MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Against Enemy Operational Airborne Landing Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article is a general treatment of ways to combat airborne landing forces in a front operation. The author examines the capabilities of fighter aviation and surface-to-air missiles to destroy the landing force in the air with nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance to this effort of radioelectronic countermeasures and stable control and cooperation among the forces. Other matters covered include the allocation of zones of responsibility for ground combat and the role of fighter-bombers in destroying a landing force on the ground. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon

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Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel A. Lapenin. This article is a general treatment of ways to combat airborne landing forces in a front operation. The author examines the capabilities of fighter aviation and surface-to-air missiles to destroy the landing force in the air with nuclear weapons, and emphasizes the importance to this effort of radioelectronic countermeasures and stable control and cooperation among the forces. Other matters covered include the allocation of zones of responsibility for ground combat and the role of fighter-bombers in destroying a landing force on the ground.

Comment:

After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Combat Against Enemy Operational Airborne Landing Forces

by

Colonel A. LAPENIN

Operational airborne landing forces will unquestionably find
the broadest possible application in a missile/nuclear war.
Possessing high tactical mobility, operational mobility, and the
ability to quickly, almost immediately, exploit the results of
nuclear strikes and create acute situations during the course of
an operation, they can accomplish the most diverse tasks.
Landing forces make it possible to capture important areas and
installations, surround and destroy large groupings of enemy
troops, support the assault crossing of large water obstacles, as
well as shift the efforts of troops to new axes.

It is natural that the employment of large landing forces
contributes to the success of actions by troops. When a landing
force is dropped into the enemy rear, additional conditions
emerge for a sharp increase in the rates of advance of the
troops, and for the more rapid completion of the destruction of
an enemy grouping or the disruption of a counterattack being
prepared by him. And conversely, with the development of actions
by enemy landing forces into the rear of the troops of a front,
not only the nature of the actions of the troops themselves
changes substantially, but the front operation as a whole may
develop differently.

The employment of large airborne landings and combat against
them put questions of organizing and conducting combat actions by
troops in a new light. This article deals with certain questions
of combat against enemy airborne landing forces during front
operations.

The most typical conditions for combat against airborne
landing forces may arise in those instances where the enemy has
succeeded on certain axes in halting an offensive by front
troops, in delivering a powerful counterattack, and in launching
offensive actions of his own. In such a situation the enemy will most likely make an attempt to drop or land a large landing force, in order to create an acute and possibly critical situation in the rear of the front troops, and to assist his own troops in following up the success they have achieved.

But the enemy can employ a large landing force from the air or in defense. Its rapid commitment to action, the great power of strikes stemming from the presence of missile launchers in the landing force, as well as the high mobility of the landing troops, can cause a certain disruption in the offensive actions of the front, can delay the commitment of second echelons to battle and the advance of reserves from the depth, and can disrupt the system of troop control and the functioning of the rear.

In the views of the probable enemy, rather powerful landing forces can be dropped into the zone of operations of front troops. They may consist of one or two airborne or infantry divisions (without tanks or long-range operational-tactical missiles) and sometimes an even larger grouping. Thus, when carrying out operational-strategic tasks (for example, the opening of a new front), an entire corps, functioning as an airborne landing force and cooperating with an amphibious landing force, can be dropped. But such landing forces will most probably be dropped not in the zone of the front, but far beyond its limits.

The equipment and materiel-technical resources of an operational landing force are designed for prolonged and intense combat actions. Its independent actions, in isolation from the main forces, may last from two to five days or more. The landing areas are set in the depth of the operational formation of the front troops at a distance of 75 to 250 kilometers from the forward edge. Transporting the landing force by air from the landing operation's departure areas, which are usually located from 400 to 600 kilometers from the forward edge, is accomplished on aircraft of a troop-carrying air army and takes one to several hours.

The relative importance of the task of destroying airborne landing forces in the overall volume of the tasks of a front will vary depending on the situational conditions. Only at the most

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critical moments, when the landing is taking place or the landing force has already been dropped on the territory of the front, is combat against them given the most serious consideration. In all cases, however, the main efforts of the front, including the employment of nuclear weapons, are constantly directed toward retaining the initiative of the troop offensive on the main axis, destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons, and destroying his main grouping; and the elimination of the airborne landing force must be accomplished simultaneously and in conjunction with these basic tasks.

