MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems of Reconnaissance in the Preparation of a Front's First Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article criticizes and amplifies a previous article of the same title. It points out that a border military district will have great difficulty in peacetime and in a period of threat in obtaining reconnaissance data on targets deep in the enemy area. In these periods, radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance are of greatest value since agent reconnaissance will have communications and target access problems. It discusses the main elements of peacetime reconnaissance, pointing out its grave problems at a war's outbreak, and outlines the reconnaissance shortcomings experienced by border military districts. This article appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned
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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of the first part of this article are Colonels H. Sinyayev and M. Shmelev, and of the second part, Colonel I. Khozin. This article criticizes and amplifies a previous article of the same title. It points out the great difficulty a border military district will have in peacetime and in a period of threat in obtaining reconnaissance data on targets deep in the enemy area, thus dampening the original article's optimism on this score. In these periods, radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance are of greatest value since agent reconnaissance will have communications and target access problems. It discusses the main elements of peacetime reconnaissance and criticizes what will prevail at a war's outbreak: the slowness in collecting, processing, and transmitting reconnaissance data, the inadequate reconnaissance resources in border military districts, and the shortcomings of agents recruited in the enemy border zone.
Some Problems of Reconnaissance in the Preparation of a Front's First Offensive Operation

by

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Colonel R. SIMONYAN has raised in his article* a number of important problems of reconnaissance and has given sound and persuasive recommendations on how to resolve them under the conditions being discussed. But at the same time a number of his statements, in our view, require elaboration.

The development of operational reconnaissance under modern conditions is, as we know, proceeding along the lines of further improving its organization and equipping it with the latest technical means -- means possessing great mobility. This in turn ensures that reconnaissance is conducted to a considerable depth and at the same time increases the accuracy of the reconnaissance data obtained.

During preparation for a front's first offensive operation, increased requirements are imposed upon reconnaissance, not only to obtain but also to continually accumulate specific data on the enemy and constantly keep abreast of any changes he makes, especially in the border zone. And all this must be done covertly. This is actually one of the difficulties of reconnaissance under the conditions being discussed.

The author, in our view, has not made it sufficiently clear that the most important feature of reconnaissance, for all the great difficulty in carrying it out in peacetime, as well as during a period of threat, is that of obtaining reconnaissance data to a great depth. This depends on the disposition of enemy troops and installations and the depth of the front's first offensive operation. When we consider that in the most important theaters of military operations a front carries out an operation to the entire depth of the theater, we can anticipate that reconnaissance will also be conducted within these limits.

We agree with the author that an urgent task at the present time is that of making substantial changes in the content and nature of the reconnaissance activity of staffs of all levels of each border military district (group of forces). There is no doubt that the main content of this activity must be the actual conduct of reconnaissance and the purposeful study and accumulation of valid reconnaissance data on the actual enemy to support the effective delivery of missile/nuclear strikes and the successful conduct of the first offensive operation by a front.

The experience, however, of operational command-staff exercises in 1961-62 shows that this task is not being successfully accomplished in all border districts, because some of them do not as yet attach to it the importance it deserves. We must unfortunately state that the volume of data on the actual enemy that is available in certain districts is far from ensuring the successful conduct of initial operations. This is borne out by the experience of certain exercises where, for the initial situation, arbitrary rather than actual data on the enemy were taken and were also used by those being trained. As for reconnaissance, in peacetime it is not usually assigned actual tasks. One gets the impression that when preparing initial operations no special hopes are placed upon front reconnaissance.

As a result, as the material from operational exercises shows, a command is sometimes forced to make a decision for the first operation on the basis of extremely meager reconnaissance data. And when working out training problems the directing body of an exercise is forced to build up data on the enemy which likewise do not always prove to be realistic. Any arbitrary practices or relaxation of procedures in the sphere of reconnaissance against the enemy in peacetime, or limited data on him, have a highly adverse effect on the overall readiness of troops to conduct combat actions.

