MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between Means and Means of a Front and a Fleet in an Offensive Operation on a Coastal Axis

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The first part of the article examines how cooperation is set up and implemented among the various forces involved in a front offensive operation on a coastal axis, in which cooperation is organized in terms of tasks, axes, time, targets and methods of actions. Specific examples are given for the delivery of an initial nuclear strike, amphibious and airborne landings, antilanding defense, and seizure of a straits zone. The author of the second part covers much the same ground in somewhat greater detail, but focuses more on the control aspects of joint front-fleet tasks and the need for a command ship in amphibious landing operations. Both authors review cooperation planning and discuss the role of operations groups in implementing the plans. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strictly need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned:  

William W. Wells
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between Forces and Means of a Front and a Fleet in an Offensive Operation on a Coastal Axis

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of the first part of this article is Colonel General I. Pavlovskiy, and of the second part, Captain 1st Rank F. Bukatar. The first part of the article examines how cooperation is set up and implemented among the various forces involved in a front offensive operation on a coastal axis, in which cooperation is organized in terms of tasks, axes, time, targets and methods of actions. Specific examples are given for the delivery of an initial nuclear strike, amphibious and airborne landings, antilanding defense, and seizure of a straits zone. The author of the second part covers much the same ground in somewhat greater detail, but focuses more on the control aspects of joint front-fleet tasks and the need for a command ship in amphibious landing operations. Both authors review cooperation planning and discuss the role of operations groups in implementing the plans.

Comment:
Colonel General Ivan Grigoryevich Pavlovskiy has been identified as Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces since 1967. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Cooperation Between Forces and Means of a Front
and a Fleet in an Offensive Operation on a Coastal Axis
by
Colonel General I. Pavlovskiy,
Captain 1st Rank F. Bukatar

Cooperation between the forces and means of a front, fleet, and large units of long range aviation and air defense forces of the country in an offensive operation on a coastal axis is organized according to tasks, axes, time, targets, and methods of actions throughout the entire depth of the operation.

The forces and means of each branch of the armed forces allocated for joint actions in an operation are determined by the General Staff. In a front, the units cooperating most closely with fleet forces will be one or two combined-arms armies advancing on a coastal flank, missile large units, an air army, air defense troops, and engineer and chemical units.

All branch arms of the navy may take part in the operation. Large units of submarines and naval missile-carrying and antisubmarine aviation will wage combat against enemy submarines, aircraft carriers, and other ships impeding the offensive of the ground forces, and will destroy naval bases and ports and wipe out convoys; surface ships will put landing forces ashore and repulse enemy landings, lay mine obstacles, support our naval shipping, and disrupt enemy shipping; coastal missile units will repulse the landing of amphibious landing forces and destroy surface ships; marines will be landed as amphibious landing forces and defend the bases.

One or two bomber divisions from long range aviation may operate in support of a front. Medium-range missile large units of the strategic rocket forces will take part in the destruction of particularly important targets which are impossible to hit with front and fleet nuclear means. A corps or army of the air defense of the country will cover the forces and means taking part in the operation against enemy strikes from the air.

In accordance with a decision to carry out initial operations on a coastal axis and operations to seize island territories or straits zones, the main matters of cooperation between a front and a fleet should be coordinated before the outset of military operations and [four to five}
words missing] in consideration of changes in the military-political situation [three to four words missing] of the enemy in the theater. In the event of a drastic change in the situation [three to four words missing] and problems of cooperation may be worked out anew.

The main aspect of cooperation in an operation is the buildup of efforts when delivering the initial nuclear strike. The General Staff will indicate to each formation of the branches of the armed forces its tasks in the initial nuclear strike and the initial data on cooperation. Detailed treatment of these tasks within the framework of the operation is left to the front.

An important factor in the organization of cooperation in the initial nuclear strike is data on the employment of strategic nuclear means. On the basis of this data, the time of nuclear strikes by front and fleet means is established, and it must be brought as close as possible to the beginning of the first launch by the strategic rocket forces.

The front commander determines the overall objective of the first nuclear strike, the targets of destruction and the tasks of the front rocket troops and front air army, the disposition of the first strike, the quantity and yield of the nuclear and chemical warheads, the conditions of cooperation between large units and means of the front participating in the strike, the time required to achieve readiness, the procedure for preparing, storing, and supplying ammunition, the control signals, and other matters.

