MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Massed Nuclear Strike During a Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The beginning of the article is devoted to defining the term "massed nuclear strike" (in the context of a front offensive operation) and other related terms such as "concentrated massed strike", "grouped nuclear strike", "dispersed massed strike", etc. In the main body of the article the authors discuss the specific goals of a massed strike, the procedure for organizing one, the targeting for such a strike, and the coordination of troop actions in its delivery. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (68) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Massed Nuclear Strike During a Front Offensive Operation

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (68) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Colonel S. Begunov and Colonel V. Glazov. The beginning of the article is devoted to defining the term "massed nuclear strike" (in the context of a front offensive operation) and other related terms such as "concentrated massed strike", "grouped nuclear strike", "dispersed massed strike", etc. In the main body of the article the authors discuss the specific goals of a massed strike, the procedure for organizing one, the targeting for such a strike, and the coordination of troop actions in its delivery.

Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
A Massed Nuclear Strike During a Front Offensive Operation

by

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A great deal of attention is being devoted in military theory and in operational training practice to the organization and delivery of massed nuclear strikes. And this is fully understandable, since only through the massed use of nuclear means is it possible to achieve the most decisive results.

In theoretical elaborations and in training exercises in the last few years, special emphasis has been placed on investigating problems regarding the delivery of an initial massed nuclear strike. There has been a tendency here to use as many nuclear warheads as possible in this strike, sometimes even against very questionable targets. Such an inclination in exercises has frequently been unjustified, either by the tasks facing the front troops or by the situation. In our opinion, this has come about, on the one hand, because of the stereotyped distribution of nuclear warheads which has become established practice and is to a certain extent legitimate, i.e., as a rule twice as many or more nuclear means have been allotted for the immediate task as for the subsequent task, and on the other hand, because of underestimation of the importance of the massed employment of nuclear weapons in the depth, where the front troops may encounter heavy resistance from large operational and strategic enemy reserves. A not inconsiderable role was also played by the circumstance that the participants in operational exercises have not always taken proper heed of the results of the initial strategic missile strikes in the offensive zones of fronts. The lack of data on these results has also made it necessary, to a certain extent, to use a great part of the nuclear warheads allotted to the front at the beginning of the operation when delivering the initial massed strike and carrying out the immediate task.

In the present article we shall attempt to briefly examine problems regarding the delivery of massed nuclear strikes during
an operation and to ascertain the capabilities for implementing them and the conditions under which they can take place. But before proceeding to the examination of our topic, we wish to dwell on the concept of the "massed nuclear strike" itself, for which there is still no unanimous definition as of the present time.

At the beginning of the 1950's, when we adopted nuclear weapons into service, they could not, of course, be used in a massed manner in exercises, since not more than 25 to 30 nuclear bombs were allocated for a front offensive operation. At that time, however, in carrying out so-called nuclear preparation, there was already a noticeable tendency toward delivery of the massed nuclear strike.

At the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, with the significant increase in the quantity of nuclear warheads allocated to the front for an offensive, delivery of a massed nuclear strike became the most important way of using nuclear weapons. It was considered that during nuclear preparation several massed nuclear strikes might be delivered, for each of which a substantial number of nuclear warheads would be expended, launched simultaneously in order to destroy one major target or several targets situated in a particular area.

An opinion was expressed in the press regarding concentrated (on one target) and dispersed (against several targets) massed strikes. By concentrated strike was meant a strike used to destroy targets of the same nature, namely: combat equipment and personnel in the battle formations of the attackers which are located on the line of deployment or in the area of concentration of enemy troops. A dispersed massed strike included strikes on targets of varied nature, on means of mass destruction dispersed along the front and depth, on control posts, on troop combat equipment and personnel, especially tank troops, on large defense areas, etc. It was confirmed that a massed strike may be delivered not at some particular mandatory moment but over the span of a certain time interval, from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours.

Thus, a massed strike was regarded as a series of concentrated and dispersed massed nuclear strikes, delivered in succession by a substantial number of nuclear warheads and directed toward accomplishment of the general task assigned to
There also exists the opinion that the massed strike is based on single and grouped strikes delivered within an extremely limited time frame against the most important installations of the enemy grouping which is to be destroyed. In this case, a grouped nuclear strike, as distinguished from a single strike which is delivered by one nuclear warhead against one target, is defined as a strike by several nuclear warheads delivered to a target whose destruction or incapacitation cannot be assured with one nuclear warhead.