The time has come, in our opinion, for operational exercises in border military districts to be based solely on factual data on the enemy in the corresponding theater of military operations that have been obtained by the district's own means and received from the GRU [Chief Intelligence Directorate]. The nature of the enemy's operations during the exercise must be determined each time based on the actual possible types of actions he may take should he unleash a war.
Particular attention, the article states, must be paid to reconnaissance against mobile enemy targets. However the author neglects to mention that this creates particular difficulties when conducting reconnaissance. As long as targets are situated in their permanent peacetime locations they are kept under constant observation, but once they begin to move into new concentration areas they immediately leave the zone of reconnaissance surveillance and the staff generally has no data on them whatsoever. It is quite clear that as the threat of an immediate unleashing of combat actions draws closer, data on mobile targets are not built up adequately. And these targets are often the ones to be destroyed as a top priority by a nuclear strike.

The steady rise in the role of reconnaissance when preparing a front's first offensive operation raises, in our view, a whole series of important problems of a theoretical and practical nature. For reconnaissance of a border military district (group of forces) to accomplish them successfully in peacetime and during a period of threat, it must be organized in such a way as to ensure that it is carried out continuously and that timely and reliable data on the enemy are obtained. This can be accomplished provided that means of agent, radio, and radiotechnical reconnaissance keep under continual surveillance, even in peacetime, all important installations targeted for destruction in the first missile/nuclear strike.

When speaking of the organization of reconnaissance during preparation of a front's first offensive operation, we should particularly emphasize the increased responsibility in this area of the commander and chief of staff of a border military district (group of forces). We must frankly state that the success of reconnaissance depends mainly on the proper organization and direction of reconnaissance activity by these persons.

The author draws attention to the necessity of final reconnaissance but fails to make entirely clear the fact that every reconnaissance task has to be accomplished by several types of reconnaissance means. This will make it possible to accomplish reconnaissance tasks more fully and to detect enemy deception measures in good time.
It should be borne in mind that the enemy will try to deceive reconnaissance by simulated actions and deception measures — especially during a period of threat — as regards his forces, grouping, and impending actions. Consequently, the success of the operational reconnaissance of a district (group of forces) will depend largely on careful preparation of the measures to be taken and on concealing them from the enemy.

Thus the accomplishment of the diverse and complex tasks of reconnaissance in the first offensive operation of a front requires first of all continuous direction of all reconnaissance forces and means on the part of the staff of the district (group of forces), especially on the part of the chief of intelligence of the front, as well as intense work by the officers of the intelligence directorate.

Direction of reconnaissance when preparing the first offensive operation consists of timely monitoring of the accomplishment of reconnaissance tasks by the forces and means, of providing the necessary assistance, assigning additional reconnaissance tasks, and redirecting part of these means to accomplish reconnaissance tasks whose completion has been hindered or delayed for various reasons.

During a period of threat, especially in the critical moments of an operational situation, the staff of a district (group of forces) must have the reserves of reconnaissance forces and means at its disposal go over in good time to the detection of the enemy's main groupings of forces and his important installations.

The efforts by all types of operational reconnaissance assigned by the commander and staff to obtain the necessary information on the enemy will achieve the desired results provided the intelligence directorate of the staff of the district (group of forces) displays in its activity superior efficiency, initiative, creativity, and accuracy, and is able in a short time to analyze objectively and estimate correctly the aim behind the enemy's grouping of nuclear weapons, ground forces, and aviation, and the purpose and possible nature of his actions, and is able to report this information in good time.

We must, however, note that the existing system of collecting, processing, and transmitting data obtained by
reconnaissance to the commanders and staffs concerned is still a long way from fully meeting the requirements made of reconnaissance in modern operations. An unjustifiably large amount of time is still being spent on collecting reconnaissance information and processing it. The reason for this lies first of all in the fact that this information must pass through many levels and those being trained are merely paraphrasing the factual material without properly analyzing it.

The article correctly points out the increased role in modern operations of the time factor. In this connection the collection and processing of reconnaissance data in the shortest possible time, reporting it to the commander, and its timely transmission to rocket troops and aviation, take on exceptionally great importance. Any delay in analyzing data on important targets to be destroyed in a first nuclear strike is particularly intolerable.

