

TOP SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): How Proposals
by Authors of Military Thought Articles
Are Being Adapted for Operational Training

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article examines the extent to which proposals by authors have a practical effect in the fleets, based on the results of a survey of fleet staffs conducted by the Main Staff of the Navy. Citing specific articles as examples, the author treats the four basic groups into which these proposals fall, based on their importance and the results of their application. These are general matters of planning and conducting amphibious operations which are applicable to all fleets, methods being used in combat training for achieving the greatest effectiveness from the employment of forces and means in conducting and supporting landings and combat actions of landing forces, matters which have not yet been incorporated into the combat training of fleets, and important questions still requiring discussion in the military press. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells



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
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




Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR



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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): How Proposals by Authors of Military Thought Articles Are Being Adapted for Operational Training


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
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Captain 1st Rank N. Vyumenko. This article examines the extent to which proposals by authors have a practical effect in the fleets, based on the results of a survey of fleet staffs conducted by the Main Staff of the Navy. Citing specific articles as examples, the author treats the four basic groups into which these proposals fall, based on their importance and the results of their application. These are general matters of planning and conducting amphibious operations which are applicable to all fleets, methods being used in combat training for achieving the greatest effectiveness from the employment of forces and means in conducting and supporting landings and combat actions of landing forces, matters which have not yet been incorporated into the combat training of fleets, and important questions still requiring discussion in the military press. End of Summary

Comment:

The author also wrote "The Initial Strike in Armed Combat at Sea" in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.





How Proposals by Authors of Military Thought Articles
Are Being Adapted for Operational Training

by
Captain 1st Rank N. Vyunenko

More and more officers and generals of late have begun to take an interest in the question of how proposals and recommendations by authors of articles in our Collection are being adapted for training branches of the armed forces and branch arms. We are speaking here not of the ordinary comments on articles which are received by the editors and are routinely published in each issue of the Collection. These comments contain the personal opinions of officers and generals, as a rule on a theoretical level or with confirmation from already existing practical experience.

With this article, on the timely subject "The Landing of Amphibious Landing Forces under Present-Day Conditions of Conducting Military Operations", the editors are attempting for the first time to show, with the necessary documentation, which theoretical statements by authors of articles have found practical application or general recognition in fleets, and which proved to be unacceptable or required further development and testing.

At the request of the editors this material has been prepared by means of a survey taken of commanders and staffs of fleets and flotillas by the Main Staff of the Navy and a generalization of the material obtained from them.

The editors plan to continue to keep careful track of how the proposals by authors of articles are being adapted for operational and combat training of troops, and to keep our readers informed of the results in good time.

* * *

One problem that has aroused vigorous discussion on the pages of the Collection has been the problem of joint actions by naval forces and ground troops, especially in their highest form -- amphibious landings of various scales.






At one time this form of joint actions was not considered in our press to be a real possibility. But an objective study of the conditions and nature of the actions of armed forces in the initial period of a war has led to the conclusion that amphibious landings in modern operations are not only a real possibility, but are essential. The skilful employment of mobile groupings of troops, which amphibious and airborne landing forces are, has as its goal the maximum exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy and the completion of his destruction within a short period of time. In recent years there has been a noticeable increase of interest in this problem on the part of readers of the Collection. This is entirely natural since during this period landing training has become much more active in all our fleets and in a number of coastal military districts. In 1963-64 alone 262 landing exercises of various scales were held, in which 1,392 warships of various types took part. During the exercises, in accordance with the operational situation that had been created, over 29,000 men, drawn from marine units and troops from coastal military districts, were actually landed. The landing forces included approximately 4,700 pieces of various combat equipment.

It should be particularly noted that more and more attention is being given to improving methods of joint training of naval forces and troops from coastal military districts. Whereas in 1963 large units of landing ships of the Pacific Fleet, in conjunction with units of the Far East Military District, held only nine preparatory, training, and examination exercises on amphibious landings, in 1964 more than 100 such exercises were held. There has also been a noticeable increase in landing training in the Black Sea Fleet. Here in 1964, the number of preparatory, training, and examination exercises increased almost fourfold over 1963, and there was a twofold increase in the number of landing ships allocated for the exercises.

At the same time, if we bear in mind that the expansion of landing training was also accompanied by serious theoretical research, it will become clear that in recent years a solid base has been established for further developing the art of the combat employment and actions of amphibious landing forces, and ways have also been determined for developing more advanced landing ships and armament for the landing forces.

A significant event in landing training has also been the fact that in recent years matters of cooperation among naval forces, ground troops of coastal military districts, and formations of Air Defense Forces of the Country have been worked out. Further evidence of the increased attention being paid to landing training is the rather large number of articles



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published in the Collection and the number of comments on them regarding various matters of the combat employment of tactical and operational amphibious landing forces.

