MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article examines the possibilities for civil defense assistance of the different branches of the armed forces in outlining areas for military and civil defense cooperation and identifying existing shortcomings. The author points out the lack of an overall concept and plan for employing military and civil defense forces, and the need for a central organ at the Ministry of Defense level to organize cooperation. The organization of civil defense at the military district level requires allocation of more military forces and better cooperation planning by the civil defense department to cover mutual assistance procedures, control over civil and local defense, and a composite plan for basic civil defense measures at the local level. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (69) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok. This article examines the possibilities for civil defense assistance of the different branches of the armed forces in outlining areas for military and civil defense cooperation and identifying existing shortcomings. The author points out the lack of an overall concept and plan for employing military and civil defense forces, and the need for a central organ at the Ministry of Defense level to organize cooperation. The organization of civil defense assistance at the military district level requires allocation of more military forces and better cooperation planning by the civil defense department to include mutual assistance, warning and communications procedures, control, and support. The civil defense department must have another plan to cover control over civil and local defense, and a composite plan for basic civil defense measures at the local level. The author also asserts that the assistant military district commander for civil defense must have a control post.

Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense
by
General-Mayor Ya. Kozachok

The civil defense of the USSR, as we know, is a system of state-wide defensive measures to be carried out for the protection of the population and the national economy against weapons of mass destruction, and for conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration work in centers of destruction. Civil defense is a new type of strategic support for the defense of the state in war. It comprises one of the most important defensive functions of the Party and Soviet organs and is a new way for the entire population of the country to participate in protecting the socialist state.

The conduct of rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in major cities and industrial areas which have been subjected to an enemy nuclear attack will take the form of large-scale civil defense operations in which participate tens and hundreds of thousands of people, organized into non-military civil defense contingents and operating with the active assistance and direct participation of troops. Rescue operations must be begun immediately after centers of destruction have been created, and they must be carried out within an extremely short time limit by all available forces, otherwise the people who are in the centers of destruction will perish.

It is natural that close intercoordination and interdependence exist between the civil defense and the armed forces. Now, it is difficult to achieve victory without well organized and well trained civil defense forces at our disposal which, in a nuclear war, must ensure the preservation of human and material resources and the maintenance of a stable economy.

Even in the Great Patriotic War, civil defense forces -- its engineer units and non-military contingents -- provided substantial assistance to the troops of the fronts. Many civil defense engineer units, by order of the commanders of fronts, were allocated to construct defensive works and defensive lines;
they took part in battles against the fascist German troops, dismantled obstructions, reconstructed industrial and residential buildings and structures, disarmed unexploded aerial bombs and artillery shells, cleared mines from buildings and passages, built shelters, and carried out other combat assignments. Thus, civil defense did not fulfil its tasks separately, but in cooperation with the armed forces.

At present, the role of such cooperation has grown immeasurably. Unfortunately, this has not been fully reflected in documents specifying the tasks of civil defense and its cooperation with the armed forces. They only discuss what military-methodological assistance has to be given to civil defense organs by the Ministry of Defense, military districts and garrison chiefs, and what kind of assistance must be given in strengthening civil defense, raising its combat readiness, and also in conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in stricken cities and at installations of the national economy.

In our opinion, it is time to abandon the mistaken view that only unilateral assistance (only from the armed forces) is possible for civil defense in carrying out its complex and important tasks. This view inevitably leads to a serious underestimation by many generals, officers, civil defense chiefs and their staffs of the problems of cooperation between troops and civil defense. It is necessary to reveal those great capabilities which civil defense has at its disposal for supporting combat actions by all branches of the armed forces in a future war.

The experience of joint exercises conducted in 1962 with the staffs and troops of military districts and military garrisons, and the civil defense of republics, krais, oblasts and cities, confirms this conclusion. Civil defense engineer units and non-military contingents of the medical, firefighting and engineer-technical services, supply services and several others can be of great assistance to the troops.