In our opinion, the following principles must underlie the organization of combat against enemy airborne landings. First, while all the forces of a front are in constant readiness for combat against an airborne landing, the only ones that actually enter combat are those which in the situation that has developed can go into combat from the march against an airborne landing force without substantial regrouping. Secondly, the major damage to the landing force is inflicted by aviation, surface-to-air missile units, and in some instances missile large units and units; combined-arms large units and units complete the destruction of the landing force in the event it lands on the territory of the front. Third, the destruction of the airborne landing force and the elimination of its remaining portion in the rear of the front troops is completed quickly and without delay. Any delay in the destruction of the landing force may result in the disruption of the plan of operation and may affect the nature of its execution. And finally, in the fourth place, the elimination of an airborne threat is accomplished by first destroying troop-carrying aviation on airfields and in flight; the troops become the target of actions only after they have been dropped on the territory of the front. Relying on these basic principles the command of the front can, in the specific situation of an operation being carried out, determine the times of the beginning of combat against the landing force, the composition of the forces to be allocated for this, and for the destruction of which elements of the landing force the main efforts should be shifted.

Combat against a landing force can proceed in different ways. Its nature, scope, the composition of the forces brought in, and the time and methods of their actions, depend to a large extent on when the enemy's intention to drop his airborne landing
force into the rear of the front becomes known to the front commander. Combat against a landing force may begin with strikes against troop-carrying aviation and against troops in the departure areas for landing operations or in the air during the period of landing; in the event of a drop it ends with the destruction of the landing force on the ground.

Under modern conditions the destruction of military transport aviation and of airborne landing troops in the areas of their concentration and at dispatching airfields cannot be the basic method of combat against a large airborne landing by front means. Although at this time enemy troops and aviation are located in areas of concentration of limited size and at airfields, and have only the minimum amount of protection against weapons of mass destruction, a front, having on hand a limited quantity of long-range missiles brought in from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, cannot inflict decisive damage on a landing force at this moment. Furthermore, to thwart a landing by even one division a large quantity of nuclear warheads for long-range missiles will be required. Thus, if we assume that the enemy will abandon his plans for a landing in the event of the loss of such a quantity of troop-carrying aircraft, and that he will be unable to transport even half of his landing force by air, then, as the calculations indicate, to prevent the landing 80 nuclear warheads will be required.*

One must assume that the front will be unable to allocate such a quantity of nuclear warheads for combat against one division. Therefore the basic means of destroying an airborne landing force will be conventional and chemical weapons, not nuclear weapons.

* This estimate is based on the assumption that the loading of one airborne landing division onto aircraft is accomplished at the 15 to 20 airfields on which a troop-carrying air army (700 aircraft) could be based. Destroying the aircraft on eight to ten airfields and putting them out of action with nuclear strikes would make it impossible for a long time for the enemy to land a landing force at full strength, since to transfer military transport aircraft from other axes to replace those lost would take so much time that the need to land the landing force may no longer exist.
Nor has the problem been resolved of destroying a landing force in loading areas using front aviation forces, which have greater range than front rocket troops. This is because only bomber aviation can operate in landing preparation areas which are a considerable distance away. But in view of their limited number in a front, they will be unable to destroy as many targets as are necessary to deprive the enemy of the opportunity of dropping a complete landing force. Furthermore, to support the flight of bombers, enemy fighter aviation and air defense should be effectively neutralized, and over a rather large area along the front and in the depth. But, an air army does not have available the forces necessary for this.

Therefore, the actions of front aviation against airfields for loading and dispatching a landing force may be carried out with a limited purpose -- to disrupt the preparation of an airborne landing, inflict certain losses on its troops, and partially destroy the troop-carrying aircraft on the airfields.

Aviation can successfully employ chemical weapons and conventional means of destruction. Bombing calculations show that to destroy transport aircraft on the airfields it is most advantageous to have a load of small aerial bombs, chemical bombs, and high-explosive fragmentation bombs using proximity fuzes. According to estimates, to destroy transport aircraft standing in the open in a parking area 1,000 by 200 meters in size, up to one bomber aviation regiment with AO-10 and RBK-500 bombs and chemical bombs with persistent toxic agents of the VRK-7 type will have to be allocated. Such a strike could result in the destruction or disabling of up to 60 to 70 percent of the aircraft. In addition, at an airfield subjected to such a strike other aircraft and parking areas will be contaminated for a period of up to a day and sometimes even longer. Using OFAB-250-270 bombs with proximity fuzes the complement of aircraft can be reduced approximately 1.5 to twofold.

