MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Training Troops to Go over to the Offensive from Permanent Deployment Areas

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article consists of three separate comments on a previous article on the operational deployment of front troops. They deal with the matter of bringing the troops to full combat readiness when organizing their operational deployment, focusing on the importance in this of the timely supplying of missile units and large units with missiles. The second part of the article examines the advantages of using MI-6 helicopters to transport missiles, emphasizing the time advantage and the increased reliability of the missiles when transported by air. The third also proposes having some assembled missiles with the troops in advance to further reduce the missile delivery time. Reconnaissance measures, methods of troop control, and the procedure for troop movement forward to the border are also discussed. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned.

William W. Wells

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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of the first part of this article are General-Lieutenant of Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy and General-Mayor N. Lichutin; of the second part, General-Mayor of Engineer-Technical Service V. Alekseyev and Engineer Colonel A. Latukhin; and of the last part, General-Mayor N. Stashek. This article consists of three separate comments on a previous article by General of the Army I. Yakubovskyi on the operational deployment of front troops. They deal with the matter of bringing the troops to full combat readiness when organizing their operational deployment, focusing on the importance in this of the timely supplying of missile units and large units with missiles. The second part of the article examines the advantages of using MI-6 helicopters to transport missiles, emphasizing the time advantage and the increased reliability of the missiles when transported by air. The third also proposes having some assembled missiles with the troops in advance to further reduce the missile delivery time. Reconnaissance measures, methods of troop control, and the procedure for troop movement forward to the border are also discussed.

Comment:

Major General D. A. Dragunskiy is Chief of the "Vystrel" Higher Officers Courses. Engineer Colonel A. N. Latukhin has written a number of articles on artillery and antitank weapons in various military publications. General-Mayor N. Stashek was identified as Deputy Chief of the Frunze Military Academy.
Training Troops to Go over to the Offensive from Permanent Deployment Areas

by

General-Leytenant of Tank Troops D. Dragunskiy
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General-Mayor of Engineer-Technical Service V. Alekseyev
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A large and very difficult problem raised in an article by General of the Army I. Yakubovskiy* requires further detailed analysis. The purpose of these comments, then, is to share some ideas gained from experience on how to organize the going over of troops to the offensive directly from permanent deployment areas.

First, we would like to mention that the main conditions enabling troops to go over successfully to the offensive from permanent deployment areas are their high combat readiness and their ability to swiftly and in an organized manner be alerted by a combat alert signal, move out from their military cantonments, and be prepared for the fulfilment of the combat task. Among the troops themselves there is justifiable concern about carrying out as efficiently as possible measures to increase their combat readiness. However, this matter has as yet not been thought through or organized properly. Consequently, in certain units, the preparation of vehicles for moving out and the loading of military supplies remain the weakest area in bringing the troops to full combat readiness, so that as a result, a great deal of time usually is spent on this. Measures are being taken, of course, to eliminate this shortcoming. In particular, the area for loading work at the depots is being increased and the training of loading teams is being improved. However, practice shows that this is only partial solution to the problem. It is necessary, obviously, to keep a considerable part of the most important types of mobile reserves aboard motor transport vehicles during peacetime, but the main thing is to make a substantial effort to mechanize loading work and to provide for the centralized supplying of troops with means of mechanization.

* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1964, No. 3 (73). (not available)
To ensure the high combat readiness of the troops, it is necessary to reduce sharply the time used to deliver nuclear warheads to missile units and large units by extensively employing helicopters to transport them, as General of the Army I. Yakubovskiy correctly indicates, and also by moving missile storage points closer to the troops. Mobilization measures among troops located near the state border should be kept to a minimum.