We should also keep in mind that civil defense forces will be of substantial help to installations of the Ministry of Defense in eliminating the aftereffects of nuclear strikes against them. In addition, assistance can be given to all
branches of the armed forces in fulfilling their combat tasks both in the country's rear and in the operational rear.

Such assistance can be given to the Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense Forces of the Country in repairing badly damaged lines of transportation leading to launch sites, launchers and surface-to-air missile launchers, in camouflaging them, in restoring the control system and airfield network of air defense aviation, and in other ways.

Civil defense can assist the Ground Forces in ensuring the movement of troops from the interior of the country to areas of combat actions when enemy nuclear strikes have begun. This is done by repairing severely damaged sections of roads, bridges and crossings. In the operational rear civil defense forces will assist troops on the march when roads are impassable, when troops are regrouping, and when a defense is being organized, in particular by installing defensive works, shelters, camouflage means, etc.

Civil defense engineer troops and non-military contingents will be able to assist the Air Forces in reconstructing damaged airfields, in constructing takeoff and landing strips and sites and camouflaging them, and in restoring damaged transportation lines.

The Navy can be helped in eliminating the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes against naval bases, ports and other installations, in setting up temporary points for basing a fleet or individual combat and auxiliary ships, and in laying transportation lines to them.

Civil defense forces will play quite an important role in eliminating sabotage and airborne landing groups which the enemy intends to drop on a wide scale during the initial period of a war into the rear of the country and especially the rear of fronts.

The troops of the Soviet Army and civil defense forces will undoubtedly make local medical bases and rear hospitals available to one another for treatment of casualties among the population and servicemen, as well as transport means, fuel, provisions, etc. Of great importance also are cooperation between the troops
and civil defense in conducting joint radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance, the mutual reporting of data from this reconnaissance, and forecasting of the spread of clouds from nuclear bursts. In connection with this, we feel it is advisable to hasten the solution of the problem of setting up a unified state-wide system of reconnaissance and warning about nuclear bursts and radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination on the basis of the state hydrometeorological service, all branches of the armed forces, and special posts set up within the civil defense system (of engineer units, organs of the militia, installations of the national economy, collective farms and state farms).

The timely and efficiently organized warning of civil defense control posts and the population by the radiotechnical troops of the Air Defense of the Country regarding the threat of an enemy air attack plays an important role. At present, such warning has been set up without regard for the special features of modern means of attack. The "Air Alert" signal, as a rule, is transmitted from the Air Defense Forces of the Country to civil defense control posts, and they duplicate it for the population and installations of the national economy, which leads to a great loss of time. Only major cities and industrial centers are warned of the threat of an attack; there is no warning of rural areas, which could in a number of instances lead to heavy losses.

The combined use of state and ministry communications nets, especially those which are necessary for the uninterrupted control of civil defense and troops both while they are moving from the interior of the country to areas of combat actions and in the operational rear, particularly when there is heavy jamming, is quite important in a nuclear war.

The cooperative use of roads for moving troops and carrying out civil defense tasks (evacuation and dispersal of the population, manual and office workers, institutions, and valuable materiel into a non-urban zone) is of some interest to the command of the troops of military districts and fronts, and to the civil defense leadership. It is necessary to precisely specify the time for using one or another road or crossing with regard for the importance of the tasks being carried out by troops and civil defense. Along with this, if the appropriate measures are not provided for in advance, moving great masses of
the population (those being evacuated and refugees), especially from border areas and major cities, could have a considerable effect on the movement of troops, their support and their actions.

An important role is also played by decisions coordinated between the commanders of the troops of military districts and the civil defense leadership on the use of a non-urban zone for accommodating the population and facilities evacuated, for dispersing manual and office workers, valuable materiel and transport, and for dispersing non-military contingents, control posts, etc. This, in turn, will ensure the well-organized full mobilization of the armed forces.

Not less important are also coordinated actions by troops and civil defense forces in zones where disastrous flooding will probably occur when major hydraulic engineering structures are destroyed.

