MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between Troops and Civil Defense Organs

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article, in supplementing a previous one dealing with cooperation between the military and civil defense, dwells on civil defense planning at the military district level. Civil defense cooperation matters to be included in the planning of long-distance troop movements are listed, along with a recommendation that a unified service be formed to regulate the movement of troops and civilians. The author recommends establishing a nationwide network of radiation observation facilities, and covers planning related to combating saboteurs, eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear attack, training personnel and employing and controlling special civil defense troops. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963. The

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between Troops and Civil Defense Organs

Summary: The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Lieutenant P. Chirkov. This article, in supplementing a previous one dealing with cooperation between the military and civil defense, dwells on civil defense planning at the military district level, which involves the oblast and republic civil defense chiefs. Civil defense cooperation matters to be included in the planning of long-distance troop movements are listed, along with a recommendation that a unified service be formed to regulate the movement of troops and civilians. In discussing the importance of radiation reconnaissance, the author recommends establishing a nationwide network of observation and measuring facilities. Other aspects of civil defense planning covered in the article relate to combating saboteurs, eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear attack, training personnel, and employing and controlling special civil defense troops.

Comment: General-Lieutenant Petr Mikhailovich Chirkov is a former chief of the Ashkhabad garrison in the Turkestan Military District. He retired in 1971.
Cooperation Between Troops and Civil Defense Organs
by
General-Leytenant P. Chirkov

As is known, great changes have occurred in the nature of troop combat actions, and in the preparation and conduct of operations, in connection with the possibility that means of mass destruction will be employed in modern war. The importance and nature of training and the work of civil defense, and its scope and scale in a missile/nuclear war also are radically changing.

In connection with this, we feel it is necessary, as a supplement to the article of General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok, "Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense", to express certain views relating to the nature of cooperation between troops and civil defense organs, without which, in our opinion, it is now impossible to successfully implement the movement of troops from the interior of the country and to organize the supply of reserves to a front.

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Military organs must begin taking part in the work of civil defense even in peacetime, when the military district staff and all garrison chiefs have the capability to offer qualified assistance to local civil defense organs in working out civil defense plans. In doing this, it is very important to draw the proper conclusions from an assessment of expected enemy action against the installations of an oblast (republic), to set up warning and communications, to designate evacuation routes for the populace and areas for distributing supplies, and to establish measures for the military command to take in assisting the quickest possible evacuation. An evacuation which is begun in an untimely or careless manner can alert the enemy and forewarn him of the nature of our actions. It is necessary to stipulate in the plan what specific assistance, and with what forces, one military garrison or another can offer a city in eliminating the aftereffects of a nuclear strike and, conversely, what assistance the military can count on from local organs, what installations require increased protection in support of the troops, and where it is necessary to concentrate various construction materials in advance (for example, for restoring crossings or increasing the trafficability of roads).

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The corresponding military commissar can take an active part in working out the operational plan of a republic (oblast, city, raion). He must be concerned with matters of supporting the mobilization of reservists and transport: where will the various supplies allotted to support the mobilization and evacuation (dispersal) be placed, with what types of transport and at what time will he assist in carrying out the evacuation. Quite a number of other matters arise, which the military commissar and chief of the garrison must take part in resolving. The operational plan for civil defense of an oblast and republic must be coordinated with the staff of the military district. Without this, it is largely unrealistic, and the consequences of such lack of coordination in the period of threat or at the beginning of war will be very severe: "traffic jams" on the most important movement routes, the gathering of masses of population in troop concentration areas, unpunished enemy sabotage, and others.

It is very important for the military district staff to work out, in a timely manner, a plan for assisting local civil defense organs in eliminating the aftereffects of a nuclear strike against the most important installations. All subunits, facilities, units and large units which may be allocated to render assistance and to be responsible for warning local organs, as well as the procedure for organizing assistance, should be listed in the plan.

The forces and means allocated by the local organs to aid installations of the Ministry of Defense, for example, bases, airfields, etc., can be indicated in the plan. Therefore, in our opinion, it is more correct to call this document a plan for cooperation between the military district troops and the local civil defense organs. Copies of the plan should be sent to interested garrison and civil defense chiefs. Obviously, the troop commander and the chief of civil defense/the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic in whose territory the military district is located, must approve the plan.

