MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Planning and Forms of Research of the Problems of Military Science

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article reviews recent progress in military science work in the Soviet armed forces, in which emphasis is being placed on researching the problems of conducting strategic operations with nuclear weapons. The authors recommend that the General Staff and military academies develop ten-year plans for research, in addition to the five-year plans, and that military districts have two-year plans instead of one-year plans. The overall conduct of collective military science work in the military districts is examined, with emphasis on the need for continued training of scientific cadres and more timely publishing of their work. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Colonel H. Skoptsov and Colonel M. Vasilenkov. This article reviews recent progress in military science work in the Soviet armed forces, in which emphasis is being placed on researching the problems of conducting strategic operations with nuclear weapons. The authors recommend that the General Staff and military academies develop ten-year plans for research, in addition to the five-year plans, and that military districts have two-year plans instead of one-year plans. The overall conduct of collective military science work in the military districts is examined, with emphasis on the need for continued training of scientific cadres at academies and in practical experience in the armed forces, as well as more timely publishing of their work.

Comment:

A Colonel M. I. Skoptsov was identified as a participant in a conference held by the Military Science Directorate of the General Staff in July 1967. The authors also collaborated on "Combat Actions of Troops Without the Use of the Means of Mass Destruction" in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966 and "Military-Scientific Work in the Armed Forces in a New Stage" in Issue No. 1 (77) for 1966.
The Planning and Forms of Research of the Problems of Military Science
by
Colonel M. Skoptsov
Colonel M. Vasilenkov

Military science work in the armed forces constitutes an important means of raising combat effectiveness and combat readiness. Its function is to ensure the uninterrupted development of military science and the theory of military art. This is especially necessary at the present time, when new means of armed combat are rapidly being developed and existing models of combat equipment and weapons are being improved. The need naturally arises to refine and reexamine our views as to the nature and possible forms and methods of conducting modern wars, operations, and battles.

Soviet military science, by drawing upon the achievements of the social and natural sciences, determines, on a timely and scientific basis, the main directions for the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR and works out new methods and forms of armed combat.

Many years of experience demonstrate that our military science accurately reflects the changes taking place in military affairs, advances sound new propositions, and points the way to achieving victory in a modern war. It is being developed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and the creative utilization of V. I. Lenin's enormously rich legacy of military theory.

To V. I. Lenin belongs the historic credit for developing the ideological foundations and the most important aspects of Soviet military science, which have guided our Party to the successful solution of the highly complex problem of the armed protection of the first workers' and peasants' state in the world and continue daily to strengthen the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy. Of particular value under present-day conditions are the instructions of V. I. Lenin concerning the need to further develop those aspects of military science which could point the way to practical use and meet the requirements of the present and those of the near future.
The theoretical research in the realm of military art that is being carried out in our Armed Forces is directed mainly to the conditions for the conduct of missile/nuclear warfare. Both the general problems of military art and the specific forms and methods of conducting military actions, matters of employing the branches of the armed forces and branch arms, and the special features of controlling the armed forces under the complex conditions of a situation are being studied. At the same time we are continuing to refine the methods and forms of conducting military actions with the use of conventional means of destruction only.

The simultaneous research of the theoretical problems of both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare is scientifically valid and fully meets the requirement of our Party -- to prepare the Armed Forces of the USSR to wage war under any conditions and employing all existing means.

Over the last three years, approximately 200 papers on military theory have been prepared and published and several hundred articles have appeared in military journals and the collected papers of military academies. A study of these materials shows that all the research is devoted to the urgent matters of strategy, operational art, and tactics and is directed toward supporting the operational and combat training of troops and staffs and at increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces. This indicates that theory and practice constitute a single whole and are developed, not in isolation from each other, but on the basis of continuous interconnection and cross-fertilization. This unity is achieved by having the General Staff and the main staffs of the branches of the armed forces centrally determine the principal problems of military science to be researched and tested in practice. These problems are reflected in the five-year plans and the one-year plans for military science work, which as a matter of course must be coordinated with plans for operational and combat training.

The General Staff conducts long-range planning of research on problems of military science through its scientific organ -- the Military Science Directorate. The General Staff determines the general direction and scope of the research in the branches of the armed forces in light of the long-range prospects for the development of military affairs. This makes it possible to concentrate scientific efforts on solving the fundamental problems of military science.

The main staffs of the branches of the armed forces, which constitute the basic link in the system of planning scientific research and its practical application, develop long-range (five-year) and yearly work...
plans. These staffs, which are familiar with the general direction of operational and combat training and the requirements for the development of military science, determine the specific subject matter and volume of scientific research.

