MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
    Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combating Enemy Sabotage and Reconnaissance Activity in an Army Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article outlines Soviet perceptions of US and NATO intentions and capabilities in the area of unconventional warfare and describes its objectives and the ways in which it will be carried out in a future war. The authors propose possible actions to prevent sabotage and to neutralize or disrupt enemy reconnaissance, which range from security operations to electronic countermeasures to political work among the troops. The role of the KGB and border guards in this essentially new form of combined-arms activity is carefully indicated. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned counterintelligence control.

JOHN N. McMAHON

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No, 3 (70) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are General-Mayor R. Simonyan and Colonel V. Tumas. This article outlines Soviet perceptions of US and NATO intentions and capabilities in the area of unconventional warfare and describes its objectives and the ways in which it will be carried out in a future war. The authors propose possible actions to prevent sabotage and to neutralize or disrupt enemy reconnaissance, which range from security operations to electronic countermeasures to political work among the troops. The role of the KGB and border guards in this essentially new form of combined-arms activity is carefully indicated.

End of Summary

Comment:

Both authors have written several other articles on related topics for this publication.
During the last war the armies of the capitalist countries devoted much attention to sabotage and reconnaissance activity among the troops and in the rear of the enemy. For this purpose, besides the T/O reconnaissance subunits and units, special contingents were formed which performed a wide range of tasks, from reconnaissance of troop locations and the capture of prisoners and items of armament to the carrying out of sabotage.

At the present time, still greater importance than formerly is attached to sabotage and reconnaissance activity in the armies of the imperialist states. Thus, according to the views of the American command, with the start of a war sabotage actions against the Soviet Army will occupy a place second in importance after nuclear weapons. The US ruling circles have, already in peacetime, raised reconnaissance and sabotage actions to the level of an official state policy.

Hence, it follows that from the moment war is unleashed by the aggressors, actions of the sabotage and reconnaissance subunits and units of the enemy will obviously be conducted on a massive scale at the front and in the rear. It must be kept in mind that the very nature of modern operations favors this. Thus, the maneuvering actions of advancing troops over great areas on separate axes, the presence of considerable gaps and intervals between the large units and units, the wide zones of offensive, the great separation of some large units from the main forces of the army, actions at night -- all this affords the enemy an opportunity to carry out sabotage and reconnaissance activity immediately in the zone of the operational disposition of troops of an army and in its rear area to a considerably greater extent than in the past.

In connection with this, combat against the sabotage and reconnaissance activity of the enemy within the framework of a
modern army offensive operation undoubtedly acquires exceptional importance.

Let us examine in greater detail the goals, tasks, and capabilities of our probable enemies for organizing and conducting subversive sabotage and reconnaissance activity and the methods of performing it.

The main goals of sabotage and reconnaissance activity, according to the views of the US Army command, are to lower the combat effectiveness of our troops, destroy missile/nuclear means, and disorganize troop control and the work of the rear, which may ultimately lead, in their opinion, to breaking off the offensive altogether or to a serious reduction of the rates of advance of the troops. Besides that, it is intended, with the help of sabotage and reconnaissance activity, to demolish transportation lines, bridges, and important structures, destroy control posts, radar and radiotechnical equipment, to contaminate water sources, rations depots, etc., with bacterial means, and also to capture prisoners, valuable documents, and items of new armament, and to obtain other reconnaissance data.

The carrying out of different kinds of sabotage is planned to be combined with strikes of nuclear weapons and with actions of troops from the front as well as of large airborne landing forces landed in the depth of the operational disposition of our troops.

One cannot fail to take this into consideration during the planning and course of an offensive operation. It is known that the prevention of sabotage and the neutralization or even partial disruption of the conduct of reconnaissance by the enemy can seriously hinder his fulfillment of his plan and drastically reduce the effectiveness of employing missile/nuclear weapons, aviation, and air defense means, thereby permitting the successful conduct of an army operation.

During an offensive operation, the troops of an army may encounter various enemy forces and means in their zone carrying out subversive and reconnaissance activity.