We think that all the intended measures concerning mutual assistance should be examined by periods: in peacetime, in a period of increased readiness, in the period of threat (if there is one), and in the period of eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Chief of Civil Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade V. I. Chuykov, by a special directive in June 1962, proposed to the chiefs of civil defense of Union and autonomous republics, krais and oblasts, and also to the commanders of military districts, that the leadership, staffs and services of civil
defense should be called to participate in military exercises, and that the staffs of large units and units of troops, the assistant troop commanders for civil defense, civil defense departments of the military districts, engineer units, and also local defense installations of the Ministry of Defense and military commissariats should participate in civil defense exercises.

In 1962, such joint exercises were conducted in many military districts. For example, in the Odessa Military District, skeleton staffs and subunits of military units assigned to render assistance to the city of Nikolaev participated in a civil defense exercise of Nikolaev Oblast. In the course of exercises conducted in the Transcaucasus Military District, the necessity of setting up cooperation between the medical facilities and military road services of the front and those of the Transcaucasus republics was brought to light. In an exercise in the Moscow Military District much attention was given to control of civil defense troops and military units while they were assisting a stricken major city and in joint elimination of areas of bacteriological contamination.

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Matters of cooperation with local civil defense organs will occupy quite an important place in planning a troop movement from the interior of the country. In our opinion, it is mandatory that the commander and staff of the advancing formation provide for:

-- the timely clearing of march routes for the passage of troops;
-- the stocking of building materials close to bridges and crossings to restore them in case they are put out of service by the enemy;
-- the setting up of reserves of water for drinking and equipment needs at places of possible troop halts;
-- the setting up of reserves of fuel and rations to replenish those which have been used;
-- continuous reconnaissance (radiation, chemical, and bacteriological);
-- assistance in regulating movement and in reconnoitering routes;
-- the use of local communications means to control the movement of troops (through civil defense staffs);
-- the use of local repair organs to repair motor vehicle-
tractor and armored equipment on the movement routes;
-- the capabilities of medical facilities in the zone of
movement, for the purpose of employing them in the
event of the mass destruction of troop personnel.

Properly organized cooperation between the formation staff and civil
defense chiefs and staffs on the above-listed matters alone allows the
troops to be moved from the interior of the country in shorter time limits,
with a considerable saving of troop means for subsequent combat actions.

Regulating movement in the area of the advancing troops requires
special attention from the military command. We must keep in mind that
intensive movement of the civilian population from the cities to non-urban
areas may begin at the same time. Therefore, it becomes necessary in
peacetime to have at least the basis of a unified service to regulate
movement on all local, republic and Union roads. The personnel of this
service can in peacetime be attached to civil defense staffs and can be
deployed with the introduction of increased readiness or in a period of
threat. To think that only the military road service handles these tasks
would be erroneous, since the volume of tasks it carries out has grown very
greatly. The time has also come now to train not only the urban but also
the rural community to perform the regulating service. Examples of the
participation of the local population in regulating movement are well known
to us from the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Of very great consequence, requiring close cooperation between troops
moving from the depth, and local civil defense organs, is radiation
reconnaissance. Data on the radiation, chemical and bacteriological
situation in the zone of troop movement will accumulate in civil defense
staffs much earlier than it will come to the commander and his staff from
their reconnaissance organs. Therefore, in addition to existing weather
stations and chemical laboratories, it would be very desirable to set up
throughout the country a network of radiation observation posts which are
provided with special instruments and linked both among themselves and with
the appropriate staffs (facilities). If the public (the All-Union
Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Navy, and Air Force --
DOSAAF, Komsomol, and the trade unions) can be enlisted for this task, then
it is possible to carry it out with a minimal expenditure of means.

Without this network of radiation observation posts, it is hardly
possible to find a method of warning the population and troops in the
interior of the country about the movement of a radioactive cloud, and
without timely warning, it is impossible to make arrangements in advance to
shelter the population or employ means of personal protection.

Let us note, by the way, that our probable enemies devote a great deal of attention to similar posts. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, it has been proposed to set up 36 interregional dosimetric detachments with 36 standing patrols in each; for every 25 patrols it is proposed to have one data processing point. By mid-1963 the number of radiation measuring posts in the US is projected to reach 180 thousand. To observe the radiation situation in England, 1,500 observation posts were set up, secured by dug-in shelters and located throughout the country at a distance of approximately 13 kilometers from each other.

Large areas of contamination, major destruction in cities, and fires, which are not always possible to bypass, may be created on the movement routes of troop groupings. Local civil defense organs can offer troops great assistance in negotiating these obstacles by breaching them and putting out fires, both independently and jointly with the troops.