It must be noted that both in exercises and in the press opinions differ as to the targets which should be destroyed when delivering massed strikes. Thus, it is sometimes considered inexpedient to destroy enemy reserves in concentration areas or enemy command posts; in other instances, conversely, these targets are to be destroyed first of all. Many different interpretations of this problem in our military literature could be cited.

It seems to us that the basis for determining a massed nuclear strike should be the main task it is to accomplish. As a rule, we understand massed nuclear strike to mean a powerful, pre-planned surprise strike delivered simultaneously by all or the greater part of the existing forces and means at the disposal of a front at a given moment (rocket troops, aviation, nuclear warheads) against one or several enemy groupings or key targets.

The goal of a massed nuclear strike delivered at the beginning of an operation, usually in cooperation with strategic means, must be to accomplish the main task of a front -- to incapacitate the main enemy grouping, to destroy the most important enemy installations, and thus to set up favorable conditions for routing the surviving enemy forces and means, securing the territory, and achieving the ultimate goal of the operation in the shortest possible time.

The goal of a massed nuclear strike delivered during an operation must be to carry out, with front troops, important intermediate tasks (the rout of enemy groupings blocking the commitment of the front second echelon or reserves to the engagement; the destruction of large enemy reserves.
allocated for delivering a counterattack; the rout of enemy groupings defending a wide water obstacle and preventing its assault crossing by front troops from the march, etc.), tasks with whose fulfilment favorable conditions would be set up for achieving the ultimate goal of the offensive operation in minimum time.

As regards the proposals that a massed nuclear strike be taken to mean a series of single and grouped nuclear strikes or several successive concentrated and dispersed nuclear strikes directed toward accomplishing the overall task, here it is more a question not of what constitutes a massed strike but of how to implement it. Indeed, is it possible to conceive of delivering a massed strike according to any given model? Under modern conditions the situation will change frequently and abruptly, and the methods of delivering a massed strike must therefore be most diverse. In one instance this will be a series of single nuclear strikes, in another a combination of single strikes with grouped strikes, and in a third several grouped strikes. There can be many such combinations. Each time they must correspond to the specific tasks assigned to the massed nuclear strike.

We cannot agree with the proposal to consider a massed nuclear strike as a series of successive strikes on targets dispersed within the most diverse areas of the zone in which the front troops are operating, and, moreover, with these strikes spread over a period of time. Even disregarding the fact that the very term "dispersed massed strike" clearly fails to correspond to the principle of massing, such a method of delivering a strike is in its very essence unequal to the goals and tasks which are placed before it.

We would also like to emphasize the fundamental distinction between a massed nuclear strike and a grouped strike. A grouped nuclear strike is a strike directed toward the destruction or incapacitation of one large target, let us say a division, when one nuclear warhead is not enough to attain the intended level of destruction or when the use of one higher-yield nuclear warhead, which would provide the necessary destruction of the target, is impossible because of safety conditions for our own troops or is inadvisable because of the situation. A massed nuclear strike, however, is directed above all toward the destruction or incapacitation of a group of targets, and its yield is determined
by the number of targets comprising the group.

Let us examine in greater detail the situational conditions under which it may be required to deliver massed strikes during an operation.

The advancing troops may, within the depth, encounter large enemy reserves being moved up, without whose prompt destruction it will be impossible to continue the offensive at a rapid pace. In this case a meeting engagement will probably arise. In modern operations, meeting engagements can sometimes arise simultaneously on several axes or successively on one main axis but at different depths, i.e., under the most diverse conditions. This requires skillful operating methods by the front troops. In such a situation it may be expedient to deliver a massed nuclear strike. If so, it is very important to correctly determine the enemy grouping against which the massed strike should first be delivered. This will usually be the grouping which represents the greatest danger for the front troops on the main axis.

The enemy may also use his operational reserves for a counterattack. As is known, in order to break up a counterattack it is necessary to fight the enemy systematically deep in the rear while his reserves, which are in transit by road, by sea, or by air, are being concentrated in their disposition areas, or are being moved up and deployed for the counterattack. An important role in this fighting will unquestionably be played by strategic means. If the enemy nevertheless succeeds in assembling a counterattack grouping, it may become necessary to deliver a massed nuclear strike in order to rout the grouping and thereby break up the counterattack.