The intelligence directorate of the staff of a border military district (group of forces), it seems to us, must receive reconnaissance information directly from active secret agents and from radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, as well as from cooperating formations, literally within a matter of minutes. To accomplish this it is essential that under peacetime conditions the chief of intelligence of the district (group of forces) have direct communications with the entire agent reconnaissance net, with some of the most important sources, and with means of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, and that the information he receives from them bypasses all intervening command levels.

To prove the importance of the above statement we shall cite an example. The Intelligence Directorate of the Kiev Special Military District, which as early as May 1941 already had fairly detailed data on the areas of concentration of the German fascist troops on the territory of Poland, was unable to assemble and collate in time the data on the enemy grouping that had deployed by the middle of June of that same year on the Rava-Russkaya and Brody axes. This hampered the district command in discovering the actual intention of the enemy and determining the possible time when his offensive might begin.

Reconnaissance information, as we know, comes in from various sources that have varying degrees of reliability, and
must therefore be carefully studied. Information from agent
reconnaissance must be checked without fail by other types and
means of reconnaissance in order to obtain more precise and
reliable data for a final assessment of the enemy.

To speed up the collection, processing, and transmittal of
reconnaissance data, it is also essential to introduce automation
and electronics into these processes. In the very near future we
should, in our view, equip troops with more sophisticated means
of communications, secure transmission devices, facsimile
equipment, and television equipment. This will greatly
facilitate the work of staff officers, ensure the timely receipt
of reconnaissance information, and speed up the process of
analyzing it. Much also depends on improving the methods of
directing reconnaissance on the part of the commander and the
staff.

Data which have been obtained and collated concerning enemy
measures in preparation for war are reported regularly to the
commander and chief of staff and transmitted to the command
levels concerned. In addition, for a correct assessment of the
enemy's capabilities to unleash a war, it is advisable to report
these data not less than once a month to the Military Council of
the district (group of forces).

Particularly important data requiring an urgent decision
must be reported immediately. Under peacetime conditions these
include: when the enemy brings his means of nuclear attack to a
higher level of combat readiness; clearly hostile actions by
aircraft, ships, or ground forces subunits of a probable enemy in
a border zone, or the violation by them of the national border
(territorial waters); drastic changes in the strength, grouping,
nature of activity, or positioning of enemy troops in a theater
or in areas adjoining the national border; stepping up of the
enemy's reconnaissance and counterintelligence measures.

On the basis of a thorough and in-depth analysis of data on
the enemy, the commander of the district (front) must determine
as accurately as possible the enemy's grouping of nuclear
weapons, ground forces, and aviation, as well as the expected
nature of his actions. Along with this he must also determine
additional reconnaissance tasks during the period of threat in
order to gain a more complete picture of the reserves,
disposition, and delivery schedule of nuclear warheads; the
grouping of missile units, aviation, and ground forces; and also
the probable nature of enemy actions. The final assessment of the
enemy immediately prior to the beginning of the first offensive
operation must reflect all changes that have occurred in the
grouping of troops and of the most important enemy targets in the
front's zone of impending actions.

The article should have stressed the fact that in peacetime
reconnaissance must unfailingly distinguish dummy missile/nuclear
installations from real ones, and quickly determine and transmit
the exact coordinates of the latter's location. An important
prerequisite to this is the systematic study by all
reconnaissance organs of the conditions and particular features
of conducting reconnaissance in the part of a theater of military
operations that is beyond our borders. In addition, in peacetime
we must study in detail the areas of anticipated actions, as well
as the reconnaissance indications of specific installations which
are subject to reconnaissance or final reconnaissance during the
period of threat and at the outset of combat actions. In certain
military districts it is worthy of attention, for example, to set
up training grounds with movable mock-ups of enemy means of
nuclear attack.

The article fails to deal adequately with the problem that
under modern conditions the successful accomplishment of a great
number of reconnaissance tasks is possible only by maintaining
the reconnaissance forces and means of a border district (group
of forces) at a consistently high level of combat readiness for
immediate actions at any time. For this purpose it is essential
to work out in peacetime all of the measures which will have to
be carried out by each staff and reconnaissance unit and subunit
in anticipation of and at the outset of military actions.