To conduct subversive activity and reconnaissance in a zone of combat actions, different contingents have been established in
the armies of the NATO countries: the Rangers special-purpose airborne groups in the US (three groups numbering over 1,200 men each have already been trained and one group is in the activation stage), the regiments of the special airborne service and the commando brigades in England, the special-purpose battalions in the West German Army, the commando detachments in France, Belgium, Holland, the sabotage and reconnaissance battalions in Greece, etc. The personnel of these contingents are selected in advance and undergo the appropriate training.

Besides the enumerated types of large units and units, the regulations and manuals of nearly all the capitalist armies provide for the extensive use of airborne troops, marines, reconnaissance subunits and units of the ground forces, as well as all other subunits and units that happen to be on enemy territory to carry out sabotage and reconnaissance tasks.

In this respect, the American command has the greatest capabilities. In recent years they have undertaken a number of measures aimed at improving the direction of subversive activity; in particular, in 1962 the position of assistant chief of staff of the army for the conduct of "special warfare" was established, and special regulations and manuals were also published.

To carry out subversive activity in the enemy rear, which it usually organizes to a depth of 75 kilometers and more, a US field army can receive as reinforcement from the special-purpose group a sabotage and reconnaissance detachment numbering from 200 to 800 men. With the personnel of such a detachment of 200 men, from four to 20 sabotage and reconnaissance groups of 10 to 50 men each can be formed.

Suffice it to say that the total number of personnel of the T/O and attached reconnaissance units and subunits in a US field army and the large units belonging to it, which, besides reconnaissance, can be allocated to conduct sabotage activity, comes to over 39 thousand men. These units and subunits, according to data at the end of 1962, have 36 Davy Crockett small-scale nuclear weapons launchers which can be used by large sabotage groups and detachments, as well as conventional means of sabotage (mines, explosive and incendiary agents, bacteriological means) and other armament. Having at its disposal over 1,300 aircraft and helicopters, a US field army contemplates making
wide use of part of them to drop sabotage and reconnaissance
groups in the rear of the enemy. The latter are equipped with
the appropriate technical means to conduct radio and
radiotechnical reconnaissance.

The organization of sabotage and reconnaissance activity in
the rear of an advancing enemy to a depth up to 75 kilometers is
entrusted mainly to army corps and divisions. For this purpose,
in an American army corps it is planned to have a special-purpose
company, from which up to 24 groups can be allocated.

The great attention devoted by the American command to
increasing the number of T/O reconnaissance subunits of line
large units and to improving the means of reconnaissance allows
us to assume that these large units will also conduct sabotage
extensively. At the present time, for instance, all the
reconnaissance subunits in a mechanized division number over
1,600 men, and have three Davy Crockett small-scale nuclear
weapons launchers, 37 tanks, and other armament. Besides that,
to support and conduct reconnaissance, part of the army air
battalion, having 105 aircraft and helicopters, can also be
allocated. Taking into consideration the experience of the war
in Korea, where every army division was given a reconnaissance
and sabotage company, the additional reinforcement of a division
with several other reconnaissance subunits can be expected.

If we turn, for an example, to the other armies of the NATO
countries, it turns out that, in each army corps of the Northern
Army Group, the British command intends to include a
special-purpose reconnaissance regiment and, already in
peacetime, has it situated in the zone intended for the wartime
conduct of combat actions by the corps. From this regiment can
be formed up to 64 patrols, dispatched into the rear by various
methods for sabotage and reconnaissance purposes.

Such are the forces and means designated by the enemy to
conduct sabotage and reconnaissance activity which the troops of
an army will encounter during an offensive operation.

The basic principles of sabotage and reconnaissance
activity, according to the views of the US Army command, are
considered to be surprise and concealment of the actions to be
carried out by small mobile groups or larger detachments.
From the experience of exercises of the NATO armed forces, it is known that, for sabotage on transportation lines, destruction of means of communications, attacks on weakly guarded targets, contamination of water sources and rations depots with bacterial agents, perpetration of terrorist acts, etc., the NATO command proposes to send in small groups of three to 12 men in strength or subunits of the platoon-company type. To accomplish more complex tasks such as attacks on airfields, large staffs, missile launching areas, nuclear weapons depots, and the destruction of bridges over large rivers, the dropping of detachments in company to battalion strength is contemplated. Along with the previously enumerated means of sabotage, nuclear weapons, and by large detachments, jammers and other modern means of warfare may also be employed.