For example, the long-range plan for the next five years (1969-1973) provides for research to determine the possible nature of a future war and the conditions under which it might occur, and to refine methods of conducting combat actions both in a nuclear war and in a non-nuclear war, as well as in a war which might begin with the use of conventional means of destruction and escalate into a nuclear war. A knowledge of the nature of modern warfare is important because it makes it possible to correctly organize the working out of the basic problems of military science and to train military personnel in specific areas.

For this reason attention is being focused in this plan on the need for in-depth scientific research on the problems of preparing and conducting joint strategic operations involving the different branches of the armed forces and branch arms, on the methods of combat actions of troops following an exchange by the belligerents of massed nuclear strikes, on the methods of restoring groupings of forces and means and committing them to an engagement, and on a number of other subjects.

The one-year plans for military science work are drawn up by the staffs of units, large units, and formations and by all the military educational institutions. They reflect the tasks to be carried out during the given year, i.e., they survey individual problems that arise from the long-range plan. This individual treatment makes planning more flexible and responsive to conditions in the armed forces. Thus, for example, further research on methods of combat actions by troops using combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and on methods of troop control during the march and under complex battle conditions, constitutes one of the main directions for the working out of problems of military science during the current year in conformity with Order of the Minister of Defense No. 0314, 1968.

Along with centralized planning and determination of the problems of military science that are to be researched, every general and officer is given broad freedom to plan and work out problems that arise out of the practical tasks of large units and formations, in addition to working on the required subjects stipulated by the plans of the higher staffs.
The state of military affairs now depends, to a much greater degree than before, on the military technical sciences which, while developing new models of combat equipment and weapons, coordinate their research with the latest scientific discoveries. During peacetime, this area of military science is in the very forefront of the battle for military technical superiority over the probable enemy. As is known, the planning of our socialist economy and of industrial output, including means of armed combat, is done for a five-year period, and fairly specific indicators are established. For this reason research in the area of military science is always coordinated with the development of new military equipment and combat weapons. This is necessary so that theoretical research may exert an active influence on armament development while at the same time timely progress may be made in military science in the light of long-range improvements in equipment.

However, under present-day conditions the rate of scientific progress is so great that a five-year plan for the development of science, especially of military science, no longer fully ensures its priority. Scientific prognosis, without which scientific development is doomed to backwardness, is now moving into the forefront. Scientific prognosis over a period of ten or more years is no longer considered a futile fantasy but a valid proposal based both on experience and on the present state of technical thought.

In this connection, it appears advisable for the General Staff, the main staffs of the branches of the armed forces, and the military academies, in addition to drawing up a five-year plan for military science work, to formulate plans for the next ten years, in which the general directions for the development of military science are determined. These would be of benefit when establishing the scientific grounding for requirements for new weapons and combat equipment. An understanding of the problems of future knowledge would be exceptionally valuable in solving the major problems of the present.

The yearly planning of military science research by the military districts (groups of forces), air defense districts, fleets, and armies makes it possible to formulate the theoretical matters requiring study and practical testing over the course of a year. However, in order to lay a firmer foundation for the in-depth scientific development of long-range plans, in our opinion it is advisable to draw up a two-year plan for military science work instead of a one-year plan. This would make it possible to summarize the experience of large exercises and war games, to discuss it at military science conferences and meetings, and during the
second year to scientifically formulate conclusions and recommendations and set them forth in a report, article, or short paper.

Let us examine some specific examples of how the subject matter for the research and practical development of certain problems of military science may be determined.

First, naturally, the problems involved in ensuring high combat readiness in our Armed Forces are explored. Combat readiness is one of the most important factors in achieving a swift and decisive victory in a war and, above all, in the operations carried out at its very beginning. Therefore the problems involved in maintaining large units and formations in constant combat readiness, and especially of bringing them to full combat readiness in the shortest possible period of time, are given special consideration in the orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, in the directives on operational training, and in theoretical papers and articles.

In order to explore more deeply the problems of increasing the combat readiness of troops and staffs and to achieve unity of opinion on these matters, the General Staff composed and published in 1965 the study "Combat Readiness of the Division" (edited by Colonel General K. F. Skorobogatkin) and the monograph "Bringing the Troops of a Border Military District to Combat Readiness" (by General-Leytenant G. G. Semenov). These works summarize the operational and combat training experience of a number of military districts and groups of forces, and offer recommendations aimed at reducing the amount of time needed to notify personnel, assemble on the basis of a combat alert signal, prepare the troops and combat equipment and move them out of their permanent deployment sites, load and move out mobile reserves, deploy the rocket troops and aviation for the delivery of the first nuclear strike, etc. They stress that the requirements for combat readiness cannot remain fixed. The intensive development of the means and methods of armed combat must always be taken into consideration and appropriate changes must be made in the substance of the actual measures taken to maintain a high level of combat readiness among all branches of the armed forces and branch arms.

