


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Meaning of
"The Protection of Troops Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction"


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article is an analysis of the concept of protection against weapons of mass destruction and its treatment in contemporary military literature. The author asserts that certain matters not directly related to protection, for example, the disruption of enemy employment of the weapons, cannot be included under the protection concept. The author considers the main measures of protection to include dispersal and sheltering of personnel, radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance, preventive measures and decontamination. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.



2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned





William W. Wells



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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 8 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO. Early 1962

DATE September 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Meaning of "The Protection of Troops Against Weapons of Mass Destruction"

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The author of this article is Colonel D. Sheyn. This article is an analysis of the concept of protection against weapons of mass destruction and its treatment in contemporary military literature. The author asserts that certain matters not directly related to protection, for example, the disruption of enemy employment of the weapons, cannot be included under the protection concept. The author considers the main measures of protection to include dispersal and sheltering of personnel, radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance, preventive measures and decontamination. End of Summary

[Redacted] Comment:

One Colonel D. Sheyn was identified in Red Star, 19 June 1968, as a candidate of military sciences. After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. [Redacted]

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Meaning of 'The Protection of Troops Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction'

by
Colonel D. Sheyn

In connection with the radical change of views on the nature and methods of the conduct of combat actions and war as a whole occasioned by the emergence of nuclear weapons and the further improvement of chemical and bacteriological weapons, many new problems naturally have arisen. These problems include such things as the protection of troops against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, the detection and assessment of the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation, and the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy employment of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, these problems are not now properly and accurately reflected in our official guides, training manuals, and other military publications.

In the meaning of "the protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction", along with questions which actually relate to protection against the casualty-producing elements of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons (the warning and dispersal of troops, engineer and antichemical preparation of the terrain, the exploitation of its protective features, preventive measures, the provision of personnel with means of protection and the utilization of them), a majority of authors include a whole series of matters which are not directly related to it. Thus, for example, many include the disruption of enemy employment of these weapons, the camouflage of troops and having them periodically change disposition areas, among measures for protecting the troops against weapons of mass destruction.

The disruption of enemy employment of any type of weapon is the main thing in conducting combat actions. Under conditions of considerable development of missile/nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, this is of utmost importance since it influences the success of the battle, operation and, possibly, even war as a whole. From this standpoint, to consider disruption only a protective measure means to belittle its role in modern warfare. One cannot forget also that disruption is implemented mainly by attacking the enemy; that is, by strikes against his means of employment (delivery vehicles) of weapons of mass destruction, against depots and bases, and also by putting the system for controlling these





weapons out of action. Attack and defense are antagonists. Therefore, it is not logical to unite them in a single concept.

The camouflage of troops and the periodic changing of their disposition areas also are not, in our opinion, a method of protection against weapons of mass destruction, since they cannot secure the troops against the action of these weapons, but only make it difficult for the enemy to search out and select targets for the employment of weapons. As a result of skilful camouflage and concealment of troop actions, enemy strikes can fall on an empty area, and our troops will not suffer substantial losses. But what does this have to do with protection against weapons, against their casualty-producing elements? If in this case one operates on the "protection" concept, then one must apply this concept not to weapons, but to the enemy as a whole and to his actions, and, consequently, it is necessary to use the term "protection against the enemy". It hardly is desirable to use such a term.

A number of comrades include the maintenance of close contact with the enemy and the swiftness of the actions of our troops among measures for protection against nuclear weapons, considering that, since this reduces enemy capabilities for delivering nuclear strikes, consequently, the goal of protection is thereby also attained. It is not difficult to show that neither of these measures protect against nuclear weapons since they are directed against enemy actions and not against weapons and their casualty-producing elements.



Some compilers of official guides and authors of military books and articles sometimes seem to present the matter in the following manner: since action, whatever it would be, leads to a reduction of enemy capabilities for employing weapons, then it must be included among the measures for protection against weapons.

If one discusses the matter on such a plane, then one can assert that the defeat of the enemy, the gaining of a victory over him, is the best method of protection against weapons. In essence, this will lead to the slogan, "Everything for the sake of protection, the entire war for the sake of protection against weapons."

