MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Comments on Civil Defense Cooperation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article presents two individual comments on a 1963 article concerning cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense. The first examines the role of the assistant military district commander for civil defense and makes a distinction between cooperation and mutual assistance. The author proposes that a state committee for civil defense be organized within the Council of Ministers to coordinate with a civil defense directorate under the General Staff. The second author asserts that civil defense activities should be planned to the advantage of the military and coordinated by an element of the General Staff. He takes issue with the proposal that the assistant district commander control the military forces allocated to civil defense, and calls for independent civil defense exercises. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Comments on an Article
by General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok

SUMMARY:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (71) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article presents two individual comments on a 1963 article concerning cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense. The first, by Colonel V. Radchenko, touches upon such matters as establishing a unified traffic control service for mutual use of roads, defining the role of the assistant military district commander for civil defense, and making some distinction between cooperation and mutual assistance. In examining the growing pains of civil defense, the author proposes that, instead of a national civil defense staff, a state committee for civil defense be organized within the Council of Ministers to coordinate with a civil defense directorate under the General Staff. The second author, Colonel A. Stets, asserts that civil defense activities should be planned to the advantage of the military and coordinated by an element of the General Staff. He takes issue with the proposal that the assistant district commander control the military forces allocated to civil defense, and calls for the conduct of independent civil defense exercises.

Comment:
Colonel Radchenko also contributed to "Local Air Defense" in Issue No. 1 (62) for 1962.
Comments on an Article by General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok
by
Colonel V. Radchenko
and
Colonel A. Stets

The article by General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok, "Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense"* is of indisputable interest, inasmuch as it makes an attempt to formulate a theoretical basis for the common aim of tasks of the armed forces and civil defense which are to be accomplished in a future war, and also to reveal the essence of cooperation between all branches of the armed forces and forces of civil defense.

By making use of considerable factual material at his disposal and taking the experience of many exercises into account, the author has quite sufficiently and, in our view, correctly shed light on this important matter.

On the basis of our own experience, we would like to express certain ideas as a supplement to this article.

The author dwelt very briefly on the mutual concerns the troop command of military districts and civil defense leadership have as to the use of roads. Everyone understands that, as a result of the first massed enemy nuclear strike, the railroad network may be put out of action for a more or less long period of time. In this case, if the necessity arises to sharply increase the transfer of cargoes to meet the demands of the national economy and civil defense as well as the armed forces, then the main means for delivering cargoes will be motor transport, and the volume of this traffic will increase several times over. The problem of increasing the traffic capacity of roads to the maximum will become acute. A solution to this problem must be found now, in peacetime, by setting up a road and dispatching traffic control service through the joint efforts of military districts and civil defense organs. The road department and civil defense department of the military district unquestionably must become the main organizers. They must take the possible daily load on the roadways into consideration, work

*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" No. 2 (69) for 1963
out an approximate schedule for two-way vehicle traffic, determine the procedure for using parallel routes on unsurfaced roads in order to relieve the main roadways, know the detours for bypassing cities, the areas of the dispatching traffic control posts, the procedure for restoring, paralleling or bypassing water crossings and defiles, for organizing communications between dispatching traffic control posts, and the amount of forces and means necessary for setting up the service.

All this information must, in our view, be brought together into a unified road and dispatching traffic control service plan which must be approved by the commander of the military district. Civil defense of oblasts, krais, and republics can be assigned the task of erecting parallel bridges, regulating traffic and maintaining parallel routes and detours in a condition suitable for vehicles, providing communications between dispatching traffic control posts, and repairing and restoring sections of main roads which have been destroyed.

Much in common is observed in the activities of military commissariats and civil defense staffs.

By informing military commissariats about the radiation situation, civil defense staffs allow them to make the correct decision in selecting assembly points for those liable for military service and for motor transport; this also gives them some idea as to which groups of conscripts, from which areas, will not be able to arrive at the prescribed time.

After an enemy nuclear attack, the military commissariat may receive approximate data from the civil defense staff about losses in conscripted manpower and transport, in order to amend the mobilization plan.

In turn, the military commissariat must assist the civil defense staff to better employ the assembled motor transport and newly activated units.

Undoubtedly, the commander of the military district will make the decision about using motor transport and newly activated units, but any given civil defense staff can make a legitimate request of the military district commander after appropriate consultation in the military commissariat.
The only trouble is that military commissariats, civil defense staffs and staffs of military units do not have secure communications documents in common, which makes it difficult to maintain cooperation between them.