For all types of aviation, safe zones of flight away from the launch trajectories of missiles are established, most often over a sea or ocean, with the subsequent approach of delivery aircraft to the targets of destruction located on the seacoast. This method of actions makes it possible to reduce the time interval between strikes by strategic rocket forces and by front, long range, and naval aviation.

It is important also to allocate targets correctly and most advantageously between front missile means and front aviation, and the forces of the fleet and of long range aviation, and to calculate with the greatest possible precision the time of launch of missiles and that of the delivery of nuclear strikes by bombers, especially when striking targets in one area. In so doing the capability of the delivery vehicles of various branches of the armed forces to strike important targets interchangeably must be maintained, as must the ability to retarget nuclear means from
certain targets to others.

Strikes against naval bases and large ports, control posts of naval forces, and nuclear weapons depots located on the seacoast (if, owing to their great distance, they are not struck by front means), are delivered by fleet and long range aviation forces. On the basis of reconnaissance and final reconnaissance data, the tasks of destroying targets not discovered by the time military operations begin, and the problems of cooperation between means taking part in the initial nuclear strike, must be further refined in a timely manner.

The organization and carrying out of cooperation between the large units and formations of the front and the fleet to complete the rout of enemy groupings pressed against the sea is a very complex process. It must also be done while planning the operation, and further refined in the course of combat actions.

In one of the exercises in the Far East Military District, a large enemy grouping (as many as four infantry divisions) was surrounded and quickly wiped out. In planning the operation, a maneuver by a combined-arms army was envisioned in advance for the purpose of outflanking the enemy grouping and cutting it off from its main forces. The actions of front troops and fleet forces in surrounding and isolating the enemy were coordinated with the fleet staff, and the landing of an amphibious landing force was planned to assist those of our troops who had reached the seacoast. At the time the front was repulsing a counterattack by the enemy, who was trying to link up with the surrounded troops, fleet forces imposed a blockade from the sea and prevented the landing of additional forces onto the beachhead. While splitting and destroying the surrounded grouping, the time, yields and types of nuclear bursts, and the actions by front and fleet aviation against targets on the beachhead and at sea were all coordinated.

Fire support ships were given the procedure for successive neutralization of centers of resistance, destruction of fire means and coastal batteries, and destruction of defensive installations. Direct contact was established between the detachment of fire support ships and the large units of ground forces advancing along the seacoast. The fleet commander, in addition, indicated to the fleet forces the areas and time of their deployment to blockade the enemy and the sequence of destroying combat ships and assault transports, and assigned tasks of destroying enemy missile-carrying and aircraft carrier ship groupings which were giving assistance to the surrounded troops.
When making an *assault-crossing* of straits, mouths of rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles, cooperation between front troops and naval river flotillas takes on great significance.

Cooperation between front troops and a naval river flotilla will consist in coordinating the procedure for destroying and neutralizing enemy targets on the approaches to the water obstacle and on the opposite shore, in determining the assault crossing areas and the embarkation and debarkation points of river-borne, tank-borne, and helicopter-borne landing forces, and in assisting and supporting their operations by ships of the river flotilla as well as by front forces and means.

Forces of the naval river flotilla, jointly with front means, destroy enemy ships, support the landing of troops and their combat on the opposite shore, organize the guidance of tank-borne landing forces through the water and along the bottom of the river, clear the river of mixed minefields, and help in carrying out emergency rescue operations.

In achieving a high rate of advance by front troops, in their negotiation of various obstacles, and especially in routing important enemy groupings on a coastal flank and in seizing naval bases, ports, areas of missile launching sites, airfields, and nuclear weapons depots, the organization and carrying out of cooperation between amphibious and airborne landing forces during a landing takes on special importance.