Under certain situational conditions it may be possible to deliver strikes against enemy airfields using fighter-bomber aviation. On the basis of norms especially worked out at exercises, one division of fighter-bombers is in a position to knock 40 to 60 transport aircraft out of action. Thus an air army, under favorable conditions, is capable of delivering strikes against three or four enemy airfields and destroying up
to 40 to 50 percent of the transport aircraft on them, as well as part of the airborne landing forces.

We shall indicate which methods of actions by aviation can, in our opinion, be employed to destroy a landing force on the ground in the departure areas for a landing operation. The principal method is a simultaneous attack by all forces. When nuclear weapons are being employed the bursts can be in the air or on the ground; for the delivery of strikes against airfields it is more advantageous to employ ground bursts which result in their destruction: the diameter and depth of the craters formed by the bursts of medium-yield warheads will be about 90 and 20 meters respectively, while the soil thrown up causes heavy radioactive contamination not only on the territory of the airfields, but also possibly in the areas where the landing troops are concentrated. To restore such an airfield will take several days.

It is most advantageous to time the delivery of a simultaneous strike for the moment the landing troops are loaded onto the aircraft. This will result in the destruction of the troops, aircraft, and equipment. We might note that the success of a strike of this type depends on the timely receipt of reliable reconnaissance data on the preparation by the enemy of the airborne landing in the zone of operations of the front troops, and on the time they are loaded onto the aircraft and the time the latter are airborne. And this requires systematic aerial reconnaissance and the use of all other types of reconnaissance, especially by agents.

Thus, the destruction of military transport aviation and of airborne landing forces in areas of concentration and at airfields for loading troops onto aircraft, cannot, as indicated above, be considered the most effective and economical method of combat against operational airborne landing forces. But we should not abandon the idea altogether. The delivery of strikes against airfields helps to disrupt the preparation of a landing, weakens it, and in some cases forces the enemy to postpone the landing for a considerable time. Therefore, given the availability of the necessary forces and means, strikes against airfields could take on great significance. But they must be supported every time, and the primary task is to neutralize the enemy's system of air defense in the flight zone of the bombers.
of the front air army.

Under modern conditions the basic method of combat against large enemy airborne landing forces using front forces and means must be the destruction of the airborne landing force while it is being delivered to the landing area. When the landing force is in the air, the most favorable conditions exist for inflicting decisive damage on it. At this time it is most vulnerable, since troop-carrying aircraft are weakly defended, and the front command can concentrate the maximum amount of forces and means on destroying it, without diverting in the process the forces of the main grouping of troops from accomplishing the main tasks of the operation.

Combat against enemy aircraft is conducted by forces of an air army and by front surface-to-air missile units. In addition, fighter aviation of the air armies of adjacent fronts and armies of the air defense forces of the country can be brought in for purposes of cooperation. The comparatively long flight of troop-carrying aviation in the zone of operations of the forces and means of air defense of a front at an altitude of 5,000 to 6,000 meters and along a limited number of converging or parallel routes (two or three) enables almost all fighter aviation surviving after possible enemy strikes, a portion of the fighter-bombers, and up to three surface-to-air missile regiments to be committed to battle. In the process the front troops are not deprived of the support of their own aviation and are covered against air strikes.

More favorable conditions for the destruction of a landing force in the air also arise in those cases where its flight is carried out in the zone of operations of adjacent fronts. In such instances the air battle will be waged by the allocated forces of several fronts, each of which concentrates its main efforts on destroying only that part of the landing force which is moving through its zone. It is natural to expect that combined efforts may result in the complete disruption of an attempt by the enemy to land his landing force in the rear of our forces.

In our opinion, front fighter aviation should be regarded as the main force for destroying a landing force in the air. Until recently many people felt that it was not fighter aviation, but
surface-to-air missile units which were capable of accomplishing this task most effectively. But the exercises of the troops do not confirm this. In reality it turns out that the ability to introduce fighters on any axis and at great distances behind the front lines over enemy territory, and to control the course of an air battle from the ground, as well as the great reliability of the guidance of groups of fighters against a large number of air targets enables the latter to achieve better results in combat against an airborne landing force than the surface-to-air missile units of a front.

Let us examine the capabilities of fighter aviation and of surface-to-air missile units to destroy a landing force in the air. To use a specific example, let us assume that one airborne division is transported by air by a troop-carrying air army moving in three parallel columns at an altitude of 4,000 to 6,000 meters at a speed of 450 to 500 kilometers per hour. On this basis the minimum amount of time it would take front air defense means to fly through the zone of operations would be 30 to 40 minutes.