It is very important to stipulate in advance the measures to be taken in the event of enemy nuclear strikes against deployment areas. It is particularly important to specify which units and large units are to replace troops which have been put out of action, and what measures are to be taken to reorganize units suffering heavy losses, and to eliminate the aftereffects of nuclear strikes. Staffs at all levels should have accurate calculations for moving troops forward both into concentration areas and directly to the border, and they should study carefully each axis and each route. Under the pretext of exercises and other training measures, roads and deployment lines should be prepared and control posts should be set up. It is desirable within the system of combat training and operational training to conduct exercises that involve moving troops forward to the probable axes of attack, in order to check the feasibility of the calculations that were made, to determine appropriate methods, to move forward and deploy troops, to organize the provost and traffic control service, and to prepare routes, deployment lines, and areas in which to locate control posts.

To achieve surprise and success in combat actions, it is very important to select and prepare in advance several siting areas for each missile unit (large unit). These should be located close to permanent deployment posts, a point that was not stated too clearly in the article under discussion. And, of course, it is necessary to prepare missile units and large units to deploy in unprepared siting areas from the march.

The cover of the state border is of no less importance, especially the setting up of continuous and active reconnaissance, prevention of enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups and airborne landing forces from penetrating the zones or routes on which troops are moving, the counteracting of his technical reconnaissance means, and also a reliable air defense.

The most active operations by reconnaissance organs will be possible only at the beginning of a war. Therefore, it is very important to deploy reconnaissance forces and means in the shortest possible time. To do so, it is necessary to plan reconnaissance measures in advance and at the
appropriate time assign the tasks to the executors. It is necessary to utilize more fully reconnaissance data from the troops located directly on the border (border guard units and fortified areas, where such exist) as well as from superior staffs.

Particular attention should be given to the organization of cooperation with border guard troops, who are able to carry out a number of very important tasks in support of the advancing troops. They can carry out intensified guarding of the border prior to the initiation of combat actions, eliminate the border guard posts of the enemy, pinpoint his reconnaissance and sabotage groups, operate either within special detachments of large units and units or independently, seizing and holding bridges, corridors, passes, and other important installations and strong points, and carry out field and agent reconnaissance. Moreover, border guard detachments support the passage of troops across the state border, cover gaps in the battle formations of the attacking troops, and fulfill other tasks. Therefore, already in peacetime it is necessary to know the strength of the forces and means of the border guard troops operating on the axis of the army's advance, and to organize cooperation with them.

After the troops have been alerted by combat alert signal, they may move out to assembly areas or, most frequently, begin moving forward to the axis of the impending actions. The need to move units and large units out to combat alert assembly areas usually will occur if the enemy delivers nuclear strikes against troop deployment posts before the troops have moved out. At such a time it obviously will be necessary to restore the combat effectiveness of units and large units that have been subjected to nuclear strikes. In principle, it is not advisable for troops to move out to these areas, since even a brief stay there leads to a loss of time, and later on, to the loss of an opportunity to deploy ahead of the enemy.

More favorable conditions will be created to preempt the enemy in deploying, in delivering a strike, and, finally, in seizing the initiative, if the troops immediately begin moving forward to the axes of the impending actions without moving to the assembly areas. In this case, in order to move the troops out in an organized manner, it is advisable to designate the areas for forming into columns at a relatively short distance from the deployment posts, where units from one or several garrisons can be assembled, march columns can be set up, and reinforcement means from the large units can be included.

It is most frequently advisable that the operational disposition of the army and the battle formation of the divisions consist of one echelon,
with strong combined-arms and other reserves moving forward. The need to allocate a combined-arms reserve rather than a second echelon results from the uncertainty of the situation, which makes it impossible to define specific tasks for the reserve troops in advance. Moreover, drastic changes in the conditions of the combat actions and the absence in a number of instances of adjacent units may require the sudden execution of many new tasks, for which, of course, considerable reserve forces and means will be required.