It seems to us that when determining the meaning of "protection against weapons of mass destruction" within the framework of military art, it is necessary to strictly differentiate the following three situations:

- a. the actions of the troops against the actions of the enemy, which include the sum total of the many elements of the art of conducting the





battle and operation, for example, an offensive against a defending enemy or a defense against an attacking enemy;

b. action against means of employment (delivery vehicles), against depots and bases of weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of destroying them; for example, actions against weapons delivery vehicles in the air form the basis of air defense activity;

c. troop actions directed toward preventing or reducing the effect of the casualty-producing elements of weapons of mass destruction. This is also protection against weapons.

Consequently, only measures which prevent or lessen the action of the casualty-producing elements of weapons on the troops should be included in the meaning of "protection against weapons".


In our opinion, it also is improper to include in protection the entire complex of measures connected with the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction, for example, with the restoration of disrupted troop control, of the battle formation and combat readiness of units (subunits), and of the system of obstacles, with the clearing and restoration of the routes of troop movement, and other measures. It is known that none of this can lessen or prevent the action of the casualty-producing elements of weapons.

Closely tied in with the concept, "the protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction", is the detection and assessment of the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation.

A sharp increase in the scales of radioactive contamination and the increase in the danger of mass destruction of personnel connected with this, requires an essentially new attitude toward these problems. So, the radiation situation under modern conditions has become a factor of operational-strategic importance and can substantially influence the nature and methods of conducting combat actions.

It is the duty of each commander to constantly take the radiation situation into consideration. Accordingly, new, increased demands are made on radiation reconnaissance. Presently, the main tasks of radiation reconnaissance cannot be limited to a timely warning and notification of the troops about the necessity of taking protective measures against radioactive substances. The timely provision of the command with the complete and comprehensive data necessary to make decisions on combat actions acquires enormous importance. The importance of dosimetric monitoring, on the basis of which one can draw a very important conclusion





as to the combat effectiveness of the troops, also has grown. The role of chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance has expanded just as sharply.

It is desirable to examine the detection and assessment of the radiation, chemical and bacteriological situation on a broader plane than protection. In our opinion, it is necessary to set aside a special place for and thoroughly expound upon this problem in the official guides, for example, in the sections devoted to combined-arms reconnaissance. The assessment of the radiation, chemical and bacteriological situation must enter, as an independent element into, specifically, the assessment of the situation by the commander, the combat order, the combat instructions, and so forth.

Such a recommendation does not exclude consideration of radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance, even of dosimetric monitoring, as protective measures. However, in this case, the substance and scope of these measures will be limited by the tasks of protecting the troops against weapons of mass destruction.

Thus, everything examined above shows that, first, matters not relevant to the concept, "protection against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons", must be eliminated from it and, second, that the detection and assessment of the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation, as well as protection against weapons of mass destruction, must attain intrinsic importance.

In our opinion, one must consider the main measures for protection of troops against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons:

- the dispersal of troops, exploitation of the protective features of the terrain, and engineer preparation of it;
- the special equipping of shelters and sealing of military equipment to protect personnel from the penetration of radioactive substances, toxic agents and bacterial means;
- radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance for the purpose of taking protective measures;
- the warning and notification of troops about the danger of enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction and about the contamination of the terrain and air by radioactive substances, toxic agents and bacterial means;
- the carrying out of medical and preventive measures;
- the utilization of areas with the lowest level of contamination for troop actions, and limitation of the stay of personnel on contaminated terrain;





- the monitoring of radioactive irradiation of personnel (within the scope of protection);
- the providing of troops with means of protection and timely employment of these means;
- the rendering of help to the stricken;
- the setting up of observation or quarantine for troops exposed to the action of bacterial means;
- decontamination treatment of troops, materiel, rations and water which were exposed to contamination by radioactive substances, toxic agents and bacterial means, and also measures to combat insects and other carriers of infectious diseases.

One should note that when defining the concept, "the elimination of the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction", the last three of the measures listed above can be included in it. But in this case, they can be formulated as measures for the elimination of contamination (radioactive, chemical and bacterial). This will be fully justified, especially if we want to consider under a single concept the sum total of measures for the elimination of the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction; that is, measures for the elimination of aftereffects of nuclear bursts and measures for the elimination of radioactive, chemical, and bacterial contamination.

In conclusion, one should observe that when reworking manuals, instructions and other official guides, one should thoroughly review the meaning of "the protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction" and "the elimination of the aftereffects of their employment".