The experience of exercises shows that an amphibious landing force in a modern operation must be landed in cooperation with an airborne (helicopter-borne) landing force. The time and depth of the landing depends on the tasks and strength of the landing forces, and possible opposition from an enemy ground forces grouping and naval forces operating in the coastal area. Thus, at a front command-staff exercise in 1964, the landing force, consisting of a motorized rifle division and a marine regiment, was assigned the task of seizing, in cooperation with an airborne division, a naval port and important strongpoints of the enemy, and, after seizing crossings over the river and road junctions, of preventing the approach of large operational reserves of the enemy and ensuring that the main forces advancing along the seacoast reached this area. Depending on the situational conditions, it was planned to land the amphibious landing force on the third day of the operation to a depth of about 200 kilometers, on the assumption that the landing force would be able to carry out independent combat actions for at least three days until the arrival of front troops.
According to the plan of the operation, by this time the front troops should have begun completing the rout of the main groupings of the first operational echelon of the army group, while the enemy fleet should be considerably weakened. The correctness of this decision was confirmed in the course of the operation. Amphibious and airborne landing forces landed on the routes of advance of large enemy operational reserves contributed to the rout of the first echelon, and the operation from that point on proceeded at high speed.

In organizing cooperation during these landings, the front commander, jointly with the fleet commander, during the preparatory period coordinated the procedure for preparing forces and means for the landing, determined the concentration and waiting areas, as well as the routes of the movement of troops to the embarkation area, the areas, sectors, and points where they were loaded onto and boarded ships, the time the convoys were to get out to sea, and the landing areas of the landing forces. Matters of air defense for the landing force and combat support by fleet forces during the loading and the movement of convoys at sea and the actions of the landing force on shore after the landing were also coordinated. To support the actions of the landing force while it was being landed, the procedure for cooperation between the landing ship forces and forces allocated to neutralize the enemy antilanding defense was also established. For this purpose a determination was made of those targets to be destroyed and neutralized by nuclear weapons, and the types of bursts and the procedure for the landing troops to exploit their results. Also coordinated were the procedure for supporting the landing force during combat on shore after the landing, the organization of target designation and information reporting, the identification signals of our troops and fleet forces, the procedure for delivering means of materiel support by sea, bringing in reinforcements, and evacuating the wounded, and the carrying out of emergency rescue operations. Immediately before the landing there was a further refinement of the tasks, areas, and time of the landing, the axes of operations of the airborne landing force, and the time and lines of the meeting of the landing forces with each other and with attacking troops.

When landing forces are landed for the purpose of seizing islands, the role of fleet forces increases greatly in supporting not only the landing of troops but also their conduct of combat actions right up to the completion of the operation. The fleet, jointly with front aviation, organizes and imposes a blockade of a large island from the sea, delivers strikes with nuclear and conventional means of destruction in order to weaken the defense of the island, and wages combat against enemy naval forces, thus interdicting their strikes against the landing troops during
passage at sea and while they are landing and holding the seized island. Fleet forces in this case are also responsible for providing the landing troops with materiel-technical means and evacuating the wounded.

Considerable work must be done to coordinate the combat actions of ground forces, fleet forces, aviation, and airborne troops in seizing a straits zone. Various methods and variants of action by these forces are possible; they depend on the size and geographical position of the straits, on the grouping of enemy forces, and on other factors. In certain cases it will be a rapid breakthrough by tank and mechanized groupings with the simultaneous landing on a broad front by amphibious, tank-borne, and airborne landing forces for the purpose of seizing by surprise the most important islands and peninsulas in the straits zone, and areas on the opposite shore. In other cases the seizure of a straits zone may be organized by amphibious and airborne landing forces before the attacking groupings reach the strait, with a subsequent buildup of their efforts and consolidation of success by arriving troops.

The quantity of forces and means allocated to seize a straits zone will be determined on the basis of the specific situation. To seize a straits zone containing numerous islands (for example, of the kind in the Baltic) will require the allocation of a considerable amount of nuclear warheads and troops (up to a combined-arms army), as well as of the appropriate fleet and aviation forces. Based on the experience of one exercise, to seize one of the straits zones in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations, 12 nuclear warheads, a motorized rifle division and a marine regiment, the forces of a naval base, front and fleet aviation, and a surface-to-air missile regiment and two fighter regiments of the air defense forces of the country were allocated.

