MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Unified Organ for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Is Not Necessary

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article criticizes a proposal to make the control organs of the chemical troops into a special service responsible for protecting troops against weapons of mass destruction, from the standpoint that to do so would expand, rather than streamline, the organization for this function. The author argues further that the troops already have their own means of protection, and must be responsible for protecting themselves; thus it would be better to concentrate certain appropriate protective functions in the chemical troops' control structure and improve protection capabilities among the troops, rather than establish a separate protection service. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Unified Organ for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Is Not Necessary

Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (75) for 1965 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Colonel A. Kolgushkin. This article criticizes a proposal to make the control organs of the chemical troops into a special service responsible for protecting troops against weapons of mass destruction, from the standpoint that to do so would expand, rather than streamline, the organization for this function. The author argues further that the troops already have their own means of protection, and must be responsible for protecting themselves; thus it would be better to concentrate certain appropriate protective functions in the chemical troops' control structure and improve protection capabilities among the troops, rather than establish a separate protection service.

Comment:
The author also wrote "The Use of Statistical Data in Researching the Organization of Troop Control Organs" in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966 and contributed a portion of "Speeding Up the Automation of Control Processes in Ground Forces Formations" in Issue No. 3 (85) for 1968
A Unified Organ for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Is Not Necessary

by

Colonel A. Kolgushkin

At the present time an idea which is being persistently put forward is that of transforming the control organs of the chemical troops into the control organs for the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction, with the goal of increasing the effectiveness and reliability of this protection, of reducing the number of personnel connected with it, and also of releasing the staffs, directorates and branches of the branch arms and services from carrying out protective functions. The latter commands the attention and arouses doubt.

It is known that protection against weapons of mass destruction includes a large complex of measures which are carried out by various elements of the control organs and by the troops themselves under the direction of the commander and his staff. For example, radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance and warning are conducted by chemists, medical personnel, and operations officers; the dispersal and rotation of troop location areas are planned by operations officers; the exploitation of protective terrain features, the selection of methods for crossing contaminated zones and the providing of protection for personnel during actions on contaminated terrain are carried out by operations officers, engineers, chemists, and medical personnel. Operations officers, chemists, engineers, medical personnel and various services of the rear organize the supplying of troops with means of protection and elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction.

Analysis of statistical data shows that the extent to which the directorate of the chemical troops of a front participates in the protective measures of the field headquarters of the front may reach 30 percent. If the remaining functions also are transferred to the directorate of the chemical troops, on the basis of which it has been proposed to establish a protection service, then the directorate would have to be enlarged about three times. The authors of the idea of establishing a special
service, in striving to eliminate a certain parallelism in the work, did not foresee such an increase in the personnel of this service; they ignore the fact that to transfer all or a significant part of the functions to one organ is practically impossible. For example, the intelligence directorate can transfer only an insignificant part of its duties to the new service, but the directorate itself, owing to the specific character of its work, will not be able to be released from these duties in the integrated performance of reconnaissance tasks in the interests of protection as a whole.

Let us assume that the duties of collecting, processing, and disseminating information about enemy nuclear strikes are taken on by the proposed unified protection organ. But this will not release the operations and intelligence directorates, and the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, from these duties. Similar information will inevitably come to them from subordinate staffs, such as the main component part of reports concerning the situation. A specific analysis of these data will be carried out by all directorates and services concerned, independent of the "overall" analysis conducted by the special service by way of mass servicing, which, in our opinion, will be incapable of completely satisfying anyone, since it will be directed toward specific purposes.

Matters concerning the dispersal of troops or the rotation of troop location areas cannot be transferred to the new organ. This function is connected with the general combat readiness of the troops; it is purely operational and cannot be carried out by anyone except the operational staff. The transfer to the protection service of sanitary-hygiene and preventive measures will not release the medical organs from planning, materiel support and the proper fulfilment of these same measures.

It is either impossible or undesirable to transfer many functions to this service, because they are organically connected with other basic functions and can be more successfully carried out only in a system with them. These examples show how the reasons for the increase (not the curtailment!) in the table of organization, and the appearance (not elimination!) of parallelism in the work are created. In this manner, the table of organization of the proposed organ in comparison with the directorate of the chemical troops, can of course be increased,
but compensation for this increase with a corresponding decrease in other elements of the directorate will hardly be successful.

Having set to work, the protection service would immediately be met with certain difficulties. It will not be in a position to independently plan, organize and conduct a single important measure without coordination with the staff and the other directorates and services possessing materiel and technical means of protection. The protection service apparently will not have these means, otherwise it would have to have a considerable number of supply organs transferred to it.

Operations officers, chemists, engineers, medical personnel - this is the list of the main persons who have to plan and organize the protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction under the direction of the chief of staff in accordance with the commander's decision. In our opinion, we cannot count on any real increase in the effectiveness and reliability of the protection of troops in connection with the establishment, in essence, of an organ having no rights, the chief of which would be given no titles.

Would not be better for those protective functions which it is actually useful to unite, to be concentrated for the time being in the directorate (branch) of the chief of the chemical troops? The allocation of an essentially new organ can be justified, in our opinion, only when it can be proved desirable to establish special protection troops, which are in need of centralized rather than autonomous control. We will examine the matter concerning the desirability of establishing such troops.

