MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Theodore G. Shackley
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Strategic
Regroupings Under Conditions of Modern
Armed Combat

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article is a comprehensive examination of the concept of strategic movements of troops to establish new or altered groupings during combat operations, and how regrouping conditions have been influenced by missile/nuclear weapons. The emphasis of the article is on transportation capabilities: norms for troop movements via different forms of transportation are examined, and the peculiarities of the rebasing of air and naval forces and the use of pipelines are noted. Measures suggested to ensure the survivability of transportation include advance preparation of roads and transport means as well as centralization of planning and control in a state transportation committee. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

Theodore G. Shackley

Page 1 of 22 Pages

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2004
Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor Kh. Dzhelaukhov. This article is a comprehensive examination of the concept of strategic movements of troops to establish new or altered groupings during combat operations. The regroupings of both world wars are used as historical background in determining modern regrouping conditions which have been influenced by missile/nuclear weapons and increased transportation capabilities. The emphasis of the article is on the transportation aspect: norms for troop movements via different forms of transportation are examined, and the peculiarities of the rebasing of air and naval forces and the use of pipelines are noted, with an example given for the movement of an army combining rail, air and organic transport. Measures suggested to ensure the survivability of transportation include advance preparation of roads and transport means as well as centralization of planning and control in a state transportation committee. The General Staff is responsible for the overall planning of strategic regroupings, with input from the main staffs of the appropriate armed forces branches.

Comment:

General-Mayor Kh. M. Dzhelaukhov was identified in 1962 as an instructor on the history of war and military art at the Military Academy of the General Staff.
Strategic Regroupings Under Conditions of Modern Armed Combat
by General-Mayor Kh. Dzhelaukhov

The Soviet Armed Forces, equipped with the most powerful and modern means of combat, among which above all should be noted strategic missile/nuclear weapons, are capable of terminating, in a relatively short time, any new war that might be unleashed by the imperialists. In addition, as was stated by Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy, we must be prepared for a long war.

However, in the event of a protracted war, it is improbable that all the basic strategic tasks arising from specific military-political objectives and the final goal of the war will be accomplished by the strategic grouping of armed forces that was initially established.

An analysis of the possible course of a future war confirms that various kinds of large-scale strategic tasks can be accomplished by armed combat on different continents and in numerous theaters of military operations. In order to do this, in preparation for the conduct of operations, obviously, a certain relocation of forces and means and repeated changing of the composition of the groupings of armed forces is required -- the strengthening of some, the reduction of others, and the establishment of new ones. This thesis has been confirmed by the experience of the world wars.

Such a shifting of efforts under present conditions will be carried out primarily by maneuvering the trajectories of strategic missiles. However, in a number of instances, in a specific situation which has arisen, and especially during the periods of a war following the initial period, such maneuvering can prove to be inadequate and it probably will be necessary to move ground and air forces, as well as large units and formations of other branches of the armed forces, forward to the theaters of military operations. In addition, in the event of heavy losses from massed missile/nuclear strikes, it will be necessary to replace many large units or entire formations. All this will bring about a certain redistribution of forces and means between adjacent theaters of military operations and the use of strategic reserves.
Thus, as we see it, in a modern war the forward movement of formations of the armed forces from the interior of the country, as well as their relocation between widely separated theaters, or within adjacent theaters of military operations, will be a normal phenomenon. Such relocations involve various branches of the armed forces, as well as the means of materiel and technical supply, and represent strategic regroupings. Along with the maneuvering of the trajectories of strategic missiles, they are one of the important elements of a strategic maneuver and therefore must be considered an integral part of armed combat.

In connection with this, we believe that research of matters concerning the organization and implementation of regroupings of formations and large units of all branches of the armed forces on a major scale is extremely important in theoretical and practical respects.

** Strategic regroupings may be defined as the aggregate of the relocations of formations and large units of the various branches of the armed forces which are performed upon orders from the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command within one or several theaters of military operations, as well as in the interior of the country (including the system of coalitions), in order to establish new or to alter existing strategic groupings, with the goal of attaining an advantageous balance of forces while carrying out important strategic tasks both at the beginning and especially in the course of armed combat. Strategic regroupings should always be linked with the impending fulfilment of important strategic tasks.