The allocation of considerable forces and means of various branches of the armed forces to seize a straits zone calls for detailed coordination of their actions. Thus, the actions of front and fleet forces and means allocated for the delivery of nuclear strikes against an antilanding defense system in a straits zone and on the approach to it, and on islands and peninsulas, are determined and coordinated; and tasks are assigned to weaken the enemy's navy, air forces, and air defense system. Then the actions of groupings of forces and means of the front, fleet, and airborne troops, and in certain cases of the air defense forces of the country as well, to seize the straits zone, are all coordinated. In the process the sectors of assault crossing of the straits by troops are determined, together with the number of crossings and the amount of amphibious crossing equipment; the strength and task of amphibious, tank-borne, and airborne
lending forces, and the time and areas of their landing; the tasks of nuclear means, aviation, and fleet forces during the assault crossing of the straits by troops, during the landing of the landing forces, and during combat actions; the procedure for minesweeping, clearing obstacles from the straits, and smoke-screening the crossings.

Problems of covering groupings from the air and sea during actions by them to seize the straits are further coordinated, and so are combat, materiel-technical, hydrographic, and emergency rescue support, while signals to identify and mark friendly forces are established, together with the procedure for mutual information and communications. And lastly the procedure for moving out the fleet's strike forces through the seized straits and organizing basing in the zone, and the procedure for its defense and cover, are refined.

The organization of cooperation when tank troops are making an assault crossing of straits by organic means deserves special attention. This is one of the most promising methods of assault crossing and, as the experience of exercises in the Far East Military District and other military districts has shown, with good preparation and support it best permits a rapid and sudden negotiation of the straits zone, effective exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes, a substantial increase in the fire power and capabilities of amphibious and airborne landing forces, and the creation of conditions for seizing the straits zone from the march. Tank-borne landing forces to a considerable degree make up for a shortage of assault transports and fire support ships, which is extremely important in seizing fortified targets on the opposite shore.

Front troops, at the same time as they are conducting an offensive operation, will have to organize and conduct the defense of coastal areas vulnerable to landing attack, of naval bases, ports, islands, straits zones, and of other important installations and areas suitable for a landing by enemy amphibious and airborne landing forces.

For this purpose, areas of a possible landing by enemy amphibious and airborne landing forces, the probable axes of their actions, and the make-up of the forces and means allocated to cover the seacoast must be determined while still planning the offensive operation. An antilanding defense of a seacoast is organized by specially allocated front troops cooperating with naval forces. To ensure its success, large units and units of long range aviation and of the air defense forces of the country may be brought in. The make-up of forces and means assigned to secure the coastal flank will depend on the situation.
On the basis of exercises conducted in our military district, to cover a seacoast in a front operation several motorized rifle divisions, units of operational-tactical missiles and front aviation, large units of ships of a naval base, and the fleet coastal missile and artillery units and fleet aviation were brought in. In many cases, where a front had a limited number of combined-arms large units that could be brought in to take part in the antilanding defense, the tasks of covering the coastal flank were assigned to large units and units with reduced combat effectiveness -- for example, to divisions withdrawn during the operation in order to be restored to full strength. In such cases, as a rule, more-substantial aviation and naval forces were assigned and more nuclear warheads allocated for their support.

Cooperation between all forces and means when organizing an antilanding defense is organized according to tasks and possible variants of enemy actions. In so doing, particular attention is devoted to coordinating the delivery of nuclear strikes by front and fleet forces against enemy means of mass destruction, concentration and embarkation areas of the landing force, and ships of the landing force in transit at sea. The main forces and means are concentrated on routing the most dangerous enemy landing groupings. To do this the front commander, jointly with the fleet commander, determines the tasks and targets of destruction -- allocating them among strike groups and front and fleet forces and means -- and refines the time of delivery of nuclear strikes, variants for interchanging delivery vehicles, the procedure for maneuvering trajectories, and the zones of overflight by aviation during the strikes. He also organizes reconnaissance, target designation, and guidance.

The organization of cooperation during combat against enemy landing forces in transit at sea consists of coordinating the targets and the procedure for delivery of a series of successive strikes by fleet and front forces against enemy landing detachments. Based on the combat capabilities of these forces and means, the front commander coordinates with the fleet commander first of all front aviation and fleet aviation strikes with strikes by submarines, missile ships and missile boats, and other means at great distances from the shore.

In the zones of defense where the main landing forces are expected to land, strikes are planned for front and army missile brigades, missile battalions of divisions, fleet coastal missile and artillery regiments, missile ships, missile boats and torpedo boats, front aviation, and air defense aviation.
When the convoys come to within 100 to 150 kilometers of the shore, front and army missile brigades deliver a strike in cooperation with strike groups of ships of the fleet. When they come to within 25 to 30 kilometers of the shore, missile battalions of divisions, and then tube and rocket artillery, deliver strikes, closely coordinating them with those of torpedo boats and other ships of the fleet.

