MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems in the Organization of Military Educational Institutions

22 February 1978

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses and reinforces a previous article on the same topic advocating the consolidation of military educational institutions for reasons of economy and efficiency, to improve the quality of training, to coordinate and broaden it, and to improve materiel support. It sets forth the deficiencies of the current system of numerous small schools with duplication of staffs and facilities, uncoordinated curricula, and limited training resources, and recommends the establishment of a central pedagogical institute under the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions to improve training techniques. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Problems in the Organization of Military Educational Institutions

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of the first part of this article are Colonel V. Petrov and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Rak, and of the second part, General-Leytenant D. Barinov and Colonel M. Popov. This article discusses and reinforces a previous article on the same topic advocating the consolidation of military educational institutions for reasons of economy and efficiency, to improve the quality of training, to coordinate and broaden it, and to improve material support. It sets forth the deficiencies of the current system of numerous small schools with duplication of staffs and facilities, uncoordinated curricula, and limited training resources and recommends the establishment of a central pedagogical institute under the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions to improve training techniques.

Comment:

General-Leytenant D. Barinov also wrote "Methods of Conducting a Front Offensive Operation with the Use of Means of Mass Destruction" in Issue No. 6 (67) for 1962 (in Russian). After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The article to which it refers was disseminated as .
Some Problems in the Organization of Military Educational Institutions

by

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Lieutenant Colonel Yu. RAK
General-Lieutenant D. BARINOV
Colonel M. POPOV

In the article, "Some Questions on the Organization of Military-Educational Institutions," Colonel V. CHOPOROV raised the question of the need to consolidate military educational institutions. Besides the great economic effect, consolidated military educational institutions will to a considerable extent help to improve the quality of training of officer personnel, and of scientific-pedagogical and methodological work: the problem of materiel support of the training process can be resolved more fully and more easily in them.

Colonel CHOPOROV proposes the consolidation of military educational institutions which have a single curriculum and are related by specialty.

On the basis of experience in work at a specialized military educational institution, we, like Colonel CHOPOROV, consider it desirable to set up large combined-arms command military schools with rotating personnel numbering approximately three to four thousand men, and with sections for training officers for the combined-arms, tank, and artillery units, and air defense, engineer, chemical, and communications troops. Along with the combined-arms command schools, it is desirable to organize specialized technical schools.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 6 (61), 1961.
In a large military educational institution full departments will be created, with a sufficient number of instructors, instead of "miniature" departments and cycles numbering four to five men. Cycles or departments can be set up under these conditions and in such disciplines as military topography, weapons of mass destruction and antichemical protection, military engineering training, and the history of military art.

Experience shows that in communications schools and apparently in other specialized higher educational institutions, the instructors in tactics, in addition to their own subject, conduct classes in artillery, air defense troops, aviation, missile weapons, the history of military art, and military administration. It is quite clear that they are not qualified to conduct training sessions in other specialized disciplines. But a large military academy will be able to have not one, but a group of instructors for each of these subjects. This will help to raise the qualifications of the teaching staff and improve the entire training process in these subjects.

It is known that the specialized schools are experiencing particularly great difficulties in the materiel support of sessions in tactical training, because they lack the armament and combat equipment of the other branch arms, the study of which is called for by the program. By shifting materiel around within large combined-arms command higher educational institutions, it is possible to greatly improve support of the training process, and to set up well-equipped study rooms, laboratories, firing ranges, small-arms firing ranges, and training areas. All this will be a good foundation for the high-quality training of officers of all specialties and for the broad development of scientific-pedagogical and efficiency-promoting work. In our small communications school, for example, study rooms with very primitive equipment were built for combined-arms subjects, but we cannot build a small-arms range or equip a tactical training area or an engineer or antichemical training area, because we lack the necessary forces and means.

The establishment of combined-arms command schools with a training combined-arms regiment or brigade attached to them will make it possible to hold integrated training sessions and combined-arms exercises. This practically ensures that the training sessions will be carried out under conditions most closely approximating a combat situation, and this will greatly improve the quality of the field training of the students.

And, finally, in a large combined-arms command school with a training regiment attached to it, the opportunities for bringing in trainees for
training in methods of conducting classes with soldiers and trainees in the lower grades and in other specialties increase considerably.

To improve the pedagogical education of the instructor and training-command personnel of the schools, it would be desirable to organize, under the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, a pedagogical institute for improving the skills of the instructors and of a number of categories of officers of schools which do not have pedagogical instruction, as well as of officers being assigned to schools to assume teaching positions. The training period at this institute could be set at one year. During this period, a student at the institute should receive the necessary minimum in the fundamentals of pedagogy and psychology, and should study the methods of instruction in his own specialty.

At the same time, this institute will become a scientific center under the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense. It must be assigned the task of developing scientifically based programs for training in various specialties, the generalization of experience, and, on the basis of this generalization, the development of recommendations on the scientific-pedagogical and training methods work of the military schools.

In order to maintain a close connection between the military educational institutions and actual combat training in the life of the troops, it seems to us that it also makes sense to introduce into the system periodic practical training for officers with the troops after three to five years of work in a school. An officer undergoing practical training is assigned a certain duty position for a year, with full responsibility for the training of the subunit, unit, staff or department entrusted to him.

In connection with the consolidation of higher military educational institutions, and the considerable reduction in their number in the military districts for the purpose of more qualified leadership, it will be desirable to place the school directly under the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense, leaving to the district the functions of administrative and managerial direction of the schools located in their territory.

