MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John H. Stein
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Characteristics of a Defensive Operation in Wooded Swamp and Lake Terrain in the Initial Period of War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". Based on the expected enemy offensive methods and on the natural geographical factors, the authors of this article maintain that defensive operations in wooded swamp and lake areas will be characterized by aggressive maneuvering actions and maximum exploitation of favorable terrain conditions. The specific character which these actions will take is discussed in the context of the methods for employing nuclear weapons, the operational disposition of troops, the dispersed deployment of troops on separate axes, and the conditions and methods for conducting a counterthrust. This article appeared in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned.

/ John H. Stein

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Characteristics of a Defensive Operation in Wooded Swamp and Lake Terrain in the Initial Period of War

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 4 (65) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Colonel V. Cheremnykh and Colonel V. Sinev. Based on the expected enemy offensive methods and on the natural geographical factors, the authors maintain that defensive operations in wooded swamp and lake areas will be characterized by aggressive maneuvering actions and maximum exploitation of favorable terrain conditions. The specific character which these actions will take is discussed in the context of the methods for employing nuclear weapons, the operational disposition of troops, the dispersed deployment of troops on separate axes, and the conditions and methods for conducting a counterthrust.

Comment:

A Colonel V. Cheremnykh also co-authored "A System for the Collection, Processing and Transmission of Information in a Military District" in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964. After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Characteristics of a Defensive Operation
in Wooded Swamp and Lake Terrain in the Initial Period of War

by

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Along with the development of offensive operations in the main theaters of military operations in the initial period of war, defensive operations may be conducted in secondary theaters or axes of operations of the troops of some border military districts. This may occur in those cases where the troops of the border military district, due to various circumstances, are not ready for decisive offensive actions in the wake of the first massed nuclear strike. While carrying out preparation for the offensive, they will use the available forces and means to go over to the defense for a while. Such conditions of the going over of the troops of a front to the defense will occur, obviously, not on decisive, but on secondary axes, in particular in extensive areas of wooded swamp and lake terrain. Even with the readiness of the offensive grouping -- which on such axes will be limited in size -- immediately going over to the offensive will, by virtue of the developing situation, be inadvisable. Deciding this question will depend primarily on the results of the first nuclear strikes delivered by the warring sides in the main theaters of military operations.

Thus, the conduct of a defensive operation under the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain as a first operation in an initial period of war is, in our opinion, fully acceptable and does not contradict the offensive spirit of Soviet military strategy.

In examining the nature of such a defensive operation and the methods of conducting it, we cannot fail to take into account the views of our probable enemies on the conduct of offensive operations under these conditions. According to the views of the American command, with the immutability of the principles of employing nuclear weapons it is considered advisable to employ on behalf of the ground forces, in view of the lack of large targets, nuclear warheads of lesser yield than under ordinary conditions against the main groupings of troops, supply bases, and
airfields of the defender. Great importance is attached to the
independence of groupings of troops advancing on separate axes, and the
forming of temporary operational-tactical groups is not out of the
question. As is known, the Soviet forces employed such groups during the
Great Patriotic War in the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations.
The Lapland Army, made up of German and Finnish units and large units,
operated apart from other enemy forces and means under the conditions of
lake and wooded swamp terrain.

According to the views of the American command, the purpose of an
offensive under such conditions is the successive and complete annihilation
of the defending forces in the shortest time. The most advantageous
targets of the offensive are considered to be the main groupings of troops,
populated localities, road junctions, transportation lines, and airfields.
Considering the absence of a continuous front line, it is recommended to
employ such forms of offensive actions as flanking and envelopment,
including also two-sided envelopment even with equal forces, if the
attacking troops have more mobility than the defenders. The American
command is not only working out the theory, but is also preparing the
theaters of military operations and is conducting intensive combat training
of troops under conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain.

The nature of a defensive operation under these conditions and its
peculiarities will depend not only on the expected enemy offensive methods,
but mainly on natural geographical factors and the possibilities of
employing different branches of the armed forces, branch arms, and
primarily nuclear weapons. Intense combat against the attacking ground
forces of the enemy will have to be conducted from the very beginning of
military actions on all axes and to a more considerable depth than on
ordinary terrain.