It is not at all compulsory that such regroupings simultaneously involve all or several of the branches of the armed forces. They are predetermined by the role and position in the war of one branch of the armed forces or another. Depending on the scale and purpose, the regroupings of the formations (large units) of even one branch of the armed forces, can have a strategic character. Accordingly, the regroupings of the ground forces are the most complex, since they are the largest branch of the armed forces.

This position requires some explanation. Let us assume that during a specific phase of the war a particularly critical situation has arisen in combat to disrupt the enemy's ocean lines of communication, and the existing grouping of rocket forces, naval and air forces does not ensure the successful fulfilment of that task. It can be accomplished with the
additional effort of the navy through the rebasing of considerable missile-carrying submarine forces from another naval theater. In the course of the war, it might be necessary to establish a new front of armed combat, the backbone of which will be the ground forces. If formations of other branches of the armed forces are present on a given axis, the main task can be accomplished after the establishment of a large strategic land grouping. In both examples, as we can see, strategic regroupings of one branch of the armed forces are carried out.

However, one should keep in mind that strategic regroupings most often entail the relocation of large units and formations of several branches of the armed forces. This situation corresponds completely with our doctrine which envisages achieving successes in armed combat through the united efforts of all the principal branches of the armed forces.

The question arises, did the author not narrow the concept of strategic regroupings in excluding from the definition strategic movements for concentration and deployment in the initial period of war? One must note that the theory of Soviet military strategy sets aside a special place for these movements and examines them separately, since they essentially are connected with the establishment of the primary strategic groupings corresponding to the operational plan of the war. Consequently, these movements are, in their own right, another strategic category, and are not relocations being carried out as strategic regroupings would be conducted.

At the same time, changes can occur in the system of primary concentration and deployment, as a result of which individual large units and even formations already advancing to the appropriate theaters, on orders of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (General Staff) change the direction of their movement into deployment areas, i.e., they actually carry out a regrouping in the strategic sense. Therefore, the definition of the concept of strategic regroupings which has been cited, in our opinion, should be considered sufficiently complete.

Another completely justifiable question arises concerning the possible bounds and distinctions between strategic regroupings and operational ones. What is the maximum numerical strength of large units beyond which the regroupings pass into the category of strategic?

It is obvious that an arithmetical approach is not suitable here. The specific military-political and strategic situation and objectives, for the sake of which regroupings are being conducted, are the basis for determining the strategic significance of the numerical strength of the
troops being relocated.

For example, to bring about a radical change in the situation on the Marne in 1914, the French command had to establish the Sixth Army to the north of Paris and to regroup up to six divisions there. As a result of the thrust of this army in cooperation with other French and English armies, an important strategic objective was accomplished -- the Germans were driven out of Paris and the Marne and began a retreat.

In order to avert the disintegration of the Italian army and prevent Italy from withdrawing from the war after the damage sustained at Caporetto in the autumn of 1917, the allied command quickly transferred six French and five British divisions to Italy.

To achieve a decisive strategic result in the course of armed combat in North Africa and to assist the defeated Italian army, at the beginning of 1941 Hitler's command was forced to transfer the 10th Air Corps from Germany to Sicily, and a little later to transfer Rommel's corps to North Africa (the 3rd and 15th tank divisions).

To establish an offensive grouping of Soviet troops in the area of Stalingrad, by decision of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command four rifle and two tank corps, a cavalry corps, three tank regiments and up to 25 artillery and mortar regiments were transferred to the Southwestern Front. For this same purpose the Stalingrad Front received a cavalry corps, tank brigade, six mechanized brigades, and 18 artillery regiments.

In the summer of 1944, to conduct the most important Belorussian Strategic Operation, besides numerous tank, rifle, artillery and other special large units and units, the fronts of the western axis in addition received ten air corps and six separate air divisions, numbering 1,134 fighters and 1,209 bombers and ground-attack aircraft.

