MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Providing Concealment for the Forward Movement and Commitment to Battle of the Troops of a Reserve Front

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article describes operational camouflage and deception measures undertaken in exercises in the Belorussian Military District. The author found simulation of the forward movement and concentration of troops to be the most difficult. The exercises demonstrated that camouflage may be improved by increasing the number of camouflage units and the quantity of standard mock-ups, and using a special battalion in a front to simulate communications. Procedures for maintaining secrecy in planning and for radioelectronic countermeasures are described, and the problems of using operations groups to assist in camouflage measures are discussed. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned.

William W. Wells
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Providing Concealment for the Forward Movement and Commitment to Battle of the Troops of a Reserve Front

Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel B. Vashchenko. This article describes operational camouflage and deception measures undertaken in exercises in the Belorussian Military District. The author found simulation of the forward movement and concentration of troops to be the most difficult, partly because of the inadequacy of available mock-ups. The exercises demonstrated that camouflage may be improved by increasing the number of camouflage units and the quantity of standard mock-ups, and using a special battalion in a front to simulate communications. Locations should be changed periodically to avoid detection. Procedures for maintaining secrecy in planning, for radio and radar camouflage and radio-electronic countermeasures are described, and the problems of using operations groups to assist in camouflage measures are discussed.

Comment: The author contributed to "The Advance of Front (Army) Troops over Great Distances and Their Commitment to Battle from the March in the Initial Period of War" based on a military science conference in the Belorussian Military District. The Russian-language version of
Providing Concealment for the Forward Movement and Commitment to Battle of the Troops of a Reserve Front
(From the experience of command-staff and field exercises of the Belorussian Military District in the years 1963-1966)
by
Colonel B. Vashchenko

The main purpose of operational camouflage in the exercises conducted in the military district was to conceal the actual scale and direction of forward movement of the troops of a reserve front, and also to mislead the enemy concerning the true concept of an offensive operation.

We planned to achieve this purpose by such interconnected measures as concealing actual troop disposition areas and displaying dummy troop disposition areas, simulating troop movements on false axes, organizing radio jamming and radar camouflage, deceiving the enemy, dispersing advancing troops to the maximum, and conducting combat against enemy agent and aerial reconnaissance and enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups.

Of this entire system of measures, the most difficult and labor-consuming was simulating the forward movement and concentration of troops in dummy areas. In exercises we frequently planned to simulate the moving out and concentration of the troops of one army, to set up areas simulating the dispositions of a front missile brigade and a mobile missile technical base, two to three airfields, and the front command post. In the dummy disposition area of the army we simulated the concentration of two to three divisions, an army missile brigade, a mobile missile technical base, and the army command post, for which we allocated a combat engineer battalion and an engineer position preparation (or engineer construction) battalion. Simulated front installations were set up by the forces of camouflage and motorized rifle units and subunits, and airfields were set up by forces and means of the air army.

According to our calculations, it is necessary to have in the simulated concentration area of a tank division, for example,
mock-ups of 50 to 60 tanks, 200 to 250 vehicles, 30 to 40 guns and mortars, one or two launchers with tactical missiles, and two to four transport trailers. Overall, on a front scale, 1,000 or more diverse equipment mock-ups are needed, not including dummies simulating personnel. Front troops are not able to prepare and set up such a quantity of mock-ups by their own forces while advancing over long distances. And further, because of their poor quality, the mock-ups will hardly mislead the enemy.

We believe the time has come to make a serious effort to solve the problem of providing troops with an adequate number of factory-produced standard mock-ups. They must be easily transportable, small in size (inflatable or folding) and, of course, realistic. Camouflage units already have fairly good mock-ups of tanks and missile launchers. It is very important that mock-ups of the principal types of armament and combat equipment incorporate reflective qualities that match the actual items. All of this will considerably reduce (twofold to fourfold, according to calculations) the expenditure of forces and means allocated to provide operational camouflage.

Furthermore, with the aim of substantially solving the problems of operational camouflage it also is necessary to increase the number of camouflage units in the troops. In our opinion, on a front there should be a camouflage regiment made up of two to three battalions to set up extensive dummy troop location areas and camouflage the most important front installations, and a separate camouflage battalion to camouflage the principal installations of the front's rear. It is advisable for tank, combined-arms, and air armies to have a camouflage battalion capable of fitting out a dummy division area or three to four airfields, respectively. At the same time, as revealed by exercise experience, we have to increase drastically the readiness of camouflage units to engage in operational camouflage measures when the troops of a reserve front are moving forward and being committed to battle.

