MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combating Enemy Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article explores NATO reconnaissance capabilities, strength, and operating methods in determining the countermeasures which may be employed by a front. Among possible countermeasures the author discusses the categories of detecting and destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and means, suppressing their actions, and using radioelectronic countermeasures and deception. The need for unified command over combat against enemy reconnaissance, which involves centralized information collection and processing; unified planning, and the coordinated efforts of the various participating forces and means, is also stressed. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Korepanov. This article explores NATO reconnaissance capabilities, strength, and operating methods in determining the countermeasures which may be employed by a front.

Among possible countermeasures the author discusses the categories of detecting and destroying enemy reconnaissance forces and means, suppressing their actions, and using radioelectronic countermeasures and deception. The need for unified command over combat against enemy reconnaissance, which involves centralized information collection and processing, unified planning, and the coordinated efforts of the various participating forces and means, is also stressed.

Comment:

The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Combating Enemy Reconnaissance in a Front Offensive Operation
by Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. KOREPANOV

The objective of combating enemy reconnaissance is to eliminate its activities or limit them as much as possible, to deceive the enemy regarding the actual intentions of our troops, and thereby make it difficult for him to use his forces and means as he wishes, thus creating favorable conditions for front troops to fulfill the tasks of an operation successfully. This is achieved by timely detection and destruction of enemy reconnaissance forces and means, suppression of their activities in our territory, as well as neutralization of enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance means by jamming and deception of the enemy.

Appropriate forces and means of all front troops have to participate in this combat. Also rear security troops and border guard troops situated in the zone of front combat actions must constantly engage in it. Military counterintelligence organs, whose activities are inseparable from the measures taken by the troops and are carried out by specific forces and means, also are allocated to perform this task.

The probable number of reconnaissance forces and means of the armies of the US and other NATO countries which can operate simultaneously in the zone of a front, and their capabilities at various depths, are given in Diagram 1. The operating methods and procedures of enemy reconnaissance, as well as measures to counteract them, are shown in Diagram 2. We will examine the most important of these measures.

We are convinced that the detection of enemy reconnaissance activities and the obtaining of information on them, in view of their great volume and importance, must be allocated as an independent task of all types of operational and tactical reconnaissance which possess significant capabilities for it.
Special-purpose reconnaissance detachments, reconnaissance groups and other large reconnaissance elements can and must allocate part of their forces to detect targets in the enemy reconnaissance system. In regard to agent reconnaissance groups and special and field reconnaissance elements, they must be used extensively to detect enemy reconnaissance forces and means. Agent reconnaissance efforts should be aimed at obtaining varied and extremely valuable information on enemy reconnaissance which is difficult or impossible to obtain from our other types of reconnaissance. Radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance can obtain a large amount of information on enemy reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance can detect and determine the location of the airfields and landing sites of reconnaissance aircraft, the launch sites of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and the positions of enemy radiotechnical reconnaissance means and radar stations. Border guard troops can obtain important information, particularly before a front operation is initiated, by surveillance and by using their aviation, technical means and agents.

However, these tasks cannot be carried out just incidentally in the process of the everyday activities of all types of our reconnaissance. Therefore, it is necessary to specially allocate a certain part of the forces and means of operational and tactical reconnaissance to obtain information on enemy reconnaissance in certain areas or spheres. In addition, analogous information must be selected from the overall flow of information on the enemy, processed separately, and quickly sent to interested organs. For these purposes we should make maximum use of the data obtained in peacetime relating to the organization and nature of the operation of the reconnaissance of our probable enemies, for which surveys on the status and trends in the development of reconnaissance and the use of its forces and means in exercises in the armies of the principal imperialist states should be circulated to the troops periodically.

Destruction of enemy reconnaissance forces and means in their disposition in a front offensive operation is accomplished simultaneously with the destruction of his troops, since the predominant part of these forces and means is located together with the troops or installations servicing them. However, a considerable number of reconnaissance forces and means are separated from the troops. The choice of means and methods for
destroying the latter is determined by the conditions of the operational situation, the nature and numerical strength of the targets, and the activeness of enemy reconnaissance, as well as by the number of forces and means which will be allocated to combat it and their capabilities.

Enemy reconnaissance forces and means, as targets of destruction, can, in our opinion, be divided into five groups.

The first group -- group ground targets (airfields of tactical reconnaissance aviation, control and warning radar centers of the tactical air forces, reconnaissance units and elements, armored cavalry regiments). In view of the importance and comparatively small number of such targets in the zone of a front (four to seven airfields and nine to 11 centers), it is preferable to allocate nuclear warheads to destroy the majority, if not all of them, in the initial nuclear strike.