The strategic regroupings of our armed forces in the summer of 1945 were the greatest in scope. They were conducted from the West to the Far East and had the goal of reinforcing the grouping already there and delivering an attack against imperialist Japan. According to incomplete data, in the course of three months, the 39th and 53rd Combined-Arms Armies and the 6th Tank Army were transferred to the Baykal axis, and the 5th Combined-Arms Army to the coastal axis. During this time the armies which comprised the Far East troops were replenished with personnel who had combat experience. In addition, large units and units of aviation,
artillery, and engineer troops, communications troops and other special, rear and transportation units, facilities and materiel reserves (1,666 operational echelons in all) were moved (rebased).

As seen by the examples cited, the numerical strengths of the troops being regrouped were quite different and the regroupings themselves were conducted in order to carry out important strategic tasks.

Thus, the difference between strategic and operational regroupings is determined by the following situations.

First, strategic regroupings are carried out according to the decision and order of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command within the limits of the entire territory of the country, or in several theaters of military operations (including naval theaters), then they are carried out as operational regroupings by decision of the commanders of the operational formations, involving an entire operational formation within the limits of its disposition.

Secondly, strategic regroupings usually involve major formations and large units of the branches of the armed forces and large units of the special branch arms of the reserve of the Supreme High Command; as a result of this relocation a new grouping is established or the former grouping is changed qualitatively and quantitatively to carry out strategic tasks. The operational regroupings lead to the establishment of new groupings, or to the strengthening of former operational groupings capable of carrying out operational tasks.

In this manner, the basic and determining element of the strategic regroupings is the establishment of that grouping of the armed forces which would be capable of carrying out specific strategic tasks in the course of armed combat and would ensure the achievement of the corresponding strategic objectives.

***

Let us examine the possible conditions for conducting strategic regroupings in a modern war.

Missile/nuclear strikes and the actions of other branches of the enemy's armed forces can lead to great destruction in the theaters of military operations, in the interior of the country, and especially in the system of transportation lines, and consequently cause a disruption in the
plans for strategic concentration and deployment, as a result of which the troop regroupings at the beginning of military actions will take on very broad proportions.

At the beginning of the war, the sending of large units and even formations to new theaters of military operations or new strategic axes will become a common occurrence. The regrouping of forces under these conditions can also be demanded by the members of the coalition in order to assist an allied country which has sustained significant losses as a result of an enemy missile/nuclear attack.

As we see it, strategic regroupings are completely possible throughout the course of armed combat. For example, during a strategic offensive, when as a result of aggressive enemy counteraction (massed missile/nuclear strikes against the principal strategic groupings, counterattacks with large numbers of forces, the landing of large-scale amphibious or airborne landing forces in the rear or on the flank), an abrupt change will take place in the situation, sometimes even involving the disruption of a stable situation in a given theater. In this case, it will be necessary for the strategic rocket forces to maneuver fire, and for ground, aviation, and sometimes even naval forces to regroup on threatened axes.

Strategic regroupings can also be conducted upon completion of a strategic offensive in the theater of military operations, when the opposing side has been substantially weakened or has surrendered, but the armed forces operating there are being transferred to another theater of military operations (regroupings after the completion of a strategic operation are not unlike those of the Stalingrad or Crimean operations, when a mass transfer of troops to other fronts was conducted).

In the course of strategic defense, regroupings might take place under conditions which are highly unfavorable from the strategic and transportation standpoint, such as those caused by nuclear strikes, deep enemy penetration, severe destruction in the rear, as well as by heavy troop losses. In such a situation, it is possible by means of a strategic regrouping to reinforce the existing defensive grouping (one or a number of operating fronts), to form a reserve front formation and to set up a defensive front in the interior of the country on the axes of the enemy's main attack, as well as to establish large-scale counterattack groupings.

Consequently, the conditions for conducting strategic regroupings throughout the course of a modern war will prove to be most varied, but will be the most complex at the beginning of a war, when the general
strategic situation will require decisive actions and rapid maneuvering of troops, and the transport capabilities may be extremely limited as a result of mass destruction. Complex conditions for the conduct of regroupings may also arise during unsuccessful armed combat at a specific phase and axis, if we are forced to go over to strategic combat after losing important strategic areas.