The essence of a defensive operation under the conditions being
examined consists, in our opinion, in the exceptionally aggressive, mobile
actions of the defending troops even with small forces with maximum
exploitation of certain favorable terrain conditions. In conjunction with
hitting the enemy with nuclear weapons, this will lead, in our opinion, to
the transformation of a defensive operation into an offensive one without a
special pause. Such actions should find extensive application primarily on
the approaches to the defense. In the future, fighting for a main zone of
defense will apparently be only an extreme measure, and troops located
behind this zone and in the operational depth will be intended mainly for
going over to the offensive.
One of the most important characteristics of a defensive operation in wooded swamp and lake terrain consists in the real possibility of disrupting the enemy offensive at its very beginning by the skilful employment of even a relatively small amount of nuclear munitions in combination with conventional means of destruction and actions of only part of the forces of the defending troops. Under these conditions, the main ground forces grouping of the defenders may not even enter into an engagement with the main forces of the enemy; it will merely execute an antinuclear maneuver (with battalions or regiments) within the limits of the assigned zones of defense and carry out preparations for aggressive offensive actions.

Of course, disruption of the enemy offensive is possible even though it is not carried out immediately, by a single action of the defender. His means of delivering nuclear munitions will be in different stages of combat readiness, some on alert status at launching positions and at airfields, others will still be deploying in siting areas. Naturally, not all the most important enemy targets designated for destruction with missile/nuclear weapons will be precisely known in advance. Besides that, the main efforts will have to be concentrated primarily on hitting the nuclear means and certain stationary targets of the enemy. Therefore, in the first strike, only part of the nuclear munitions will be used directly for hitting those ground forces which are directed towards an invasion on the main, most threatened axis.

The procedure for delivering nuclear strikes for the purpose of disrupting the enemy offensive may vary. It depends on the position of the attacking troops, the availability of nuclear means to the defender and the readiness of these means to deliver strikes. In our opinion, it is most advisable to deliver simultaneous nuclear strikes against the most important levels of the enemy grouping located in concentration areas, or against the main part of its forces and means moving forward to the national border or already prepared for an offensive (for instance, against the first-echelon large units, especially tank units, means of nuclear attack, and most important control posts).

The first nuclear strike must annihilate, neutralize, or destroy the main targets representing an immediate threat to the defensive grouping. In itself, this strike under the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain is specific to the situation and will consist of a number of simultaneous grouped strikes against enemy troops dispersed over a large area with greater than usual gaps between the large units and other elements of the operational disposition. In such a strike, individual air
or ground nuclear bursts can be used effectively.

As the combat actions develop, as the additional reconnaissance forces and means are used, and as the nuclear combat means are brought to readiness, the troop commander will be able to obtain more precise data on the position of the enemy grouping and the axes of its offensive. These data will permit making a decision regarding the delivery of subsequent strikes and the actions of troops.

The period of delivering the subsequent strikes is when the complete disruption of the enemy offensive can, in our opinion, be done by maneuvering the trajectories and concentrating the fire power of nuclear weapons against the ground forces of the enemy. Missile and air strikes should be delivered against large units, reserves, junctions of transportation lines, narrow passages and crossings — especially at the moment troops are passing through — and other important targets that were not affected in the first strike. This will deprive the enemy of the opportunity to execute maneuvers for purposes of restoring the combat effectiveness of the first echelon of his grouping.

In planning the delivery of strikes, in no case should nuclear munitions be dissipated immediately on many large units, but they must be concentrated on a smaller number of large units making up the first echelon of the enemy. It is necessary also to endeavor with one strike (especially when the amount of nuclear munitions is limited) not only to destroy the target, but also to create a zone of radioactive contamination in an area of adjacent narrow passages — of which there are very many in wooded swamp and lake terrain. Besides that, it is necessary to consider the consequences of each nuclear strike in a given vicinity, namely: the formation of obstructions, occurrence of fires, flooding of individual sectors, etc. The creation of zones of destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain must be coordinated with the plans of the subsequent actions of the troops.