To destroy in the air the enemy troop-carrying and tactical aviation supporting a landing force, up to five or six fighter and fighter-bomber divisions may be brought in from the front air army,* from cooperating fighter aviation regiments of the air armies of adjacent fronts, and from an army of the air defense forces of the country. But it turns out that not all of these can be committed directly to combat against troop-carrying aviation. During this period probably as many as two air regiments of fighter-bombers of an air army will be carrying out search and destroy operations against enemy nuclear weapons and will perform the task of aviation support of the troops, while approximately one fighter regiment will be needed to support the combat actions of its own bombers. In addition, a certain percentage of these aircraft will be in the air, carrying out previously assigned tasks, or on the ground getting ready for takeoff. Consequently, not five or six, but only four divisions at the most will be able to take part in the air battle. If we also take into account the coefficient of the combat use of combat aircraft and forces allocated for combat against fighters covering the landing force, then up to 180 aircraft (about two divisions) will be able to operate directly against

* An air army could consist of three fighter divisions and two fighter-bomber divisions.
troop-carrying aviation.

With this complement, and with the coefficient of successfully attacking fighters (their percentage of the total number committed to the air engagement) equal to 0.6 or 0.7, between 220 and 250 enemy aircraft will be destroyed (estimating that each fighter with guided missiles will make two attacks, while those with cannon armament will make four or five).

The capabilities of surface-to-air missile units depend on the number of them taking part in repulsing the raid and on the supply of surface-to-air missiles on hand. Taking into consideration the composition of the surface-to-air missile units and the density of their disposition in the zone of a front, in all up to one regiment of front surface-to-air missiles and up to one regiment of army surface-to-air missiles, as well as up to two battalions of tactical surface-to-air missiles (one battalion from a combined-arms large unit operating on the flight axis of troop-carrying aviation, and up to one battalion from two adjacent combined-arms large units) will be able to fire on the aircraft. Since the problem of destroying an air target by launching no more than two missiles has now been solved, one front or army surface-to-air missile regiment will destroy six enemy aircraft per firing cycle (two minutes), and by expending only one unit of fire (36 missiles) the regiment can shoot down as many as 20 aircraft. Having a mobile reserve of missiles (1.5 units of fire) in the surface-to-air missile units enables the regiment to destroy up to 30 aircraft. Consequently, the surface-to-air missile regiments can shoot down up to 50 to 60 transport aircraft carrying landing forces. The fire capabilities of a battalion of tactical surface-to-air missiles are up to three aircraft per firing cycle (one minute), while with 1.5 units of fire continually on hand it is capable of destroying from 23 to 27 aircraft; two battalions can destroy 50 to 60 aircraft. Thus, at best, surface-to-air missiles can destroy from 100 to 110 enemy aircraft carrying approximately one battle group of troops.

From this calculation it is evident that the mobile reserve of surface-to-air missiles in the surface-to-air missile units does not ensure success in destroying a landing force during the airborne phase of a landing operation. To increase the combat capabilities of surface-to-air guided missiles we must either
increase the number of missiles in the mobile reserve or organize the continuous delivery of prepared surface-to-air guided missiles to the launching positions.

The employment of surface-to-air guided missiles with nuclear warheads substantially increases the combat capabilities of the surface-to-air missile units. Thus, for example, a surface-to-air guided missile with a conventional warhead destroys all aircraft flying at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 meters within a radius of 115 to 200 meters from the center of the burst, while one with a nuclear warhead (with a yield of 27 kilotons) destroys all aircraft within a radius of 1,000 to 1,200 meters (with the shock wave alone). Thus, based on the initial data assumed, one surface-to-air guided missile with a nuclear warhead simultaneously brings down six to nine transport aircraft. In addition, thermal radiation and penetrating radiation within a radius of 5,000 to 8,000 meters affects the crews of the aircraft and the airborne landing forces which are in them. Exploiting the powerful effect of a nuclear air burst requires that the unit of fire in surface-to-air missiles to be carried along include missiles with nuclear warheads; when applied to our calculation, at least 20 percent of the missiles must be such missiles. Having them on hand, we can count on successfully thwarting an attempt by the enemy to land a landing force, mainly through the efforts of front, army, and tactical surface-to-air missile units, since they will be capable of destroying up to 350 aircraft together with the landing troops on board.

