MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Unified Organ for the Command of Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article presents two individual comments on the advisability of establishing a unified organization to take command of all functions relating to protection against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The first examines problems of inefficient organization of protective measures and inadequacy of protective, detection, and decontamination means. A unified service, headed by a deputy commander, would replace and reorganize the chemical service in the table of organization of units up through formations. The second also recommends central organization of protection, based on the chemical service and headed by an assistant commander, with a combined committee on weapons of mass destruction and protection against them at the Ministry level. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned [Redacted].

William W. Wells
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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Lieutenant Colonel I. Borisov and Engineer Lieutenant Colonel S. Savenkov. This article presents their individual comments on the advisability of establishing a unified organization to take command of all functions relating to protection against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The first examines problems of inefficient organization of protective measures, inadequacy of protective clothing, detection equipment and decontamination means in making a case for a unified service for protection against weapons of mass destruction. The service, headed by a deputy commander, would replace and reorganize the chemical service in the table of organization of units through formations. The second also recommends central organization of protection, based on the chemical service and headed by an assistant commander, to improve reconnaissance, warning, preventive measures and elimination of aftereffects. The corresponding organization at the Ministry level would be a combined committee on weapons of mass destruction and protection against them.
A Unified Organ for the Command of Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

by

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and

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In our opinion, the status of the preparation of troops, staffs, and rear installations to protect themselves against weapons of mass destruction requires attention. It is acknowledged that this protection is a key element in the combat training and combat readiness system of all branches of the armed forces. Nevertheless, large unit and formation commanders and their staffs frequently are accused of paying little attention to this important subject. But in reality, they do not have the machinery for control, nor the appropriate equipment, nor adequate forces and means, to carry out the very great volume of work for protection against weapons of mass destruction. This has led to conventionality in the combat training process and has lowered the combat readiness of the troops.

The primary shortcoming which leads to all other deficiencies lies, in our view, in the fact that at the present time there is no unified organ in charge of preparing to the fullest extent troops, staffs, and rear installations for protection against weapons of mass destruction.

In accordance with current regulations and instructions, when formation commanders and commanders at all levels arrive at a decision on an operation or battle, they determine the tasks for protection against weapons of mass destruction. The staff, together with the chiefs of branch arms and services, organizes and monitors the accomplishment of the assigned tasks. A large number of persons are assigned to participate in the organization of this protection: the chief of staff, the deputy commander for the rear, the chief of the chemical service, the unit engineer, the chief of the medical service, and others. Since the majority of them are directly subordinate to the commander, only he or the chief of staff can coordinate their actions.

But practice has revealed that because of his heavy work load, a formation commander or a commander is in no position to take personal command of the entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass destruction and to coordinate the actions of subordinate commanders,
staffs, and chiefs of branch arms and services in this field. Thus, in an experimental exercise in the Belorussian Military District in 1962, the military district staff, even when a specially created protection staff was present, was unable to accomplish this task by itself; inevitably it had to call upon the chiefs of the branch arms and services.

As a result, the attempt to make the staff, or more accurately, the chief of staff, the main organizer of the troops' protection against weapons of mass destruction, did not lead to success. The staffs could not take on this function during the exercise, and with their existing structure they cannot, in our opinion, do so in the future.

The commanders of units and large units and their staffs, realizing the necessity of having a single organ, as a rule are trying to make the chief of the chemical service responsible for organizing and monitoring the accomplishment of all measures for protecting the troops against weapons of mass destruction. We should also note that when exercises and inspections are being conducted, the higher authorities encourage this situation.

The experience of a number of regimental, divisional, army, and front exercises, and also the daily activities of troops, have revealed that in order to resolve almost any problem associated with preparing for protection against weapons of mass destruction, the chief of the chemical service is called upon. But, all the other assigned personnel do not fully resolve their own peculiar problems, and therefore the complete organization of protection on the whole is not carried out properly.

The lack in the troops and in the headquarters of operational formations of a unified organ for the command of protection against weapons of mass destruction has given rise to the fact that a number of the problems connected with assessing the radiation and chemical situation, with organizing the monitoring of radioactive radiation, with eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction, and with providing the troops with great quantities of varied protective equipment and items, are resolved, in our opinion, extremely slowly and half-heartedly.

