MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Command-Staff Vehicles Based on Modern Tanks for Tank Armies

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article advocates the development of vehicles based on the tank to serve as the command-staff vehicles for tank armies. It is not very specific about the proposed vehicles and focuses primarily on the communications facilities they should provide. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1987.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned
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Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor of Communications Troops Kh. Lubnin. This article advocates the development of vehicles based on the tank to serve as the command-staff vehicles for tank armies. It is not very specific about the proposed vehicles and focuses primarily on the communications facilities they should provide.

Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
The results of research carried out in operational exercises and war games in recent years show that approximately 50 percent of the time during an offensive operation, the troops of a tank army may be located in zones of radioactive contamination, destruction, and flooding. Naturally, under these conditions, it is impossible to manage to have control posts of large units and formations take their positions outside of the zone of contamination and relocate around them or wait for the level of radiation to drop. Nor can one imagine that crossing contaminated areas will be carried out only by marches, although, in this case, too, the troops may be in a dangerous zone for a long time. Combat actions will also have to be conducted in radioactively contaminated zones.

All this makes it necessary to equip the control posts and communications centers of tank armies and divisions with armored command-staff vehicles which are mounted on a wheeled transport base, possess high mobility, maneuverability, and cross-country capability, are supplied with air filtration equipment, and have a sufficiently high coefficient of attenuation ($K = 6$ to $8$). At the same time, the forward command posts of formations, large units, and units must be provided with more reliable means of conveyance, using for this the base of modern tanks with an attenuation factor of several tens of times, which will allow control posts to negotiate contaminated zones together with the combat tank units and subunits, since their stability, mobility, and maneuverability will be raised to a significant degree.

Command-staff vehicles on the base of modern tanks, in our opinion, must have two ultra-shortwave (R-111) and one shortwave radio set, an ultra-shortwave tank radio set (R-123), two tank internal communications systems (R-124), equipment for securing radiotelephone channels (at least for temporary security), navigation equipment, and the necessary staff equipment. The dimensions of the equipment enumerated above are small and setting up such vehicles on the base of modern tanks is possible if the gun armament is removed. The most difficult question, obviously, will be the
electricity supply of communications equipment while the vehicles are located in place (when the engine of the vehicle is turned off). However, this problem can also be solved. The work positions in these vehicles may be divided as follows: three for officers, two for radio operators (one of them is the commander of the vehicle), and one for the mechanic-driver.

Given seven to eight such command-staff vehicles in the forward command post of the tank army, three to four in the forward command post of a division, and two in the command post of a tank regiment, it is possible to achieve efficient and stable control under the difficult conditions of a modern operation and battle.

In this case, radio communications of the commander of a tank army with commanders of tank divisions will be maintained on two ultra-shortwave radio nets and on one shortwave radio net, with commanders of the army missile brigade and its battalions on two ultra-shortwave and shortwave radio nets, and with reconnaissance groups, air defense, engineer, and chemical troops on two radio nets on shortwave and ultra-shortwave radios.

Communications with front commanders may be carried out on two radio nets on shortwave and ultra-shortwave radios. If, because of the great distance, direct communications cannot be maintained, radio-relay posts may be set up in vehicles or helicopters. Sometimes the role of a radio-relay post may be accomplished by radios of the communications center of the command post of the army.

Radio communications of the forward command post will be maintained with the command post of the army on the radio net of the control posts, as well as by including radios or receivers at the communications center of the command post in the main radio nets of forward command posts.

The commander of a tank division located at the forward command post may have stable communications by means of ultra-shortwave and shortwave radio nets with commanders of regiments and of the separate missile battalion, as well as some other radio communications based on the specific conditions of the situation.

Commanders of tank regiments are virtually supported with all necessary communications from the command-staff vehicles mentioned above.

Thus, communications of the superior commander with subordinates can be provided with back-up capabilities from several vehicles, which affords great survivability of communications and better ensures the continuity of
control, and also allows the even distribution of the work of troop control among officers of the forward command post.

Certainly, the number of command-staff vehicles mentioned does not completely satisfy the requirements of the forward command post of the tank army for means of control, especially when the necessity arises to control all troops and maintain continuous communications with front staffs and supporting troops, which may happen during the relocation of the command post or if it goes out of action. Therefore, we consider it advisable to set up all radios, radio-relay sets, and other communications facilities on an armored wheeled transport base. When negotiating zones with high levels of radiation, these means may fall somewhat behind the forward command post while waiting for the level of radiation to drop or while making a detour over routes with lower levels, but then they will quickly join together and will operate jointly.

The need to develop means of control of a tank army on an armored transport base and control vehicles on the base of modern tanks, in our opinion, is obvious. Now is the time to develop them, to experiment and practice using them in troop exercises, and at the same time to work out matters of supporting the control of troops from the vehicles indicated both independently and within a system of communications centers and within a system of integrated automated control. The solution of this problem will make it possible to maintain continuous control of the tank troops under the complex conditions of a nuclear war.