During combat actions, enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups will penetrate overland or be airlifted through the gaps and intervals in battle formations, they will be left in the rear of our troops during an enemy withdrawal, and on coastal axes they will be landed from naval transport and landing means.

Sabotage and reconnaissance tasks, according to the views of the American command, can be accomplished in different ways. Thus, to carry out sabotage, the groups must penetrate covertly (under the guise of local servicemen, etc.) to targets or carry out sabotage by means of sorties (for the purpose of destroying missiles, special weapons depots, staffs, communications centers, engineer structures, and other important targets), and, in some cases, with the help of ambushes.

Ambushes usually are set up on the routes of movement of troops and rear services organs for the purpose of destroying or capturing them. The success of actions in this case depends primarily on the surprise of the attack and the choice of the most advantageous spots, such as hidden sections of rail and motor roads, defiles, narrow passages on swampy and mountainous wooded terrain etc., are considered to be.

Along with the conduct of sabotage, the groups carry out reconnaissance tasks by observing, photographing, and listening, and also by interrogating prisoners, capturing documents and items of armament, questioning the local population, etc.
Thus, the enemy allocation of a large number of different forces and means for subversive actions and the variety of methods of performing them testify to the serious threat to troops and rear installations in the offensive operation of an army and require timely, careful organization and systematic implementation of combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity.

The main purpose of the organization and implementation of this combat, in our opinion, is the curtailment of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity and the destruction of his forces and means in the zone of offensive of the troops of the army, in the areas of the location of its rear installations and on transportation lines. Here it should be kept in mind that combating enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity is not an end in itself; it is done in support of the offensive operation of the army, in combination with the tasks to be accomplished by the troops.

To achieve this purpose, it is necessary to accomplish a number of tasks before the start of the operation and during its course. The most important of these, in our opinion, are: timely determination of the capabilities of the enemy to conduct subversive activity, discovery of the preparation and probable methods of the penetration of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments into the disposition of troops and the rear area of the army, the detection and destruction of such groups or the prevention of their conducting of reconnaissance, and the capturing or destroying of important targets.

These tasks can be accomplished only if the array of measures that constitute a definite, thoughtful, timely organized system of combat against sabotage and reconnaissance activity are constantly carried out. This system must obviously include reconnaissance, deception of the enemy in respect to our true plans, prevention of the infiltration of his sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments across the line of contact of the troops of the warring sides as well as into the intervals and gaps in the disposition of battle formations, guarding of troops and rear installations, radioelectronic countermeasures, combing of individual areas and evacuation of the local population from them, political work among the personnel of the large units and units, and other measures.
Analysis of the experience of past wars shows that the organization and conduct of combat against sabotage and reconnaissance activity, in view of their complexity and the variety of methods employed by the enemy, must be carried out during an operation not by any single service, but by the joint efforts of all branch arms and special organs, by the whole range of forces and means acting in the operational disposition of the troops of the army and participating in the security and defense of rear installations, in close cooperation with the appropriate organs of the KGB. In other words, to organize and conduct combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity, besides the special departments of the KGB and the border guard troops where these are watching over the troops of the army, are enlisted (with different degrees of participation) all the troops, staffs, and services of the army in close cooperation with one another and depending on the changing situation.

As is known, the special departments of the KGB concern themselves with the discovery and exposure of enemy agents and other hostile elements striving to penetrate the armed forces, with the investigation of cases of antistate manifestations among the troops, with the investigation of cases of state crimes in the army, and also with the monitoring of the security of military and state secrets, and a number of other matters.