As the landing begins, the efforts of the antilanding defense are directed toward destroying the troops on the shore, isolating the landing force from the approach of subsequent echelons, and also supporting the delivery of counterattacks and counterstrikes. The front commander establishes a unified procedure for target designation, combat support, and mutual information and identification.

A few words on the procedure of formulating cooperation by staffs. In the practice of operational training the question arises of how and where to include matters of cooperation. In the past at certain joint exercises staffs worked out an overall plan of cooperation between front and fleet. However, practice has shown that drawing up such a plan takes a great deal of time, so that when the planning of an operation was done in a short period of time, the staffs were late in completing it. In addition, if it was worked out in great detail, this document turned out to be extremely cumbersome and in effect duplicated the plan of the operation.

We have come to the conclusion that reducing all matters of cooperation to one document is inadvisable. In TAYRUN-65 (TYphoon-65) and other exercises conducted in the military district and in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, the operation plan reflected only the main matters of cooperation between front and fleet. Details were worked out in a supplement to the operation plan in the form of separate documents (for example, a landing by amphibious, tank-borne, and airborne landing forces; seizing a straits zone; defense of a seacoast). This greatly simplifies the job of staffs in working out matters of cooperation, and also facilitates their subsequent refinement.

Matters of cooperation are worked out in greater detail by the main personnel of staffs during preparation of the operation. With the deployment of forces, and immediately prior to the beginning of the operation, cooperating staffs exchange operations groups, and reliable multichannel communications are established between them through command posts and, when necessary, also directly with troops and fleet forces.
The make-up of the front and fleet operations groups may vary and will depend on the forces and means taking part in the joint combat actions. But in all cases the operations groups, in accordance with their make-up and level of representation, must provide their commanders with data on the situation that is sufficiently complete for timely and coordinated use of forces and means during joint actions. The speed and fast-moving pace of combat actions in certain cases will make it necessary to refine the tasks for cooperating forces and means directly through the operations groups, bypassing the complex chain of command. This is particularly important for the control of means employing nuclear weapons, and in the event of disruption of cooperation.

Command over offensive operations conducted jointly by fronts, fleets, and other branches of the armed forces on coastal axes within a strategic operation in a theater of military operations will be exercised by the Supreme High Command and the General Staff. In theaters of military operations which are isolated or far from the center of the country -- for example, in the Far Eastern Theater -- a high command of the armed forces in the given theater may be established to direct operations. If this is not done, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command may assign the direction of such operations to the front commander.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that one of the most important prerequisites of success in carrying out cooperation in a joint front and fleet operation is advance preparation and teamwork among the staffs of the front and fleet, combined-arms armies, naval bases, and cooperating large units. The necessary mutual understanding between them is developed in peacetime during operational and combat training and at joint exercises and war games, by maintaining close contact between commanders and staffs in everyday life.

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To achieve the objectives of an offensive operation on a coastal axis, the combat actions of front troops and fleet forces will be conducted in close operational and tactical cooperation when accomplishing joint tasks. There are several such tasks. Let us examine some of them briefly, based on the experience of joint exercises by the Odessa Military District and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet.

The routing of an enemy naval grouping. The major role in accomplishing this task is played by the fleet, which has missile-carrying and antishubmarine aviation, strike and antishubmarine submarines, and
coastal missile units. In order to neutralize air defense forces and means on the flight routes of naval missile-carrying, long range, and antisubmarine aviation — especially in a stationary air defense zone — in addition to strategic rocket forces, front rocket troops and front aviation may take part to a depth of up to 300 to 500 kilometers. The targets and time of delivery of strikes by front means are determined by the fleet staff when planning the combat actions, and during the operation they are further refined at the shore command post of the naval commander through representatives of the front staff and the staff of the air army.

Under favorable conditions front forces and means may deliver strikes directly against aircraft carriers and missile submarines, especially in ports and bases, sea straits, canals, and other narrow waterways. To do this there must be a well-organized exchange of information between front and fleet staffs, and rapid transmission of reconnaissance data directly to command posts of large units of front aviation and front rocket troops. Front rocket troops and front aviation may also take part in routing enemy convoys and surface ship groupings.