The vigorous discussion of this problem which has continued even up to the present time is unquestionably of great value. It not only contributes to the development of a unity of views among officers and generals, but also does much to improve the operational and combat training of naval forces and troops of coastal military districts.

We shall try to show to what extent proposals by authors of articles have had a practical effect in the fleets. This information was obtained by the Main Staff of the Navy from staffs of fleets as a result of a survey.

The staffs of all fleets responded actively to this project. They noted that many of the articles published in the Collection were received with great interest in the large units and staffs of the fleets, that they were carefully studied, that a number of proposals and recommendations by authors were incorporated into combat training and operational training, and that they were tested in exercises and war games.



In the opinion of the staff of the Pacific Fleet, the articles published, although far from being of equal value in their content, on the whole encompassed a number of matters of preparing and conducting an amphibious landing operation under conditions of nuclear war that were important to the fleet.

The staff of the Black Sea Fleet felt that almost all the articles in the Collection were timely and served to raise the level of the operational-tactical training of officers and to expand their outlook. This made it possible on the basis of a whole series of matters to come to a unified understanding of the problem of conducting landing operations under conditions of nuclear war, and, furthermore, to practically implement a number of the authors' recommendations.

The staff of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla also confirmed that many of the proposals contained in the articles were taken into consideration during the process of training the senior officer personnel of the flotilla.

Admittedly this assessment was not fully shared by the staffs of the Northern and Baltic Fleets. They reported that in view of the exclusively

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operational orientation of the indicated articles (the authors' statements as a rule applied to operational landings), few of the recommendations had broad application in combat training.

The fact of the matter is that these fleets, in the process of combat training, are thus far working on the matters of landing only tactical (up to the battalion level) and diversionary landing forces. We must in addition take into account the diverse conditions and tasks of the combat training of each fleet. What is acceptable, for example, for the Pacific Fleet might not always be applicable for the Baltic Fleet, etc.


In the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets, where amphibious landing exercises were conducted both at the tactical and operational level, a greater need was felt for theoretical elaborations and the use in practice of the recommendations contained in articles in the Collection.

Naturally, to test in practice the soundness of all the recommendations made by the authors of the articles published did not appear to be possible, owing to obvious limitations resulting both from the scales of the exercises and from the conditions under which they are conducted in peacetime. In fact, it is obvious that neither the editors nor the authors expected this to be done.

In our view, the most objective opinion was that of the staffs of the Pacific and Black Sea Fleets, who felt that all the conclusions, proposals, and recommendations which appeared in the pages of the Collection in the past three years could be divided into four main groups based on their significance and the results of their application.

The first group includes those, as a rule, theoretical propositions which proved applicable to all fleets. These are general views on the role, place, and importance of amphibious landing operations in a future war, the special features of the conditions under which a landing of amphibious landing forces might take place, and of their composition, tasks, and actions, and views on the role and procedure for the combat employment of the branches of the armed forces and branch arms when conducting amphibious landing operations. These propositions, recognized by all as being correct, also include requirements expressed by the authors of the articles for new landing forces and means of landing them, and the organization of control of them.

The staffs of the fleet believe that a unified opinion on these matters has already been established among admirals, generals, and





officers. This, of course, helps to make the performance of operational and combat training tasks more successful.


At the same time the staff of the Pacific Fleet draws attention to the fact that the lack of sufficient practical experience in the fleets in working on modern landing actions has thus far prevented the authors of articles from making all their conclusions and recommendations sufficiently sound with regard to the methods of amphibious landings in a nuclear war and the employment of modern means of combat in carrying them out. As a result, the propositions in the articles are often too general, resting solely on the experience of the last war and a general idea of the nature of a future war, all of which greatly reduces their practical value. Certain articles, in addition, are not without subjectivity and one-sidedness. Probably in order to sound more convincing, certain authors sometimes resort even to overstating the combat capabilities of one or another landing means, thus creating doubts as to the validity of their recommendations. One often finds in the articles attempts to formulate a theory out of individual cases or to restate theses and recommendations that are already known. This, in the opinion of the staff of the Black Sea Fleet, was typical of the assertions of Colonel I. Snezhkov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Klyuyev* on advance planning and preparation of landing operations in peacetime, on control of forces in an operation, and on exploiting the results of nuclear strikes delivered by strategic rocket forces and front troops. And although these propositions are on the whole correct and raise no doubts, they do not go beyond well-known provisions contained in current regulations and manuals, and do nothing to develop them further or make them more specific.