The content and volume of measures to ensure a high level of
combat readiness for each staff and reconnaissance unit and
subunit will vary. But continuous combat readiness for immediate
action is based upon: having reconnaissance units and subunits at
a high level of combat training; having them at full personnel
strength and with the full complement of authorized
reconnaissance means; a thorough knowledge on the part of
commanders and staffs of the tasks to be accomplished by
reconnaissance (in the area concerning them); high morale and
political consciousness on the part of reconnaissance specialists of all categories; the stationing of reconnaissance forces and means in areas which ensure their quick deployment for action.

A high level of combat readiness on the part of the reconnaissance organs, subunits, and units of a border military district (group of forces) requires that they be kept at a strength that ensures they can be immediately committed to action for reconnaissance against previously designated and, if the situation has drastically changed, newly assigned targets and areas. It is apparent we cannot count on bringing them up to full strength, and even less on activating reconnaissance subunits, during a period of threat.

As we know, certain work is being done at present with the aim of increasing the capabilities of field reconnaissance; the T/O&E of a division now includes a separate reconnaissance battalion with modern reconnaissance means, while a combined-arms (tank) army includes separate battalions of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, as well as a special-purpose reconnaissance company. But what is completely unjustified is the sharp reduction that has been made recently in the air reconnaissance means in the districts and the removal of these means from combined-arms (tank) armies.

Other measures to ensure the immediate commitment to action of reconnaissance forces and means and to preserve their survivability should include: complete reconnaissance and prior equipping of observation posts; preparing the primary and alternate disposition areas for all reconnaissance units and subunits; specifying the methods of notifying that actions have been initiated by reconnaissance organs of subordinate troops and by air reconnaissance; establishing the procedure and time for the changeover of agent, radio, and radiotechnical reconnaissance to combat status; determining the means and methods of dropping agent reconnaissance groups and reconnaissance-and-sabotage groups, the methods of collecting reconnaissance information and of transmitting it to all command levels concerned, as well as the procedure for replacing losses, the composition of the operational reconnaissance reserve, the times for its readiness, and the procedure for its use. These questions were also inadequately covered in the article.
Of particular importance when preparing the first offensive operation is the prior development by the staff of a border military district (group of forces) of a complex of measures to combat enemy reconnaissance activity. The reason for this is that our probable enemies devote great attention to reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity in present day operations. In so doing they assign a special place to sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups (detachments). The leaders of the armed forces of the US indicate that sabotage operations in the rear of the Soviet Army will be second in importance after nuclear weapons. This is because small groups armed with powerful means of sabotage can inflict massive destruction on our units in the rear by setting off special nuclear devices and spreading bacteriological means, or by aiming their means of nuclear attack against important installations in the rear that they have discovered.

The manuals and regulations of practically all armies of the capitalist states provide for the extensive use, in performing sabotage-and-reconnaissance tasks, of airborne troops, marine subunits, ground forces reconnaissance units, and all units and subunits of regular troops that happen to be in enemy territory. In so doing the major efforts of sabotage activity are to be directed against nuclear attack means, staffs, and rear services units, since these targets are the most vulnerable and accessible to sabotage.

In the ground forces of the US so-called special forces groups have been established, one of which is presently stationed in Bad Tolz (West Germany). Each of these groups is made up of four special forces (airborne) companies, which in turn are subdivided into detachments and teams.

The special forces groups are manned with various kinds of specialists: weapons and demolitions specialists, radio technicians, radio operators, and others. In the course of their training the personnel are familiarized with local customs and the political and economic conditions of the area of impending actions, and study the language of the country in whose territory they are to perform their tasks. Depending on the specific tasks, the plans are to equip the teams and detachments with nuclear land mines, as well as with recoilless guns of the Davy Crockett type with nuclear warheads.
The American command, along with the further refinement of organs of strategic reconnaissance, has in recent years been doing a great deal of work in seeking new means and forms of conducting operational and tactical reconnaissance. In troop exercises and maneuvers they have tested different types of organization, weapons, and methods of using reconnaissance subunits in the operational-tactical depth to obtain information on weapons of mass destruction and to reconnoiter installations in order to deliver nuclear strikes against them.