With all this apparent similarity of conditions for organizing and carrying out strategic regroupings in past and present-day wars, it is essential to emphasize that there is a qualitative difference between them, which consists in:

-- first, and this is the main thing, the fact that the presence of strategic missile/nuclear weapons enables the Supreme High Command to accomplish suddenly arising tasks primarily by means of the maneuvering of the trajectories of the missile/nuclear means, and then by this time to maneuver the ground, air and naval forces, and the forces and means of the air defense of the country, regrouping them in the appropriate theaters of military operations;

-- second, the complexity of the general situation, when strategic regroupings will be conducted under conditions of the possible large-scale destruction in all forms of transportation and massive troop losses from the strikes of missile/nuclear weapons;

-- third, the increase of the scope and size of the regroupings in contrast to the past, and that they embrace many theaters of military operations;

-- fourth, broader integrated use of all the contemporary forms of transport, in which one of the decisive means, aside from rail transport, will be motor transport, at the same time that the relative proportions of air, sea and pipeline forms of transport are being increased.

***

Regroupings of formations and large units of all branches of the armed forces are performed under present-day conditions over long and short distances with the use of various types of transportation, including the transport with the troops themselves.

In the Soviet Union, the main means for strategic regroupings carried out between theaters of military operations which are separated a considerable distance from each other, are the railroads, and within one theater of military operations or adjacent ones -- motor transport with partial use of rail transport for the shipment of tanks and other heavy equipment. It is assumed that sea (river), air and pipeline transport will
be used as supplementary means for the present. When regroupings are being carried out between continents, the main means of transport is sea (ocean) transport and, in part, air transport.

Let us examine some initial data for operational and technical estimates and norms for troop and cargo transport involving various forms of transportation. In planning railroad shipments, we consider the following approximate norms acceptable (see attached table).

Naturally, these norms are strictly hypothetical and should be tested in training exercises. However, calculations indicate that the recommendations we are making will ensure the necessary rates of movement and compact transport of large units in two to three days, and formations in seven to eight days.

In planning the movement of rocket forces and especially shipments of missile propellant by rail, we must keep in mind the complexity of transporting various oxidizing agents, which require special containers (specially designed aluminum tanks).

In regrouping large units on organic transport, one should take into consideration that a combined-arms army moving along four routes will have a column depth of 250 to 300 kilometers, and a tank army -- 150 to 160 kilometers. The extent of a normal day's march of modern large units is 180 to 250 kilometers, of a forced march -- 300 to 350 kilometers.* Under favorable conditions, with good roads, and using two shifts of drivers, individual motor transport columns can move 500 to 600 kilometers in a day's march.

The sizes of the designated concentration areas should be as follows: for a motorized rifle (tank) division and missile brigade -- 300 to 400 square kilometers, army corps -- 1,200 to 1,500 square kilometers, and for a combined-arms army -- 2,250 to 3,750 or more square kilometers, so that there will be intervals of 20 to 30 kilometers between large units.

* Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Division - Corps) § 496, 1959.
For the sea transport of large units of all branch arms and their materiel over long distances the most convenient means are the dry-cargo freighters being built in the Soviet Union which have a capacity of five, ten, and even 15 thousand tons. These ships will have two or three decks, large hatches and spacious cargo holds, cranes capable of lifting five, 40, and 60 tons, and a cruising speed of 30 kilometers per hour. In addition, we will be able to count on the construction of smaller ships with a cargo capacity of one, four, ten, 18, and 25 thousand tons.

The experience of the operational movements of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period affirm that dry-cargo ships with a capacity of six to ten thousand tons are the most suitable means for moving troops over long distances. Each of them can accommodate one to two fully armed motorized rifle battalions and one or two servicing subunits. Based on the present composition of a motorized rifle division and its approximate weight of 19 thousand tons, it would require a total ship tonnage of approximately 130 thousand tons, or 13 ships with a capacity of ten thousand tons each.

To move troops over relatively short distances, when the norm is seven to eight registered tons per man, it is desirable to use ships with a cargo capacity of one to three thousand tons.

The loading of equipment and embarkation of personnel require five to eight hours for each medium-tonnage transport (four to seven thousand tons) and seven to ten hours for a large-tonnage transport (seven to 15 thousand tons).

