MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Conduct of Special Operational Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article is a comment on a previous article on special operational exercises. It discusses the importance and implications of these exercises, in contrast to regular command-staff exercises, as a means of focusing on individual branch arms and staffs to examine specific questions of their employment and control under combat conditions. The author disagrees with certain questions of the organization and direction of the exercises as well as of the personnel involved in them, and briefly mentions the conducting of two- and three-level special exercises. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells
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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Conduct of Special Operational Exercises

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel D. Nazaryants. This article is a comment on a previous article by General-Mayor N. Reut on conducting special operational exercises. It discusses the importance and implications of these exercises, in contrast to regular command-staff exercises, as a means of focusing on individual branch arms and staffs to examine specific questions of their employment and control under combat conditions. The author identifies disagreements on questions of the organization and direction of the exercises as well as of the personnel involved in them, and briefly mentions the conducting of two- and three-level special exercises.

Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
The Conduct of Special Operational Exercises
by
Colonel D. Nazaryants

The complexity of the tasks facing the organs of control in a modern operation requires precise and well-coordinated performance, high efficiency and flexibility. Therefore, the question of training staffs, about which General-Mayor N. Reut speaks in his article, "The Conduct of Special Operational Exercises," should certainly be at the center of attention of our military thought. We too would like to make a few comments about the conduct of special exercises.

As practice has shown, the selection of operational training methods, and the instruction and coordinating of staffs should not be stereotyped. Officers and generals need independent study, as well as training as a department, directorate and, as a whole, an entire field headquarters of an army and front.

In order to knit together the separate levels of the control organs, it is useful, periodically, to conduct special operational exercises which would allow a more complete and thorough working out of questions of the employment of each branch arm in an operation and the work of the staffs in controlling them.

Such exercises are periodically conducted in the practice of operational training in the Odessa Military District. During these exercises there are worked out questions of the control of rocket troops, forces and means of air defense, aviation, and the rear, questions of setting up communications, warfare against enemy radioelectronic means, and so on. Troops usually take part in such exercises. This gives the staffs an opportunity to control units and large units in a situation which most closely approximates that of actual combat.

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We do not consider it compulsory, as the author suggests, to conduct such exercises under the direction of the combined-arms chiefs. Depending on the goals and specific tasks of the exercises, they also can be directed by the appropriate chiefs of the branch arms. This is possible, for example, if the exercise provides for the working out of questions of the activity of the staff of a given branch arm or its individual components.

We cannot agree with the author's opinion that in the preparation and conduct of each special exercise it is always necessary to enlist the participation of the operations and intelligence directorates, the communications directorate, and those chiefs of the branch arms and services of the military district, who are either directly or indirectly concerned with the solution of these questions in the course of a front operation. This then would be not a special but a regular staff exercise, the purpose of which is completely different.

Taking into consideration that all in all, in the course of a year, there will be a relatively large number of both the special and regular command-staff or staff exercises, some directorates simply will not be able to cope with it, not to mention the excessively large material expenditures involved.

In order to conduct a two-level special exercise, it is necessary to allocate the appropriate staffs of branch arms or services and of the military district (front) and armies in full strength, not to be confined to the front command level with the presence of only small army operations groups and mobile control posts, as the author believes. Because this is what two-level special exercises are needed for -- to work out the solution of assigned questions within the framework of two command levels.

We also consider it useful (this is confirmed by experience) to conduct three-level special exercises, allocating to them, for example, front, army and division or corps levels.

That staff of the branch arm or the service with which the special exercise is being conducted should be allocated in full strength. This would make it possible to train every staff officer in the working out of questions of troop control, and in this case he would obtain practice in fulfilling his functional duties during an operation.
It seems to us that on the scale of the military district it is not necessary to conduct special front exercises on the relocation and deployment of control posts, which the author speaks of. Such exercises in the version he proposes are none other than regular staff exercises. Questions of control post relocation and deployment are best worked out in special operational exercises of communications troops, and also in the tactical drill instruction of support organs in staff training sessions.