The command of the military district and the leadership of civil defense are concerned that, in the period of threat (when there is one) and from the moment of an enemy strike, there not be any disruption of planned measures resulting from panic among the populace. In taking all measures to prevent this, it is necessary at the same time to develop procedures for combating panic in case it breaks out and to specify the forces and means required.

It is naive to think that the militia can cope with such a task. The assistance of troops is required in this. We feel that, in plans for the assistance of military districts to civil defense chiefs, it is necessary to specify units with a special purpose -- combating panic. These units must learn the tactics and procedures for establishing order on roads, in cities, ports and in rail centers.

General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok duly emphasizes that, "as yet only individual problems of cooperation are solved, and there is no overall concept and plan for employing civil defense forces and troops not participating in operations". But even this beginning is the result of the initiative of individual adherents of civil defense. Moreover, almost no concern has been shown in this direction on the part of the military command.

It seems to us that the author has far from fully uncovered the reasons for the poor cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces. He explains such a situation only as an underestimation of the capabilities of civil defense to assist the armed forces. In our view, the matter does not consist in this alone. Many deficiencies occur because, during the immense growth of the role of civil defense, which is now considered one of the most important factors of strategic support of the activity of the country in a future war, its legal, financial, and materiel-technical situation has been exceedingly grievous. The legal status of a civil defense chief is lower than that of a minister or chairman of a State committee. Almost all measures of civil defense are financed by drawing on local budgets. Civil
defense has practically no materiel reserves at its disposal, if one does not count the scanty reserves which were set up during the time of local air defense, which was headed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Civil defense has been cut off from the Ministry of Defense at the central level, and this has a strong effect locally. Chiefs of civil defense of oblasts, krais, and republics lack a feeling of responsibility for the state of civil defense and they regard it as a burden. The theoretical foundations for the organization and conduct of civil defense still have not been completely developed. Civil defense units have been set up, but the problem of controlling them has not been considered.

It has been shown theoretically that large non-military contingents must be the decisive force for carrying out civil defense tasks, but these are very poorly supplied even with means of individual antichemical and antiradiation protection.

All this has led to defects in the planning of civil defense and to lack of faith in its capabilities on the part of the workers of the system itself.

There are quite a few deficiencies, but, in our view, they are not the result of some serious omission, but rather they are the inevitable growing pains of the new system.

General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok feels that these growing pains can be cured by setting up a single organ for civil defense matters in the General Staff or in the Ministry of Defense which would unify the efforts of civil defense and all branches of the armed forces.

This idea is essentially correct, but it has not been carried through. This problem must be studied more thoroughly in order to find ways for closer functioning of the organs of the Ministry of Defense and civil defense both centrally and locally, and to change the principles of planning, financing and the materiel-technical supply of civil defense.

Our proposals on this matter come down to the following: Instead of having a civil defense staff for the country, it would be useful to have a State Committee for Civil Defense within the
Council of Ministers of the USSR, having as chairman of this committee a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for civil defense matters. In this case, any order or directive on civil defense would be more effective, and all matters which arise would be resolved more easily and more efficiently. For coordinating actions between the State Committee for Civil Defense and the Ministry of Defense and for directing the civil defense and local defense of military districts, it would be expedient to set up a directorate of local and civil defense under the General Staff. This would ensure unity in civil defense planning and the working out of civil defense tasks in complete accord with the strategic plan for conducting the war; it would search out the forces and means which each district could allocate for assisting civil defense; and it would handle problems of civil and local defense of military districts directly.

We can also examine the solution to this problem from another aspect. This would be to entrust responsibility for civil defense to the Minister of Defense, having designated him Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for Civil Defense.

However, this version is worse than the first, since control of civil defense of Union republics causes many problems.

Civil defense planning, obviously, must be implemented first at the center, and coordinated with the planning of war as a whole. Except for general instructions, only specific assignments and operational tasks should be sent to local areas. After all, the operational tasks of civil defense, in our opinion, should be different for interior and border military districts. The main task of civil defense in a border military district amounts to supporting the successful actions of troops in the initial period of war, and the task of civil defense in an interior military district is conducting rescue and emergency restoration operations.

