airfields, primarily those on which delivery aircraft are based; various military equipment depots; medical facilities; food supply points; and others. Enemy agents armed with modern sabotage means can do great harm to the troops by putting combat equipment out of action during the critical moments of an operation, by destroying materiel, and by inflicting massive losses on personnel through the use of bacteriological means.

The experience of the past war, however, shows that enemy intelligence agencies far from always gave their agents the task of infiltrating directly into the troops. A considerable part of them, and in some instances the majority of them, collected reconnaissance information about the troops by moving along the transportation lines of the front and in the rear areas, by observing the troops from well concealed observation posts, by mingling with the local population, etc. For example, from 1 through 30 August 1944, in the zone occupied by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, military counterintelligence organs arrested 39 German fascist reconnaissance agents. Of these, 17, or about 44 percent, did not have the task of infiltrating the troops.* In September, the number of these agents rose to 52 percent.** From 1 June 1942 through 20 March 1943, the special departments of the 6th Army exposed 126 German spies. Only 24 of them, or 19 percent, were directly in the subunits of the troops. Eighty-one percent of the German fascist agents operated in the army zone without infiltrating the troops.***

* Central Archive of the KGB, archive 67, file 30840, inventory list 213, sheet 47.
** Central Archive of the KGB, archive 67, file 30840, inventory list 213, sheet 132.
*** Central Archive of the KGB, archive 43, inventory list 114 "ch", file 4, sheet 240.
The large percentage of agents dispatched by the enemy to our rear area without the mission of infiltrating the troops is explained primarily by the difficulty of training an agent capable of rapidly infiltrating the troops and obtaining the needed information. This requires a more or less long period of time, which, under conditions of a mobile war, reconnaissance most often does not have, and the availability of the appropriate contingent of agents. It is much simpler to train and dispatch an agent to collect reconnaissance information in a specific area and to have him return to the reconnaissance center with the collected information. Moreover, an agent who has infiltrated the usual line subunit in the overwhelming majority of instances has fewer opportunities to collect and -- what is most important -- to transmit the reconnaissance information to the enemy than does the agent who has settled in the area or who carries out observation reconnaissance by moving through the area of the operational disposition of the front troops toward the operational rear area.

There should be expected in future operations a considerable increase in the number of agents who will not have the task of infiltrating the troops. With modern technical means of reconnaissance, communications, movement, and sabotage at their disposal, these agents will be able (in the absence of an appropriate counteraction), along with the sabotage-reconnaissance groups and the enemy's radiotechnical and aerial reconnaissance means, to carry out a considerable part of the reconnaissance and sabotage tasks for their command.

The enemy's reconnaissance and sabotage-subversive activity will be carried out with the use of new technical means, which he will put into operation at the start of the war. Starting in the spring of 1961, an exceptionally great deal of attention began to be given in the US to scientific research, with the aim of creating improved combat means for carrying out various types of special operations in the enemy's rear area. Appropriations for this research in fiscal year 1962 come to 20.5 million dollars. This figure was increased by 35 percent in 1963. Included among these means are special sabotage missiles; an electronic apparatus for detecting, tracking, and identifying targets; photography, communications, and movement means; and special-purpose radio beacons.
In view of the achievements in the fields of radioelectronics, photo technology, quantum physics, and other branches of science and technology, it is realistic to assume that there will appear in the equipment of the enemy's agents and sabotage-reconnaissance groups such means as automatic portable transmitters of information about the radiation situation in the rear area and in the disposition area of our troops. The enemy will attempt to set up these transmitters ahead of time in the areas of the contemplated nuclear strikes. Switching on automatically at the moment of a nuclear strike, they will transmit a radio signal whose intensity will correspond to the level of radiation.

It has been established that the external radiation of nuclear warheads in special containers exceeds the radiation given off by the earth. Therefore, through the use of special devices nuclear warheads can be detected by their gamma radiations at a distance of up to 500 meters. In addition to equipping his agents with these kinds of devices, the enemy will surely attempt to set up automatically operating indicators on the main probable supply routes for nuclear means. The purpose of these indicators is to determine the number of nuclear warheads and the delivery direction and to transmit their information in the form of radio signals to a so-called "indicator alert center" of the army or army group. Once having placed these indicators in a well planned manner, enemy reconnaissance will be able under certain conditions to keep a check on the movement of our nuclear weapons and to draw from this fact alone exceptionally broad and far-reaching conclusions.

There is also the possibility that enemy agents, using modern instruments that can determine the external radiation of nuclear warheads, will employ special mines (including atomic mines) which explode only beneath vehicles carrying nuclear warheads.