It was also felt in the staffs of the fleets that the conclusions and proposals of General of the Army Ya. Kreyzer on the effect of changes in military affairs on the methods of preparing and conducting a modern amphibious landing operation, on the possibility and necessity of landing amphibious landing forces, and on their tasks and preparation for actions** were not, unfortunately, marked by originality of ideas.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (68), 1963

** Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (73), 1964 (not available).





Exhaustive answers to all these questions may be found in official publications -- manuals, guides, instructions, etc.

The second group of matters consists of conclusions and proposals which constitute a new step in the development of operational-tactical thought in the area of this problem. They are fully shared by the fleets and, insofar as possible, are being used in operational and combat training.


These are primarily proposals on methods of achieving the greatest effectiveness from the employment of the forces and means of various branch arms in joint landings, on the use of amphibious tanks and the employment of special over-water tank-borne landing forces, as well as all-round support of the landing and the combat actions of the landing forces.


In the opinion of the staff of the Pacific Fleet, of great value were the recommendations of Colonel I. Snezhkov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Klyuyev on the content of tasks, the accomplishment of which must be provided for when planning a landing operation and during landing training of forces. Planning and preparation for a landing operation are for a number of reasons more complex than for other operations conducted by naval forces. Therefore, in seeking new ways of organizing the work of staffs in this area, the practical advice for a more efficient sequence of drawing up the plan of an operation and preparing it proved highly valuable.

At the same time, the staff of the Pacific Fleet felt that control of the landing forces during the conduct of a landing operation for the purpose of seizing large islands and straits zones, when a significant portion of the naval forces are taking part in the operation, should be entrusted to the fleet commander, not the front commander as proposed by the authors of the above-mentioned article. This is necessary, in the opinion of the fleet staff, because a front, and especially an army, does not have at its disposal the necessary means for controlling the naval forces. The detailing of an operations group from the fleet staff makes it possible to coordinate only to a certain degree the actions of naval forces with those of troops of other branches of the armed forces taking part in the amphibious landing operation, but does not ensure the accomplishment of the task of controlling the naval forces, especially the landing forces.

However, the staff of the Black Sea Fleet does not share this opinion, which, by the way, was also contained in the article by Rear Admiral A. Kruchenykh*, and believes that it is not always advisable to entrust

* Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought', No. 3 (70), 1963






control of all forces of a landing operation entirely to the fleet commander.


Success in landing operations is achieved by the joint efforts of the ground forces, strategic rocket forces, the navy, airborne troops, and Air Defense Forces of the Country, and depends largely on the degree of coordination of their actions which are directed toward the achievement of a single goal. It is this that led the staff of the Black Sea Fleet to conclude that the organization of an amphibious landing operation and the command of troops while it is being carried out should be entrusted, as a rule, to the front commander. Only in certain instances is it better for this command to be entrusted to the fleet commander.

The question of the control of forces in a landing operation also was discussed at a military science conference of the Navy. The conference termed this question "a subject of perennial debate" but it nevertheless was resolved in the most correct manner, which is entirely applicable in practice.

In the course of a comprehensive exchange of opinions, the conference participants came to the unified overall conclusion that the question of the control of forces in a landing operation can be correctly resolved not in a general way, but rather by taking into account the specific conditions of the given amphibious landing operation, based on the composition of the forces taking part in it, the goals of the operation, and the tasks of the troops. The conference came to the conclusion that if a landing operation is part of a front offensive operation, then command of all forces taking part in it must devolve upon the front commander. But, if the landing is conducted in support of the fleet, then the command of all forces taking part in the operation will become the prerogative of the fleet commander. In those cases where an amphibious landing operation is conducted outside the framework of a front operation and is of independent importance, then command of all forces in this kind of operation devolves upon an individual designated by the Supreme High Command. These recommendations are now also being followed by our fleets during operational training when working out matters of landing operations.

Some new and entirely correct recommendations were given by Rear Admiral A. Kruchenykh in the above-mentioned article on determining the composition of groupings of naval forces when carrying out a landing in order to seize a straits zone during a front offensive operation, as well as on the methods of seizing the straits. In this regard, in the exercise of the Black Sea Fleet held in the fall of 1964, departing from the






practice of previous exercises, the establishment of several groups of missile and torpedo boats was planned, as well as a detachment of landing ships intended to transport troops across the straits and to supply them. In addition, the unloading of surface-to-air missile hardware for the air defense of the landing area was worked out simultaneously with the landing of the landing forces. The directing body of the exercise concluded that all this contributed considerably to the success of the landing operation, but that the methods of actions used in a landing under these conditions require further improvement.