The second group -- individual ground targets (reconnaissance radars of field and antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles, control posts for unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, radio reconnaissance direction finding posts). In a zone of up to ten kilometers away they are destroyed by artillery, and beyond its limits -- mainly by aircraft. However, destroying these targets requires expending a very large quantity of means of destruction and often does not produce the proper effect. Even when 50 percent of such targets have been detected and one battery assigned to destroy each of them, in an army it is necessary to allocate 25 to 30 batteries, and in a front -- 95 to 100, which is hardly possible. The small size of individual targets, their considerable distance and the necessity of negotiating a strong enemy air defense seriously reduce the effectiveness of air operations against them. Consequently, the task of destroying these targets cannot be carried out by artillery and aviation using conventional means of destruction. To put radar stations and control posts of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft out of operation, it is advisable to employ missiles with passive radiotechnical homing heads and cluster-type warheads. These means should be employed widely in aviation, and -- in the form of missile systems -- in combined-arms large units and formations.
The third group -- group and individual targets deployed in command post locations (radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance subunits, their control posts, subunits for processing aerial photographic data, reconnaissance helicopter landing sites, field reconnaissance reserves, radio communications centers with sabotage-reconnaissance groups and agents). Such targets number more than 110 in the zone of a front. In view of the difficulty of detecting them, it is most expedient, while employing fire means in favorable conditions, to assign the task of destroying these targets to (special-purpose) and long-range reconnaissance groups. They can spot a target, immediately destroy it, simultaneously seize important documents, samples of new reconnaissance equipment, and prisoners, disrupt wire communications, create confusion in the enemy disposition, as well as guide aircraft with the use of radio beacons to targets which they cannot destroy with their own forces and means. Calculations show that putting these targets out of operation will require, in addition to the groups allocated to reconnoiter command posts, detailing one group in a division, two to three in an army, and five to 12 groups in a front.

The fourth group -- individual targets (radiotechnical and radar reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters) flying along the line of armed contact over enemy territory, can be destroyed by fighter aviation, and in certain cases by short- and medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles.

The fifth group -- individual (group) special-purpose ground targets (border guard posts, reconnaissance and counterintelligence centers, their subsidiaries, schools, crossing points), which can conduct agent reconnaissance and sabotage-reconnaissance operations. At the beginning of an offensive operation, border guard posts (30 to 40 in the zone of a front in the main theater of military operations) will be destroyed by forward detachments and reconnaissance groups of first-echelon divisions, with the participation of border guards who are very familiar with the terrain, disposition, and security and defense system of the posts. In the gaps between the axes of operations of combined-arms large units and units, the border guard troops can carry out this task independently. The elimination of the nearest enemy reconnaissance and counterintelligence elements and crossing points is entrusted to counterintelligence elements with border guards allocated to...
them. As enemy territory is seized his reconnaissance and counterintelligence elements will be destroyed or captured by special detachments of formations and by field subunits allocated for this, and in a number of cases also by delivering strikes with conventional, nuclear, or chemical weapons.

Thus, the enemy reconnaissance forces and means separated from general-purpose troops and installations are destroyed by various specially allocated means, as well as by forward and special detachments, tactical airborne landing forces, troops operating apart from the main forces, and partisans. It is advisable to orient these elements and troops toward the destruction of hostile reconnaissance forces and means in advance.

Suppression of enemy reconnaissance activities in our territory envisions the destruction of reconnaissance aviation in the air in the overall air defense system, and the combating of field patrols, sabotage-reconnaissance groups, detachments and agents which is carried out by front troops. They obstruct the penetration of these forces through the line of armed contact by covering gaps and flanks, they organize the security of the troops and the security and defense of important installations, detect and destroy hostile reconnaissance on the ground near the disposition of large units and units, clear certain areas of agents and sabotage-reconnaissance contingents, set up field obstacles, and conduct political work among the troops and populace, as well as maintain public order in the rear of the front. All of these measures are carried out by the troops in cooperation with counterintelligence organs, as well as with the forces and means of the Ministry for the Protection of Public Order.

To support close combat with enemy reconnaissance and, specifically, with the ground forces and means penetrating our disposition, combat subunits (companies and battalions) and border guard troop subunits require light reconnaissance radars, and formation staffs need reconnaissance helicopters for aerial surveillance in their own operational rear. Calculations show that for this purpose it is sufficient for an army to have a detachment of three helicopters, and for a front to have two squadrons of 15 to 20 helicopters.
Detecting the enemy in our rear also requires using forces and means from the reserves or second echelons of formations (to periodically inspect areas of probable drop and concealment of sabotage-reconnaissance groups and agents), from rear services units and facilities, military komendaturas established as enemy territory is seized, and from the reconnaissance of the border guard troops, in conjunction with utilizing the capabilities of state security organs and enlisting the local populace.