Representing a great danger to the troops will be radio beacons dropped in the area of staffs, missile launch sites, airfields, important rear installations, etc. In a number of instances, the placing of these radio beacons in the area of these installations will be the most important task for the agents, since the enemy will orient himself on the position of particularly important installations.
It must be taken into account that the enemy may use radio beacons which on call send out short radio signals and which come in the form of small magnetic containers. These radio beacons are currently being used by agents. If the enemy agents succeed in planting these containers in the units and large units, then the enemy's reconnaissance will be able always to receive information about their location.

The conditions of missile/nuclear war present intelligence agencies with one of the most important problems -- to ensure the survivability of their agents in the enemy's rear area. Since the troops are now saturated with nuclear weapons, there will actually be no place in the rear areas of the warring sides that would not be subject to some of the casualty-producing elements of nuclear means: penetrating radiation, shock wave, thermal radiation, and radioactive contamination of the air, soil, and water. Under these conditions, unprotected agents are doomed to destruction. It is obvious that the enemy will provide specific measures for their protection. One of these will be the use by the agents and the sabotage elements of individual means of protection. However, it is known that these means provide protection only against radioactive particles in the form of dust or mist. They cannot protect against shock wave and penetrating radiation, and give only weak protection against thermal radiation. The most effective means of protection against the casualty-producing elements of nuclear weapons are shelters built in the ground. The usual covered trench with an earth covering of no less than 100 centimeters thick weakens a gamma radiation dose by 200 to 400 times* and in effect provides 100 percent protection against penetrating radiation and thermal radiation. Earth shelters ensure a multifold weakening of the shock wave. There is no doubt that the enemy agents and sabotage-reconnaissance elements operating in our rear will make wide use of underground shelters to protect themselves from nuclear weapons. As a rule, these shelters will be set up in advance. Already in 1956, the foreign press repeatedly spoke about "the underground armies of the future." The idea was expressed that for actions in the enemy's rear area under conditions of "radioactive devastation," agents, sabotage and reconnaissance elements and other "resistance forces" comprising the so-called underground army should have at their disposal a far-flung

network of underground shelters and stores of food, water, communications and movement means, and medicines. These shelters should be constructed in advance in all the probable theaters of military operations.

The use of underground shelters for agents and sabotage elements is not a new operating method on the part of the enemy intelligence agencies. These shelters were used widely in the past war. They were especially used by armed bands of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, and other nationalists. Enemy agents also resorted to them. Thus, in the instructions of the German counterintelligence organ "Sonderstab-R," seized by military counterintelligence organs of the 1st Belorussian Front in March 1944, mention was made of the need to construct before the withdrawal of the Germans well camouflaged shelters of the dug-out and covered trench type in which the agents of this organ should take shelter during active combat actions of the troops and during massive round-ups.*

In future military actions, it will be a usual occurrence for agents to go underground. A planned system of underground shelters, located primarily near the most important transportation lines, by water boundaries, on commanding heights, and equipped with modern reconnaissance means (radiation situation transmitters, indicators for locating atomic weapons, long-range periscopes, laser radar systems, and others), will not only provide reliable protection for the agents against means of mass destruction but will also make it possible to collect reconnaissance information directly from under the ground.

These shelters will become the strongpoints for the agents and the sabotage-reconnaissance groups, from which they will carry out reconnaissance raids and sabotage attacks against targets in a particular zone of combat actions.

* Central Archive of the KGB, archive 6, inventory list 1, file 773, sheets 141-142, 197-198.
The unprecedented fast-moving nature of combat actions, in particular the delivery with the speed of lightning of modern weapons to targets on the field of battle, again poses the problem of transmitting to the reconnaissance center the information that has been collected. This information must be transmitted literally with missile-like speed, or else it loses its usefulness. Consequently, this almost excludes ways in which most information is transmitted, such as the return of the agent across the front line and a personal report on the information that has been collected. Transmission of information via courier agents will be reduced to the limit. Basic changes will take place in transmitting reconnaissance information via radio channels. In the past war and currently a great deal of time was and is being spent on this. Thus, a well trained agent takes 35 to 40 minutes to compile a report, encipher it, enter into communications, and transmit it; a poorly trained agent takes 1.5 to two hours. It is obvious that during this time changes may take place in the location and actions of the troops that would nullify the information transmitted to the reconnaissance center. Therefore, enemy agents will, as a rule, transmit reconnaissance information about our troops by means of brief radio signals. They will use radio sets with automatic enciphering and high-speed transmission of radio messages. Even now the combat engineer-tactical reconnaissance organs are equipping their agents with high-speed attachments for radio transmitters, which make it possible to transmit at a speed of 1,000 characters a minute. As the foreign press reports, there is equipment being tested which makes it possible to transmit reports at a speed of 1,500 to 1,600, and even 5,400, characters a minute. Some agent radio transmitters stay on the air for four to six seconds altogether. The taking of a DF bearing on these radio transmitters requires modern equipment and highly skilled operators.