The experience of joint exercises has shown that the destruction of enemy naval groupings, including missile ships, by fleet forces in cooperation with front aviation and front rocket troops calls for further improvement in the system of control and especially in the organization of communications, as well as broad employment of computers, high-speed means of communication, and cipher-coding machines.

The landing of amphibious landing forces to capture sectors of the seacoast, islands, ports, and naval bases is one of the active tasks requiring the most precise cooperation between front troops and fleet forces. Despite the fascination in recent years with tactical landings, it should be remembered that only a landing by an operational landing force at least the size of a motorized rifle division can have a significant impact on the course of a front or army operation. Here such matters as the organization of control of forces, air defense, neutralization of enemy forces and means of defense in the area of the landing, removal of obstacles on the water, and others that are carried out jointly by front troops and fleet forces, need further study and improvement.

A modern amphibious landing force is a joint landing force, consisting of the amphibious landing force itself, as well as tank-borne and airborne landing forces. Landing of such forces has become a permanent feature of joint exercises of coastal military districts and fleets. However, it is not as yet a single organically unified system of joint combat actions by
various branch arms and branches of the armed forces. During a landing, one often senses a certain isolation on the part of each landing force, and a desire for independence. The reason for this is probably the lack of unity of command of all forces in the landing operation. At exercises, as a rule, only the landing ship forces form up and a commander of these forces is appointed. To serve as airborne and tank-borne landing forces, large units and units of motorized rifle and tank troops, respectively, are allocated together with their commanders and staffs, as well as assisting and supporting units. A unified command of the forces in a landing operation exists only nominally in the form of a front, army, or fleet headquarters.

But in practice, in view of the preoccupation of the commands of these formations and large units with commanding the main forces (which will be the case in an actual combat situation), control in an amphibious landing operation seems to shift spontaneously to the commander and staff of the landing ship forces. Instead of assigning control to a specially trained T/O organ, the commander and staff of an offshore defense force or a naval base are generally brought in for this purpose. Therefore, such a staff, which moreover is not reinforced with officers from various branch arms and branches of the armed forces, will naturally be unable to grasp the full range of matters involved in an amphibious landing operation and organically knit together the component parts of a joint landing.

It seems to us that under the complex conditions of modern warfare, to prepare and execute a landing of amphibious landing forces -- one of the most complex types of joint operations -- a command of forces in a landing operation must be established in the person of a specially appointed commander, his deputies for branches of the armed forces and branch arms, and a joint staff also consisting of representatives of all branches of the armed forces and branch arms taking part in the operation. The staff, the regulations concerning it, and the decision on the procedure for bringing it up to full strength at the outset of a war, must all be prepared in peacetime. The training of this staff should be carried out by the method of assemblies and joint war games and exercises, according to a special program.

Major difficulties are also encountered when organizing control while a landing force is in transit at sea, particularly when selecting the ship for the commander of the landing ship forces and the commander of the landing force and their staffs. For the former, it is more convenient to be on a cruiser-type ship or on a destroyer. These ships are fast-moving, protected, and equipped with means of communications. The commander of the
landing force is more "at home" on a landing ship, which can take on
several radio sets and staff vehicles and quickly unload them onto the
shore. In practice there have been cases where precisely for these reasons
the commander of the landing ship forces went on one ship and the commander
of the landing force on another, thereby unquestionably impeding control
during the landing.

Consequently, it has now become necessary to have a special command
ship. It must provide comfortable accommodations for the commander of the
landing ship forces, the commander of the landing force, their staffs, and
the operations groups of the airborne and tank-borne landing forces and of
the supporting large units of aviation and air defense, and for their means
of communications. It must also come right up to the shore or have the
means for quick landing of personnel and equipment, and have means of
communications and protection against aviation, surface ships, and
submarines.