Special attention is devoted to security for the front rear, within which there is located a large number of installations attracting the attention of enemy reconnaissance. This task is given first to the rear security troops who, by organizing field obstacles and the other measures indicated above, ensure the detection and destruction of the enemy.

In our view, successfully combating enemy sabotage-reconnaissance activities requires training troops in peacetime (especially in the border military districts and groups of forces) in operational tactics to destroy such groups. This will make it possible to detail any subunit or unit from the second echelon (reserve) of the army or front to carry out specific tasks before the activation or arrival of the rear security troops is completed. At the same time, to ensure organized actions of rear security troops at the beginning of a war it is necessary to develop tactics for utilizing them, to work out these matters in exercises, and to restore to its rightful place the experience of the Great Patriotic War, taking into consideration the specific features of present-day operations, as well as to prepare officer cadres for the rear security troops.

Neutralization of enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance means by jamming envisions disorganizing the operation of his reconnaissance radio and radiotechnical equipment, radio communications and radar, and is accomplished in the overall system of warfare against enemy radioelectronic means. The neutralization of radio communications acquires especially great importance since it frequently is the only means of rapidly transmitting information obtained by the enemy in the disposition of the front troops. Our principal efforts therefore must be concentrated on disorganizing the operation of radio communications between the reconnaissance elements of the staffs of every level of enemy command and the forces and means
immediately subordinate to them. The number of the most important radio communications lines alone is so great that it exceeds the capabilities of front SPETSNAZ units to neutralize them.

To attract attention to this matter it is advisable to allocate the neutralization of radioelectronic means by jamming, especially enemy reconnaissance radio communications, as one of the important tasks of warfare against radioelectronic means as a whole. In our opinion, it is necessary to precisely delimit the activities of the forces and means from the organizational standpoint: all hostile reconnaissance radio communications beyond the line of armed contact and the radio communications of reconnaissance aviation are to be neutralized by the SPETSNAZ radio units of the front; the neutralization of the radio communications of sabotage-reconnaissance groups, detachments and agents operating within the territory of the front must become the function of the radio counterintelligence service of KGB organs, although this task is not assigned to them at the present time. The identification of enemy reconnaissance radio nets and the pinpointing of their affiliation and technical characteristics for subsequent allocation of efforts to destroy them, in our opinion, require additional research. The capabilities for detailing front means to carry out this task, and all questions of cooperation, should be worked out in peacetime.

From the technical standpoint, resolving the problems of neutralizing the radio communications and other radioelectronic means of hostile reconnaissance by jamming, in our view, primarily involves extensive employment of intermittent barrage jamming transmitters, which may be the most effective means for emitting jamming signals into the disposition areas of control posts and radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance means, as well as the employment of airborne jamming transmitters to disrupt the reception by ground control posts of radio information from enemy manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.

Deceiving the enemy is defined as deliberately sending him false information, simultaneously concealing everything that interests enemy reconnaissance. It has the objective of thrusting erroneous information on the enemy with respect to our intentions, the position of our troops and their actions, and of forcing him into actions, or inaction, favorable to us.
The entire set of measures and the procedure for carrying out actions to deceive the enemy in the period of threat and at the beginning of a war must be provided for in advance in the plan for operational camouflage and for the preparation and conduct of a front offensive operation.

The above indicates that combating enemy reconnaissance presupposes defining and assigning independent tasks for operational and tactical reconnaissance, the air defense of the troops, radio and radioelectronic jamming means, and for all troops and means of destruction to interdict enemy reconnaissance activities, as well as using rear security troops, border guard troops and military counterintelligence organs for this purpose. The actions of all these forces and means are coordinated with measures for deceiving the enemy.

It is possible to carry out all these complex and exceptionally important measures only if there is unified command over combat against enemy reconnaissance at every level of command and at the front level as a whole. By this we mean the centralization of information collection and processing, unified planning, and the coordination of efforts by the command center through the respective control organs for the countermeasures forces and means.

All reconnaissance information to be used for combat against enemy reconnaissance, coming from subordinate formations and large units, front reconnaissance forces and means, staff directorates and departments and other organs, is concentrated in the intelligence directorate of the front staff. Here this information is processed, reported to the front commander or chief of staff and sent to the operations directorate. The staff of the rear, which directly controls the security and defense of the operational rear, reports information on enemy reconnaissance activities in that part of the front zone to the front staff periodically, but reports important information immediately.

Unified planning is manifested first in developing a plan which reflects the sum total of measures for combating reconnaissance in general terms. It is drafted by the operations directorate with the participation of representatives from the directorates of chiefs of branch arms and special troops, the staff of the rear, the appropriate department of the front
political directorate, the border guard district staff and front directorate of special departments in charge of the various aspects of countermeasures against enemy reconnaissance. On the basis of this plan, specific countermeasures matters are worked out in the plans for the combat employment of the branch arms, special troops and services.