In recent years, different points of view have been expressed in the military press and at military science conferences as to the problem of the meeting engagement. There have been differing evaluations of the role of this type of offensive action in the operations of a nuclear war. Doubt was cast even on the likelihood of a meeting engagement taking place in a future war. The matters of preparing and conducting a meeting engagement were examined from various standpoints and resolved in practice.
The General Staff carefully studied this problem, summarized the materials from a strategic exercise and the theoretical work of the Belorussian, Carpathian, North Caucasus, and Volga military districts, and in 1969 published the theoretical work "The Meeting Engagement", which has been sent to the troops and staffs and is a good textbook.

Let us take another example. Several years ago, during the operational training of a number of border military districts, it was discovered that the generals and officers lacked sufficient experience in organizing and carrying out troop movements over large distances and in planning their commitment to an engagement from the march. This was because troop training had been based on the experience of past wars, and the capabilities of new means of armed combat and of highly mobile transport had not been given adequate consideration. This shortcoming was repeatedly observed in directives on operational training. It was necessary to treat this problem scientifically and give specific recommendations to the troops and staffs.

With this in mind, the General Staff instructed the Belorussian, Odessa, Carpathian, Kiev, North Caucasus, and Moscow military districts, the Northern Group of Forces, the directorates of the chiefs of engineer troops and communications troops, and certain military academies to develop methods of organizing the forward movement of troops over great distances, to test them during front, army, and division exercises, and to submit a report containing conclusions and proposals for subsequent generalizations to be drawn.

As stipulated by these tasks, the troops conducted command-staff exercises and war games, and held military science conferences and meetings where the problems of moving large groupings of troops forward and of committing them to an engagement were discussed. On the basis of the materials obtained, the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff composed and published the work "The Movement of Front Troops Forward over a Large Distance and Their Commitment to an Engagement". (The collective of authors was headed by Colonel General M. I. Povaliy.) The theoretical recommendations set forth in the work are now being widely implemented in practice and are of great help in increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces.

It is clear from these two examples that the planning of the basic problems of military science should be centralized, and that theoretical research should be aimed at raising the quality of operational and combat training and at developing new methods and forms of armed combat.
As has already been pointed out, the individual generals and officers (authors) are given wide latitude in determining which problems of military science are to be researched. Confirmation of this is found in the publishing of the following works: "V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces" (authors' collective of the Military Political Academy i/n V. I. Lenin), "Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army" (collections of articles), "Military Strategy" (authors' collective under the direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky), "A Front Offensive Operation to the Entire Depth of a Theater of Military Operations" (authors' collective composed of Colonel General I. S. Glebov, General-Mayor S. V. Shtrak, and Colonel G. A. Parkhalin), "Nuclear War Strategy" (authors' collective under the direction of Colonel General K. F. Skorobogatkin), and others.

Generals and officers of the Military Academy i/n M. V. Frunze and of the Far East and Baltic military districts at one time did a great deal of work in studying the principles of the combined-arms battle in a nuclear war. The General Staff commended their initiative and gave its consent to research of this extremely important problem and to composing the work "The Combined-Arms Battle in a Nuclear War" (authors' collective under the direction of General of the Army P. M. Kurochkin). The book was published and is now being used extensively not only by our Armed Forces, but also by the armies of the socialist countries. In 1967 the authors' collective of this work was awarded the M. V. Frunze Prize.

At the present time almost every major scientific achievement has been attained by a collective and is the fruit of the work of many generals and officers, each of whom contributed his share to the overall work. The greater the participation of specialists in the research and development of the fundamental problems of military science, the fewer mistakes there will be. All our experience supports this conclusion.

The constant participation of many generals and officers in the research of the problems of military science makes it possible to bring to military science activities a broad spectrum of creative workers with considerable experience and deep theoretical knowledge, as well as talented young people. This form of work enables military scholars to maintain constant creative ties with generals and officers in the troops and to focus the efforts of the scientific cadres on performing important tasks. Moreover, the use of the collective form of work substantially reduces the amount of time spent in researching the problems of military science.

The experience of the work of authors' collectives demonstrates that to obtain good results and complete research within the established time
limits, supervisors and chiefs at all levels must devote constant attention to the work of the collective, providing it with skilled assistance and systematically monitoring the course of research. The problem of allotting the necessary time and basic materials for creative work is becoming especially acute. Where these problems are resolved successfully, the results of the scientific activity are always good.