If the army troops go over to the offensive in a wide zone and have to destroy covering units and break through a previously prepared enemy line of defense near the border, forward detachments are to be sent out from each regiment of the large units of the main forces. Their task is to destroy the enemy covering units deployed at the border, seize sectors (targets) on the line of defense, and create favorable conditions for main forces to move out to this line unimpeded and to break through it from the march. If the army troops go over to the offensive in a relatively narrow zone, and at the border only covering units are defending themselves and in the immediate depth the enemy does not have prepared lines, it obviously is preferable to allocate forward detachments from each large unit of the main forces. Such detachments will be able to cross the border with great speed, quickly break through into the depth, deliver an attack against the enemy's flank or rear, and create conditions enabling the main forces of the army to rapidly develop the offensive and defeat the main grouping of the enemy.

First to move forward are the reconnaissance organs, and, behind them, the forward detachments. The main forces of the army follow under the cover of the advance guards in readiness to deploy from the march. The rocket troops move forward immediately to the nearest sitting areas from which they can most successfully carry out the tasks assigned to them. In this regard, the army missile large units have broader capabilities than the missile units of the divisions. The latter are forced to deploy near the state border because of the relatively limited range of fire, and quite often lose considerable time in moving forward. Therefore, already in peacetime, very favorable conditions will have to be created for moving missile units forward. It will be necessary to allocate to them better routes and to ensure the unimpeded movement of their columns over them.

Most of the artillery must move together with the advance guards or at the head of the main forces, so that it can take its firing positions as quickly as possible. Antiaircraft artillery moves in the troop columns, concentrating its main efforts on covering the rocket troops, the main
forces, and the control posts.

If some large units quartered closer to the border move forward to it earlier than others, they should not wait for the arrival of the latter, but, as the author of the article recommends, they should go over to the offensive immediately. Each unnecessary delay, when the threat of an enemy nuclear strike hangs over the troops, is fraught with irremediable consequences. However, in this case, so as not to allow the enemy to defeat our troops in detail, sufficiently powerful nuclear strikes should be delivered in the zone where the large units are on the offensive. This task will be assigned mainly to army and front means, since it obviously is not advisable in this instance to employ the nuclear warheads allocated to the large units. At times, however, the troops will not have nuclear warheads, and the divisions will have to begin combat actions with only conventional means of destruction, exploiting on a wide scale the results of the nuclear strikes by strategic, front, and army means. It is more advantageous for the large units to use their nuclear warheads when breaking through prepared lines of defense in the depth, to defeat main groupings of the defending enemy, to hit his strong points on the axis of the main attack, and, of course, to destroy his means of nuclear attack.

In regard to matters of troop control, we will note that under these conditions, the capability of the staffs at all levels to quickly set up control posts is of decisive importance. Along with stationary control posts, which may be used mainly at the very outset of combat actions, timely consideration must also be given to setting up mobile control posts. They must all have a previously prepared and harmoniously operating communications system. Our experience shows that it is advisable to organize troop control approximately according to the following format. When the troops assemble and move out from the garrisons after a combat alert signal, control is carried out, as it is done in the permanent deployment posts, by wire communications means, and when these are put out of operation -- by radio means. The army commander, upon arrival at the staff, assesses the situation, makes a decision, and assigns tasks to his subordinates. Simultaneously, a command post is set up under the command of the deputy commander of the army in one of the areas which has been previously selected and appropriately equipped. The commander goes to the command post with a small group of generals and officers, bringing with him the necessary communications means, and leaving the army chief of staff in charge of controlling the troops. When the commander at the command post assumes control of the troops himself, the chief of staff joins him. The forward command post and the rear control post are set up at the same time as the command post. Troop control can be set up approximately according
to the same format in the large units as well.

If the troops are required to execute a rather lengthy approach march to the state border, the control posts then follow in the march columns and provide troop control on the move. Since the operation of radio means for transmission may be restricted while the troops are moving forward, it is necessary, if, of course, the situation permits, to set up in advance a network of base points for technical communications means on the movement routes which the commanders and staffs can switch into in order to transmit or receive instructions and reports.