Of course, this is hardly an exhaustive list of those measures whose accomplishment will require close cooperation from the military command and civil defense leadership in peacetime, in a period of threat and during a war.

We observe that the solution of problems of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense at the center suffers from substantial shortcomings which, in turn, negatively affect the organization of cooperation locally. This cooperation consists of the following. First, the Civil Defense Staff of the USSR coordinates measures for protecting the population and national economy against weapons of mass destruction with the General Staff and the staffs of the branches of the armed forces. We should mention that this coordination is sporadic in nature. Second, scientific research institutions and military academies participate in the research of civil defense subjects. Third, joint command-staff exercises are conducted. In other words, as yet only individual problems of cooperation are solved, and there is no overall concept and plan for employing civil defense forces and troops not participating in operations.

While in the matter of cooperation between civil defense and the ground forces the situation is more or less satisfactory since the direct organizer of the cooperation, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, is at the same time the Chief of Civil Defense of the USSR, cooperation with other branches of the armed forces is carried out poorly or is totally nonexistent. Moreover, no one is properly studying and working out the problems of cooperation between the branches of the armed forces and civil defense.

How can we explain this situation? In our opinion, it is due primarily to an underestimation both of the capabilities of civil defense to assist the armed forces, and of the importance of cooperation between civil defense and the armed forces on the whole. One of the reasons for this, we feel, is the lack at the center (in the Ministry of Defense) of a single organ for matters of civil defense which would unify the efforts of civil defense and all branches of the armed forces, and would be the organizer of cooperation.

Based on the experience of two years of work on civil defense by the civil defense departments of the military districts and the assistant commanders of military districts, it is advisable to have a corresponding organ in the Ministry of Defense, headed by a Deputy Minister of Defense, or to have such an organ in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

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In peacetime cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense occurs mainly in military districts and in military garrisons. The staffs of military districts, the civil defense departments of military districts, and garrison chiefs help civil defense staffs to: organize the training of civil defense command personnel and staffs, enginer units, services, non-military contingents and the population; prepare for and conduct civil defense exercises and staff training practices; organize control and warning about the threat of an enemy air attack; and monitor the status of civil defense in the republics, krais, oblasts, cities, raions, in installations of the national economy, in ministries, agencies, in economic councils, and civil defense services. They also help in every way possible to provide control, to work out plans of civil defense, to organize mobilization measures, to train military civil defense cadres, to work out and implement measures for protecting the population and national economy, and to conduct work in military science.
Joint exercises of the troops of military districts and garrisons and the civil defense staffs of the republics, krais, oblasts and cities located within the operational boundaries of these military districts are of special significance in working out problems of cooperation between troops and civil defense. Such exercises were conducted in 1962, for example, with troops of the Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Moscow, Leningrad and other military districts. During the exercises problems were studied regarding cooperation between civil defense and the troops of the military district in a period of threat and during an enemy nuclear attack, and regarding cooperation with the troops in a front offensive operation in the initial period of a war, when the troops are moving from the interior of the country to areas of combat actions. They tested the practicability of plans which had been worked out for cooperation between civil defense and the troops of the military district allocated for rescue operations in cities and installations of the national economy which had been attacked. The exercise conducted between the civil defense of the Primorskiy Krai and troops of the military garrisons in 1962, for example, attests to the great usefulness of joint exercises. By decision of the commander of the troops of the military district, the civil defense department of the military district, military garrisons, military construction units and subunits of the Navy were enlisted for the exercise. Along with many other matters, the procedure for using military units of the district for rescue operations in centers of destruction and landing craft for evacuating the population, and the procedure for deploying first aid detachments, firefighting subunits and other non-military contingents for assisting in the local defense of military installations, were studied in the exercise.

The civil defense departments of military districts along with the civil defense staffs of republics, krais, oblasts and cities work out coordinated plans and then carry them out jointly.