Admittedly, this statement is true only in those cases where front (army) surface-to-air missile units participate in full force in the destruction of troop-carrying aviation. In reality such an ideal situation may be only a rare exception. In all likelihood only a portion of the forces (no more than 75 to 80 percent) of the number we took in our estimate of surface-to-air missile regiments (battalions) will be able to wage combat against troop-carrying aviation, and consequently their capabilities will be reduced accordingly.

* Based on American data for the Nike and Terrier surface-to-air guided missiles.
The fighter aviation of the front and the surface-to-air missile units employing missiles with conventional warheads, destroy in all up to 340 transport aircraft carrying enemy landing forces. Such a quantity of aircraft provide the transportation by air of more than two battle groups of troops with their combat equipment. It is natural that with the loss of about half the complement of a landing force, the enemy will not be able to count on accomplishing the tasks originally planned with the portion of the landing forces still intact. Even if he is able to land the remaining portion of the landing force, its actions will not be on the scale originally planned. Therefore, the basic method of combat against a large enemy landing force is acknowledged to be its destruction in the air during the landing operation.

Achieving good results in combat against a landing force is ensured by the proper organization of the employment of forces, especially fighter aviation. Since the destruction of an airborne landing force during its landing operation in principle is accomplished like the destruction of aircraft when repulsing a massed raid by enemy aviation, the success of the actions of the fighters will depend mainly on the timeliness and range of detection of the air enemy (at a distance of 250 to 300 kilometers beyond the forward edge), on the timely putting of the fighters into the air, and on efficient control of them during the battle. All this is organized by the chief of air defense forces and by the air army staff.

The great depth of the columns of transport aircraft carrying the troops to be landed requires the steady introduction of fighters into the air engagement from several lines. To destroy a landing force in the air it is desirable to have two phase lines in the zone of a front: the first for fighters with cannon armament, the second for fighters with guided missiles. Fighters from adjacent fronts may also be committed from the second line; to commit fighter aviation of the air defense of the country, an independent line is necessary, set above the territory occupied by our troops.

The method of committing fighters to battle is also of vital importance. Since there are difficulties in having fighters directly accompany troop-carrying aviation, the enemy, apparently, will generally protect its flight path, and at the
same time establish "curtains" of fighters on the most probable axes of appearance of our fighter aviation. Taking this into consideration, our fighters should be introduced into an air engagement in small subunits (flights), for the most part from different axes. With a change in the conditions of the actions of aviation the methods by which it accomplishes its tasks also change. For example, when conducting combat actions against troop-carrying aviation at night or in the daytime under adverse meteorological conditions, fighters will already be able to be committed to an engagement not in small subunits, but only as single aircraft with preliminary guidance of them by ground radar stations.

The implementation of measures in the area of electronic countermeasures is by no means unimportant to the achievement of good results in air engagements. Systematic strikes by missiles, aviation, and artillery against enemy radiotechnical equipment must be carried out well in advance, in order to disrupt the system of control of his aviation. And the jamming of enemy ground and aircraft radioelectronic equipment must reach its maximum intensity when troop-carrying aviation is flying over the front line. We should not forget that the enemy too will be carrying out radio and radar jamming during this period in order to reduce the effectiveness of front means of air defense. Therefore, the air army staff and the chief of the front air defense forces must work out in advance measures to ensure stability of control of forces and means. First, the procedure for shifting means of control to new channels and frequencies must be clearly defined, as well as the procedure for employing secure radio nets and of controlling forces from different command posts (of the chief of air defense forces, the commander of the air army, aviation large units, and others).

When destroying a landing force in the air, the organization of cooperation between forces, and especially between aviation and surface-to-air missile units, takes on great significance. The commander of the air army and the chief of the air defense troops of the front are able to do this. The organization itself of cooperation in the surveillance of air targets and in the guidance of aircraft against them must enable fighter aviation to conduct combat actions against troop-carrying aviation on distant approaches while still above enemy territory, beyond the zones, between the zones, and with accurate control of air defense means
and a proper allocation of targets (for example by axes and altitude of flight), also in the zones where missiles are employed by surface-to-air units.

To organize cooperation between fighters of the air armies of adjacent fronts and the aviation of the air defense of the country when they are operating with their own forces in a front zone, we must coordinate the procedure for transferring control of aviation in the air, of determining the lines of committing forces to an air engagement, as well as of allocating landing airfields for them after they have completed their tasks.

When conducting an air engagement in a zone of several fronts, the organization of cooperation must, in our opinion, apply mainly to the allocation of the waves of air targets between them, and to the establishment of lines and appropriate signals for transferring control of the forces from the command posts of one front to the command posts of another.