In order to develop the operation, fresh front reserves must be committed, or even the second echelon (if there is one). It is most advantageous to intensify efforts by committing reserves into gaps which have formed between the advancing troops of the first echelon. The situation may develop in such a way that the enemy will also attempt to direct his forces toward these same gaps in order to come out on the flank or rear of our troops. In this case the commitment of the front reserves to the engagement may be jeopardized. To avoid this, it will be advisable to deliver a massed nuclear strike on the enemy troops, calculated
to preempt a strike by the enemy.

In order to halt the advancing troops, the enemy will extensively exploit large rivers. The most important task of a front in anticipation of their forced crossing is to rout the enemy forces directly defending the water line and the reserves. If several single strikes or one grouped strike are inadequate for the accomplishment of this task, the front will be obliged to resort to a massed nuclear strike.

A massed nuclear strike may also be required during completion of an operation, when the front troops must rout the enemy's counterattack grouping or his reserves moving up from the depth, especially if he has been able to concentrate forces for a counteroffensive.

Thus, during an offensive operation the need for massed nuclear strikes may arise more than once. This does not, of course, mean that such strikes will be frequent. It should be taken into account that a massed nuclear strike is a very complex measure, requiring careful organization, the allocation of rocket troops, aviation, and other forces, and preparation of the necessary quantity of nuclear warheads. A certain amount of time is needed for concentrating and deploying the forces and means allocated for the strike, assembling and bringing up the missiles and nuclear warheads, and possibly also regrouping the rocket troops. It must accordingly be assumed that such strikes will take place only under those conditions in which the main task of the front cannot be accomplished by delivering single or grouped nuclear strikes.

Massed nuclear strikes during an operation when carrying out the most important tasks of the front, as well as at the beginning of an operation, will usually be organized and delivered by the front. This makes it possible to use the power of the rocket troops and aviation with maximum effectiveness. Their joint participation in a massed strike demands the efficient coordination of their actions as to time and objectives, which can only be attained with maximum thoroughness and precision if there is centralized planning on a front-wide scale. Centralized planning will make possible a more proper utilization of the yield of the nuclear warheads available in the front and armies, allowing them to be neither overexpended nor
underexpended (if it may be so expressed) when hitting any given targets.

It should be noted that a massed strike during an operation, in its yield and the quantity of forces allocated for its implementation, may not only not be inferior to a massed strike delivered by a front at the beginning of an operation but may sometimes even surpass it. Indeed, in those instances in which a major portion of the tasks for destruction of the main enemy grouping and other important targets in the front zone will be carried out by strategic rocket forces in the initial massed nuclear strike at the beginning of the war, there will scarcely be a need to allocate a large quantity of front means for participation in this strike. The front will use its own operational-tactical and tactical missiles and aviation, naturally within circumscribed limits, to hit only those targets, first and foremost the enemy's nuclear means and troops, which for one reason or another are not hit by strategic missiles. During an offensive, however, the situation may develop in such a way that the strategic rocket forces will not be in a position to hit the targets in the front zone, but that the enemy will be able to concentrate large reserves for a powerful strike on the advancing troops. Under these conditions, the front must be ready to inflict a decisive blow against the enemy reserves by means of a massed nuclear strike while utilizing in a timely manner the maximum quantity of our own rocket troops and aviation.

What forces may be drawn on by the front to deliver a massed strike during an operation? In determining this, our point of departure must be, on the one hand, those tasks which must be accomplished by the strike in accordance with the overall concept of the operation, and, on the other hand, the availability and capabilities of the forces.

As is known, during the relocation of missile brigades and battalions and the rebasing of aviation during an operation, not less than 50 percent of the rocket troops and about 70 to 80 percent of their available aircraft must be kept ready at all times to deliver strikes. A front, operating in the Western Theater of Military Operations, may have one to two front missile brigades, one separate missile battalion, and two to four army missile brigades and tactical missile battalions, depending on
the number of divisions in the front. Thus, in a front there may be a total of 51 to 79 launchers (not counting cruise missiles) of which 21 to 39 are operational-tactical launchers and 30 to 40 are tactical missile launchers. Consequently, in order to deliver a massed strike with 50 percent of the launchers in use and one battery in each battalion left as a duty battery, which is necessary for effectively opposing enemy nuclear attack means, the front may use about 10 to 15 operational-tactical missiles and approximately the same quantity of tactical missiles.

The determination of the number of rocket troops to be allocated to deliver a massed nuclear strike may be arrived at in different ways. For example, let us imagine that two armies are operating on the main axis and that six to eight divisions are advancing in their first echelon. In the gap which has formed between these armies, a third is committed, and it is on this axis that a massed strike is delivered. In this case, the front will be able to allocate for the strike six to eight launchers from the divisions, up to six launchers from the army brigades, and three to nine launchers from the front brigades and the separate battalion, a total of about 15 to 20 launchers. There may, of course, be other variants as well.