The work of the military councils of a number of military districts (Volga, Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Transbaykal, Leningrad and others), which, in their sessions in 1962, discussed the condition of civil defense in the republics, krais and oblasts located within the operational boundaries of the district, and measures for increasing the combat readiness of civil defense, deserves our full approval. This attests to the
fact that the civil defense departments of military districts have played a positive role in organizing cooperation between the troops and civil defense. The form of this cooperation must be improved even further, and effective methods must be found for providing practical assistance in fulfilling civil defense tasks. The civil defense departments of military districts have been assigned to assist, in every way possible, the civil defense organs of National Economic Councils which, in accordance with decisions of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On developing the economy of the USSR and restructuring Party control over the national economy", have been greatly consolidated and now embrace the territory of several autonomous republics, krais and oblasts (for example, the Central Asian National Economic Council embraces the territory of four republics).

While previously national economic councils, as a rule, were set up within the limits of one republic, krai or oblast and the civil defense staffs of these republics, krais and oblasts directed civil defense matters, now the entire volume of work involved in directing civil defense in the national economic councils is assigned to the civil defense staffs of the USSR of the corresponding union republics and to the civil defense departments of the military districts.

This revision of the organizational structure of Party and Soviet organs and national economic councils in accordance with the decision of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU obligates all civil defense chiefs, their staffs, ministries, agencies, the national economic councils, military districts, main staffs of the branches of the armed forces, and the Ministry of Defense as a whole to exert their joint efforts to further improve cooperation between the troops and civil defense.

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How will cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense be organized in wartime? We should note that this problem has not been worked out very completely at all. Cooperation as it is now being organized still does not correspond, in our opinion, to the nature of modern warfare.
The civil defense departments of military districts together with the staffs of the military districts and the civil defense staffs of the corresponding republics, krais and oblasts must work out plans for the military districts to lend assistance to civil defense chiefs. However, due to insufficient practical experience in this matter and sometimes to underestimation of the role of such cooperation, the plans which have been worked out, in our opinion, suffer from substantial shortcomings. Not all commanders of military districts provide for the allocation of the forces necessary to help civil defense in eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy air attack. As the experience of joint exercises with troops and civil defense shows, commanders of military districts must allocate considerably more forces to carry out rescue operations in cities which have been the target of nuclear strikes than the number stipulated in the plan for cooperation.

Frequently, the time limits for the arrival of troop units at destroyed cities, the march routes for their movement, and the type of transport are not specified in the plans for providing assistance. These plans do not reflect the problems of controlling the units allocated for lending assistance, the measures to be carried out by forces of troops and civil defense in zones where there is disastrous flooding, or the problems of cooperating with adjacent districts. They do not provide for the creation of reserves for accomplishing ... (missing) ... of civil defense ... (missing) ... with means ... (missing) ... of civil defense ... (missing) ... of the armed forces (for assisting installations of the Ministry of Defense in eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy air attack) or else they plan for this assistance in very insignificant amounts.

There is absolutely no plan for using civil defense forces to assist in fulfilling other combat tasks of the troops, especially in the initial period of a war. These matters are also not properly reflected in the civil defense plans of republics, krais and oblasts.

We also need to find a better method of compiling a composite plan for the civil defense of a military district. All civil defense measures to be carried out by republics, krais and oblasts in a period of threat and in wartime are mechanically combined in one plan; it does not reflect the tasks to be carried
out by the troops of the military district in the interests of civil defense, for example, in evacuating the population and institutions, in dispersing manual and office workers and valuable materiel, and in other measures (determining march routes and dispersal areas, ensuring public order in major cities and on march routes during evacuation and dispersal, and others).

We must also mention that, when plans for organizing cooperation between the troops and civil defense have been drawn up, the decision of the commander of the military district on conducting the civil defense and local defense of Ministry of Defense installations has not been drawn up and relayed to the executors. Instructions for working out plans have become largely obsolete and are in need of serious reworking and revision.