In a present-day war, wide-scale radioactive and chemical contamination will become a constant occurrence, not only for the troops, but also for rear area installations. If we take into account that fact that the enemy may use by surprise quick-acting toxic chemical agents like "V-gas" in order to kill personnel, the personnel will have to stay in their individual protective means at all times.
The status of protective means and the ways of improving them, as well as other problems of protection against weapons of mass destruction, have already been dealt with in our military press, and specifically in the Collections of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", Numbers 1 (71) and 3 (73) for 1964 and others. Permit us to recall them briefly. Thus, the individual protective means of the insulating type available to the troops possess good protective properties, but they are designed for short-term usage (for not more than 30 to 50 minutes when the air temperature is plus 20 to 25 degrees centigrade), they are very awkward to handle, and when they are used for an extended time, they sharply reduce the combat effectiveness of the personnel. The protective means are almost unsuitable for use in winter conditions: the protective overboots cannot be worn over felt snow boots and the protective cape cannot be worn over the greatcoat nor over the three-quarter-length sheepskin coat, the rubber facepiece of the gas mask markedly loses its elasticity in low temperatures and requires systematic warming-up, and the outlet valve freezes.

Consequently, present individual protective means do not fully satisfy the requirements of modern warfare and they do not permit personnel to conduct combat actions for an extended period of time in all seasons when the terrain and air are contaminated with radioactive, chemical and bacteriological substances.

The radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments supplied to the troops are deficient; they do not have adequate discrimination nor adequate operating reliability and they show excessive reading errors.

At present, a number of the problems of organizing special decontamination treatment still remain unsolved; in particular, we do not have a common chemical solution for the chemical, radioactive, and biological warfare decontamination of weapons and equipment nor for the partial decontamination treatment of personnel. Instruments and vehicles in the table of equipment which are designated for the special treatment of combat equipment are not adapted for the preparation of chemical and radioactive decontamination solutions, nor do they permit servicing crews and teams to carry out the special treatment of this equipment in a short period of time.

Subunits and units of all branches of the armed forces do not have T/E means for the complete decontamination treatment of personnel. In view of the high toxicity of present chemical agents, the decontamination treatment of personnel should be carried out immediately after they are contaminated, but without the means in the table of equipment, it will be very difficult
to accomplish this, especially under winter conditions.

The present-day level of development of our country's science, technology, and industry makes it possible for us to solve many of these problems now; however, the development of means of protection, reconnaissance, and decontamination and the equipping of our troops with them unfortunately are proceeding extremely slowly.

One of the key elements of protection is the elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction. Under actual conditions, to carry out rescue work, restore the troops' combat effectiveness, and restore rear services installations will require considerable forces and means, which at the present time are not available, with a few exceptions, in our units and large units. Taking into account the probable enemy's ever growing capabilities to employ nuclear and chemical weapons as well as bacterial means, we must have for the purpose of this protection specially designated and previously trained subunits which are provided with the requisite equipment.

We believe a regiment should have in its table of organization a company for protection against weapons of mass destruction and a division should have a battalion made up of two or three companies. With these forces a division can simultaneously organize the elimination of aftereffects in three to four centers of mass destruction without calling a halt to the fulfilment of its combat mission. Operational formations also should have the necessary number of units and large units for protection against weapons of mass destruction.

The methods and forms of command over the preparation of troops, staffs, and rear installations for their protection against weapons of mass destruction must also, in our view, undergo a fundamental change like the one that took place in the means and methods of armed combat. We must resolutely get rid of old and deep-rooted habits and views associated with the command of this protection.

In Order No. 021 of 1964, the Minister of Defense pointed out that when assessing the combat training and overall status of units and large units, the key element is the knowledge all personnel have of the combat characteristics of the weapons of mass destruction and of the methods of protection against them, as well as the skill with which the commanders and staffs organize and support such protection of the troops. From this requirement it follows that "weapons of mass destruction and protection against them" is the leading subject in the training program for all
branches of the armed forces and, correspondingly, the overall assessment of the status of a unit or large unit cannot be higher than the assessment in respect to this subject. The role and importance of the given requirement can hardly be overestimated, since it has been brought to the fore by actual practice and by realistic prospects for developments in the means of waging war.

All of this once more corroborates the fact that in order to raise the level of readiness of the troops to protect themselves against weapons of mass destruction it is necessary, we are convinced, to establish in units, large units, and formations a unified organ -- a service for protection against weapons of mass destruction, which would be fully charged with the command of the full-scale preparation of troops, staffs, and rear installations for this protection.