As is known, our probable enemies are preparing to send groups and detachments of saboteurs into our rear and onto movement routes of troops during a war. Non-military civil defense contingents and units will have to play a large part in combating them. This matter must concern military chiefs and their staffs. All installations of the Ministry of Defense (depots, bases, airfields, important installations already in existence and those being built) will not be able to operate normally without reliable protection organized in cooperation with civil defense organs.

Matters of cooperation between troops and civil defense in eliminating the aftereffects of a nuclear attack against major cities, and industrial, political and administrative centers of the country, will become very urgent. The task will consist mainly of rescuing the stricken population, restoring industrial enterprises producing articles of military importance, and in connection with this, power supply enterprises, municipal services, communications means, etc. It is quite probable that, to assist local organs, the commander of the military district (front) and the chiefs of the garrisons will have to allocate additional military units and even large units besides those which were designated for this purpose according to the peacetime plan. Of course, it must not be detrimental to the fulfillment of the combat task and to the completion of mobilization to allocate these troops. Training and replacement units, schools, construction units, and, if necessary, even combat units, will be sent first. This matter must be more precisely defined in the instruction of the General Staff, since the existing instruction of 1955 has become quite
Cooperation between the allocated troops and civil defense contingents, in our opinion, should be organized by the chief of civil defense of a given oblast (republic). He should refine the tasks of the cooperating forces, determine the installations (sections, sectors) in which they will operate, means of reinforcement, the routes for supply and evacuation, the procedure for providing various materials and information, methods for communications and reporting, etc. The commander of the military district (front) may have not one but several installations (areas), where troops will have to be allocated to assist the civil defense. He will monitor their proper employment through his assistant for civil defense.

Taking into consideration everything said above, it seems to us that it is necessary to include matters connected with civil defense in the combat training program of all branch arms, as well as in command and staff training, so that all categories of servicemen will have a certain minimum of knowledge in this area. It is also important because each demobilized soldier, sergeant or officer can, if necessary, become a public instructor and organizer for training the population. It has become necessary as well to include the subject "Civil Defense" in the programs of all higher military and civilian educational institutions.

And still another important matter. As we know, to carry out the tasks of civil defense, special civil defense troops -- separate engineer regiments and battalions, communications and control subunits -- exist now and will be deployed, if necessary. In peacetime, these units are centrally subordinate -- to the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR through his Staff. They are entitled to all types of rations, just like all the other troops in the Ministry of Defense, and are supported through the military districts where they are garrisoned.

At the beginning of a war the matter of controlling these troops, providing them with all types of supplies (equipment, armament, fuel, spare parts), and replacing personnel, including officers, will be considerably more complex. Some comrades suggest immediately resubordinating newly deployed units to the civil defense chiefs of those oblasts where they were fully mobilized. In our opinion, such a decision is incorrect, since in the first days of war a large number of matters arise which the chief of civil defense and his staff will not be able to decide. Therefore, it seems to us that civil defense troops should be controlled in wartime by the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR/Deputy Minister of Defense through
the military districts. For this purpose, the military districts have an assistant commander for civil defense with a department which for wartime must be reinforced with officers and communications means. He must see to deployment, advanced combat training, and also to the proper employment of civil defense units in the territory of his district.

The proposals for employing these units, of course, will be introduced by the commander of the military district, who cannot remain indifferent to this matter, all the more since under certain conditions the government may make him responsible for eliminating the aftereffects of a nuclear attack on the territory of the district, and not only for assisting the civil defense organs.

This becomes more understandable if one considers the situation of such republics as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasia where, under the complex conditions of modern war, it sometimes is impossible for the Union and republic governments to maintain stable control over a group of distant oblasts. Within the Ministry of Defense we have a well organized level of control -- the military districts, which, if necessary, can, of course, be made responsible for organizing emergency measures within the borders of the military district in order to eliminate an enemy attack with means of mass destruction.

Considering the goals of civil defense, in our opinion it has become necessary to increase the number of military districts, especially in the Far East, in Siberia, and in Kazakhstan. For example, the Turkestan Military District, occupying an immense territory, is not in a position to successfully carry out new tasks which will arise there regarding lending assistance to civil defense.

In conclusion, we should remark that the matters of the cooperation of troops and staffs with the civil defense organs await their investigators. But it now is already fully obvious that, without cooperation organized in advance, and precisely worked out and comprehensively tested in the course of exercises and operational training, we will not be able to use the defensive might of our state to its full extent in time of war.