Experience shows that, instead of the plan being worked out now for assisting civil defense and the plan for conducting local defense at Ministry of Defense installations, it is advisable to have in the district a single "Plan for the Civil and Local Defense of the Military District". Such a plan must, in our opinion, take into account the plans for civil defense of the corresponding republics, krais, oblasts and national economic councils, and the tasks of local defense at military installations. The decision by the commander of the military district on conducting civil and local defense, which sets the main tasks of cooperation between troops of the district and civil defense, must precede the working out of this plan.

In his decision, the commander of the military district must draw conclusions from an assessment of the situation which could develop within the military district and adjacent districts as a result of the employment of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy; he must estimate what aftereffects are possible in the event of the destruction of cities, industrial installations, bridges, junctions of transportation lines, roads, and communications centers. The commander must further determine the level of troop participation and the amounts of forces and means to be allocated for assisting civil defense in a period of threat, for rescue operations in centers of destruction and for conducting local defense, and also determine the procedure for employing civil defense forces. It is also necessary to provide for the organization of control over troops who are allocated for
civil defense, and also over the engineer units and non-military civil defense contingents allocated to assist in local defense and in carrying out the other tasks of the troops of the district. The procedure for cooperation between the troops of the district and the civil defense of republics, krais, oblasts, national economic councils and adjacent military districts, as well as the tasks involved in providing combat, materiel, technical and other types of support for troops and civil defense forces, must be stipulated.

On the basis of the commander's decision, the civil defense department of the military district, together with the staff of the district, must work out a plan for the civil and local defense of the military district. This plan must, in our opinion, basically include the following individual plans: plan for cooperation between the military district and the civil defense and local defense of the military district; plan for organizing control of the civil and local defense within the district; plan of the basic measures to be taken by the military district for civil and local defense; and a composite plan for the civil defense of the republics, krais, and oblasts located within the operational boundaries of the district. The plan for cooperation between the military district and the civil defense of the corresponding republics, krais, oblasts, national economic councils and adjacent districts is the most important document. It is advisable to reflect the following in it:

-- the composition and grouping of troops to be allocated by the military district to assist the civil defense of each republic, krai and oblast; and also the forces to be allocated by the chiefs of civil defense of the republics, krais and oblasts to help in the local defense of the district and in carrying out other combat tasks;

-- measures to be carried out by civil defense in a period of threat; and the tasks of the troops in offering assistance to the corresponding chiefs of civil defense in carrying out these measures;

-- the tasks of the troops of the military district and the non-military civil defense contingents allocated to eliminate the aftereffects of an enemy air attack at civil and local defense installations;

-- the procedure for calling up military units and non-military contingents, their concentration areas, march routes to centers of destruction, the type of transport, the time for
arriving in the specified areas, and to whom they are to be subordinated;

-- the organization of control of troops and non-military contingents, communication with them, the warning procedure, and cooperation with adjacent military districts;

-- the organization of combat, materiel, technical and medical support to troops and non-military contingents;

-- the composition, deployment areas, tasks and procedure for using reserves of the civil defense and the military district which have been allocated for carrying out tasks which arise suddenly.

Experience shows that the plan for cooperation should be worked out graphically on maps (diagrams), and clarified with the necessary legends and tables.

The chiefs of garrisons make their decisions for offering assistance to civil defense and conducting local defense on the basis of the commander's decision and excerpts of the plan for cooperation between the troops and civil defense. They work out detailed plans for cooperation with regard for local conditions, and coordinate them with the corresponding civil defense chiefs of the oblasts, cities and individual installations. The plan for cooperation between the troops of a garrison and civil defense is approved by the garrison chief and the corresponding chief of civil defense.