Movements by air transport can be carried out using the modern AN-8 and AN-12 transport aircraft, which have a flight range of three to 3.5 thousand kilometers, or TU-104, IL-18, and others, which have considerably greater flight ranges. The AN-12 and AN-22 can be used to move all types of army and front missiles.

Calculations show that the one-trip air movement of a motorized rifle division without heavy equipment and with a reduced amount of motor transport requires 580 AN-8 aircraft and 250 AN-12 aircraft or 10 to 11 military transport aviation divisions. The air transport of the bulk of a motorized rifle division at full combat strength (with tanks) would require 700 AN-12 aircraft and 200 AN-22 aircraft for transporting the tanks. Three to four military transport aviation divisions (300 to 350 AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft) could move a motorized rifle division a distance of up to 2,000 kilometers in two trips over a period of two days.
To move an airborne division weighing 2.4 thousand tons in one trip would require three military transport aviation divisions.

The rebasing of aviation and a fleet to a new area presents a rather complex problem, since it involves conducting restoration operations at airfields and ports, preparing the materiel and technical base, supporting air and sea crossings, etc.

The rebasing of an aviation division requires at least one or two airfields in the new area. It might take a great deal of time to prepare them to receive a large unit. Therefore, during a high priority rebasing, the aviation could temporarily use the airfields of front aviation, of the aviation of the air defense of the country and other airfields already in operation in the new area until their own airfields are restored and put into operation. Airfield technical servicing units and supplies usually are transported by rail, or, for short distances -- by motor transport.

The rebasing of the forces of a fleet may be carried out in a variety of ways. First the temporary basing means (floating depots, cranes, tankers, and others) move, then the submarine and surface forces of the fleet, escort ships, naval aviation, the forces and means of air defense, coastal defense, and so on. Only after this, under the cover of the fleet combat forces, the rear of the fleet is gradually rebased along with the repair means, depots, supplies, hospitals, and so on, a process which might require several weeks. The most labor-consuming work in supporting the rebasing of the fleet is clearing the mines from the transit channels and the water areas of the base (port).

The use of pipeline transportation. A modern main oil pipeline with a pipe diameter of approximately 500 millimeters can move more than 200 thousand tons of liquid fuel per day (the equivalent of about 20 railroad trains); field pipelines with pipe diameters of 100 to 150 millimeters can carry 700 and 2,000 tons of fuel, respectively. One pipeline brigade can lay 600 kilometers of field pipeline and provide a daily production of 2,500 tons.

Let us assume that, for combined movement using several forms of transportation, a combined-arms army has four motorized rifle divisions and three tank divisions, and army large units and units. The army is to be regrouped over a distance of 1,200 kilometers. In this case, the rail movement of the tank units of the three tank divisions would require 30 trains for each division, or a total of 90 trains; the movement of the tank regiments and tank battalions from each of four motorized rifle divisions
would require 20 trains per division or a total of 80 trains; 10 trains would be needed to move the remaining units and their heavy equipment. In all 180 troop trains will be required.

If ten railroad stations on two railroad lines are allocated for loading, and the loading rate is 60 trains per day (six trains per station), then three days will be required for loading and two to three days for the move. Consequently, the first troop trains would arrive on the third day, and last on the sixth day. All the remaining large units and units would move on organic transport. When the march is being made along four routes with a day's march of 300 kilometers, the leading units will negotiate the entire distance in four days, and the entire column will complete it in five days.

In this manner, using the selected version of combined movement, a combined-arms army at full strength could be concentrated in the new area within six to seven days.

If, in addition, four military transport aviation divisions were allocated for moving the army, then on the very first day a motorized rifle division (without tanks) and an army headquarters would be located in the new area, and on the third day -- another motorized rifle division. Further use of transport aviation would be undesirable, since all the troops that are regrouping using organic transport will already be in the new area by the end of the fifth day, and the entire army will be there by the end of the seventh day.

Taking into consideration the possibility of large-scale destruction of transportation in a future war, we should examine the probable ways of maintaining the survivability of transportation, which, in our opinion, should be approached along two lines: engineer-technical and organizational, and would encompass the advance preparation of the theaters of military operations and all the country's territory from the transportation standpoint.