The quantity of means allocated from the air army to participate in a massed nuclear strike is also determined according to the composition of the air army. It may have one bomber division, one or two fighter-bomber divisions, and one or two aviation engineer regiments of cruise missiles. A bomber division can put 15 delivery vehicles into use at the same time (two to four aircraft equipped for radioelectronic countermeasures are required to support each delivery aircraft). A fighter-bomber division having one squadron in each regiment which is trained for toss bombing can deliver a strike with 30 nuclear bombs. A cruise missile regiment is capable of launching four missiles at once. Therefore, an air army has the capability of putting 45 to 83 delivery vehicles into action simultaneously. However, experience from training exercises of recent years indicates that usually only part of the forces of an air army are allocated for a massed strike during an operation. As a possible variant of such an allocation we may utilize: one bomber regiment, one or two fighter-bomber regiments, and one cruise missile regiment, a total of 19 to 29 delivery vehicles.
In all, of course, if nuclear warheads are available, a front can put 34 to 49 missiles and delivery aircraft into action simultaneously and can hit up to 26 to 38 targets (the coefficient of technical reliability of the missiles is 0.0, ?; the probability for the delivery of a nuclear warhead by a cruise missile and a fighter-bomber is 0.8; for a bomber it is 0.6).

Along with nuclear means, chemical and conventional means also will find very wide application in a massed strike during an operation, especially for incapacitating the personnel servicing radiotechnical systems and tactical means of nuclear attack.

It has not been ruled out that when a front delivers a massed strike during an operation, strategic rocket forces and strategic aviation will participate in it.

It has already been noted that preparation for delivery of massed nuclear strikes during an operation is an exceptionally complicated task. It includes a series of measures to be taken by the command and staffs. It is very important to foresee in advance the possibility of having to deliver massed strikes, of adopting a decision without a delay in transmitting the tasks to their executors, and of organizing cooperation, relocation of missile large units and units, stockpiling and transport of nuclear warheads, control, and communications. In order to implement all of these measures on a timely basis, the command and staffs must be exceptionally well organized and efficient in their work.

Judging by experience from training exercises, the following will be the most expedient procedure for organizing a massed strike during an operation.

Upon receipt of situation data dictating the need to carry out the primary task of a front at a given stage of an operation by delivering a massed nuclear strike, the commander of the front, together with the chief of staff, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, and the chief of the intelligence directorate, will proceed to work out a decision for the strike. He must determine the possible enemy targets and the degree to which each must be incapacitated, the yield of the nuclear warheads and how many are to be expended for hitting each target as well as for the entire strike, the types
and altitudes of the bursts, and the time of delivery of the strike; he must allocate the strike targets between the rocket troops and aviation; he must determine the degree to which conventional means of destruction will participate in the strike and the goals and methods of the combat actions of combined-arms large units and units of the front that are to exploit the effects of the massed nuclear strike; and he must lay the groundwork for cooperation and control.

On the basis of these initial data, the front staff, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, and the commander of the air army will first of all assign tasks for the final reconnaissance of the enemy by our own means and will determine what additional intelligence data must be received within what time limits from the front intelligence directorate.

The operations directorate of the front staff, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, the directorate of missile and artillery armament, and the staff of the air army will be assigned tasks for organizing the relocation and deployment of rocket troops, preparing the aircraft, and preparing and issuing missiles and nuclear, chemical, and conventional warheads.

Following this, the front staff, jointly with the staff of the rocket troops and artillery and the staff of the air army, will work out the operations procedure for the rocket troops, aviation, and combined-arms large units of the front. In the course of this activity, the necessary preliminary instructions will be issued to the staffs of the armies, to the missile large units (units), and to aviation.