The commander exercises overall command over combat against enemy reconnaissance through the staff, but if necessary -- directly through subordinate commanders and chiefs of the branch arms and services. All the directorates and departments within the staff work on these matters to some extent in accordance with their functional responsibilities, but the operations directorate assumes the central role. This command structure for combating reconnaissance is based on the interrelationships occurring among the control organs. Considering the diversity, the great volume, and specificity of measures being examined, the operations directorate possibly should have a special department for this, and the intelligence directorate should have a section. It is advisable to organize similar sections and groups in the staffs of the armies and divisions. And finally, the front rear staff should have a security and defense department. Such departments, as we know, were set up in a number of operational exercises in recent years and demonstrated how vital they were.

The organization of combat against enemy reconnaissance presupposes the existence of continuous cooperation among all participating forces and means, especially among the front, military counterintelligence, and the border guard troops. This cooperation must be carried out under the overall direction of the front command and must be based on the accepted plan for field command over combat against reconnaissance and an estimate of the capabilities for taking the necessary counterintelligence measures. Since the principal levels in this respect are the staff of the front and the staff of the rear, the actions of the special departments must be coordinated with these very levels, and within these organs -- with the department of combat against enemy reconnaissance of the operations directorate and the department of security and defense of the staff of the rear. At the same time, the diversity of tasks for combating enemy reconnaissance presupposes coordinating, to some extent, the activities of military counterintelligence organs with all the directorates and departments of the staff, as well as with the
political directorate of the front.

The front command will exercise command through the general coordination center, this being the department of combat against enemy reconnaissance in the operations directorate of the front staff and the first echelon of the directorate of special departments. The subsidiary of this center is the department of security and defense of the staff of the rear and the second echelon of the front directorate of special departments.

The cooperation of the front command with the command of the border guard troops, according to the experience of exercises, is maintained through an operations group of the border guard district staff. Attaching border guard officers to the intelligence and operations directorates of the front staff according to their specialties may help improve this method.

Thus, in our view, the problem of organizing combat against enemy reconnaissance may be resolved by combining and putting in order the separate uncoordinated efforts of the troops, by closely coordinating these efforts with the activities of the counterintelligence organs, and by creating a harmonious system of measures directed toward carrying this out.

The growing importance and necessity of increasing the effectiveness of combat against enemy reconnaissance raises the question of further developing the theoretical bases which provide for a unity of views and identify the fundamental principles of countermeasures against enemy reconnaissance. For this purpose, obviously it makes sense to introduce a theoretical course on combating enemy reconnaissance into combined-arms academies, the communications academy, the rear services and transportation academy and related military schools, and to begin working on a regulation or instruction on this matter.

Furthermore, we think it necessary to introduce various technical means and weapons into the troops, refine the organizational structure of individual control organs, and put certain aspects of the control system in order. The training of specialists from both the regular personnel and those enlisted through mobilization also has acquired great importance.
Key to Abbreviations for Diagram 1.

A
Air Recce. Regt.
Air Reconnaissance Regiment
AM Bde.
Army Missile Brigade
AMMTB
Army Mobile Missile Technical Base
ARCP
Army Rear Control Post
ASAMTB
Army Surface-to-Air Missile Technical Base
Aux. OP
Auxiliary Observation Post
CC
Communications Center
CM Regt.
Cruise Missile Regiment
CmdP
Command Post
C Plt.
Communications Platoon
F
Front
F-B Regt.
Fighter-Bomber Regiment
FE & C Res.
Front Engineer & Chemical Reserve
FHB
Front Hospital Base
FMMTB
Front Mobile Missile Technical Base
FRCP
Front Rear Control Post
FSMB
Front Separate Mobile Base
Ftr. Regt.
Fighter Regiment
MAB
Mobile Army Base
Mot. Rif. Bn
Motorized Rifle Battalion
Motorized Rifle Regiment
MTA Regt.
Military Transport Aviation Regiment
OP
Observation Post
RCP
Rear Control Post
RE Sta.
Radioelectronic Station
RFB
Rear Front Base
RT
Radio Tank
RT Sec.
Radio Tank Section
SM Bn
Separate Missile Battalion
SMMTB
Separate Mobile Missile Technical Base
Tac. Rear
Tactical Rear
Tac. Recce. Av.
Tactical Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment
TKA
Tank Army
Tk ARCP
Tank Army Rear Control Post
Tk Bn
Tank Battalion
Tk Div.
Tank Division
Tk Regt.
Tank Regiment
TTA
Temporary Transshipment Area
2nd Ech. (Res.)
Second Echelon (Reserve)
Diagram 2. Enemy reconnaissance activities and combat against them in a Front offensive operation.