The solution of this important problem of the transportation lines is tied mainly to the establishment of a dense network of railroads and highways, and to the preparation of a large number of modern airfields and sea (river) ports in support of the country's defense. Along with this, a number of specific engineer-technical measures are being advanced. Above all, these must include: the construction of bypasses around major road junctions; preparation of essential parallel crossings over large water obstacles; the outfitting of all main lines of the railroad with an
automatic block system and an automatic control system, and conversion to traffic control by radio; the establishment of reloading (transshipment) areas at the junctions of various forms of transportation; the installation at small sea (river) ports of berths and other loading facilities which are not overly expensive; the holding of freight cars and locomotive means (diesel and electric locomotives) in reserve, as well as the holding in reserve and maintenance of a fleet of steam engines as locomotive means, which do not require complex types of fuel and which fully justified themselves in the last war; and other measures.

The second direction for carrying out engineer-technical tasks supporting large-scale troop movements is the constant renovation and modernization of the existing transport means, as well as the mass introduction into the transportation system of fully modern loading and unloading equipment.

In the first place the organizational measures must include the implementation of unified planning and unified control over strategic movements being carried out along all roads (routes) using the main types of transport.

At the present time in the territory of the Soviet Union there are 35 railroad directorates, 33 river and sea steamship lines, and republic and local civil air fleet directorates. Motor transport movements are under the authority of smaller organizations. Until recently there was no proper centralization in the system of the Military Transportation Directorate.

In connection with this, there arises the necessity to establish a unified organ to direct all forms of transportation on a state-wide scale both in peacetime and in time of war.

In what direction should this problem be solved?

The existing territorial borders of the railroad directorates, river and sea steamship lines, directorates of the civil air fleet and motor transport make it difficult to set up everyday unified control over the complex dynamics of freight turnover on various types of transport within the borders of individual small Union republics and oblasts. Apparently, if the existing transportation administration system is to be maintained, it will be necessary, for the purpose of coordinating interjurisdictional shipments, to establish an all-Union transportation organ in the form of a State Transportation Committee attached to the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The direction of all transportation
lines of the Soviet Union, the long-range planning of the development of types of transportation, the planning of shipments according to the types of transportation, the coordination in terms of time and volume of the transfer of cargo from one type of transportation to another, the constant monitoring of the progress of shipments, and the resolution of other questions concerning the operation of transportation, would be transferred to this committee. In the republics and economic regions it also is desirable to have transportation committees (or directorates) with analogous functions.

This will lead to the normalization of shipments, and to the proper distribution of the freight flow in terms of time and type of transportation; it will increase the total volume of freight being moved and the speed of its movement; and it will reduce unnecessary transshipments and will have a rather large economic impact.

The presence of a unified transportation organ will ensure a more advantageous organization of all types of shipments, even under wartime conditions. In this connection it should be pointed out that, despite the reorganization and subordination of the Central Military Transportation Directorate to the Deputy Minister of Defense for the Rear, the complete centralization of the planning and direction of military shipments using all types of transportation still has not been achieved.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the solution to the question concerning strategic regroupings under present-day conditions, in addition to maintaining the troops at a high level of combat readiness, is above all to work out engineer-technical problems, as well as to implement organizational measures in respect to transportation.

Now let us examine the matters of planning strategic regroupings, which in general terms are included in the plan of impending strategic actions. These matters should be defined in greater detail in the plan for strategic regroupings (movements), in particular: the purpose of the regroupings, the large units (formations) designated for movement, the order of priority and time periods required for movements, the type of transportation, main routes of movement, as well as the departure areas before loading and the loading areas, and the areas for the unloading, assembly and concentration of troops. If the troops are carrying out a movement on organic transport, then, in addition, the total time required for leaving the departure area, the main routes or zones of movement, and areas and times of arrival are established, and it is indicated to whose command the troops are to be subordinated. The procedure for providing
cover (who will be covered, with what forces, and in which areas) and the procedure for materiel-technical support for the troops being regrouped, also are specified. This planning will be carried out in its entirety by the General Staff.