The functions of selecting and placing personnel of military schools also should be transferred to the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions.
The organizational measures indicated above will have a great economic effect and will improve to a considerable extent the quality of training of officer personnel as a whole.

* * * *

The need to improve the organizational structure of military educational institutions has existed for a long time. The discussion of this problem in the pages of the Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" is of fundamental importance.

In accordance with the tradition which has developed in our country, each branch of the Armed Forces has its own educational institutions, firing ranges, training centers, and other institutions of an educational and scientific nature. Along with its positive aspects, such a structure also contains serious defects, which in a number of instances are a serious hindrance to the training of personnel, and to the development of scientific research work in higher educational institutions. We shall try to illustrate this point with one example.

The Order of the Minister of Defense of 24 November 1956, concerning the formation of an Air Defense Military Command Academy, laid down the task, concurrent with that of training personnel for the Air Defense Forces of the Country, of training in a combined-arms faculty "officers to fill the positions of air defense chiefs of large units and formations, and officers of air defense staffs (departments) of all branches of the Armed Forces".

Stating the problem this way was correct, since the officers assigned to air defense of ground forces received thorough training, and as a result, successfully performed the tasks assigned to them.

However, after only two classes had graduated, for some reason they stopped sending the graduates of the combined-arms department to the Ground Forces, and at present the academy is training personnel only for the Air Defense Forces of the Country. At the same time the Ground Forces department was also eliminated, and the teaching of general tactics and of operational art in the air defense of ground forces was, in effect, abolished. In this situation students graduating from the academy have only the vaguest idea of the nature of a modern battle and operation and of the actions of ground forces and rocket troops, despite the fact that covering the deployment and actions of ground forces in operations is one of the most important tasks of the Air Defense Forces of the Country. But
is it really possible to skilfully perform this task without a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of conducting a combined-arms battle and operation?

Since we have touched upon the problem of ground forces, we should also mention the fact that in specialized educational institutions there is a definite slighting of the study of the fundamentals of combined-arms combat, and of the tactics and operational art of the ground forces. An unacceptably small amount of time is given over to this very important discipline: in the Air Defense Academy, for example, a total of only about 30 hours have been allotted during the five-year training period whereas in the order of the Minister of Defense from 90 to 150 hours were allotted for the history of military art, and no one has the right to "encroach" on these hours. But the time to be allotted to the fundamentals of combined-arms combat and the tactics and operational art of ground forces was not given in the order of the Minister of Defense.

And so the training of personnel for air defense of the ground forces has been discontinued in the academy. It is difficult to say by whose will the order of the Minister of Defense was violated. Apparently, the same tradition with which we began this discussion played more than a minor part. The fact of the matter is that in 1958 a directorate of air defense troops of the ground forces was organizationally established, which, following the same tradition, evidently decided to train personnel for the air defense of ground forces only in its own institutions.

As a result of the bureaucratic approach there is now an enormous number of large and small educational institutions for air defense, and Comrade CHOPOROV properly criticizes such a system.

The point, however, is not the number of educational institutions alone, which, undoubtedly, is extravagant. What really matters is the fact that splitting up the training of personnel among various educational institutions with the same or related specialties results in a lack of coordination in the training, and does not contribute to the development of a unity of views on the most important problems of air defense of the country and of the troops, while splitting up the professorial-teaching staff in many specialized educational institutions interferes with purposefulness in scientific research work and results in unnecessary duplication. It is no accident, then, that we come across situations where several dissertations or other works of a research nature are written on one and the same topic.
A similar situation also occurs in the case of manuals. Each educational institution writes its own manuals and training texts. The efforts of a tremendous number of instructors is spent on this and great sums of money are spent, but the quality of the manuals is most often poor. The lack of a coordinating body results in a situation where one educational institution has manuals in abundance, while another has a shortage of them or there are none at all.

The existence of a large number of related or specialized educational institutions also has an adverse effect on the materiel-technical resources of the training process. For example, to provide all air defense educational institutions with radar sets or missile systems, it is necessary to take many of these means from the troops or distribute them directly from enterprises producing this equipment which the troops need in the first place. In practice this leads to a situation where the students are taught not on new models of equipment, but on models which have become obsolete.

The situation with regard to firing ranges is also unsatisfactory. The academy has already been in existence for five years, yet there is no firing range on which the students can receive the maximum amount of practical skills in working with combat equipment. Meanwhile, the students travel more than 1,000 kilometers every year for range firing practice, on which a great deal of training time is spent and which costs as much as it would have cost to build a firing range long ago. This cannot be considered normal. The necessary effectiveness resulting from the link between training and practice is not being achieved.

In his article Comrade CHOPOROV also correctly raises the question of the desirability of combining some scientific research institutes with higher educational institutions in those places where this is possible given their specialty and mode of operation. This would make it possible on the one hand to make the most effective use of the scientific results achieved in the institutes during the training process and, on the other hand, to submit for scientific research vital problems of modern air and antimissile defense of the country's territory and of the troops.

Long ago it was proven that locating a scientific research institute or educational institution even in the same city but operating on the principle of the division of labor, does not solve the problem of combining scientific efforts or close interconnection. We are convinced of this on the basis of our own experience, having the Scientific Research Institute No. 2 in the vicinity.
In conclusion, we should like to say that the problems raised in Comrade CHOPOROV's article are very timely, and a broad exchange of views would help to find the correct ways of solving them.