As is known, protection is carried out through a broad range of measures not only against the effects of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological, but also against the conventional types of armament of the ground and air enemy. Protection is carried out by all troops and control organs in all forms of combat actions, and comprises an integral part of them. Therefore, the troops cannot be released from the functions of protection and self-protection, and the functions cannot be concentrated in one place. It is impossible to devise some sort of universal special troops which would take this diverse task away from the rest of the troops and take it upon themselves.
We are convinced that to establish such troops will lead to the weakening of the responsibility of the commanders and staffs of all levels for protection, to the formal right to think that, once these troops have been established, it is they who should protect all the remaining troops, releasing them from the duties of self-protection. To establish such troops might lead to curtailment of a front's protection operations. The latter, being some of the most important, and organically fused with the other duties of all the troops and control organs, will be reduced from a general problem to a narrow, specific task.

The protection troops, in the opinion of those in favor of establishing them, should consist of chemical, engineer, and medical units. Two groups from each branch arm will be formed—one, subordinate to the chief of its own branch arm, and the other subordinate to the chief of the protection troops. This undoubtedly will lead to an undesirable scattering of the troops. For this reason, protection cannot be carried out by special units alone.

The subunits, units, and large units of all the branch arms should carry out the basic volume of work themselves: camouflage, dispersal and rotation of areas, entrenching, evacuation of wounded, administering of self-help, mutual aid, and medical first aid, partial decontamination treatment of personnel and decontamination of armament and combat equipment, extinguishing of fires, clearing of barriers, restoration of engineer installations which have been destroyed, and replenishing of armament and materiel. The field troops repel enemy attacks while eliminating a center of destruction, they replace troops who are not combat-effective with those who are combat-effective, they restore battle formations — this has already outgrown the functions of protection and is a field of the tactics of combat actions. It is clear that the protection troops will be unable to carry out all these functions without the field troops.

The protection of the troops against weapons of mass destruction should be carried out first of all by the troops themselves. In other words, the troops should protect themselves.

The motorized rifle and tank troops of modern organization from the regiment on up include in their composition everything
needed for protection against weapons of mass destruction, including engineer, chemical, and medical subunits and units, i.e., so-called protection troops. For this reason, no other special troops are required. The task is to teach all the troops to cooperate with each other properly to fulfill the unified, integrated task of protection.

Protection is not bad because there is a lack of special troops, but because there is no proper organization in this matter. The staff should organize protection, but the troops themselves should implement it. Accordingly, the chemical units and subunits included in the composition of the field troops will play an important role and will carry out the duties which are peculiar to them at the present time.

Certain authors allude to the foreign armies, particularly the West German Bundeswehr, which has so-called troops for "anti-nuclear, anti-bacteriological, and anti-chemical protection" in the form of ABC companies and battalions. These essentially are regular chemical companies and battalions, equipped with decontamination vehicles and heavy protective suits for working in centers of contamination, and having narrower functions than the corresponding subunits and units of the Soviet Army. There are no universal protection troops in a single army in the world who even roughly answer their purpose.

In our opinion, the most expedient solution for this problem is to be found by increasing the resistance of the troops themselves to the casualty-producing elements of the means of mass destruction and their capability for independent protection, for the elimination of the aftereffects, as well as for working out more perfect methods of combating means of mass destruction.

Any element of the battle formation or operational disposition of the troops, including the protective means themselves, may be subject to destruction. Therefore, the protection of the troops should not be made dependent on special subunits which cannot always arrive at the center of destruction on time. The greater the independence of the combat subunits and units in resolving matters of protection and elimination of aftereffects, the higher their combat effectiveness. Each battalion, regiment and division should have its own appropriate means of protection for subunits, control organs and the rear.
The foregoing does not deny the desirability of having means in the division, army, and front for rendering assistance to the troops who have been subjected to mass destruction, mainly by means of the advance reinforcement and allocation of chemical, engineer, and medical units and subunits, in the course of combat actions.

In order to attain independence and take the initiative concerning protection and the elimination of the aftereffects of the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction, the troops should complete comprehensive training even in peacetime; they should know beforehand under what circumstances, by whom and to whom, and with what forces and means help will be rendered. The troops instructed in this way will display judicious initiative in any situation, including even one which is unforeseen, without waiting for instructions and help from above and thus losing precious time and with it their combat effectiveness.

In conclusion, we will note that, in our opinion, it has not been proven necessary to establish a special control organ for the protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction and to establish special protection troops. The command of the protection troops should be exercised by the formation commander or commander, but the planning, executive, and coordinating organ will be the combined-arms staff. The organization of the troops, especially at the tactical level, is in need of improvement from the standpoint of increasing their capabilities for effective self-protection against weapons of mass destruction.

In the course of an operation, the formation of temporary composite detachments designed to render assistance to the troops in eliminating the aftereffects in the centers of the heaviest destruction, cannot be ruled out. Such detachments will be established on the basis of units and subunits of chemical and engineer troops, and the medical service. At the operational level, they can be allocated from the provost traffic control subunits, which have been appropriately equipped and instructed beforehand.