Tasks will be assigned to the troops in the form of brief oral combat instructions, signals or commands. There will be only limited employment of technical communications means, a part of which, once the troops have been alerted by the combat alert signal, will no longer be deployed. Very often liaison officers will have to be used to assign or refine tasks while the troops are already moving forward. Under these conditions, courier communications means, primarily helicopters, will be employed extensively. For this reason, it is desirable to have helicopters in the armies and the divisions.

Uncertainty and drastic changes in the situation, as well as the rapid development of events, will require the staffs to continuously and reliably monitor the timely transmission of all instructions to the troops and their execution of them. Therefore, it is extremely necessary to clearly specify in advance the duties of the staff officers, to indicate to each one his position at the control posts, and to work out the most desirable methods of assigning tasks to the executors and of monitoring the fulfillment of instructions that have been issued and combat tasks that have been assigned.

When the troops first move forward, and during the course of their movement, the provost and traffic control service acquires exceptionally great importance. However, the organization of this service has not yet been given the attention it rightly deserves, especially when the large units and the units are quartered in large and medium-sized cities, which usually create rather sizeable difficulties for the movement of troops.

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General of the Army I. Yakubovskiy, in his article "Some Questions on the Operational Deployment of Front Troops" aptly points out that one of the most complex tasks carried out in deploying troops is the timely
supplying of missile units and large units with missiles. The author points to the use of helicopters as a means of reducing the time needed to deliver missiles, stressing that this method is particularly effective and, at times, the only one possible at the beginning of combat actions when there are large zones of contamination and destruction and when roads are jammed with troops and equipment. The task, which was very correctly stated in the article, involves how to introduce into the troops and master as quickly as possible the delivery of missiles by helicopters.

The advantages of delivering missiles in a front in helicopters are indisputable. But it is not only that transporting missiles by air provides an enormous advantage in the speed of delivery when compared with any surface means and ensures virtual independence from the nature of the terrain and the condition of ground lines of transportation. Missiles transported by air are in better condition from the standpoint of the effect on them of external factors (vibrations, overloads, humidity, etc.). Experience shows that air transportation has no negative effect on the normal functioning of missiles later on. The operational overloads that occur during flights, even under the most unfavorable conditions, do not exceed two g's, which is approximately two to three times less than when missiles are shipped by motor transport. Therefore, when missiles are transported by air, there are no limitations imposed upon them as to the distance or speed of flight.

There is no need to doubt that in the very near future Mi-6 helicopters will become one of the main means for supporting maneuvering and for supplying troops with missiles at the front level. The experience of exercises conducted in the last two years in a number of military districts attests to this.

Let us turn to the facts. Practical training exercises were held in the Leningrad Military District in 1964 involving the delivery of missiles by Mi-6 helicopters over actual distances. The stages for accomplishing the assigned task and the amount of time spent are shown in the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Stage</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Time Spent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loading of missiles into helicopter</td>
<td></td>
<td>19 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight to first intermediate airfield</td>
<td>100 km</td>
<td>40 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refueling of helicopter and waiting for permission to take off</td>
<td></td>
<td>One hour and 40 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight to second intermediate airfield</td>
<td>486 km</td>
<td>Two hours and 30 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refueling of helicopter and waiting for permission to take off</td>
<td></td>
<td>One hour and five minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight to airfield of destination</td>
<td>337 km</td>
<td>One hour and 45 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unloading of helicopter</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>923 km</td>
<td>Eight hours and 14 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The return trip along the same route using the same schedule took even less time -- altogether seven hours and 30 minutes (because there was a reduction in the waiting time for permission to take off).

To illustrate the indisputable advantage of delivering missiles by MI-6 helicopters, a comparison has been made between air and rail transportation as to the actual amounts of time spent on the same operation.

In this case the speed of the railroad car carrying missiles was 400 kilometers per day.

Very instructive data were obtained:
- the distance by rail was 1,116 kilometers, and by air -- 923 kilometers;
- time for delivery by railroad -- 67 hours (2.8 days), by MI-6 helicopter -- a total of eight hours and 14 minutes (or seven hours and 30 minutes).