Taking into account the novelty, versatility, and special importance of this service, it can be headed, in our opinion, by a deputy formation commander or a deputy commander for protection against weapons of mass destruction. Introducing this post into the table of organization will not lead to a drastic disruption of the established structure of our staffs and headquarters, and it will cause almost no increase in their numerical strength, while at the same time it will to a considerable degree relieve commanders and staffs of a wide variety of complex responsibilities and simplify control.

With such a deputy present, the formation commander or commander would require a minimum amount of time to solve at least the basic problems, and the deputy with full authority -- a highly skilled specialist in his field who knows his business to perfection -- would exercise direct, continuous, and full command over the actions of subordinate commanders, staffs, chiefs of branch arms, and chiefs of services in ensuring protection against weapons of mass destruction. He also would be a permanent consultant and adviser to the commander on the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons and should command the supplying of troops with equipment and items protecting them against weapons of mass destruction. Centralized command would spare us the need for lengthy sessions for agreement and coordination in the organization process and would ensure the rapid implementation of the entire system of measures for protecting the troops against weapons of mass destruction.

So as to avoid increasing the number of assigned personnel directly subordinate to the commander, we consider it expedient to eliminate the post of the chief of the chemical troops (chemical service) and assign the
duties he performs to the deputy formation commander, or deputy commander, for protection.

In discussion of this matter, the view has been expressed that it will suffice to rename the chemical service the service for protection against weapons of mass destruction. We fully agree that the chemical service, by the nature and scope of the tasks it accomplishes in actual practice, has actually been transformed into a completely new service. The chemical service, established more than thirty years ago, has gone beyond the scope of its past characteristic activities. However, formally renaming it the service for protection against weapons of mass destruction, without changing its administrative and legal status in the troops, headquarters, and staffs, will not produce positive results. At present, the chief of the chemical service has at his disposal extremely limited forces and means and, in accordance with his service status, he cannot be the fully authorized organizer of the full-scale preparation of the troops, staffs, and rear installations to protect themselves.

Therefore, we also believe that the service for protection against nuclear and chemical weapons and bacterial means, as it was conceived and in fact exists now in the troops, must be made legal by the tables of organization which are in force and headed by a deputy formation commander or deputy commander possessing the necessary authority and powers. We should not forget the fact that during a nuclear war it hardly will be possible for us to succeed in refining and verifying the most desirable forms of the command and organization of protection against weapons of mass destruction.

Taking into consideration the actual function of existing chemical troops, we should also rename them, in our opinion, the troops for protection against weapons of mass destruction and subsequently reorganize and equip them properly.

So that protection against weapons of mass destruction will fully correspond to the level of development of the means of mass destruction and meet the requirements of modern warfare we must solve a variety of problems involving science, production, actual practice, the prior and comprehensive preparation and training of all branches of the armed forces, and the equipping of the branches with modern protective equipment and items. These problems can be solved successfully and with the necessary feel for what is new only when there is present a single centralized organ for command of the preparation of the armed forces and of the country as a whole for protection against weapons of mass destruction.
Some of the material costs, which will be unavoidable upon implementing the proposed measure, will be more than repaid and justified should a nuclear war be unleashed.

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Commanders and chiefs at all levels are charged by the regulations and instructions with the responsibility of organizing the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction. A commander must direct and unify the efforts of the different services and branch arms in this area.

The correctness of this rule is beyond all question. But a commander's activities are many-sided and he and his staff, as a rule, focus their main efforts on accomplishing the missions of the operation and battle. But in most instances, proper attention is not devoted to the problems of preparing the troops to protect themselves against weapons of mass destruction and of organizing this protection. Mainly, the organizational problem has not been adequately resolved, in our opinion.

Thus, up to now it has been established who is responsible for the precise organization of the forecasting of radioactive contamination, and specifically, for fixing the coordinates of nuclear bursts, determining their parameters, transmitting the data to forecast centers, and also monitoring the performance of these tasks. At the same time, we can now achieve great effectiveness in forecasting with the aid of artillery reconnaissance means, air defense radiotechnical means, and communications.

Whereas the warning of staffs, large units, and combat units and subunits is being carried out reliably with the existing communications system, an unresolved problem at the army, front, and military district level is that of warning the supporting and rear services subunits, units and facilities about the danger of being affected by radioactive and highly toxic chemical agents or by bacterial means.