Based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War, we know that individual mock-ups in dummy areas were insufficient. The enemy quickly discovered the deception and camouflage did not produce the desired results. Therefore it is necessary to allocate a certain number of troops with combat equipment to "liven up" dummy areas. Thus, to simulate the forward movement
and concentration of a tank or motorized rifle division, we need, in addition to engineer and camouflage subunits, a tank battalion and a motorized rifle battalion, an artillery battery, an antiaircraft artillery platoon, one or two sound-imitating sets, two to three radio sets, and other simulating equipment. Overall, based on exercise experience, a motorized rifle regiment, a separate tank battalion, an artillery battalion, and two antiaircraft batteries were frequently designated for this purpose in the front. Depending on the scale of the operational camouflage measures, even more troops may be required.

We planned to simulate the forward movement of troops for a distance not over a day's march from the dummy areas. To represent combined troop movements we allocated from four to 15 railway trains with the corresponding number of mock-ups and real tank and motorized rifle subunits. It is advisable to evacuate the civilian populace from dummy troop location areas, especially from those of missile large units and units. Furthermore, we must strengthen the security of these areas and organize their air cover.

The most important indication of the realism of dummy areas is the operation, according to a previously formulated plan, of radioelectronic means within the areas in a manner which does not differ in nature and routine of operation from that of permanently operating radioelectronic means. However, it is very difficult to allocate such means, especially for dummy front and army command posts. A front will not ordinarily have reserve means available for this. Therefore during the exercises we had to allocate them from the troops which had been designated to simulate concentrations in the dummy areas and also from communications and radiotechnical units of a second-echelon army, the air army, and the front, which was extremely undesirable. In our opinion, it would be very worthwhile to have a special battalion in the front with the appropriate number of radio and radiotechnical means which will be used for operational camouflage. Organizationally, this battalion might be included in the camouflage regiment.

When setting up dummy areas we must also devote special attention to having the troops allocated for simulation retain their combat effectiveness to the maximum. For example, the subunits representing the dummy division disposition area should
periodically move from one dummy battalion area to another without lingering in them for an extended time. Radio sets should operate, as a rule, using remote control means.

Simultaneously with setting up dummy concentration areas among the front troops, during the exercises we implemented the strictest camouflage discipline and concealed the actual disposition of the troops during day halts and especially in final concentration areas. The natural concealing features of the terrain were widely exploited and technical means and methods of camouflage were employed. During the final marches the movement of troops took place only at night.

To mislead the enemy concerning actual troop concentration areas and to decrease the probability of having these destroyed by enemy nuclear strikes, in our opinion we should carry out troop antinuclear maneuvering more widely and more frequently, especially within division areas. As shown by exercise experience, a battalion requires from 30 minutes to one hour to change its disposition area, a regiment requires 1.5 to two hours, and a division now requires six to eight hours. It is precisely because of this that it is advisable for battalions and regiments to change locations periodically. Should the area be detected, it will be more difficult for the enemy to deliver accurate strikes against the division's units and subunits. The concentration area of an entire division should be changed only after ground nuclear bursts and when there is a threat that all personnel will receive high doses of radiation.

In order to keep secret our plans to move troops forward and launch an offensive operation, in the staff of our military district all questions arising as the commander is making a decision and during planning were worked out in detail only through personal contact between generals and officers. Conversations over technical communications means were categorically prohibited. The staffs of the front and of the armies instituted special passes for entry to the control center.

Taking into consideration the special importance of keeping secret the procedure for employing nuclear weapons, in the July 1966 command-staff exercise the chief of the front rocket troops and artillery, with a small staff, was incorporated into the control center complement, which had a favorable effect on the time required for planning and the quality of planning.
Keeping the aforementioned plans secret depends directly on the time periods required to work them up. The shorter the time period, the lesser the chance of divulging the plans. In this respect, the method of parallel work between front, army, and large unit staffs developed in our military district fully proved its value. The overall time for planning the operations and the battle at the front-division level was reduced by 30 percent.

The front commander's decision and operation plan with instructions on matters of cooperation were drawn up on a single map. An explanatory note and associated documents for the branch arms and services were attached to it. An overall operational directive, and also bulky cooperation plans in textual or graphic form actually are not necessary, as shown by exercise experience, and therefore we have not been working them up in our military district, and only in individual instances have we drawn up special written instructions on cooperation. In our opinion, it is advisable to enter appropriate amendments in the field service manual for staffs.

Long ago in our military district we also gave up announcing the complete decision for the operation to the staff. Chiefs of branch arms and services have been preparing their recommendations as to the employment of subordinate troops on the basis of the concept of the decision, and when necessary, they have briefed the front commander on them.

As a rule, tasks have been assigned to the troops by high-frequency communications or by using secure communications equipment. In so doing, it has been our practice, as the plan was being worked out, to transmit step by step to subordinate staffs the data needed by them to arrive at decisions and plan an operation or battle. Concurrent with an overall decrease in the time needed to work out decisions and make plans, this method of assigning tasks hampers the enemy's capability of intercepting in full the directives to a formation or orders to a large unit.