In our opinion, the civil defense department of the military district must also have a plan for organizing control over civil and local defense within the operational boundaries of the military district. In this plan, it would be desirable to indicate: the location of the control posts of the civil defense chiefs of the republics, krais, oblasts, cities and national economic councils, of the assistant commander of the military district for civil defense, of the chiefs of garrisons, and of the chiefs of the local defense of Ministry of Defense installations; the organization of wire and radio communications between these control posts; measures for warning the civil defense system of the republics, krais, oblasts and cities, civil defense engineer units, military units allocated for offering assistance according to the plan for mutual assistance, and Ministry of Defense installations about the threat of an enemy air attack and about radioactive, chemical and bacteriological
There is also the practical necessity of having in the civil defense department of the military district a composite plan of basic measures for the civil defense of the republics, krais, oblasts and national economic councils located within the operational boundaries of the district. This plan covers such matters as the location of civil defense forces, their composition and grouping, the location of the materiel resources of civil defense, a plan for evacuating the population and dispersing manual and office workers, facilities, non-military contingents and valuable materiel, the areas for accommodating casualties and deploying civil defense engineer units, and the provision of the population and non-military contingents with means of group and individual protection.

Also, practical measures of the military district, providing for assistance to civil defense and the maintenance of close cooperation, are indicated in the composite plan.

Depending on local conditions and the decision of the commander of the military district, other necessary documents may be included in the plan for the civil and local defense of the district. However, we must observe the general requirement that the plan should not be unwieldy, and that it should contain the necessary data and be simple and convenient to use.

For implementing cooperation between troops and civil defense and for controlling troops allocated for the purpose of assisting civil defense, the assistant commander of the military district for civil defense must have a control post with wire and radio communications means providing reliable communications with the chiefs of civil defense of the republics, krais, oblasts and national economic councils, with chiefs of garrisons and troops allocated to assist civil defense, with Ministry of Defense installations, and with reserves. Without this, it is impossible to ensure control and implement cooperation. It is necessary to establish reliable control also because a considerable number of separate units and subunits, military schools, academies, and schools will come under the command of the assistant commander. It is self-evident that the assistant commander will control units through the chiefs of garrisons, who in turn must have the necessary means of control at their disposal. Besides this, in
major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and others), where the commanders of the military districts are the chiefs of the garrisons, their assistants for civil defense will have to directly control a considerable number of units which have been allocated to assist these cities.

Unfortunately, the assistant commanders of military districts for civil defense do not have any means of control and actually lack the capability to control troops and maintain cooperation, which leads to a lowering of the combat readiness of civil defense and the troops. This has been confirmed by numerous joint exercises.

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In conclusion let us remark that, in a nuclear war, close cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense is one of the important conditions for achieving victory in the war. Unfortunately, the bases for cooperation between the Armed Forces and civil defense in the initial period of a nuclear war still have not been thoroughly investigated. Regardless of whether or not they have been allocated to assist civil defense according to the plans for cooperation, many units of troops will nevertheless have to participate in eliminating the aftereffects of the employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy in cities and at installations of the national economy. Consequently, along with the advance working out of problems of cooperation, it is very important to train staffs, all officers and troops in organizing and conducting rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in centers of destruction. It is impossible to accept a situation where many officers of large units and units do not have the necessary conception of civil defense, its tasks and the methods of carrying them out.

It is advisable to include matters of organizing and conducting civil defense within the officer training program of large units and units, and within the program for the operational training of personnel from both the staffs of armies and military districts, and the staffs of the branch arms and branches of the armed forces. It is also desirable to examine the possibility of including these matters in the programs for training the cadets of military schools, officers taking advanced courses, and students of military academies.
Special attention, in our opinion, should be devoted to training and preparing civil defense engineer units for action. The experience of the Great Patriotic War attests to the fact that these units must be combat units in the full sense of the word, and must be well trained not only for rescue operations in centers of destruction, but also for fulfilling other combat tasks in support of the actions of the armed forces. They must become the combat reserve of the armed forces. This circumstance urgently requires that systematic combat training be conducted for them, and that the use of engineer units for anything other than their function be prevented.

The elimination of the deficiencies in the organization of cooperation between the armed forces and civil defense, and further improvement of this cooperation, will to a considerable degree promote the raising of the level of combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the armed forces and civil defense.