Conventional means of destruction — tube and rocket artillery and aviation — must supplement with their fire and strikes the effect of nuclear weapons against the enemy grouping as it moves forward or deploys in front of the main zone of defense. Here the creation of areas of destruction by fire, especially on the most important axes, is facilitated by terrain conditions and can disrupt the enemy offensive even before his approach to the main zone.
Under the conditions being examined, missile/nuclear strikes are not the only means of smashing the enemy grouping, although they do promise great results, if one takes into account the difficult nature of the terrain and the operational disposition of enemy troops it entails. Therefore, disruption of an enemy offensive under the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain before the encounter of the main forces of the ground forces groupings of the sides is perfectly realistic. However, this situation does not in any way rule out the necessity of preparing troops for an intense fight to hold the zones of defense; this fight will take place especially in the situation when the enemy will manage to maximally exploit the factor of surprise, as well as to inflict substantial damage on our missile/nuclear grouping.

Another important characteristic of the defensive operation being examined is the peculiarity of the grouping of forces and means, primarily missile/nuclear means. This peculiarity stems from the necessity of conducting combat actions on separate axes not only dozens but sometimes even hundreds of kilometers apart from one another. The capacity of the axes accessible to the actions of tanks, artillery, and other branch arms is very limited. Extensive areas of difficult terrain separating relatively passable axes drastically complicates the conditions of cooperation between the separated groupings of troops. Maneuvering the trajectories of missile/nuclear weapons is in many cases out of the question. As for a regrouping of forces and means during an operation from one axis to another, it is connected with the difficulties of moving around in wooded swamp and lake areas and may require considerable time. Therefore, one must count on it only in an extreme case.

The grouping of defending troops must ensure maximally favorable conditions for conducting a defensive engagement, which will usually represent an aggregate of battles isolated from one another and conducted according to a single plan. Underlying the establishment of the grouping must be the principle of unequal distribution of efforts among the axes. Strong groupings of troops must be concentrated on the most important of them in advance, including missile/nuclear means, which could independently conduct an engagement, having the exposed flank (flanks) border on areas of difficult access. On other axes it is possible to get along with smaller forces and conventional means of combat, keeping in mind that, in case of a significant threat on the part of the enemy, he can be quickly acted upon with nuclear aerial bombs. And on axes where troops cannot be deployed at all, one can merely organize surveillance service.
Groupings of forces and means on separate important axes must be deployed in a dispersed way with maximum exploitation of the advantageous terrain conditions (systems of lakes, rivers, narrow places, boggy sectors) and its protective features. In the process, it is advisable to deploy missile large units and units in areas not located directly on the offensive axes of the enemy attack groupings.

What forces and means can be allocated for the defensive operation? From the experience of the Great Patriotic War, we know that in the complement of troops of the Northern Front in the summer of 1941 there were twenty-one rifle divisions (including three in the stage of being formed) and a rifle brigade. The total defense front was 2,300 kilometers, including a land sector of around 1,300 kilometers. The greatest density of troops was on the Karelian Isthmus and the Petrozavodsk axis. In the remaining sectors of the front, Soviet troops covered only the main axes, with intervals of 100 to 200 kilometers between the large units. In spite of the sectors of the front being so disconnected, the enemy attempts to overcome the defense were unsuccessful, and, in particular, the summer offensive of the Germans' Lapland Army to take Murmansk ended in failure.

Under modern conditions, the number of divisions by the start of military actions will be considerably smaller. First of all, the divisions themselves have become qualitatively completely different, being maneuverable and possessing great fire power and striking force (tanks); therefore, no equal sign can be placed between the rifle divisions of 1941 and modern motorized rifle divisions. Secondly, combat tasks can now be accomplished with fewer ground forces by skilful employment of nuclear weapons and exploitation of the results of their strikes.

According to the experience of a number of exercises, to defend the most important operational axis, an army corps can be allocated at the start, and then the complement of forces can be brought up to the scale of a combined-arms army; on the other axes the forces of a division will most often be enough. Thus, initially participating in the operation will be very limited forces and means of the ground forces, strictly speaking, only peacetime units and large units, and during the operation newly mobilized troops will start to arrive.