Combat against an enemy airborne landing force is not always over with the air engagement. Despite great losses to the landing force in the air and lowered combat effectiveness of its remaining part, the enemy may still attempt to drop his landing force into the rear of the front. When the landing force is dropped, the front command must take steps to complete its destruction on the ground. Not having forces free for this purpose, the front commander will employ combined-arms units and large units, which in the situation that has developed are forced to wage combat against the landing force or can participate in it without diverting their main forces from their previously assigned task. The postwar exercises of the troops have shown that one reserve especially allocated for this purpose is incapable of waging successful combat against airborne landing forces dropped over a vast area. For this reason, combat against airborne landings has come to be regarded not as a type of combat support but as an important part of the combat activity of the troops.

The destruction of a landing force in areas where it is dropped (or lands) through the combined actions of various forces requires, in our view, the establishment in the zone of the front of zones of responsibility for the troops of the armies of the first and second echelon and of a front zone of responsibility:
the latter in turn may be divided into zones of responsibility of large units located in the reserve of the front or which have been withdrawn for rest and for bringing up to full strength, of units and large units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as of the large units of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command concentrated in the zone of the front. Sometimes, instead of zones of responsibility for all of these large units and units, two or three axes may be designated as the most probable areas of a landing operation.

Combined-arms and tank large units temporarily free from performing other tasks join in combat against the landing force during the period when the latter is being dropped, is landing, and is conducting combat actions on the ground. During troop exercises the correct method was found for employing in combat against a landing force those forces in whose area of actions the landing force has been dropped. But it is most advantageous to employ combined-arms large units which are executing a march from the depth of the operational disposition of the troops, when they are on the approach to the areas of the drop of the landing force. It is sufficient to change their route, directing it to the landing area, and they can join the battle against the landing force from the march and destroy it, especially with their tanks.

To assist the ground forces in destroying the remainder of the airborne landing force on the ground, we should first employ fighter-bomber aviation. To deprive a landing force which has been dropped of the opportunity of delivering nuclear and artillery strikes against our troops, reduce its maneuverability, and disrupt control, fighter-bombers may destroy the launchers of the Honest John free-flight rockets, self-propelled artillery, motor vehicles, personnel carriers, and radio and radar stations. And they must strive to accomplish this task as quickly as possible.

Bomber aviation and the rocket troops of a front may be assigned during this period the tasks of delivering strikes against concentrations of airborne landing troops in the rear of the front and against the enemy airfields on enemy territory from which the materiel support of the landing force is carried out. Fighter aviation in cooperation with the surface-to-air missile units and antiaircraft artillery of a front, can, using a part of
its forces, block the area of operations of the landing force from the air, and can also destroy its troops and combat equipment.

In those cases where the front command is unable to immediately introduce combined-arms units and large units into combat against a landing force (for example, if there are no troops near the landing force's drop area), the entire burden of combat will for a time fall mainly on aviation. The main purpose of its actions will be to destroy the transport aircraft at the moment of the drop of the landing force or during the landing, the parachutists in the air, and the personnel and combat equipment being unloaded from aircraft, and to ward off attempts to combine the separated groups of the landing force into a single grouping and delay the advance of the landing force toward the targets of its actions. These tasks must be entrusted to subunits and units of fighter-bombers and of fighters not tied up in combat. At the same time strikes by bomber aviation are directed against the largest groupings of the enemy landing force. In our opinion, it would be best during this period to deliver strikes using non-persistent toxic agents.

A battle group of an airborne division dropped by the parachute method into a zone measuring at least 1,6 by 1,6 kilometers can be destroyed by one fighter-bomber regiment using OKhAB-100 bombs with toxic agent type R-35; a bomber regiment with these same bombs is capable of destroying the personnel of two battle groups in the zones where they are dropped.

The final destruction of a landing force is achieved through the joint efforts of troops and aviation which have joined the operation. Cooperation between them is organized in advance; identification signals and target designation signals are coordinated. During this period the times of air strikes relative to the times and place of actions of the units and large units of the troops that have been allocated, as well as their air support, must be strictly regulated. To identify themselves, the troops, both during the day and at night, may employ pulse-type radio beacons, ground infrared signal equipment, and pyrotechnical means. For the closest possible cooperation aviation representatives should be sent to the combined-arms large units.
These appear to us to be the methods of organizing and conducting combat against enemy operational airborne landings by the forces and means of a front.