As for the troops, staffs, and services, they concentrate their main efforts on opposing the enemy's conduct of reconnaissance by various different methods, devoting special attention under present-day conditions to the discovery and destruction of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

Considering the growing scope of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity, responsibility for the organization of combat against it in the zone of offensive of an army, in our opinion, is advisably entrusted to the commander of the army. The commander of the army, with the help of his staff, will be able to comprehensively evaluate the conditions under which combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity will have to be conducted, carefully plan all measures, set tasks for troops and rear services facilities, allocate the necessary forces and means, and also monitor and quickly react to a newly arising danger.
In evaluating the probable nature of the sabotage and reconnaissance activity of the enemy, it is necessary to determine what forces and means he has in the zone of the army and to evaluate the methods of conducting reconnaissance with them, the methods of sabotage and subversive activity, and also the attitude of the local population towards the enemy in general and towards his subversive activity in particular. Besides this, it should also be brought out what elements of the operational disposition of the troops of the army and rear installations may primarily attract the attention of the enemy and, in connection with this, to determine the possible areas and zones of the dropping of sabotage and reconnaissance groups, the targets of their sabotage or reconnaissance, and the routes of movement to them.

The installations which, in our opinion, may most likely be subjected to sabotage will be, in the first place, launching positions and launchers of the rocket troops, mobile missile technical bases, depots of nuclear weapons and missile propellant, large staffs, communications centers, engineer structures on transportation lines, rations depots, and other important rear installations.

To prevent the sending over of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments by ground and air, forces and means must be allocated from the large units of the first and second echelons (reserve) of the army and the air defense forces, and also the border guard troops, which, with the start of combat actions, will be subordinated to the combined-arms operational formations and may operate in the zone of offensive of the army. The organs of the KGB also accomplish this task in conformity with their functions.

Participating in preventing the enemy from sending over sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments by land through the considerable intervals and gaps developing in the operational disposition of the troops of the army during the offensive, in our opinion, must be primarily the subunits and units of the border guard troops quickly moved up to these axes.

Combat against sabotage and reconnaissance groups and small enemy detachments before the start of the operation and during combat actions should, in our opinion, be conducted by the
combined-arms large units in their zones of offensive (or in specially designated zones), by the units advancing on separate axes along these axes, and by the other elements of the operational disposition and rear services units and facilities in the areas of their own location and in the most dangerous sectors during relocation.

The security and defense of the rear installations of the combined-arms large units located in the zone of their offensive are advisably carried out by the latter, and of the installations of the army rear in the areas of their location, according to the instructions of the deputy commander of the army for the rear.

According to the experience of exercises conducted in the North Caucasus Military District in 1960, the zone of offensive of an army was divided into nine sectors (zones), six of which were assigned to the motorized rifle and tank divisions, and the rest to the army artillery division and other units of army subordination. The most important installations, for instance, the missile brigade and a large bridge, were set aside as special areas and guarded by subunits specially designated for this purpose. Within the zones of offensive of the divisions or their concentration areas, responsibility for combat against sabotage and reconnaissance of the defenders was distributed among the regiments and units of division subordination.

In view of the fact that the methods of penetration of large enemy sabotage and reconnaissance detachments into the dispositions of our troops and especially their actions have much in common with the actions of tactical airborne landing forces, destruction of them must be provided for, in our opinion, within a common system of antilanding defense in the army and large units.

Under conditions of the dispersal of forces and means of the army during the offensive and of brief stops in a locality, the vulnerability of individual installations even to small enemy sabotage groups is increased, and guarding them becomes complicated, requiring a considerable number of forces. Therefore, in planning an operation, it is necessary to determine the most probable targets of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance, to designate zones in which the advancing large units will conduct combat against them, and to allocate the necessary number
of additional forces and means for the security and defense of rear installations. The reserves available at the disposal of the commander of the army must be directed beforehand to move into the area of the probable appearance not only of airborne landing forces, but also of large enemy sabotage and reconnaissance detachments.

When allocating additional forces and means for the security and defense of rear installations, it is necessary to proceed from the specific conditions of the situation. Here it is necessary, in our opinion, to be guided by the rule of not weakening the forces of the first-echelon large units. At the same time, it should be taken into consideration that, at certain moments of the operation, considerable forces and means, above all from the second echelon and reserve, may be needed for some period of time, for instance, when the actions of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups present a special danger to the troops and rear installations of the army.

When planning the measures to combat enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity, of great importance is the preliminary coordination of all matters among the operations and intelligence departments of the staff of the army, the staffs of the branch arms and special troops, the various services, and especially with the border guard troops and the organs of the KGB.

In particular, with the intelligence department of the staff of the army are coordinated the questions of assessing the enemy capabilities to send in sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments (forces and means, their location, possible points of boarding helicopters and aircraft, composition and equipment of the groups and detachments, areas of their probable actions).