Acquiring special importance in the initial period of war is the speed of setting up groupings of forces and means, and primarily the bringing to readiness of nuclear means, which will be able to effect disruption of the enemy offensive. The operational disposition of the troops may be carried out in advance or already during the defensive operation that has begun;
but in all cases, it will be constantly changing, mainly in connection with the arrival of new large units in the front.

The grouping of rocket troops, as an integral part of the operational disposition, must be formed in its basis in advance, in any case well before the combined-arms large units occupy the defense zones assigned to them. Missile large units and units, having the greatest effective range, should be held in immediate subordination to the front commander and be deployed not on one, but on several very important axes. By this is achieved the capability of influencing the course of the operation in a timely manner and when necessary also of massing missile/nuclear strikes by maneuvering trajectories. At the same time, the principle of dispersed deployment of missile/nuclear means is observed and the preconditions are created for using them on disconnected axes.

The grouping of rocket troops will participate in the delivery of the first missile/nuclear strike until the deployment of the combined-arms large units on the defense lines, and then part of them will go to reinforce or join the deployed troops while the main forces will remain in direct subordination to the front commander. But in this case, too, the possibility of centralization of control of all missile/nuclear means must be ensured.

The troops of a border military district of peacetime will apparently constitute basically the first echelon of troops of the front; for the first two or three days of the operation there may not even be a second echelon. In the reserve of the front at this time there may be not more than one or two divisions. The large units of the first echelon will be defending in zones covering the main threatened axes and will have in their battle formations strong second echelons and reserves. These large units must be prepared for independent actions apart from the main forces of the army and front.

As new units enter the composition of the front formation, the operational disposition of the troops of the front, as has already been indicated, will change: the reserves of the front will increase and then, on their basis, a second echelon or one or two counterattack groupings can be established.

The first defensive operation of the front may be preceded by aggressive offensive actions of limited forces and means on one or two very important axes. It is very possible that the ground forces grouping on a given operational axis, due to various circumstances, will not undertake an
invasion in the first hours (days) of the war simultaneously with the start
of military actions in the main theaters of military operations. In this
case, in order to disorganize the actions of the enemy, disrupt his plans
in some degree, and take important areas in the border zone, our large
units in constant combat readiness can go over to a partial offensive in
the wake of the first nuclear strike. Their tasks will not be very great
in depth. Subsequently, these large units must go over to the defense on
enemy territory after taking the important lines in the wooded swamp and
lake areas, which have their own role to play in the conduct of the
defensive operation, considering how transient it is and that the troops of
the front will subsequently go over to a counteroffensive.

In the extensive difficult areas of the terrain is where the
organization of defense with the location of the main zone on enemy
territory already in the first days of the war can be undertaken if, by
promptly going over to the offensive with the forces of two or three large
units, one manages to preempt the enemy in actions.

Given the appropriate situational conditions, when the enemy grouping
has secretly concentrated in the border areas and begun an invasion, the
large units in constant combat readiness can undertake a counterthrust in
the forward security zone, remembering that the forces of the advancing
side on each axis will most often be rather limited. In these cases, the
defensive operation may be limited to an engagement in the forward security
zone. This is also characteristic of the conduct of combat actions under
the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain.

The scope of the defensive operation (it can develop on all or several
operational axes) will be determined by the tasks facing the front and by
its combat strength. Entering into the zone of defense of the front may be
not only a ground sector, but also a seacoast, where the combat actions of
troops acquire a specific nature. The operational depth will, in practice,
be limited to where there are targets of operational and strategic
importance. The duration of the defensive operation will be short, as it
will be for all the other operations of the initial period of war.

As is known, many of the principles of the disposition of a defense
that justified themselves in the past have ceased to meet the changed
conditions of conducting a modern defensive operation. Thus, the principle
of concentrating main efforts has acquired new content in defense. It
consists primarily in the maneuver of fire of nuclear weapons and -- what
is especially characteristic of wooded swamp and lake terrain -- in the
switching of efforts from one line (zone) of defense to another. It is our
conviction that, by exploiting the abundance of natural barriers, troops can occupy lines along the main road axes with considerable gaps between defense areas (sectors).