The depth of agent dispatch and activity will change. In the past war, agent reconnaissance in support of the military command of enemy operational formations preparing or conducting an operation was carried out in a defense to a depth of up to 160 kilometers from the front line (the depth of the operational disposition of our troops), and in an offensive, up to 300 kilometers and more, that is, to the depth of the offensive operation of an army group. Now the depth of enemy agent reconnaissance will increase considerably. Prior to the start of
combat actions it will extend from 300 to 400 [numbers uncertain] kilometers; and in the course of combat actions, from 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers. This is a result not only of the increased scale of modern operations, but also of the fact that the enemy has the capability of destroying any targets regardless of their distance. Enemy agents operating in the deep rear area will not only keep certain areas under agent observation, but by means of target designation will ensure the destruction of the targets that have been detected there. The enemy can make swift use of the information from its agents no matter at what depth they are located from the front line; this was not the case in the past. For example, in a given instance the capabilities of an agent operating at a depth of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers from the battle formations of the troops can be compared with the capabilities of an agent who operated during the Second World War in immediate proximity to the front line, say, at a distance of from eight to ten kilometers. At that time the agent could swiftly communicate to his command information on the location of every military target which could be destroyed by artillery fire. Now, with the same speed, but with incomparably greater effectiveness, the enemy is able to get information from his agent no matter how far the latter is situated in the interior of the hostile country.

In World War II, especially in its final stage, a considerable difference was noted in the operating methods of the enemy agents in offensive and defensive operations. Under conditions in which the Soviet troops were conducting defensive operations, the enemy agents concentrated mainly on collecting reconnaissance information, spreading provocative rumors, and destroying control posts and communications means. When our troops were on the offensive, the main stress was put on sabotage. For example, during the period that the Northwestern Front was preparing the winter offensive to destroy the Germans' Djinskiaya grouping, the enemy dispatched into the rear area of this front a large number of saboteurs, who concentrated their main attention on the Bologoe - Staraya Russa, Bologoe - Toropets railroads. Just in the period from 1 October through 22 November 1942, approximately 200 saboteurs were liquidated in the rear area of the Northwestern Front.*

* Central State Archives of the Red Army, archive 32880, inventory list 5, file 27, sheet 216.
In the initial days of the offensive by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front,* the enemy dispatched a massive number of saboteurs to the rear area of the front for the purpose of destroying the main transportation lines in the areas of Zheshuv - Lvov. Used for sabotage actions in the rear area of the front were agents trained by several sabotage schools.** A massive dispatch of sabotage agents was carried out in the rear areas of other fronts as well. Thus, from 1 January through 8 February 1943, 184 enemy agents were arrested in the rear area of the 1st Belorussian Front; of these, 124 had sabotage missions. In March to April 1945, the dispatch of saboteurs and terrorists to the rear area of the front was increased.***

This characteristic of actions carried out by enemy agents will be retained in the operations of a modern war. In offensive operations by our troops, the enemy will increase sabotage action against the troops, rear services organs, and army (front) transportation lines by using opportunities favoring sabotage activity, such as a three- to fourfold increase in the length of the transportation lines, the extension of the rear areas and the communications lines, and the resulting weakening of the protection of the important targets. By delivering sabotage strikes against the troops, transportation lines, and targets in the rear area of the front (army), the enemy will attempt to slow down the tempo of the offensive, impede the maneuvering of the troops, and disrupt their materiel-technical supply.

In defensive operations by our troops, the sabotage possibilities for the enemy agents are reduced considerably, since our troops are more concentrated than in an offensive, the length of the transportation lines is several times shorter, and important installations are well prepared for defense. These circumstances will result in a reduction in sabotage activity by the enemy and an increase in his reconnaissance activity. The reason for this will be the difficulty of destroying troops and rear installations dug deeply into the ground. Precise information on their location is necessary in order to effectively destroy them.

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* The offensive started 14 January 1943.
** Central Archives of the KGB, archive of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front, file 48814, sheet 5.
*** Ibid, sheet 354.
The importance, and consequently the scale, of agent reconnaissance is growing from war to war. Our probable enemies are assigning a particularly large role to agent reconnaissance in preparing for and conducting a missile/nuclear war. To judge from the materials appearing in the foreign press, the enemy will employ reconnaissance and sabotage agents on a massive scale in the theater of military operations. In comparison with the past war, the character of the actions by these agents will change radically. There will be a serious increase in their influence on the combat actions of the troops. In view of this, the troops should prepare in advance to combat enemy agents with their own forces and means. To do this, they must definitely be acquainted with the means and methods of their actions.