The results of this work soon became apparent: in 1961 the American command included in the T/O of army corps so-called separate long-range reconnaissance companies. These companies have the primary function of reconnoitering weapons of mass destruction, principal routes of troop movement, areas where troops are concentrated, and other important installations in the operational-tactical zone of the enemy at a depth of 75 to 450 kilometers from the forward line of their own troops. These companies perform their tasks by sending out reconnaissance patrols (groups), primarily by air (by the parachute landing method). The patrols are equipped with radio sets for communications and with technical means of reconnaissance.

Thus when a front is conducting its first offensive operation it should expect extensive use of sabotage actions on the part of the enemy and vigorous activity on the part of his reconnaissance. In the zone of a front the enemy may employ as many as 300 to 400 reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups (detachments) at one time.

As a result we must plan on employing the most decisive methods to block the actions of enemy reconnaissance and destroy its equipment. In so doing aggressive combat against the enemy's radiotechnical means of reconnaissance can be of special importance.

Combat against enemy reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity is organized by decision of the district (front) commander. All staff measures are closely coordinated with organs of the Committee for State Security [KGB] as well as with local Soviet authorities (within our territory). These measures are directed primarily at interdicting the penetration of sabotage-and-reconnaissance and other hostile contingents into
the disposition areas of staffs and rear services units; at preventing sabotage and terrorist acts and attacks on important installations in the rear; and at ensuring the security of weapons, equipment, and materiel against destruction and capture by saboteurs. For this purpose plans should be made, in our view, to assign to armies (divisions) zones or individual areas, within whose limits they must organize combat against airborne landing forces and sabotage-and-reconnaissance contingents, as well as against other hostile enemy elements. This is already being done in certain exercises. At the beginning of the first operation, border guard troops must discover and destroy enemy sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups (detachments), especially outside the zones of troop actions. The task of promptly discovering and quickly destroying first of all the diversified technical reconnaissance means is accomplished by special radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units, radioelectronic countermeasures subunits, as well as by other means of reconnaissance and neutralization.

Combat actions to destroy sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups (detachments) that have been detected must be conducted with the goal of completely eliminating them. Accomplishing these tasks is possible only by having various forces and means conduct continuous, active, and purposeful reconnaissance in the covered zone. We may state with certainty that the results of reconnaissance actions determine to a great extent the success of combat against enemy reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity.

Thus the successful conduct of a front's first operation is ensured not only by efficiently working reconnaissance, but also by active combat against enemy reconnaissance.

* * *

The questions raised in the article by Colonel R. SIMONYAN require, in our opinion, not only broad discussion and further theoretical research, but also practical study during operational and combat training, as well as testing in front (army) exercises and war games.

In addition to the author's statements, we would point out that reconnaissance to support the preparation and conduct of the
front's first offensive operation must be carried out without interruption even now by all possible forces, means, and methods. It should be noted that this proposition, like the very meaning of reconnaissance itself, is disputed by no one. Yet it is often forgotten in day-to-day practice.

For example, at operational exercises and war games, reconnaissance to support the successful conduct of the first operations of fronts is organized, as a rule, too late. Data needed to ensure the effective delivery of the first nuclear strike are given out by the directing body of the exercise arbitrarily, without taking account of the actual enemy, or of the capabilities of reconnaissance and without actually conducting reconnaissance. Even at certain specially held war games for research purposes, the matters of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in peacetime are not touched upon.

This attitude toward reconnaissance is not accidental. The reason for it, in our view, is first of all the fact that a certain portion of the officers and generals underestimate this important matter and do not have confidence in the capabilities of existing front and army reconnaissance means. As is clear from their statements, what appears particularly doubtful to them are successful actions by agent reconnaissance and reconnaissance groups operating in the enemy's rear. All this leads unquestionably to a reduction in the level of combat readiness of the troops for immediate decisive actions at the outset of war.

The article does not deal sufficiently with the fact that in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war reconnaissance will encounter special difficulties. What will happen is that during this period the enemy, in order to prepare for a surprise attack, and also to avoid losses from a retaliatory strike by us, will remove his missile/nuclear means, troops, and control posts from their permanent locations and will rebase his aviation at new airfields. As a result, many mobile targets will show up, and final reconnaissance of them will require a certain amount of time and additional means. But the present T/06E clearly does not provide for adequate amounts of these means.