Also useful, the staffs of the fleets concluded, were the recommendations of Colonel I. Sutormin* on measures to reduce losses from enemy nuclear weapons. The key to a successful landing operation must be not only the presence of high-speed landing ships and their employment in dispersed battle formations and cruising formations, but particularly the reliable neutralization of the enemy with nuclear weapons. This, as the author points out, is also confirmed by the experience of the operational command-staff exercise of the Far East Military District held in 1962. The delivery of massed nuclear strikes primarily against the deployment areas of enemy nuclear means which could be used by him to disrupt a landing operation has begun to be a major element in the plan of the operation and actions of all forces supporting the landing.

The staff of the Pacific Fleet feels the propositions contained in the article by General of the Army Ya. Kreyzer on planning nuclear strikes, coordinating the efforts of various branches of the armed forces, allocating among them the tasks and targets for strikes and seizure, and organizing the training of forces for landing actions and the loading of a landing force onto amphibious landing means were of considerable help to staff officers. These conclusions were reached by the author of the article** on the basis of a thorough analysis of an exercise conducted with the participation of troops of the Far East Military District and forces of the Pacific Fleet, which produced much that was instructive in the area of planning both their joint actions and the command of all forces in a landing operation.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (71), 1964

** Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (73), 1964 (not available).





The staffs of the fleets also note that, in addition to proposals which have already been put into the practice of combat training, the articles also contain proposals which require further more in-depth development and practical verification with the necessary calculations.

The third group of matters consists of conclusions and recommendations by the authors which have not as yet been incorporated into the operational and combat training of the fleets.

In this group the staffs of the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets place the conclusions of Rear Admiral A. Kruchenykh and General of the Army Ya. Kreyzer to the effect that the main efforts of a fleet under all conditions must be concentrated for the routing of enemy aircraft carrier strike large units and missile submarines, which supposedly constitute the greatest real threat to a landing force during the sea transit and during the landing.


As we know, our probable enemies intend to use their carrier strike large units and missile submarines primarily to destroy the most important ground targets in the depth of the territory of the country. For this reason, they may play only a negligible role in repulsing our landings at the same time.


The destruction of enemy carrier strike large units and his missile submarines in the initial period of a war, in order to decisively repulse an enemy nuclear attack from the sea as a whole, is regarded in the fleets as one of the main tasks of the strategic rocket forces, long range aviation, and naval forces within the framework of the strategic actions of the two sides, rather than one of the main tasks of an amphibious landing operation.

The most serious threat to landing forces at the very beginning of a war may be posed by enemy shore-based tactical aviation, torpedo submarines, and missile boats, as well as by antilanding defense troops. Thus it was to destroy these forces that the main nuclear weapons resource was used to support a landing during fleet exercises.

And lastly, the fourth group of matters should include those which have not been discussed in the military press, but whose study is considered highly necessary.

The staffs of the fleets particularly believe that in the Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought' it is advisable to publish such problem questions pertaining to all-round support of a landing and the





actions of amphibious landing forces. Articles on the control of the forces taking part in an amphibious landing operation and the organization of their cooperation would be of interest.


X The fleets and coastal military districts also feel the need to examine the matters of organizing joint landing training of the ground forces, naval forces, and airborne troops. Also requiring further development is the problem of conducting an amphibious landing operation under conditions where the belligerents are not employing nuclear weapons and confine themselves to the use of conventional (non-nuclear) means of combat alone -- naturally, under the constant threat of the surprise employment of nuclear and chemical weapons.

What is also needed is an elaboration of the most desirable methods of staff work when preparing and conducting amphibious landing operations, and methods of air defense of a landing force during sea transit and while landing at various distances from our shore.

Other matters not as yet treated in the military press are those of the employment of nuclear weapons to destroy antilanding obstacles in the water and on the shore, further increasing the speed at which amphibious landing forces are landed, as well as determining the specific requirements for organizing and carrying out landing operations as they apply to arctic conditions.

In the opinion of the staffs of the Baltic and Pacific Fleets, articles on all the above-mentioned matters should be worked out by generalizing the experience of joint games and command-staff exercises of the fleets and coastal military districts.

The staff of the Pacific Fleet also believes that the time is ripe for summing up the discussion of this important and complex problem of military art on the pages of the Collection. The job could be done by a specially appointed group of authoritative specialists on matters of landing actions, chosen from among admirals, generals, and officers of the General Staff, the Main Staff and Central Directorates of the Navy, as well as from the Academy of the General Staff and the Naval Academy.





In summing up the discussion, the results of which could be conveyed to the staffs of fleets and of coastal military districts in a special collection, it is essential to consider not only the individual opinions of the authors of the published articles, but also materials from exercises and military science conferences held in the fleets, in military districts, and in the Main Staffs of our Armed Forces.