Thus, air transportation provides a tenfold time advantage.

Those attending the training exercises saw with their own eyes that in a situation where there is a poorly developed network of highways and railroads, and long stretches of transportation lines are through impassable lake and marshy terrain, the employment of helicopters to deliver missiles is very important. If it is taken into consideration that under these physical and geographical conditions, the rocket troops will be operating on separated operational axes connected only by one or two rail lines, and that they will have extremely brief periods of time to prepare the initial nuclear strike, then it becomes clear that in the preparatory period it is possible to deliver missiles to the missile units in a timely manner only by using air transport, and primarily helicopters of the MI-6 type.

However, the problem of air transportation is not limited to helicopters alone. To achieve the best results, this problem should be researched on a broader basis, with consideration given to both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

In this case, there is a precise format for delivering missiles:
- from the arsenal to the front materiel support airfield by AN-12 or AN-8 aircraft;
- from the front airfield to the missile or missile technical unit by...
MI-6 helicopters, which are able to land on sites of limited size (75 x 150 meters).

It should be kept in mind when setting the tasks for the air transport of missiles that AN-12 aircraft are able to make non-stop deliveries of missiles to a distance of up to 3,000 to 3,500 kilometers, while helicopters can deliver to a distance of up to 500 to 700 kilometers. If a delivery has to be made at a greater distance, then an intermediate airfield has to be designated for refueling aircraft, while intermediate refueling points have to be prepared for helicopters.

Thus, the necessary conditions for the practical realization of the air transport of missiles already exist in the troops. Special tests have been conducted on missiles transported by air and instructions for shipping missiles by air have been worked up, printed, and distributed to the troops. These shipments are not permitted without these instructions.

It is necessary to introduce aerial delivery of missiles into the troops, to instruct airmen and missilemen in this promising matter, to accumulate experience, and to work out the most expedient and economical ways of carrying out the operations stipulated in the instructions.

At this stage we have successfully solved the problems of transporting missiles with warheads, both solid propellant missiles and unfueled liquid propellant missiles, on existing aircraft and helicopters. The complex technical problem of transporting fueled liquid propellant missiles by air is being worked out. This will make it possible to carry out the preparation of the missiles right at the arsenals and to deliver them by air in ready form to the front or directly to the area where missile units are deployed. Besides the obvious gain in the speed of delivery, it will also be possible to reduce considerably the number of certain missile technical units occupied at present with the preparation of missiles in the front and army areas. In their place missile technical subunits alone can be left in the missile units to repair, mate, and check missiles, should these operations, as an exception to the rule, have to be carried out directly in the missile units. This will make possible a reduction in the number of ground support vehicles at the missile sites (oxidizer and propellant servicing vehicles, compressors, etc.), and consequently shorten the length of the missile unit column on the march. That is why it is so important to solve the problem of transporting fueled liquid propellant missiles by air.
Being generally applicable to all types of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, the use of air transport to deliver missiles has great advantages:

-- the productivity and quality of the preparation of the missiles (at arsenals instead of under field conditions) is increased;
-- the number of missile transport battalions and transport vehicles for the transporting of missiles in a front is reduced to the necessary minimum;
-- the reliability of the missiles themselves is increased when delivered by air, since the numerous overloads and checks to which the missiles are subjected during their relatively long surface shipment from the center to the missile unit are eliminated;
-- the limit on the missile transport distance which exists under surface conditions is eliminated;
-- the battle formation of missile battalions on the march is reduced considerably, while their mobility is increased.

At high rates of advance, the supplying of missiles to rocket troops which have moved hundreds of kilometers ahead will be done either by helicopters using intermediate landing sites for refueling, or by aircraft as far as the front airfields, and from there by helicopters. Things have to be done in such a way that missiles which have been completely fueled and mated with their warheads can be transported by air in the maximum permissible degree of readiness.