Along with the above-mentioned methods of conducting research in the armed forces, specialized military science research groups are now being organized. They usually are set up for the duration of large exercises and war games and have the function of studying specific matters and testing them in practice, summarizing the information obtained, and making specific conclusions and recommendations. The fact that such groups have been formed, and that highly-trained officers with various specialties have been included in them, demonstrates that they are capable of in-depth, scientifically grounded research on the matters assigned.

Military science research works and studies put out by individual authors have been widely disseminated. This form of research is employed not only when writing articles, reports, and essays, but also when preparing monographs of theoretical works on individual problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics. In recent years a large number of scientific papers have been published and have enjoyed great success. General-Mayor of Engineer-Technical Service I. I. Anureyev prepared the paper "Problems in Employing Space Weapons for Strategic Purposes and Their Combat Effectiveness", General-Leytenant G. T. Zavizion wrote "The Movement Forward of a Tank Army over a Great Distance", and General-Mayor P. D. Gudz wrote "The Development of the Tactics of Tank Troops", etc.

We have examined only a few of the ways of researching the problems of military theory. It would be wrong to show a preference for any one of them. Only by combining all possible forms and keeping in mind the specific conditions and the availability of highly trained military cadres can success be ensured. And regardless of which form of work is chosen, it is always essential to strive for in-depth and comprehensive research of the problem assigned.

The matters of the planning and form of scientific research on military theory are inseparably linked with the availability of scientific cadres in the armed forces and their forms of training, and to a certain degree depend on having an organized system for obtaining military science and scientific-technical information on the latest achievements in the area of military science itself and the related sciences with which it comes in
To develop military science in every possible way is the concern of every general and officer. However, the wide involvement of officers in scientific work does not fully solve all the great problems confronting it. In order to develop, military science, like any other science, requires specially trained cadres who have mastered Marxist-Leninist methodology to perfection. There are now thousands of highly qualified scientific workers in the Armed Forces of the USSR, but the problem of training scientific cadres remains as urgent as before.

Order of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR No. 110 of 28 April 1969 provides that scientific and scientific research cadres of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR be trained by means of graduate work at a military academy, graduate work at a civilian university, and through non-resident graduate degree candidacy. Training is provided either by interrupting service (resident work at military academies and civilian universities) or without interruption (non-resident graduate degree candidacy, or correspondence courses given by military academies and civilian universities). The planning of time periods, numbers, and specialties is done by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the armed forces, commanders (chiefs of branch arms), and chiefs of the main (central) directorates of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and it is reflected in the annual and long-term (five-year) plans.

The leading role in training scientific cadres belongs to the military academies, which have highly qualified professorial and teaching personnel and the necessary materiel-technical base. Moreover, the concentration of efforts to train these cadres in the academies creates conditions conducive to the supervision of their training at the level of the branches of the armed forces and branch arms.

At the same time, scientific cadres are trained not only by means of graduate work at a military academy or civilian university, but also through daily teaching and scientific research activities and the independent creative work of young officers who have come from the troops to an educational institution or to the central organization of the Ministry of Defense. As a rule, they perform scientific work of increasing complexity, beginning with the writing of a lecture, paper, article, or textbook. This sequence of scientific activities makes it possible to more readily ascertain the abilities of the young officers and to aid them in choosing the direction of their research work.
In the armed forces there is at present a shortage of scientific cadres in such branches of knowledge as strategy, operational art, philosophy, economics, military education, and psychology. Our military academies, especially the Military Political Academy /n V. I. Lenin, provide good training in philosophy, education, and psychology. In them officers receive a higher military education which enables them to successfully solve the most diverse problems under the complex conditions of a modern battle. But this is not sufficient to enable the graduates to immediately begin working out and researching the major problems of military theory.

In view of the above, we believe that it would be helpful if the military academies devoted more attention to teaching the students methods of researching the problems of military theory and to determining which generals and officers are most capable of performing creative work. It is advisable for these students to be assigned, after graduation from the academy, to work in large operational staffs so that they can consolidate their knowledge and acquire skills in the areas of strategy and operational art. At the end of two or three years, young officers who have proved their ability in these matters may be recommended for work in the military science organs, scientific research institutes, and military academies.

Short courses (five to six months long) may be organized at the Military Academy of the General Staff for generals and officers who have displayed a bent for scientific research, following their graduation from a military academy, in order to give them additional knowledge of the fundamentals of strategy and operational art, and of research methods. They would then be assigned to military science organs.

