MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Matters of Providing Troop Control in an Initial Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article discusses matters of providing troop control as examined in a research war game on the organization of communications in a front offensive operation in the initial period of a war. A possible variant for the deployment and actions of troops of a military district was played out in the game, from which conclusions were drawn about troop control and the organization of control posts, concerning questions of warning, the procedure for alerting troops, and the selection of alternate sites for control posts. Matters of transferring troop control from one post to another also are treated. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned to

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Some Matters of Providing Troop Control in an Initial Front Offensive Operation

SOURCE: Documentary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (76) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel P. Murashko. This article discusses matters of providing troop control as examined in a research war game on the organization of communications in a front offensive operation in the initial period of a war. A possible variant for the deployment and actions of troops of a military district was played out in the game, from which conclusions were drawn about troop control and the organization of control posts, concerning questions of warning, the procedure for alerting troops, and the selection of alternate sites for control posts. Matters of transferring troop control from one post to another also are treated.

Comment:
The author also wrote "The Defense of Command Posts from Weapons of Mass Destruction" in Issue No. 3 (85) for 1968 and co-authored with Colonel A. Troshkin "Mobile Control Posts of Ground Forces Formations and Large Units" in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.
Some Matters of Providing Troop Control in an Initial Front Offensive Operation
(Based on materials from a research war game)
by Colonel P. Murashko

In the Red Banner Military Communications Academy, a research war game with the administrative and professor-instructor personnel was conducted on the theme, "The organization of communications in a front offensive operation in the initial period of a war, employing existing and prospective communications means".

For the purpose of assuring the best research of matters of the theme, there was played out one of the possible variants of deployment and actions of troops of a military district, which was characterized by the proximity of the largest NATO troop grouping which had nuclear weapons and was capable of initiating combat actions without extensive regroupings, and with support from aviation and naval forces. With this, it was calculated that the enemy could expend up to 15 percent of his available nuclear warheads for destroying the control posts of our troops alone.

Basically, the essence of the deployment of the troops of the military district amounted to: timely movement of large units and units out from under a possible enemy nuclear strike on the axis of their actions; setting up attack groupings during the movement; organizing reconnaissance, air defense, and the covering of the state border; preparing and issuing nuclear warheads in good time; and also, setting up the control posts of formations and large units.

Research of the matters of alerting troops by combat alert signal and moving them out to departure areas, siting areas, and concentration areas before the delivery of the initial nuclear strike by the enemy, led to the following conclusions about troop control, in general, and the organization of control posts, in particular.
First. Warning of troops must be carried out in sequence, in accordance with the priority (plan) of moving out the large units and formations. For ensuring stable troop control during this period, commanders of formations (commanders of large units) or their deputies must remain at the deployment points until such time as they are convinced that all necessary orders for organizing the moving out of the troops have been issued and are properly understood. During this time, control is organized from previously planned, and to a certain extent prepared, new control posts.

It is advisable to leave a small group of officers (a responsible officer of the staff) at the former deployment points of the headquarters of the military district (front), of the field headquarters of an army, and of the staffs of large units (units), for accomplishing certain tasks of providing troop control on the basis of stationary communications and with the employment of mobile means.

Second. Communications subunits and units, allocated for organizing communications from new control posts, must be alerted earlier than the headquarters of the military district (front) or be moved in (deployed) in advance in areas adjoining the sites which have been designated for the control posts. This will considerably increase the combat readiness of communications subunits and units and will allow them to organize communications from new control posts in a minimally short time and with observance of the necessary camouflage measures.

Third. Taking into account the constant threat of delivery of an initial nuclear strike by the enemy during the movement of the headquarters of the military district (front) to new control posts, there should be selected in advance alternate sites for the command post and forward command post, near which can be found the forces and means of one of the positions of the communications center of the command post and those of the communications reserve. Alternate sites for these control posts should be designated approximately halfway to the areas selected for main control posts, and they should be designated only when these areas are at a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers and more from permanent deployment points, which will require at least two to three hours for moving forward to them.
In this instance, within the column of the forward command post, besides the personal radio means of the formation commander, it is necessary to have two or three radio sets, which could support basic communications -- first of all, with commanders of the armies and commanders of large units of the rocket troops -- from any place of halt and possible deployment site of this control post. The radio means mentioned together with staff vehicles can be the prototype for a mobile forward command post. This task can be carried out best in the future, when the development of communications means and the transport base will make it possible to develop standard, serially produced mobile front control posts.

In case the enemy preempts in the delivery of the initial nuclear strike, the troops must move out to the previously designated areas, taking into account the situation which could be created there.

All surviving personnel of the headquarters of the military district (front), in accordance with their assignment, move into the area of the command post or rear control post. After assembling the personnel, the military district commander, his deputy, or another senior chief specifies the procedure for further actions. In such a case, it should be specified in advance which army field headquarters is replacing the military district headquarters which has been put out of action, and the troops should be notified of this.

In the game, much attention was devoted to research of matters connected with transferring troop control from one post to another, and also to another level of control, and with ensuring continuous and stable troop control during offensive operations. The unanimous opinion of the participants in the war game was as follows: the command post must take full charge of troop control when the forward command post is put out of action. If the forward command post and the command post are put out of action at the same time, the auxiliary control post of the front will provide the troop control. True, in this case it is necessary to transfer a group of the auxiliary control post in helicopters to the axis of actions of the main front troop grouping.
So that the forward command post or auxiliary control post can successfully provide control (with the command post out of action), it is necessary to provide for their reinforcement by officer personnel and by communications forces and means, through using reserves, the surviving portion of a destroyed control post and also subordinate troops. In the event that all the three front posts enumerated are put out of action, as the war game showed, a previously designated commander of one of the armies must take charge of troop control. But, with this it is necessary to take into account that the formal designation alone of one of the army commanders as deputy front commander cannot fully provide for the control of all the troops. Staffs and other control organs of these armies must be provided in advance with the necessary communications means, operational documents (especially for secure control), and also with constant information on the situation of the troops, the intentions of the front command, and the most important instructions of the Supreme High Command.

In the course of the war game, the possibility of transferring troop control to the rear control post was studied. Such cases will occur especially in a critical situation under extraordinary circumstances, when all other methods of troop control have been exhausted or cannot be implemented under the existing situational conditions. Successful troop control of the front from the rear control post is possible, but it is necessary to detail a specific group of officers from the command post to its complement in advance.

Control of rear services large units, units and facilities was carried out by the rear control post, and -- after it was put out of action -- by one of the forward front bases, which had its own communications center and which was reinforced in advance by officers of the rear services staff. Under certain conditions, the forward command post or command post of the front, and also the rear control post of one of the armies, can fulfill this task.

In our opinion, a number of other matters which were studied during the war game also deserve attention. These matters include, first of all, the following: in a period of threat, transferring the main portion of the officer complement of headquarters of formations to barracks status; activating within the military district a certain number of corps headquarters.
capable of unifying the control of large units or replacing army field headquarters which have been put out of action; preparing base points (centers) of communications means and route guides for supporting troop deployment; and planning the position changes of front control posts to be made during an operation.