While this is taking place, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, having received additional intelligence information on the enemy and data on the delivery of nuclear strikes by aviation, will carry out the precise planning of nuclear missile and chemical strikes against enemy targets (the nature and disposition of the targets, the required yields and types of bursts and the means of destruction will be precisely defined, and the necessary commands to the missile troops will be prepared). The staff of the air army will carry out analogous activity regarding the use of aviation.
All measures for organizing a massed nuclear strike must be carried out within extremely restricted time limits. The capabilities to do this are available. Thus, for example, in preparing such a strike in one of the command-staff exercises conducted in 1962, the commander of the front spent 20 minutes adopting a decision and the staff of the rocket troops and artillery spent 11 minutes taking the target coordinates, from two to ten minutes transmitting the orders, and from 33 to 37 minutes preparing the missile units. Since several of the measures indicated above were conducted at the same time, it took a total of one hour and three minutes to prepare and execute the massed strike. Such a result was achieved thanks to the fact that the preparatory work for the strike was sufficiently well thought out and organized. The commander of the front adopted his decision on the strike with the active participation of the chief of staff, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, and chief of the intelligence directorate of the front staff instead of having to listen to lengthy information reports. This speed in adopting a decision and issuing specific instructions by the commander of the front facilitated the work of the staffs and made it possible to effect a substantial reduction in the time needed for working out and issuing the necessary combat instructions to the troops and for coordinating questions of cooperation.

When adopting a decision on a massed nuclear strike, the most crucial question is determining the targets to be hit. Out of all the targets detected, those which must be selected for destruction are the ones whose destruction will bring the greatest success. In all instances, it is necessary to destroy first of all the enemy's missile/nuclear attack means, bomber aviation at airfields, and bases at which nuclear warheads and missiles are assembled. Along with nuclear attack means, it is also necessary to destroy staffs and command posts of field formations and large units, troops directly, aircraft and missile control and guidance centers, and, if possible, main road junctions, bridges over wide rivers, and other important targets.

Regarding the question of destroying nuclear attack means, different points of view exist at the present time. Some comrades consider it necessary to first of all attack the means of employment of nuclear weapons (missile launchers and delivery aircraft); others maintain that primary attention must be
directed toward eliminating depots and bases for the assembly of nuclear warheads. The simplest decision, of course, would be to destroy both types of objectives simultaneously. But under the actual conditions of a combat situation, this will not always be attainable either because of insufficient means or warheads, or for other reasons. In our view, therefore, primary attention must be concentrated on destroying those targets which, at the given moment, represent the greatest immediate danger. If, for example, a launcher, a cruise missile, or a nuclear cannon is detected, ready for delivery of a strike, and if at the same time a depot of nuclear warheads is discovered, then if it is not possible to hit these targets simultaneously, fire should be concentrated first of all on the nuclear means and then on the depot. However, when the exact coordinates of a depot or assembly base of nuclear warheads are available and when at the same time, let us say, only the concentration area of nuclear attack means is known, it is better to destroy the depot or base first and to hit the nuclear means second after completing reconnaissance of them. Thus, the most rational resolution of the problem can be found by considering all aspects of the specific data of the situation.

When destroying nuclear means situated over a small area, the probability of destruction must in all instances be brought to 90 percent, as indicated by calculations and experience from exercises. Combined-arms targets, depending on their importance and whether they are disposed on those axes on which motorized rifle and tank divisions are advancing, may be destroyed in varying degrees. From 30 to 40 percent of the total area occupied by such targets can be reliably destroyed (with 90 percent probability). In single instances, the level of destruction may be even higher. From 30 to 40 percent of the area of control posts must be reliably destroyed.

To achieve high effectiveness of a massed strike requires the organization of efficient cooperation among missile units, aviation, and combined-arms large units. Particular attention must be given to coordinating the use of nuclear weapons and the actions of the advancing troops. These weapons must inflict decisive damage on the enemy and create conditions for our own troops to advance rapidly and to quickly complete the rout of the opposing grouping.
In order to ensure coordinated troop actions in delivering a massed strike, it is necessary first of all that the army commanders, division commanders, and commanders of missile large units and units know when, against what target, at what time or with the arrival at what line, with charges of what yield, with what type of burst, with what means, and by whose order the missile launching or aviation strike will take place.

Organizing cooperation between rocket troops and aviation large units consists of coordinating their strikes with regard to place, time, and types of bursts. Front aviation, in addition to the direct delivery of strikes, is given the task of reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the targets to be destroyed, of providing air cover to the battle formations of rocket troops, and of determining and monitoring the results of bursts. The rocket troops, in support of aviation, disorganize the enemy air defense, destroy enemy antiaircraft means and fighter aircraft at their airfields, and disrupt control. To provide for the safety of our own aircraft flights, restricted zones are established above the disposition of missile units when missiles are being launched, and provision is also made for measures preventing the launching of missiles against targets located in the zone of air action.