The procedure of combat against sabotage groups airlifted in helicopters and aircraft at low altitudes is usually coordinated with the chief of air defense of the army.

With the border guard troops are specified the procedure and time of their resubordination to the combined-arms formations, and with them are coordinated the installations and areas to which special attention must be given, the procedure of coverage by border guard troops of the gaps in the operational disposition of the army, and other matters.
Conducting successful combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity is unthinkable without well-organized reconnaissance. We assume that all the necessary data are obtained not separately, but in a general integrated system of accomplishing reconnaissance tasks in the operation. Accordingly, along with getting information about the nuclear weapons of the enemy, detecting his main grouping, and other tasks, most serious attention is paid to discovering enemy intentions to develop sabotage and reconnaissance activity, to establishing the location and capabilities of the forces designated for this and the times and areas for sending in sabotage and reconnaissance groups, to detecting the actual moment of the drop of such groups, and to determining their composition, equipment, axes, and methods of action. Continual, active, purposeful reconnaissance in the rear of the enemy, in conjunction with reconnaissance and surveillance in the disposition of troops and rear services units and facilities, with the availability of a reliable warning system, will ensure successful fulfilment of the tasks of timely detection of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance measures.

Especially careful surveillance and reconnaissance must be conducted on the approaches to areas of the location of rocket troops (launching positions, mobile missile technical bases), and in places convenient for the concealed movement and location of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments. Under present-day conditions, considerable areas of the terrain will not be occupied by troops or rear installations, and they may be the most convenient places for dropping and sheltering sabotage and reconnaissance contingents. Surveillance of such areas, too, has to be conducted with the aid of helicopters and piston-engined aircraft.

In every division, for reconnaissance on the flanks and in the intervals between battle formations or on the terrain adjacent to the area even of a brief location, it is advisable to allocate two or three constantly active reconnaissance patrols on mobile means to conduct reconnaissance in the most dangerous direction in a radius of 25 to 30 kilometers each.

The large units and units of the first echelon of the army must provide for the carrying out of measures during combat actions for the purpose of preventing sabotage and reconnaissance
groups from crossing into our troop location. Among these are the usual security measures of the large units and units of first echelons: in the case of brief stops, the setting out of listening posts and ambushes on the probable paths of movement of such groups (especially in gaps and between the battle formations of troops), the use of artificial lighting, infrared, and other equipment, and if the situation permits, also constructing obstacles. Besides that, enemy groups airlifted across can be destroyed by rifle and machinegun fire of any subunit.

The provost and traffic control service to be organized in an offensive operation on the main transportation lines of the army must receive the additional task of checking all persons and small groups heading to the rear or in the direction of important installations.

Considering that it will not always be possible during an offensive to allocate a large number of forces and means to guard troops and rear installations, it is necessary to strive for the efficient utilization of the available forces and means or of those usually allocated for this purpose.

The main attention should in all cases be concentrated on the security of rocket troops, control posts, and communications centers, and the necessary forces and means are to be specially allocated for this purpose, or subunits from the second echelons and reserves which are located in the vicinity are to be used. As for important rear installations, in our opinion, part of the forces should, by instruction from the commander of the army, be allocated for their security and defense for the entire period of combat actions (principally from the second echelons and reserves), or border guard troops should be used. It goes without saying that the organs of the KGB also concern themselves with the accomplishment of this task.

Under specific conditions when organizing the security of large bridges, hydrotechnical structures, and other installations located on a river, one has to reckon with the possibility of the penetration of saboteurs to them under water and to employ mines and boom defenses or obstacle nets.

Linear installations in the zone of offensive of the army, such as structures on highways and railroads, pipelines,
communications lines, and others, are highly vulnerable to sabotage. The former methods of guarding these with stationary posts or patrols cause great expenditure of forces and are not always effective during a highly maneuverable offensive. In a modern operation they can be accomplished, to our way of thinking, in other ways.

For instance, it is advisable to provide patrols with maneuverable means for moving about and dependable portable means of communications. As the troops and rear services of the army move up, it is necessary to provide for the transfer of the functions of combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity to the front level.