Still another thought. For a particular operation, a relatively small quantity of missiles, numbering in the tens or hundreds, will be allocated to the troops. Therefore, it is preferable to effect their delivery to the front troops not by slow-moving ground transport, but by air, which ensures a rapid shipment independent of the nature of the terrain and the condition of ground lines of transportation. Aircraft and helicopters for this purpose must be allocated on a priority basis, since missiles, after all, are the number-one cargo.

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In his article, General of the Army I. Yakubovskiy made several recommendations for increasing the combat readiness of the rocket troops. We fully share his opinion and in turn would like to add some thoughts on possible ways of reducing the time needed for the delivery of missiles from the front missile technical base to the army missile brigades.
We feel that the front missile technical bases should be deployed as individual assembly (production) brigades along the axes of probable operations by the armies of the first echelon of the front and in the areas whose distance would ensure the delivery of missiles to the main or alternate launching sites of missile brigades in a very short period of time.

To transport missiles, particularly when the enemy has created vast zones of radioactive contamination, fires, destruction, and floods, the front must have at its disposal a minimum number of specially equipped heavy-load helicopters.

Since the assembly of missiles requires a considerable amount of time, which would be lacking should an aggressor suddenly initiate a war, it is advisable during a time of crisis to have ready missiles already delivered to the army missile brigades, at least to the batteries on alert. Assembled tactical missiles should be permanently available in the missile battalions. This will increase the capabilities of the combined-arms large units to carry out combat tasks independently even in the event that at the beginning of the war they are unable to obtain nuclear warheads.

General of the Army I. Yakubovskiy quite correctly states that it will be extremely difficult for troops of the first echelon of the front (army) to cross the state border simultaneously under the conditions being discussed. At the same time it is not permissible for large units of the first echelon to cross the state border at different times.

What is the way out of this situation? In our opinion, this contradiction can be resolved if the goal is not to have all the large units of the first echelon of the front achieve a simultaneous incursion into the territory of the enemy, especially since there will obviously be no particular need for this. However, it is definitely necessary to ensure a simultaneous incursion by the large units of the first echelon of the attack grouping of the armies, since without this it is difficult to count on their successful advance along the individual axes. If a nuclear strike is delivered against the troops of the first echelon and they suffer heavy losses, then, in spite of this, the large units must go over to the offensive with the part of the forces still retaining combat effectiveness. In the event entire divisions are put out of action, the armies will begin the offensive with a smaller number of large units.

To move troops forward to the border, it is necessary to use mainly dirt and secondary paved roads, keeping in mind that the primary roads,
particularly highways, will be under close observation by the enemy and may be subjected to a nuclear strike while troops are moving on them. Also to be avoided is the movement of columns in narrow passages. Nor should halts or planned stops be made. It is particularly important that the movement of troops be carried out in small columns, which allows for high-speed marches and for maneuvering in areas of destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain. This will decrease the danger to the troops of destruction by nuclear weapons.

To avoid a reduction in the rate of the incursion in those instances where the border follows a river, it is necessary in peacetime to carry out the appropriate preparatory work, and when war begins to organize the swift seizure of all the crossings and fords. For this, specially designated subunits should be allocated from those units which are closest to the border.

Forward detachments should be moved forward in front of each large unit. These have to break into enemy territory at maximum speed, and, without getting involved in battle with the enemy's border cover, swiftly penetrate into the depth to seize advantageous lines ensuring the deployment of the main forces and their attack from the march. If the enemy establishes a forward security zone, then the units and detachments of the border guard militia which are operating in it must be destroyed by the advance guards. To destroy the covering forces, it is not advisable to employ the nuclear warheads allocated to the army for the initial offensive operation. These must be kept to defeat the main forces of the enemy and his installations in the operational depth.

To eliminate the aftereffects of nuclear strikes when moving forward, large units cannot depend on assistance from special units or subunits. They must carry out this task basically with their own forces and means. To do so, it is necessary in peacetime to have in the large units specially allocated subunits and the appropriate means (besides the organic means), which would be prepared in accordance with a special program.