Commanders and staffs of cooperating troops will be able to achieve the greatest success only when they correctly understand the aim of the massed strike, the tasks of the forces and means, and when they have a good knowledge of the situation and continuous reliable communications with one another.

A massed nuclear strike during an operation is carried out at a previously established signal which is given by the commander of the front. To ensure timeliness in delivering the strike, all participating forces are brought to full combat readiness beforehand, also at a single signal or upon command of the commander of the front.

Upon receipt of the appropriate order, the missile and aviation units and subunits prepare the missiles for launching and the aircraft for takeoff. The missiles and aircraft can be brought to full readiness either immediately, skipping the intermediate stages of readiness, or by degrees.
If the forces and means are brought to full combat readiness by degrees, it will be possible to define precisely the coordinates of the points of aim specified earlier for destroying the targets or to set up the tasks for destroying newly detected targets in line with the instructions of the commander of the front.

The front staff, the chief of the rocket troops and artillery, the commander of the air army, and the commanders of the missile large units and units will monitor the carrying out of the orders (signals) issued and will report on the readiness for a massed strike against the existing communications means by transmitting specially worked out coded signals or by transmitting them directly (automatically) to an illuminated display panel set up at the front staff.

A massed nuclear strike is carried out, if possible, by a single salvo at a precisely established time. A salvo should not be considered as a strike produced instantaneously in the literal sense of the word. It is difficult in actual practice to attain such a thing. A salvo should be understood here as a strike delivered over a short time interval which suffices for carrying out all of the intended missile launchings and bombing strikes. Nor should this time interval be extended, either, since this leads to a reduction in the overall effectiveness of the strike.

In order to carry out a massed strike in a more or less short interval of time, it is very important that all forces and means be at full readiness simultaneously and that several communications channels be available for transmitting the signals for the launching of missiles and the takeoff of aircraft. In the period preceding delivery of the strike, all measures must be taken to keep the forces participating in the strike at high combat readiness.

The subsequent actions of the front troops will depend to a great degree on the results of the massed nuclear strike. The massed strike, in turn, can reach maximum effectiveness only if it is fully exploited by the advancing troops in order to complete the rout of the opposing grouping, take possession of the enemy territory, and deprive the enemy of freedom to maneuver his reserves in the depth and of the opportunity to restore the forces neutralized by the strike.
While the strike is being carried out, the main efforts of the command and staffs are directed toward determining its results and exploiting them immediately with the troops. It is very important to find out quickly which targets have not been destroyed for one reason or another and to take appropriate measures in time. For this purpose, each nuclear burst must be pinpointed by intersection as soon as the strike is delivered, in order to determine their actual ground zeros (centers) and altitudes. If the ground zero (center) of a burst deviates significantly from that initially assigned, or if the intended burst at a given target has, for technical or other reasons, failed to occur, the front commander can, depending on how important it is to destroy this target at the given moment, adopt a decision to deliver a second nuclear strike against it immediately, using duplicate or reserve means. If it is noted that a nuclear burst has occurred closer to the ground surface than the established distance, the necessary corrections are made, by order of the commander, in the plan for the upcoming actions of front troops, thus eliminating the possibility of their being contaminated by radiation.

Simultaneously with the pinpointing of the ground zeros (centers) and altitudes of the nuclear bursts, the level of destruction of the targets is determined. These data are immediately transmitted to the troops; based on the data, a determination is made of the most expedient actions for the troops to exploit the effects of the massed strike; and measures are taken to knock out undestroyed or only partially neutralized targets by means of conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads.

Mobile enemy targets can change their deployment areas, disperse, or move prior to the delivery of a massed strike or even during it. They must all be put under special observation by reconnaissance elements so that a timely change can be made, if necessary, in the type of delivery vehicle and the number and yield of the nuclear warheads for their destruction. In general, however, it is better to assign fighter-bomber aviation to destroy mobile targets.
It cannot be ruled out that in the period preceding a massed strike, or at the moment of implementation, the enemy may deliver a strike on some of the launching positions of the rocket troops or on airfields. In this case, the command and staffs will take the necessary measures for immediate restoration of the combat effectiveness of the units and of their control. At the same time, the strike targets are redistributed among the units, the missile batteries are relocated to alternate siting areas or to alternate positions, and the aircraft are rebased. All of this must be done within the shortest possible time.

When the situation does not permit extending the time period over which the massed strike is delivered, it must be carried out even with weakened forces. The destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are such that they can, even when restricted in number, bring about significant enemy losses and thereby exert a fundamental influence on the accomplishment of the main front task.