Experience shows that the organization of cooperation between forces
during the landing of a landing force is, as before, the most complex
element of a landing operation. Antilanding defense in the landing area is
neutralized by the joint efforts of the front rocket troops and front
aviation and the fleet missile and artillery units and fleet ships,
employing nuclear and conventional means of destruction. No less difficult
is the clearing of antilanding obstacles, especially on water. The former
methods of minesweeping, demolition of obstacles by frogmen, and other
methods, which took several hours and even days to accomplish, are
impractical in a rapid landing operation. In recent years bangalore
torpedoes and explosive line charges towed by launches, by torpedoes, and
even by helicopters and amphibious equipment of the ground forces have been
used in exercises. In a few minutes they can open lanes on the water 12 to
40 meters wide. Calculations have shown that even more effective will be
low-yield nuclear warheads (seven to 20 kilotons), which can open lanes up
to 2.5 kilometers wide and three to four kilometers long. The results of
calculations and experimental work on new means of obstacle clearing give
us reason to alter somewhat our view of the allocation of efforts: the
task of clearing obstacles on water may now be assigned completely to the
fleet and on shore -- to the ground forces.

To seize the landing points quickly, it is most advisable to use
forward detachments in the strength of a motorized rifle battalion
reinforced with tanks and artillery. Directly behind them, the main forces
of the first echelon of the landing force make a quick landing, followed
immediately, without a break, by the second echelon. The main forces of
the first echelon of the landing force must, with the support of ships and aviation, go over to a decisive offensive.

A helicopter-borne landing force should be employed to seize a shore 30 to 50 minutes before the amphibious landing force is landed. But a parachute landing force should be landed one to two hours in advance at a distance of five to 15 kilometers from the shore to capture road junctions and interdict the approach of enemy reserves and second echelons. A tank-borne landing force operates independently where possible on the flanks, simultaneously with the amphibious landing force or slightly sooner, delivering attacks from the rear and immobilizing enemy reserves. Marines should be used as forward detachments or the first waves of the landing force.

The seizure of a straits zone and its assault crossing by troops will be accomplished while the front operation is still in progress. It presupposes the destruction of the enemy grouping covering the zone, the breakthrough of fortified areas, the seizure of one shore of the straits, and an assault crossing of the straits by troops. Following powerful nuclear strikes delivered by the front rocket troops and front aviation, and the fleet missile ships and fleet coastal missile means, the tank large units and units as well as assault detachments of the motorized rifle large units negotiate fortified areas from the march, make a dash for the straits, and make an assault crossing of them in their own amphibious crossing means.

But should the enemy, having employed nuclear weapons, try to disrupt the assault crossing in the straits, then it is shifted to wider sectors of the straits zone and is supported by the combat ships and assault transports of the fleet, the amphibious engineer and armored equipment of the front, as well as by a landing of airborne landing forces. Thus, when planning an offensive operation, a front and fleet must orient themselves toward the most difficult variant -- in which they will have to make an assault crossing not only of the straits, but also of the adjacent areas of the sea.

As front troops approach the straits, fleet forces, together with the front rocket troops and front aviation, destroy the nuclear means and coastal artillery. Amphibious tactical landing forces, in cooperation with airborne landing forces, assist the troops in seizing the opposite shore of the straits and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. Submarines, aviation, and surface ships cover the areas of the assault crossing against strikes by enemy naval forces. A portion of the fleet forces, having
broken through directly into the straits zone, assists in the crossing of personnel and equipment, and carries out hydrographic and emergency rescue support of the troop crossing.

If the fleet has on hand a sufficient quantity of landing craft, seizing a straits zone is possible by landing an operational landing force on one shore before the front troops reach the zone. This method makes for more favorable conditions for the assault crossing of the strait by front troops.

The principal role in the assault crossing of a straits zone is played by the front troops. While still planning an offensive operation in the front staff, a determination is made jointly with representatives from the fleet of the approximate time, procedure and sequence in which front troops will reach the straits zone, the sectors for the assault crossing, and the engineer crossing equipment and naval forces and means for assisting and supporting the assault crossing. The time and targets of strikes against the defense system of the straits are planned, as are the debarkation time and areas and the strength of the amphibious and airborne landing forces, as well as measures to support their landing. In addition to the overall plan of operational cooperation, it is advisable also to develop in advance a timetable of tactical cooperation, and to refine it in the course of the operation.

Experience shows that all fleet forces allocated to directly assist front troops in an assault crossing must be subordinated to one of the commanders of the large units of the fleet—for example, to the commander of a naval base or one of the large units of ships. The command post or auxiliary control post during the assault crossing should be mobile and be placed near the command post of the front commander. A mutual exchange of operations groups or representatives should also be organized between the large units of troops making the assault crossing of the straits zone and the large units of ships supporting them.