The command of the corresponding front (fleet or military district) should be kept up to date concerning the number and nature of strategic regroupings being conducted, if they affect the interests of the given operational formation (what are the intended inputs to its composition from other theaters of military operations or from the reserve of the Supreme High Command, the time periods and areas in which the forces and means will arrive, or, on the other hand, which large units, formations, special troops and other troops should be transferred to another front).

Strategic regroupings (rebasing) of the naval forces and movements by sea are carried out in accordance with the orders of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Depending on their scales and on the nature of the naval theaters, these regroupings and movements are planned by the General Staff with the help of the Main Staff of the Navy or by the staff of the fleet which was ordered to conduct them.

The General Staff, with the help of the Main Staff of the Air Forces, the staff of Military Transport Aviation, and representatives of the staff of the Air Defense of the Country and the staff of the troops being moved, also works out the aviation rebasing plan and the airlift plan.

In its final form the plan for strategic regroupings can be either a written, or better, a graphic document (one or several maps, depending on the scale of the regroupings and types of transportation) having diagrams attached showing the movement of railroad and air transport convoys, columns of troops moving via organic transport and sea convoys, as well as individual plans for the different types of support.

The plan for strategic regroupings is a working document of the General Staff. On its basis orders are given to the military districts, reserve armies (fronts), operating fronts, the fleets, air armies, air defense forces (commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces) concerning particular and general questions of implementing this plan. In addition, the progress of the regroupings is monitored in accordance with this plan.

In our opinion the following fundamental propositions should serve as a guide in organizing strategic regroupings:
-- to consider the strategic situation in the respective theaters of military operations, and the prospects for the development of armed combat there in the near future, as well as the state of the transportation network and the carrying capacity of the different types of transportation in their most vulnerable sectors;
-- to proceed from the possibility of the extensive combined use of all the main types of modern transportation and the transportation of other socialist countries, even if they have railway gauges of different width;
-- to observe the order of priority for rebasing and regrouping, moving first of all those troops which are required immediately on the basis of the situation;
-- to prevent unwarranted splitting up of a formation and the simultaneous movement of different large units over a single dirt road;
-- to organize the loading and unloading of troops along a broad front and at a great depth in order to attain the most favorable conditions for dispersing the troops; to try to provide the armies with two to three railroad lines, and the army corps with one or two railroad lines, and to load and unload in an extremely short period of time;
-- to provide for alternate loading and unloading areas, and to have a variant for switching movements from one type of transportation to another and switching from one route to another, especially taking into consideration the possible destruction of transportation, and the need to negotiate zones of radioactive contamination.

***

Under modern conditions it is difficult to conceal large-scale troop movements from the enemy, who will strive to disrupt the regroupings with nuclear strikes, while employing chemical, bacteriological and conventional weapons against the diverse complex of installations on the transportation lines and against the troops being regrouped.

The significance of the disruption of strategic regroupings can be equated to the disruption of a large-scale operation. At the same time their successful implementation depends on the degree of combat teamwork among the troops, the skilful use of transportation means and the organization of support for all types of transportation.

The important installations on the transportation lines (major road junctions, bridges, tunnels, transshipment areas, ports, transport aviation airfields, large pumping stations for the transfer of liquid fuel, and others) are the most vulnerable in a system of movements. In order to carry out mass regroupings of large units and formations of the branches of
the armed forces, first it is necessary to organize cover and comprehensive support for all types of transportation lines.

Not denying the great importance of all types of support, the author considers it essential to dwell especially on measures to support the normal functioning of the transportation lines and to support new areas of concentration. The uninterrupted activity of the transportation lines depends on the advance preparation of routes and transportation means for large movements, the restoration of destroyed transportation main lines in the course of a regrouping, and the organization of military dispatching and traffic control services on the routes.

The advance preparation of routes and transportation means for large movements encompasses a sphere of important matters: the restoration and repair of roads, stations, ports, and loading and unloading airfields before the movements begin, as well as pipelines; the assembly and preparation of transportation means and the creation of reserves of them; the organization of a technical support service.

When regroupings are anticipated, the time limit for the conduct of measures to restore the transportation lines can be maximally shortened, and the largest possible number of forces and means can be allocated to carry them out. However, it is not always possible to restore a main road junction or main port quickly. In these cases, obviously, we must be limited to the construction of temporary installations and bypasses, and the equipping of temporary berths in sectors of the coast which are suitable for loading troops.