Occupying an important place in the system of measures to combat enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity are countermeasures against his radio and radioelectronic means, with which he maintains communications with agents and sabotage and reconnaissance groups and carries out aircraft guidance, target indication, etc. It is perfectly obvious that the destruction of radioelectronic means by artillery fire and tanks and the neutralization or even partial disruption of their work can, to a significant degree, hinder enemy conduct of reconnaissance and control of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and, consequently, drastically lower the effectiveness of using primarily nuclear weapons. In connection with this, in our opinion, it is necessary to investigate the appropriate capabilities in the army.

Disrupting the work of radio communications of the enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments becomes, in our opinion, one of the constant tasks of radioelectronic countermeasures. Inasmuch as an army possibly will not have at its disposal enough forces and means, such radioelectronic countermeasures on a wide plane must be carried out centrally at the front level.

From the experience of the last war, it is well known that one of the measures to combat sabotage and reconnaissance activity was periodic combing of the areas of presumed or established activity of enemy groups or detachments in the rear of our troops. Under present-day conditions, this method not only has not lost importance but it has, in our opinion, acquired
For the purpose of detecting and destroying the indicated groups, the mopping up should be done, first of all, in the territory adjacent to the areas of the location of rocket troops and control posts or to the zones and routes of their movement.

Combat actions to destroy detected sabotage and reconnaissance groups and detachments must be carried to complete liquidation of them. The methods of destruction will depend mainly on the strength, position and maneuvering capabilities of the enemy, terrain conditions, availability of time, and the capabilities of our troops. Sabotage and reconnaissance groups detected in the depth of the troop location are destroyed by the actions of patrols or subunits located in the vicinity.

The actions of troops to fulfil this task must have a daring and decisive character; it is necessary to try not to let small groups and even lone saboteurs get away.

Playing an extremely important role in combating enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity is political work among the troops. Here it is important that all personnel of the large units and units constantly manifest high vigilance and be ready at any moment to destroy enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups appearing in the location or on the routes of movement of our troops.

Together with conducting active political work, it is necessary to take effective measures to cover all the channels which the enemy may use to spread his influence to the civilian population, as well as to troops in the zone of combat actions and in the rear.

Everything set forth by us in this article permits the conclusion that, in connection with the considerable scale of the preparation and employment of sabotage and reconnaissance actions by the enemy, combating them in a modern army offensive operation will have not a sporadic, but a continuous nature.

All the measures to counteract enemy reconnaissance and to detect and destroy his sabotage and reconnaissance groups must be carried out in close cooperation of the staff of the army and the staffs of the large units with the border guard troops (if they
are subordinate to the front) and the organs of the KGB, with whom it is necessary to have constant liaison, regularly exchange the appropriate information, and draw up joint plans of action when this is necessary.

It appears to us that, to combat enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups more effectively, there should be in large units special T/O subunits, which it is necessary to train for this work already in peacetime and to employ during the operation in the intervals and gaps in the operational disposition of troops and in the location areas and movement routes of missile units, staffs, rear and other important installations. These subunits must be equipped with highly maneuverable fast-moving means of locomotion, light armament, portable direction finders, and other means of reconnaissance and communications. Besides that, all troop personnel must be trained more carefully in the methods of destroying enemy sabotage and reconnaissance contingents or preventing their activity.

In troop exercises it is necessary to practice infiltrating sabotage and reconnaissance groups into the rear of the enemy and realistically train troops to combat them.

It is advisable to work out an appropriate instruction with guidelines on the organization and conduct of combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity during an offensive operation. It is desirable that it reflect the procedure of cooperation between the troops and the organs of the KGB.

It is probably necessary to establish, in the central apparatus in the staffs of the military districts and groups of forces, special organs and departments that carry out the organization of combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity.

It also makes sense to introduce the new term "antisabotage warfare," which is used, in particular, in the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and, as it appears to us, will most completely correspond to the substance of the phenomena examined here.

In conclusion, we should like to say that the question of organizing and conducting combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity during an offensive operation is
essentially new to combined-arms formations and large units and requires serious further study. In our opinion, it is necessary to take up this question in more detail in the military periodical press and to discuss it at military theory conferences in the military districts.