The civil defense forces must be equipped at least with means of individual protection, entrenching tools, radio means, medical supplies and medicines. It would take decades to acquire these articles by drawing on local budget resources, which might ultimately undermine faith in the capabilities of civil defense. It is advisable to accomplish this in the shortest possible time
and by drawing on the resources of the State budget.

As we see it, the role of assistant commander of the military district for civil defense should be defined more precisely and his importance increased. First, if we are not mistaken, in the history of the development of the socialist state, there was an organ in the form of a civil defense department headed by the assistant district commander which was obligated to lend assistance to everyone and to monitor everything, but which had no authority to require execution.

Practice shows that the immediate organizers and executors of all civil defense measures are the civil defense staffs of oblasts, krais, and republics. The main personnel of these staffs are servicemen and employees of the Soviet Army. It is completely advisable to subordinate these staffs to the assistant commander of the military district for civil defense. In practice, there are quite a few examples of dual subordination. In particular, chiefs of special troops in military districts are subordinate to the district commander and to the corresponding chief of the directorate of special troops of the center.

With subordination of civil defense staffs of oblasts, krais, and republics to the commander of the military district through his assistant for civil defense, a close working relationship between the civil defense leadership and the military command will result, the responsibility of civil defense staffs for the state of affairs will be raised considerably, and the attention and assistance to civil defense from the command of the military district will be increased.

The author of the article asserts that not all commanders of military districts provide for allocating the necessary forces and assistance to civil defense for eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy air attack. It seems to us that there is no basis for such conclusions. True, it is difficult to say what the author means by "necessary forces". In a number of districts, even if all troops were enlisted for eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy nuclear attack, there would not be enough of them. The commanders of military districts have allocated forces for assisting civil defense in exact accordance with the requirement of the directive of the General Staff. This assistance on the part of the troops, of course, is very small.
In the second and third sections of the article, the author posed the important question: How should cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces be organized in peace and wartime? However, the author's proposals cannot satisfy the reader. The fact of the matter is that Comrade Ya. Kozachok has reduced all recommendations down to one-sided, unlimited assistance to civil defense on the part of organs of the Ministry of Defense whereby the author frequently calls plans of military districts for assisting chiefs of civil defense, "plans of cooperation".

The question inevitably suggests itself whether there is a difference between the offering of mutual assistance and cooperation? We think there is. Cooperating forces always act according to an overall concept and carry out a common task. Control of these forces is implemented by one organ. Their actions are regulated according to goal, place and time. This means that within the operational borders of an interior military district there must be a single concept for conducting civil defense. Troops and civil defense take part in carrying it out. The overall direction, obviously, is headed by the commander of the military district. In this instance, it is required that a plan of cooperation be worked out.

Under conditions when the military district allocates a part of its forces to the chiefs of civil defense or civil defense allocates a part of its forces for assisting the military district, there is no cooperation. The person to whom the forces have been allocated organizes cooperation. In the given instance, we have a case where assistance is offered to one another.

If, in the future, the principle of unity of direction of civil defense as a whole is not introduced within the operational borders of a military district, then there is no need to work out a "Plan for the Civil Defense and Local Defense of the Military District", consisting of five individual plans, as recommended by the author.

It is entirely sufficient to have a "plan of mutual assistance between troops of the military district and civil defense" in a military district. It must reflect such questions as the grouping of forces mutually allocated from the troops of the
district and from civil defense, their purpose, routes, and signals for movement to areas of possible operations, and materiel-technical support. All this can be reflected on one map.

In order to know the status of civil defense, it is advisable to have in the military district a composite plan of civil defense of oblasts, krais, and republics located within the operational borders of the district.

In conclusion we would like to say a few words regarding the organization of civil defense departments of military districts. The author has shown their role and numerous duties quite completely, but it is appropriate to touch upon their table of organization. In our view, it would be effective to organize these departments on the principle of tasks to be performed and, in accordance with this, to have three sections in their composition: operations, mobilization and combat training, and one for specialists and scientific information.

* * *

Under conditions of missile/nuclear war, cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense is of exceptionally great importance. Therefore, we feel that the questions raised in the article of General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok, are quite topical and deserve thoughtful discussion.

Such problems as the joint use of troops of the military district and civil defense of republics, krais, oblasts and cities which are located within the operational borders of the military district, and problems of non-urban zones, road networks and communications lines, in our opinion, must be resolved primarily to the advantage of the troops.