The author, therefore, is in our view in error when he states that a border military district is fully capable of
performing reconnaissance tasks in support of the first operation with its own forces. Moreover, he says himself that reconnaissance units (subunits), technical reconnaissance means, and reconnaissance organs of staffs must even now be brought to full strength according to the wartime T/O&E and must be trained to conduct active reconnaissance. And it is really a gross error to count on being able to fully mobilize or activate and train new reconnaissance units and subunits in the short time of a period of threat. But strange as it seems, this is precisely the way it is often done in the operational exercises that are held.

In view of the fact that reconnaissance by the forces and means of a border military district will be conducted to the entire depth of a front's first offensive operation, we believe it necessary to discover before the outset of war all enemy installations located in the zone of the front, and not only those which are to be destroyed in the first missile/nuclear strike as the author maintains. To do this the district staff must use without fail data from strategic reconnaissance, adjacent military districts, formations (large units) of the Air Defense Forces of the Country, border guard troops, and, on coastal axes, from naval reconnaissance as well.

The article fails to emphasize sufficiently the fact that reconnaissance by the forces of a border military district should be organized on the basis of an assessment of the most likely actions by the enemy, of foreseeing changes in the situation immediately prior to the beginning of and during combat actions, as well as by taking into account the tasks of the impending front offensive operation.

For this reason we consider it advisable to establish a different procedure for organizing reconnaissance. For example, when it has been determined where and when and in which grouping the enemy's means of nuclear attack, ground forces, tactical aviation, and other important targets may be operating (or located), the first thing that must be done is to determine the axes and areas of special attention which even in peacetime should be placed under the surveillance of various means of reconnaissance. A calculation is made of the possible number of enemy targets that must be reconnoitered in these areas and on the basis of these calculations, a determination is made of the purpose and tasks of reconnaissance to be accomplished in
peacetime, in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, and during the operation. Only after so doing are reconnaissance forces and means allocated and measures planned to strengthen and step up reconnaissance activity during the period of threat. In the process, particular attention must be paid to those targets which are most likely to leave their areas of permanent location in time for the beginning of the first strike, as well as to the areas where these targets may be relocated.

The conduct of reconnaissance will become much more difficult when our forces and the enemy begin to deliver nuclear strikes, when part of a front's reconnaissance forces and means are put out of action and must be replaced. The article should have pointed out that this factor must be borne in mind when organizing reconnaissance in peacetime. To be specific, in addition to reserve radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance nets, we must also have a reserve of agents intended to augment the efforts of this type of reconnaissance during an operation. To count on redeploying previously legalized agents in the depth of a theater of military operations can hardly be considered sound under modern conditions. With the rate of advance by troops reaching 100 kilometers a day, neither individual sources of reconnaissance information, nor even less the residencies, will be able to relocate to the new areas in time, and consequently will not perform the tasks assigned to them. Therefore, in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, we must not only assign additional tasks to active agents and in good time activate the reserve agent net, but also drop in the enemy's rear a considerable number of agent reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups that have been trained in advance according to their function. In so doing, the depth of their actions, in our opinion, should not be more than 30 to 250 kilometers away from the national border, since it is precisely within these limits that the enemy's main troop means of nuclear attack and troops themselves, as well as his field depots for nuclear warheads and for special fuel, and his radiotechnical means of control (guidance), will be located prior to the outbreak of war.

We should also note the necessity of making qualitative changes in our agents as compared to the past. In the first place, previously, as we know, a large percentage of them worked out of material, rather than ideological, motivations. But now
these agents, with the coming of a period of threat -- and especially with the outset of nuclear war -- will cease, out of fear for their lives, to provide reliable data and may even cease doing reconnaissance.

In the second place, in the past operational agents were often people who had stayed (or lived) for a long time in the same area, even though they had no direct access to military installations. Therefore among the agents there have been categories of people not subject to military mobilization at the outset of war (invalids, old men, etc.). At the present time agents of this kind are no longer acceptable. Without direct access to installations of interest to us, they will not provide for the detection of them in good time for us to deliver strikes against them, not to mention providing the data that will make it possible to determine the plan and intentions of the enemy.

Thus, we must now place our reliance on agents who operate out of ideological considerations and who come into direct contact with important installations and documents. Agents of this type must be selected and trained.