In our opinion, it is advisable to hold annual seminars and assemblies or scientific conferences for officers and generals engaged in the analysis of problems of military science in order to raise their scientific level and mastery of methodology. During such meetings they could summarize the experience they have accumulated and acquire the skills necessary for further work. Those attending the assemblies could attend a number of lectures given by prominent military scholars and illustrious military commanders and leaders in our Armed Forces on the achievements of Soviet military science and scientific research methods. Such assemblies, gatherings or seminars would undoubtedly lead to an increase in the number of scientific cadres.

The scope of our approach to the problem of scientific cadres depends directly on the level of general training of command personnel. In the
armed forces there are a great many generals and officers who have graduated from one or two military academies. This provides a firm base for training scientific cadres directly within the troops, staffs, and directorates of the military district and central organization.

However, the number of creative workers at these levels is still increasing too slowly. Organizational deficiencies often impede the growth in the number of scientific cadres in the troops. For example, there are difficulties in selecting topics for the dissertations. This is not because the candidate has doubts as to the relevance of his topic, but because there is no guarantee that it will be approved by the academic council of the academy for defense of the dissertation. This shortcoming could easily be eliminated if closer and more regular contact were maintained between the troops and the military academies.

In order to increase the number of scientific cadres, it is very important for information to be furnished on achievements of military science that have been worked out and defended in candidate and doctoral dissertations. It must be admitted that although we publish many books and military journals, it is sometimes difficult to publish a brief report on new developments in military science because military journals, works of the academies, and information collections are not published frequently. Even after articles are accepted they often wait more than a year for their turn to be published.

From the standpoint of increasing the number of scientific cadres and further developing military science, our publications (journals, works of the academies, collections, etc.) are not only the product of intellectual labor, but also a tool used by it. They constitute an indispensable prerequisite to highly effective work by military scholars. Therefore the military press should constantly be engaged in the accumulation and generalization of information and in the creative discussion of new problems. To this end it is clearly advisable to increase the frequency and size of several of the publications, especially the Collections of the Journal "Military Thought", which is the principal military theoretical publication, and in which new problems of strategy and operational art are discussed. The introduction of a special section in the journal devoted to military scientific life would be desirable.

The directives of the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU on the five-year plan for development of the economy of the USSR for the years 1966 to 1970 provided for an increase of 50 percent in the total number of copies of journals printed and of 25 percent in the number of books.
published. It is therefore reasonable to anticipate an increase in the frequency of appearance of our military publications. It should be observed that this could be accomplished without special expenditures of financial resources by reducing the output of nonessential, less important books, a large number of which are still being published. Even if a small increase in appropriations is required, it would be justified since it would serve to strengthen the defensive capability of our Motherland.

The Party and the Soviet government attach enormous importance to science and therefore do not spare any means for its development. Even during the difficult years of dislocation, V. I. Lenin, foreseeing the vital importance of science to our future, allocated an appreciable portion of the meager financial resources of the country to the establishment of institutes and higher educational institutions and the training of scientific cadres. Without the higher civilian and military educational institutions that were established during the first years of Soviet rule, which forged skilled cadres and served as a base for scientific centers, the great achievements in the area of missile technology, nuclear weapons, and other new means of armed combat, of which our country is justly proud, would have been impossible. The stimulation of the creative activities of scientific cadres constitutes an important prerequisite to their further growth.

The decisions of the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU commit the military cadres to substantial improvements in the style and methodology of their scientific research. The success of our work will be largely dependent on this. The Party requires that the scientific cadres of the country strengthen the principle of judiciously combining centralization with the development of local creative initiative. Scientific research should be responsive to the practical needs of the armed forces. The Soviet Army and Navy have at their disposal all that is necessary for the fruitful development of military science.

As it advances, military science will inevitably come into conflict with the level of development it has already achieved. In this lies the objective dialectic of all sciences and of any learning process. It is inconceivable that science could develop without conflicting opinions, free scientific criticism, or the discussion and testing of different points of view. True science will not tolerate a monopoly of the views of individual personalities.

The Party teaches that criticism and self-criticism constitute the driving force behind the development of a socialist society and a potent
means of detecting and decisively correcting shortcomings and mistakes. V. I. Lenin pointed out in his works that the level of criticism and self-criticism constitutes the best indicator of the maturity of a collective. The numerous works, articles, and speeches of Vladimir Ilich provide a striking example of principled, practical, scientific criticism aimed at exposing the errors of those who advocate any kind of deviation from Marxism.

The establishment of a creative situation that is conducive to the advancing of new ideas and to putting them into practice, and to raising military science to a higher level, is the task of all the generals and officers of our Armed Forces.