In connection with this, the main principles of assistance and cooperation between armed forces and civil defense, in our view, must be worked out in the General Staff of the armed forces. Stemming from this, it is necessary to have a single organ in the General Staff, which would unify the efforts of all branches of the armed forces and civil defense and which would serve as the organizer of their cooperation. The organizer of cooperation between the troops of a military district and civil defense forces located in the territory of the district, must be
the commander of the district. Therefore, all matters of assistance and cooperation, and also of coordinated operations of troops and civil defense forces must be worked out in the operational plan of the district by the staff and civil defense department of the military district jointly with representatives of the civil defense staff of the republic, according to the periods of operational readiness.

On the basis of the information in the appropriate section of the operational plan, the staff of the military district and the civil defense staffs of Union republics may give instructions to the garrison chiefs and civil defense chiefs of oblasts and krais for drafting plans for assistance and cooperation between garrison units and civil defense forces.

This method for planning and organizing assistance and cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense will be possible only if the General Staff and Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR give the commanders of military districts and chiefs of civil defense of republics, instructions on the procedure for operations of troops and civil defense forces in rendering mutual assistance according to periods of operational readiness.

There is no argument with the article's position that, in the civil defense department of the military district, there is a need for a composite plan of basic civil defense measures of oblasts, krais and republics.

The author of the article proposes that control of military district forces allocated to civil defense organs to assist them will be carried out by the assistant commander of the district for civil defense, from his control post. In our opinion, such a suggestion is unfounded, since the commander of the military district undoubtedly will control these forces through the staff and civil defense department of the district and also through the garrison chiefs, using the control and communications means existing in the district for this purpose.

Radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance in the territory of the military district, in our view, should be conducted according to a unified plan developed by the staff of the military district. The quantity of allocated forces and means, and also the organization of radiation, chemical and
bacteriological reconnaissance and the warning procedure should be stipulated in this plan. For conducting the aforementioned types of reconnaissance, reconnaissance subunits of combined-arms large units and also medical, chemical, and veterinary facilities of the military district and civil defense and radiotechnical units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country should be enlisted, since, according to available data, the coordinates, range and altitude of nuclear bursts and radioactive clouds and the direction of movement of these clouds can be determined by all types of existing radar sets.

For gathering and collating the reconnaissance data, and also for forecasting the radiation situation and warning the garrison chiefs and civil defense staffs about the enemy's employment of radioactive, chemical and bacterial means, it is advisable to set up a directing group for the aforementioned types of reconnaissance attached to the staff of the district. In conducting its work, this group can use the inter-garrison wire and radio communications which exist in the districts.

The opinion of the author that the warning of all inhabited areas about the threat of an enemy air attack must be set up directly from command posts of radiotechnical units and subunits, is deserving of attention. However, this is possible only if an automated device is introduced into the warning system. Therefore, we feel that the existing warning procedure in the civil defense system must be constantly improved. In particular, transmission of the "Air Alert" and "All Clear" signals to civil defense staffs from command posts of large units and units of the Air Defense Forces of the Country must be organized via radio links.

In order that the civil defense departments of military districts can lend effective assistance to civil defense organs of enlarged national economic councils, it is necessary for the General Staff and Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR to specify in an official document the interrelationships and obligations of these departments concerning civil defense matters.

In General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok's article, it is pointed out that the civil defense departments of military districts together with the civil defense staffs of republics, krais, and oblasts work out coordinated plans and then jointly put them into effect.
We do not know which plans he is speaking about. If it is about combat training and operational training plans, then they do not have to be drawn up, since all operational training and combat training measures, as well as command-staff and tactical exercises, courses, and staff training practices conducted by staffs of military districts and by garrisons jointly with civil defense staffs must be included in orders, directives and calendar plans of combat training and operational training which have been worked out by the General Staff, staffs of the ground forces and military districts, and also by the civil defense staffs of the USSR and the republics. Only under this condition will joint measures for operational and combat training be conducted for the benefit of both troops and civil defense forces, which will also facilitate the improvement of methods of cooperation between them.

As a rule, the method of joint operations of civil defense and military districts was used in command-staff and tactical exercises in 1962 and 1963.

Such exercises, in our view, do not produce the desired results. In order to fully work out matters of assistance and cooperation between troops of military districts and civil defense forces of republics, oblasts, and krais located within the operational borders of military districts, it is most advisable to conduct independent civil defense exercises under the leadership of commanders of military districts and chiefs of civil defense. Only in the course of such special exercises can problems of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense be properly explored.