The problem of eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes and of rendering assistance to the stricken in the centers of destruction cannot be considered to have been resolved satisfactorily. Difficulties have arisen in training regimental subunits to operate in the center of a nuclear burst: to extinguish fires, evacuate injured personnel, render first aid and medical assistance, etc. At the level of the large unit, army, and military district there is no single person or organ responsible for solving this problem for the divisional, army, and front units.
In our opinion, regiment, battalion, artillery battalion, company, and battery commanders, chiefs of the chemical service, medical service specialists, engineer troops, rear services, and others are being trained with inadequate efficiency and expertise on how to operate under conditions of the widespread employment of nuclear and chemical weapons and bacterial means.

It is well known that formation commanders and commanders at all levels are personally responsible for the status of combat equipment, the organization of the air defense of the rear, and so forth, as well as for the political education of the personnel, but for each one of these they have a deputy or an assistant who has been trained in the particular field and who directly organizes the necessary activities.

Since one of the key measures in the troops' combat support is their protection against weapons of mass destruction, a formation commander or a commander should also have, in our opinion, an assistant who knows all protective measures in detail and who is the principal reporter and adviser on all questions involving the preparation of the troops for protection against weapons of mass destruction, the organization of the protection and the elimination of the aftereffects of the employment of these weapons, and who also reports and advises on the problems of the safety of our own troops when we use these weapons.

In our opinion, the common measures for protecting troops against weapons of mass destruction must be centrally organized.

The lack of a centralized organization and unified organ engaged in preparing the troops for protection against weapons of mass destruction has also led to the fact that in supplying the troops we have adopted types of weapons, combat equipment, and also clothing and personal equipment which in most cases do not ensure protection for the personnel servicing them against injury from toxic chemical agent vapors, radioactive dust, and bacterial means. Furthermore, this equipment does not respond well to radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological decontamination because of its complex and frequently poorly conceived exterior shapes as well as unfortunate choice of materials (wood, canvas, etc.).

The chemical service, which developed after the first world war and has undergone substantial changes, is unable, however, to carry out the entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass destruction.
At present, a situation has developed wherein the chemical service organizes anti-chemical protection, the staff organizes anti-nuclear protection, and the medical service, to a certain degree, organizes anti-bacteriological protection. This has resulted in the familiar fragmentation. Although the staffs and the medical service are charged with the responsibility of organizing the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction, nevertheless, in the main they are engaged in accomplishing the traditional missions assigned to them in an operation. The work of the chemical service officers and of the chiefs of the chemical service long ago extended beyond the scope of this service, but the organizational form has immobilized their initiative and impeded the expansion of their knowledge.

In our opinion, in the interests of setting right the organization of the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction and of defining the persons responsible for it at the levels regiment to front (military district), we should establish a service for protection against weapons of mass destruction subordinate to the respective commander and formation commander and responsible for preparing the troops for protection against weapons of mass destruction, organizing this protection, and for eliminating the aftereffects of the enemy's employment of these weapons. We must charge this service (the corresponding departments and directorates in the staffs) with monitoring the accomplishment of the entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass destruction and with rendering skilled assistance.

In so doing, the role of the chemist, as a specialist, will not be depreciated, but will be enhanced since under the existing organization the Military Chemical Defense Academy will train broad specialists capable of efficiently resolving the problems of the entire complex of measures relating to protection against weapons of mass destruction.

At the regiment and division level the reorganization we have recommended can be implemented primarily by using the chemical service. What is required is to recertify and retrain the regimental chiefs of chemical service, primarily, so that they will be able to carry out the entire system of measures for protection against weapons of mass destruction.

At the operational level, in our opinion, the reorganization will apply to the departments (directorates) of the chiefs of chemical troops and to the combat training, operations, and medical departments (directorates), and others. In doing so, the department (directorate) for
protection against weapons of mass destruction should have four groups (sections, departments): for forecasting the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation, reconnaissance, reporting, and warning; operations (planning and the command of troops); preventive measures; and supply.

In connection with the fact that almost all departments (directorates) and services of the field headquarters of a front or army must be involved in solving the problems of protecting the troops against weapons of mass destruction, the chief of the department or directorate for protection must be by table of organization an assistant to the army or front commander.

At the central level, in our opinion, the directorates connected with resolving scientific and technical problems in the field of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and also the facilities engaged in training cadre personnel, in developing instructions and manuals, and in preparing industrial requisitions, should be combined into a single organ called a committee on weapons of mass destruction and protection against them.

The essence of the problem set forth is perhaps not new, but the time has come to solve this problem. It will be difficult to find among the troops a man who would not be in agreement with this. The next step is to improve the structure of the units and subunits providing assistance to the troops in organizing the protection against weapons of mass destruction and in eliminating the aftereffects of their employment.