It would appear that, as a consequence of the limitation of the network of roads, the confinement of the maneuvering of troops, and the presence of considerable difficulties in preparing defense lines (zones) with engineer works, the switching of the efforts of the defending troops from one line (zone) to another would be complicated. However, the preparation of natural boundaries for defense on the main road axes can be done in short times, though not in full, it is true; besides that, the terrain has great possibilities for creating a system of obstacles and areas of destruction by fire. The main efforts of the troops, if the defense is occupied in advance, are advisable switched from one line (zone) to another even before the start of the operation and especially during it in order to deceive the enemy.

An operational maneuver for the purpose of switching the main efforts of the troops from one line (zone) to another must be planned in advance. The essence of such a maneuver consists in this, that by means of regroupings uncomplicated in concept, the operational disposition of troops is changed right down to switching of the main efforts of a first-echelon army (corps), and in certain cases also of the first-echelon divisions, from one line (zone) to another on all or on most of the axes being defended by the large units.

Suppose that a combined-arms army in going over to the defense had concentrated its main efforts on the first zone of defense and had been in this operational disposition for two or three days of a period of threat.* In this case, it is advisable in a short time, possibly one night, to carry out a regrouping of troops, concentrating the main efforts in the depth of defense.

Finding extensive application along with operational maneuvering must be tactical maneuvering which would not affect the essence of the operational concept. The importance of the tactical levels in a defense grows drastically on difficult terrain. The presence of lakes, boggy sectors, and impassable terrain and the abundance of various narrow passages cut down the zone of terrain accessible to actions of all branch arms and reduce the extent of the offensive front of the enemy on each axis to a minimum. Of course, these narrow passages are known beforehand, and the offensive side can use nuclear strikes to destroy the units defending

* In our opinion, for troops defending outside the main theater of military operations, such a duration of a period of threat is tolerable.
them, thereby effecting a breach in the defense disposition; and it can also capture narrow passages with airborne landing forces or subunits crossing lakes on amphibious means.

The main thing for the defending side consists in this, that even with very limited forces and means it preserve them from nuclear strikes as tactical links in the general system of defense and conduct successful battles to hold its positions in the area of any narrow passage. But this can be achieved only by maneuvering. It should be mentioned that it is easier and quicker for battalions in defense to maneuver on difficult terrain than for the offensive side to make flanking and enveloping moves with larger forces. A stable position of forces and means, and more so in the area of a narrow passage, is a good condition for an enemy nuclear strike. Maneuvering with forces and means must be done according to the overall plan and primarily between the main and alternate concentration and defense areas.

While the tactical levels of the defense are taking the actual main thrust of the enemy ground forces grouping, the commander of the front (army) has an opportunity to form counterattack groupings, place them in a more advantageous operational position relative to the enemy which is penetrating, and deliver coordinated strikes with them, if only from disconnected axes.

The special features of setting up defensive zones and positions in wooded swamp and lake terrain are determined chiefly by the fact that the nature of the terrain favors the organization of defense not on a continuous front but by axes with gaps between them, which gives the defense a clearly pronounced discontinuous character. Depending on the importance of one or another axis, the army can prepare two or three defense zones varying in depth with several positions in each one, as well as a series of intermediate lines between them. Engineer preparation of these zones and positions can be carried out beforehand and completed with the arrival of troops at them.

The location of the zones and positions on the terrain must be complicated in order to deceive the enemy and force him to use up nuclear warheads on unoccupied or weakly held areas (sectors) and dummy targets. In connection with this, premature occupation of important natural boundaries by troops may be fraught with serious consequences. These boundaries, obviously, must be occupied only at the most crucial moment.
Engineer preparation of the zones and positions will largely depend on the soil and hydrological conditions, inasmuch as over considerable expanses of wooded swamp terrain there are difficult soils to work, limestone deposits, moraines, boulder conglomerations, and rocky and boggy sectors. In connection with this, the use of earth-moving equipment is extremely limited, and its output factor may be on the average of 30 to 40 percent. Consequently, the preparation time for zones and positions in sectors of terrain with difficult soil conditions will be two to 2.5 times longer than on ordinary terrain.