The assembly, sorting, technical and sanitary-epidemiological processing of freight cars, flatcars, sea transports, and locomotive means, as well as the equipping of freight cars for the movement of personnel, special cargoes and so on, will be a central issue in the preparation of transportation.

Timely preparation of the road network, especially in front zones of operations, is very important to the support of strategic regroupings. This part of the work will be fulfilled by the engineer troops of the front and the reserve of the Supreme High Command.

The skilful organization of the restoration of destroyed sections of roads, the negotiation of zones of radioactive contamination, and the elimination of other obstacles in the course of regroupings, as well as the availability to the Supreme High Command of freight cars and locomotive
means, repair units and means, play an exceptional role in maintaining the survivability of transportation and supporting its normal functioning. Engineer, chemical and road restoration units with a supply of repair means should be located in proximity to the most vulnerable sections of the transportation lines in order that, when necessary, they might immediately set about repair operations and the elimination of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes. The troops being regrouped should also take part in restoring those sections of the road which have been destroyed and in reinstating movement as quickly as possible, for the most part independently eliminating the aftereffects of the nuclear attack and negotiating the zones of radioactive contamination on the axes of movement of the main forces. For this purpose duty subunits from the engineer troops and special troops should be assigned in each troop train (column) to take part in the restoration operations.

A very important element of support for the movement of troops along main highways and main dirt roads are the military dispatching and traffic control services which assist in precise implementation of the schedule for the passage of troop columns, the strict regulation of the speed of movement on various segments of the route, the switching of columns from one route to another, permission to overtake columns moving up ahead, and other measures.

The support of unloading areas and new areas of concentration and deployment of arriving troops occupies a special position in the system of supporting strategic regroupings. Under conditions of a rapidly changing situation accompanied by a change in the front of armed combat, even in connection with a partial withdrawal of ground forces, the air defense, ground cover, engineer and chemical support of the indicated areas and the setting up of communications acquire the significance of most important strategic measures.

Usually the ground cover for the deployment areas of arriving large units and formations is carried out reliably enough by the troops operating on the given front. However, there can be no guarantee of the stability of the front line and no certainty that these areas will not turn out to be in the zone of direct combat actions. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that troops are operating forward, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command should give orders to the commander to move one or two divisions forward from the regrouping armies to cover from the front (from the flank) the most probable axes of an enemy breakthrough.
The engineer support of new areas for unloading and deployment consists mainly of preparing roads and cross-country routes, preparing the siting areas of missile large units and artillery, airfields, and command posts, conducting engineer obstacle clearing, radioactive decontamination, and so on. The above-mentioned engineer operations and measures for defense against weapons of mass destruction should be made the responsibility of engineer and chemical troops operating forward of the fronts, as well as of the engineer and chemical units being sent out in advance from the advancing armies.

The organization of communications and control in the new area acquires special significance. Therefore, the operations groups of the staffs of the troops being regrouped should arrive beforehand in the new area with the communications means, set up the control posts, and establish communications with the senior commander, organize cover of all types and assume control over all arriving troops.

Thus, under modern conditions the successful conduct of strategic regroupings is attained by maintaining a constant and high level of troop combat readiness, by taking measures for air defense and for nuclear and chemical warfare defense in advance, by ensuring in every way possible the survivability of all types of transportation and transport means, by using the main types of transportation expeditiously for the movement of troops, and by organizing and monitoring the regroupings skilfully from beginning to full completion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Three-Battalion Missile Brigade</th>
<th>Combined-Arms Army</th>
<th>Tank Army</th>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>Motorized Rifle (Tank) Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of trains</td>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>400-450</td>
<td>250-300</td>
<td>130-140</td>
<td>40-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rates of daily movements (in troop trains)</td>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loading time (in days)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading (unloading) stations required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the main area</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the alternate area</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of main loading area (in kilometers)</td>
<td>30-50</td>
<td>150-180</td>
<td>300-120</td>
<td>70-90</td>
<td>30-50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is based on calculated data of the Collection of the Military Transportation Service, Nos. 22, 23, 1959.