Another proposal of the author that seems dubious to us is that of using under modern conditions especially in the period immediately preceding a war, roadwatch agents who report on troop movements and especially if they are to be equipped with portable radio transmitters only in certain instances, as Colonel TUNAS* asserts.

Roadwatch agents reporting on troop movements were widely used during the Great Patriotic War, mainly during the relatively lengthy preparations of offensive operations or in defense. They moved along assigned routes on foot and all data they obtained were reported when they returned to the place where their own troops were located.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (64), 1962.
Under modern conditions this method of conducting reconnaissance is totally inapplicable, since the information obtained, if not reported quickly, loses its value. If, moreover, we bear in mind that a roadwatch agent will to a certain extent be legal (and this is confirmed by experience), then any radio transmitters -- even portable ones -- are out of the question.

In view of the above we believe that in modern offensive operations carried out at high rates of speed, roadwatch agents will be unable to perform the tasks that Colonels R. SIMONYAN and V. TUMAS are inclined to entrust to them.

As for radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, it must be organized on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the tactical-technical characteristics of the enemy's radiotechnical means and of the principles of using them to control missile weapons, aviation, and troops. In the process, the personnel and technical means of OSNAZ units (subunits) must even now be properly trained and prepared to conduct reconnaissance under the complex conditions of a combat situation. We must pay attention to this, because during exercises, the usual practice is to set up improvised subunits (battalions, companies, detachments) of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance from the personnel of the separate OSNAZ regiments. These temporary subunits will not be able to fully cope with the tasks assigned for the additional reason that they are little trained for actions under field conditions away from their military posts. In our view, front (army) radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units must be moved out systematically and at full strength to the exercises and actually operate under conditions as near to combat conditions as possible.

The overriding task of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance should be the detection and careful surveillance of the enemy's radiotechnical means which provide for the control (guidance) of rocket troops and tactical aviation, and which make it possible, based on their operation, to establish the time of delivery of nuclear strikes. The successful accomplishment of this task requires that OSNAZ units and subunits be assigned not only definite frequency bands (frequencies), but also the relevant areas (zones) where the operation of enemy radiotechnical means has been noted in peacetime, and to which
they may be relocated immediately before the outbreak of war.

Another important requirement not covered in the article is the need to train personnel of reconnaissance aviation units. This training must be of a practical nature. Crews must not only be given a course in combat training, but must also be trained for actual reconnaissance flights on routes that have been determined and studied in advance for the reconnaissance of specific enemy targets.

Of increasing importance under modern conditions is the conduct of reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear by forces of special-purpose reconnaissance groups and reconnaissance groups manned with personnel from the reconnaissance subunits which are part of large units and units.

These groups have proven to be wholly worthwhile in the exercises that have been held, giving us reason to believe that they will be widely used in a future war. However, being a means of field, rather than agent, reconnaissance, they are unable to operate in the enemy’s rear prior to the outbreak of war. We therefore can hardly count on using reconnaissance groups for the peacetime reconnaissance of the enemy’s rear, and even less on transporting them across national borders in aircraft. A border military district may be permitted to do this only during a period of threat. But in peacetime these groups must be established and trained for reconnaissance against specific targets, and their transportation and use at the outset of war must also be carefully planned.

In training reconnaissance groups considerable attention should be given to the organization of radio communications. The experience of exercises has demonstrated the inadequate preparedness of many radio operating reconnaissance personnel. As a result, data obtained by reconnaissance groups often do not reach the appropriate staff at all or arrive late.

Finally, one more comment. It is completely inadvisable, in our view, to assign border district reconnaissance the task of combating enemy reconnaissance and sabotage activity right down to the capture and destruction of reconnaissance personnel and saboteurs, as maintained by Colonel TUMAS.
In the first place, district reconnaissance does not have forces specially designated for this purpose. In the second place, allocating staff reconnaissance organs and reconnaissance units to perform this task would mean dissipating reconnaissance efforts.

Combat against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance activity must be conducted by the forces of all large units and units located within a given military district, by border guard troops, and by counterintelligence organs. It therefore seems advisable to assign the troops their respective areas for systematic combing.