The movement out of fleet forces through the straits zone into the open sea will of course begin after the seizure of the sector of the seacoast on its opposite shore to a depth of 30 to 40 kilometers, which ensures the safety of ships from all types of enemy artillery and tactical missiles. But even here a serious danger will be posed by strikes by aviation, ground missile/nuclear means, enemy ships remaining in the straits zone, mines emplaced by the enemy, as well as by ground forces groupings attempting to regain the lost straits.
Under these conditions reliable cover from the air, from the shore, and from the sea will be needed for the forces being moved out, and so will the organization of all types of defense and protection. Considerable help will be provided by forces and means of front air defense throughout the straits zone and especially in its most dangerous areas. Surface-to-air guided missile ships of the fleet will reinforce the front air defense grouping.

The plan for movement out of fleet forces through the straits zone is developed by the fleet staff jointly with representatives of the front staff. It indicates the time, procedure and sequence in which ships will pass through the straits zone, and support measures. It must be borne in mind that crossings by the second echelons and rears of the front and armies will continue in the straits zone. Schedules for the movement out of the fleet and the crossing of the troops, as well as support plans, must be drawn up with special precision. Four to six hours after the beginning of the assault crossing of the straits by troops, a passage by individual groups of ships is possible without interrupting the troop crossing. As this takes place, a service for directing traffic on the water is absolutely essential.

The auxiliary control post of the fleet commander during the movement out of the fleet is probably best situated on shore in the area of the straits zone. The auxiliary control post should have representatives from the front staff and without fail from the chief of the front air defense troops and the commander of the front air army. Operations groups or representatives from the fleet staff are assigned to the command post of the chief of front air defense troops and to the large units of troops in whose zones of actions the enemy may launch a counterattack.

How in practice is the coordination of joint actions between a front and fleet organized?

Experience shows that parallel with developing the concept of the operation, the main central problems of cooperation are also determined. Front and fleet staffs exchange preliminary proposals, which are then refined and expanded.

The staffs concerned develop a plan of cooperation between front troops and fleet forces in the offensive operation, which indicates the tasks to be accomplished jointly and the forces and means to be allocated, while the methods and sequence of actions are coordinated by time and place. This plan may be in the form of a table or schedule, or on a map.
A table shows the sequence of actions of each of the branches of the armed forces and branch arms more completely and in greater detail, but it is not graphic. A schedule shows very clearly the sequence of operations by time and tasks, but orientation as to place is also limited. The chief advantage of a graphic plan on a map is its visual clarity and fairly precise orientation as to place of actions. One or another form of the plan of cooperation will be used depending on the situation. To execute the plan of cooperation, the front and fleet exchange operations groups.

Based on the experience of the exercises, to fulfill its functions, an operations group may consist of six or seven officers (two or three operations officers, a missile officer, communications officer, intelligence officer, and aviator), a cipher post, and communications groups with a mobile communications center. It is headed by one of the deputies (assistants) to the commander or by the chief of staff of the front (or corresponding personnel from the fleet). The personnel of these groups must be selected in peacetime and trained at joint exercises even now, so as to avoid manning the groups with untrained people with the beginning of a war.

The methods examined above for coordinating joint actions and developing a plan of cooperation have been tested at a number of large-scale exercises, and in our view correspond to actual conditions to the greatest extent possible. Unfortunately, the best conditions for full-fledged working out of cooperation are not always created. As an example, in recent years the practice has been instituted in operational planning of holding front and fleet exercises at different times. This involves the allocation of so-called "role-playing" groups, which are posted to the "playing" staff and fulfill a dual role: both as part of the directing body staff, and as a group playing the role of the staff of the cooperating formation with open maps.

All this leads, in the first place, to the fact that real liaison is not worked out; in the second place, that, owing to the low numerical strength of the groups, cooperation is not worked out in full; and, in the third place, to the fact that the dual role of the group does not evoke interest or concentration, and does not stimulate thought among the participants in the exercises. Of course, we must not totally reject this form of working out cooperation. But it also must not be the final testing stage, the results of which are used to assess the organization of cooperation over a considerable period between such large formations as a front and a fleet.