Defensive zones and positions will originally be prepared in the form of separate strongpoints, centers of resistance, and battalion and company defense areas positioned with considerable intervals between them. In many cases, in those sectors of the terrain where rocky soils and moraines predominate, infantry positions will not be interconnected with communication passages and trenches. Extensive completion of engineer works under these difficult conditions is possible only with the use of conventional explosives and shaped charges, as well as by erecting semiburied and embanked structures. In return, there are opportunities to use natural shelters for the skilful preparation of all types of fire positions and personnel trenches and dugouts, as well as to locate control posts in conformity with the peculiar conditions of the terrain, using ready-made shelter sections to prepare them. It is also advisable to locate motor transport and combat equipment in natural shelters.

The limited possibilities due to terrain conditions for maneuvering forces and means should, in our opinion be compensated for by a well-thought-out positioning of second echelons and reserves, timely preparation of concealed cross-country routes, and also by the exploitation of the lake systems to transfer troops by water. In connection with this, it is advisable to put into service among large units operating under the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain a larger number of amphibious means -- tanks, armored personnel carriers, and motor vehicles.

One of the manifestations of an aggressive defense in an operation of the initial period of war is, as is known, a counterthrust. It must be planned and prepared on each of the probable axes of an enemy offensive in several variants. Nuclear strikes, use of other means of mass destruction, combat actions of artillery and aviation, as well as measures to support the advance and deployment of the counterattack grouping are carefully planned for each variant of actions, with due regard for the peculiar natural conditions.
One of the characteristic features of the conduct of a front counterthrust in the initial period of war consists in the fact that the grouping of troops necessary to carry it out will most probably be formed immediately during the course of the defensive engagement, using the mobilized large units that have arrived and joined the front. The front counterthrust in this case will be delivered, as a rule, from several axes with the deployment of troops from the march, and the combat actions themselves may take on the character of a meeting engagement. Such conditions, obviously, will lead to a situation where all the preparation of the troops designated to deliver the counterthrust will be carried out in very short times, and the large units themselves will be deployed on lines from the march, which will create additional difficulties, especially under the conditions of wooded swamp and lake terrain.

The time of delivery of the counterthrust will depend primarily on the situation which has developed on the main axes, as well as on the times of the arrival of additional troops to join the front, for when it only has peacetime forces and means available, it will hardly be desirable to pose the question of a front counterthrust with decisive objectives. Therefore, a counterthrust will be made usually after the arrival of mobilized large units in the front.

There are some peculiarities in the forms of executing counterthrusts. In view of the difficulty and inadvisability of establishing a compact grouping of troops in one area, as well as by virtue of the limited number of roads and the lack of such sectors of terrain as would have the capacity to allow the simultaneous deployment of several large units, it will be most typical of the theater of military operations being examined to deliver the counterthrust with small groupings from several axes, but according to a single plan.

It is more advantageous to deliver the front counterthrust against the flanks of the enemy grouping which has penetrated, along converging axes for the purpose of encircling and destroying it. However, the case is also possible where a front delivers several splitting attacks for the purpose of dismembering and destroying the enemy grouping which has penetrated in detail. But if the offending side directs its main efforts along a seacoast, then a strike is possible on one of its flanks for the purpose of pressing the enemy grouping, which has broken through, to the sea and destroying it in cooperation with the forces of the navy.
The delivery of counterthrusts in the forward security zone, as one of the new methods of conducting defensive actions, is quite probable in a situation where the ground forces grouping of the enemy is already considerably weakened by missile/nuclear strikes at the moment of moving forward. These counterthrusts can lead to the defeat of the enemy troops before they approach the main zone of defense.

In delivering a counterthrust it is necessary to fully exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and the intervals, gaps, breaches, and exposed flanks in the enemy battle formations and operational dispositions which have been formed and to carry out the counterthrust itself decisively, at a high rate, to the total defeat of the enemy grouping which has penetrated and the creation of favorable conditions for the troops of the front to go over to a total offensive.