Radio camouflage has acquired special importance under present-day conditions. Therefore radio silence was observed when front troops were moving forward. The only radio nets working without restrictions were the warning net (transmitting combat signals and information on the danger of nuclear strikes), air defense net, aviation flight service net, and road traffic...
control service net. When the rocket troops moved out to their sitting areas, tasks were assigned to them by radio and control was implemented by short radio signals.

Control of the troops during the time they were moving forward to the line of commitment to battle was also carried out only by short radio signals and primarily on radio-relay lines. Full operation of all radio nets was initiated from the moment a massed nuclear strike was delivered. Strict radio monitoring was established over the observance of radio camouflage by the troops.

Together with this, we carried out radar camouflage on an extensive scale. Its principal objects while the troops were moving forward were major railroad and highway bridges, ferry crossings, troop loading and unloading stations, the most important airfields, radar reference points, etc. Radar camouflage was implemented by front engineer troops, primarily by setting up dummy crossings on the major water lines, by utilizing corner reflectors, and also by using smoke. The requirements for corner reflectors is determined by specific conditions, and, as shown by calculations, may amount to from 300 to 350 pieces on the average to camouflage the open portions of three routes extending 100 kilometers.

One of the methods of combating the enemy's aerial reconnaissance radar means and radio reconnaissance means is to jam the operation of them. However, because of the limited forces and means of the SPETSNAZ units in a front, the main efforts of these units, as front troops are moved out to the concentration areas and are committed to battle, are aimed primarily at neutralizing ground and aerial radar reconnaissance means, radioelectronic means for controlling nuclear weapons, the radio communications of reconnaissance aviation, the radio and radio-relay communications of formations and large units operating in the zone of commitment and on the flanks, and also the radio communications of enemy reserves approaching the line of commitment. Based on the experience of exercises, a front requires for these purposes one to two type "F" radio battalions, two to three type "A" radio battalions, and three to four type "S" radiotechnical battalions. All of these units must already be in a high state of combat readiness in peacetime.
All measures for deception of the enemy were planned to be as realistic as possible, thoroughly tied in with each other, and coordinated with adjacent forces and with troops operating forward.

The front commander determined the tasks of operational camouflage for the period of time the front troops were moving forward and concentrating in the new area, the forces and means allocated to carry this out, the time for carrying it out, the responsible executors, and also the procedure and time period for drawing up the plan. A special operations group, headed by the front deputy chief of staff or some other responsible officer, was set up at the front headquarters to develop the plan for operational camouflage measures, to direct these measures, and to monitor their organization. This group's complement usually consisted of one or two operations officers, one officer each from the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, the engineer and intelligence directorates, the chief of the air defense troops, the staff of the rear, and the military transportation service, one or two communications personnel, and also the necessary number of communications and transportation means.

In exercises, the plan was drawn up in the military district troops in textual form with a map annex, an account of the forces and means allocated, and also a plan of measures to deceive the enemy. Based on this plan, instructions on operational camouflage were distributed to the troops. And upon receiving the tasks for the offensive operation, the following additional measures were worked out based on the commander's decision: organizing the simulation of dummy crossings and diversionary assault crossings at major water lines, equipping dummy airfields and rocket troop siting areas, simulating the forward movement of the front's second echelon on an axis away from the actual axis, etc. We cannot rule out the fact that during this time a new plan may be formulated.

It must be noted that establishing a special operations group to direct and monitor operational camouflage in a reserve front will entail considerable difficulties under actual conditions. During the time of full mobilization and forward movement over long distances, in addition to the command post, forward command post, and rear control post, there are also detailed from the complement of the front headquarters:
operations groups to the line of the state border, to major water lines, and to the final concentration areas (to the staff of the front operating forward). Small groups may be sent to the general staffs of allied countries and to the most important auxiliary communications centers.

In such conditions, as shown by the experience of exercises, an operations group from the staff of one of the armies is often charged with directing and monitoring operational camouflage, which is an error, since an army staff should not know the full scope of the front operational camouflage plan. Moreover, the forces and means available in army staffs to organize such a group will be clearly inadequate. There might turn out to be officers in it who are not trained to competently resolve the matters of planning and directing operational camouflage.

Since the organization and continuous implementation of operational and field camouflage play a very important role in all types of troop combat activities, in our opinion it is advisable to have in the front staff a special department of operational and tactical camouflage which organizationally should be included in the operations directorate. In peacetime the staff of a military district might have a section instead of a department for the purpose of training staffs and troops to carry out operational and tactical camouflage measures and also to work out practical measures for concealing various exercises from the reconnaissance of capitalist countries.